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diff --git a/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md b/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..86934fa --- /dev/null +++ b/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md @@ -0,0 +1,1875 @@ +[[!meta title="The Counterrevolution"]] + +* [The Counterrevolution](http://bernardharcourt.com/the-counterrevolution/). +* By Bernard E. Harcourt. + +## Index + +[[!toc startlevel=2 levels=4]] + +## Genealogy + +### Mass-scale warfare + +* MAD +* Massive retaliation +* Game theory +* Systems analisys +* Nuclear war + +### Counterinsurgency + +* Modern warfare +* Unconventional, counter-guerrila +* Special Ops +* Surgical operations + +### Mao's “Eight Points of Attention” plus two principles + +1. Talk to people politely. +2. Observe fair dealing in all business transactions. +3. Return everything borrowed from the people. +4. Pay for anything damaged. +5. Do not beat or scold the people. +6. Do not damage crops. +7. Do not molest women. +8. Do not ill-treat prisoners-of-war. + + Two other principles were central to Mao’s revolutionary doctrine: first, the + importance of having a unified political and military power structure that + consolidated, in the same hands, political and military considerations; and + second, the importance of psychological warfare. More specifically, as Paret + explained, “proper psychological measures could create and maintain ideological + cohesion among fighters and their civilian supporters.” 7 + +### Paret's (1960) tasks of “counterguerrilla action” + +1. The military defeat of the guerrilla forces. +2. The separation of the guerrilla from the population. +3. The reestablishment of governmental authority and the development of a viable social order. + +### Petraeus: 3 key pillars + +1. "The first is that the most important struggle is over the population." + +2. "Allegiance of the masses can only be secured + by separating the small revolutionary minority from the passive majority, and by + isolating, containing, and ultimately eliminating the active minority. In his + accompanying guidelines," + +3. "Success turns on collecting information on + everyone in the population. Total information is essential to properly distinguish + friend from foe and then extract the revolutionary minority. It is intelligence— + total information awareness—that renders the counterinsurgency possible." + +## Excerpts + +### Torture + + In Modern Warfare, Trinquier quietly but resolutely condoned torture. The + interrogations and related tasks were considered police work, as opposed to + military operations, but they had the exact same mission: the complete + destruction of the insurgent group. Discussing the typical interrogation of a + detainee, captured and suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization, + Trinquier wrote: “No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner + gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not, + specialists must force his secret from him. Then, as a soldier, he must face the + suffering, and perhaps the death, he has heretofore managed to avoid.” Trinquier + described specialists forcing secrets out of suspects using scientific methods that + did not injure the “integrity of individuals,” but it was clear what those + “scientific” methods entailed. 4 As the war correspondent Bernard Fall suggests, + the political situation in Algeria offered Trinquier the opportunity to develop “a + Cartesian rationale” to justify the use of torture in modern warfare. 5 + Similarly minded commanders championed the use of torture, indefinite + detention, and summary executions. They made no bones about it. + + [...] + + In his autobiographical account published in 2001, Services Spéciaux. Algérie + 1955–1957, General Paul Aussaresses admits to the brutal methods that were the + cornerstone of his military strategy. 6 He makes clear that his approach to + counterinsurgency rested on a three-pronged strategy, which included first, + intelligence work; second, torture; and third, summary executions. The + intelligence function was primordial because the insurgents’ strategy in Algeria + was to infiltrate and integrate the population, to blend in perfectly, and then + gradually to involve the population in the struggle. To combat this insurgent + strategy required intelligence—the only way to sort the dangerous + revolutionaries from the passive masses—and then, violent repression. “The first + step was to dispatch the clean-up teams, of which I was a part,” Aussaresses + writes. “Rebel leaders had to be identified, neutralized, and eliminated discreetly. + By seeking information on FLN leaders I would automatically be able to capture + the rebels and make them talk.” 7 + The rebels were made to talk by means of torture. Aussaresses firmly + believed that torture was the best way to extract information. It also served to + terrorize the radical minority and, in the process, to reduce it. The practice of + torture was “widely used in Algeria,” Aussaresses acknowledges. Not on every + prisoner, though; many spoke freely. “It was only when a prisoner refused to talk + or denied the obvious that torture was used.” 8 + Aussaresses claims he was introduced to torture in Algeria by the policemen + there, who used it regularly. But it quickly became routine to him. “Without any + hesitation,” he writes, “the policemen showed me the technique used for + ‘extreme’ interrogations: first, a beating, which in most cases was enough; then + other means, such as electric shocks, known as the famous ‘gégène’; and finally + water.” Aussaresses explains: “Torture by electric shock was made possible by + generators used to power field radio transmitters, which were extremely + common in Algeria. Electrodes were attached to the prisoner’s ears or testicles, + then electric charges of varying intensity were turned on. This was apparently a + well-known procedure and I assumed that the policemen at Philippeville [in + Algeria] had not invented it.” 9 (Similar methods had, in fact, been used earlier in + Indochina.) + + Aussaresses could not have been more clear: + + The methods I used were always the same: beatings, electric shocks, and, in particular, water + torture, which was the most dangerous technique for the prisoner. It never lasted for more than one + hour and the suspects would speak in the hope of saving their own lives. They would therefore + either talk quickly or never. + + The French historian Benjamin Stora confirms the generalized use of torture. + He reports that in the Battle of Algiers, under the commanding officer, General + Jacques Massu, the paratroopers conducted massive arrests and “practiced + torture” using “electrodes […] dunking in bathtubs, beatings.” General Massu + himself would later acknowledge the use of torture. In a rebuttal he wrote in + 1971 to the film The Battle of Algiers, Massu described torture as “a cruel + necessity.” 10 According to Aussaresses, torture was condoned at the highest + levels of the French government. “Regarding the use of torture,” Aussaresses + + [...] + + For Aussaresses, as for Roger Trinquier, torture and disappearances were + simply an inevitable byproduct of an insurgency—inevitable on both sides of the + struggle. Because terrorism was inscribed in revolutionary strategy, it had to be + used in its repression as well. In a fascinating televised debate in 1970 with the + FLN leader and producer of The Battle of Algiers, Saadi Yacef, Trinquier + confidently asserted that torture was simply a necessary and inevitable part of + modern warfare. Torture will take place. Insurgents know it. In fact, they + anticipate it. The passage is striking: + + I have to tell you. Whether you’re for or against torture, it makes no difference. Torture is a + weapon that will be used in every insurgent war. One has to know that… One has to know that in + an insurgency, you are going to be tortured. + And you have to mount a subversive organization in light of that and in function of torture. It is + not a question of being for or against torture. You have to know that all arrested prisoners in an + insurgency will speak—unless they commit suicide. Their confession will always be obtained. So a + subversive organization must be mounted in function of that, so that a prisoner who speaks does + not give away the whole organization.16 + + “Torture?” asks the lieutenant aide de camp in Henri Alleg’s 1958 exposé + The Question. “You don’t make war with choirboys.” 18 Alleg, a French + journalist and director of the Alger républicain newspaper, was himself detained + and tortured by French paratroopers in Algiers. His book describes the + experience in detail, and in his account, torture was the inevitable product of + colonization and the anticolonial struggle. As Jean-Paul Sartre writes in his + + [...] + + In an arresting part of The Battle of Algiers it becomes clear that many of the + French officers who tortured suspected FLN members had themselves, as + members of the French Resistance, been victims of torture at the hands of the + Gestapo. It is a shocking moment. We know, of course, that abuse often begets + abuse; but nevertheless, one would have hoped that a victim of torture would + recoil from administering it to others. Instead, as Trinquier suggests, torture + became normalized in Algeria. This is, as Sartre describes it, the “terrible truth”: + “If fifteen years are enough to transform victims into executioners, then this + behavior is not more than a matter of opportunity and occasion. Anybody, at any + time, may equally find himself victim or executioner.” 20 + +### Misc + + The central tenet of counterinsurgency theory is that populations—originally + colonial populations, but now all populations, including our own—are made up + of a small active minority of insurgents, a small group of those opposed to the + insurgency, and a large passive majority that can be swayed one way or the other. + The principal objective of counterinsurgency is to gain the allegiance of that + passive majority. And its defining feature is that counterinsurgency is not just a + military strategy, but more importantly a political technique. Warfare, it turns + out, is political. + + On the basis of these tenets, counterinsurgency theorists developed and + refined over several decades three core strategies. First, obtain total information: + every communication, all personal data, all metadata of everyone in the + population must be collected and analyzed. Not just the active minority, but + everyone in the population. Total information awareness is necessary to + distinguish between friend and foe, and then to cull the dangerous minority from + the docile majority. Second, eradicate the active minority: once the dangerous + minority has been identified, it must be separated from the general population + + [...] + + and eliminated by any means possible—it must be isolated, contained, and + ultimately eradicated. Third, gain the allegiance of the general population: + everything must be done to win the hearts and minds of the passive majority. It is + their allegiance and loyalty, and passivity in the end, that matter most. + Counterinsurgency warfare has become our new governing paradigm in the + + [...] + + imagination. It drives our foreign affairs and now our domestic policy as well. + But it was not always that way. For most of the twentieth century, we + governed ourselves differently in the United States: our political imagination + was dominated by the massive battlefields of the Marne, of Verdun, by the + Blitzkrieg and the fire-bombing of Dresden—and by the use of the atomic bomb. + + [...] + + warfare. + Yet the transition from large-scale battlefield warfare to anticolonial struggles + and the Cold War in the 1950s, and to the war against terrorism since 9/11, has + brought about a historic transformation in our political imagination and in the + way that we govern ourselves. In contrast to the earlier sweeping military + paradigm, we now engage in surgical microstrategies of counterinsurgency + abroad and at home. This style of warfare—the very opposite of large-scale + battlefield wars like World War I or II—involves total surveillance, surgical + operations, targeted strikes to eliminate small enclaves, psychological tactics, + and political techniques to gain the trust of the people. The primary target is no + longer a regular army, so much as it is the entire population. It involves a new + + [...] + + The result is radical. We are now witnessing the triumph of a counterinsurgency + model of government on American soil in the absence of an insurgency, or + uprising, or revolution. The perfected logic of counterinsurgency now applies + regardless of whether there is a domestic insurrection. We now face a + counterinsurgency without insurgency. A counterrevolution without revolution. + The pure form of counterrevolution, without a revolution, as a simple modality + of governing at home—what could be called “The Counterrevolution.” + Counterinsurgency practices were already being deployed domestically in the + + [...] + + new internal enemies. It is vital that we come to grips with this new mode of + governing and recognize its unique dangers, that we see the increasingly + widespread domestication of counterinsurgency strategies and the new + technologies of digital surveillance, drones, and hypermilitarized police for what + they are: a counterrevolution without a revolution. We are facing something + radical, new, and dangerous. It has been long in the making, historically. It is + time to identify and expose it. + + + [...] + + so on. I argued that we have become an “expository society” where we + increasingly exhibit ourselves online, and in the process, freely give away our + most personal and private data. No longer an Orwellian or a panoptic society + characterized by a powerful central government forcibly surveilling its citizens + from on high, ours is fueled by our own pleasures, proclivities, joys, and + narcissism. And even when we try to resist these temptations, we have + practically no choice but to use the Internet and shed our digital traces. + I had not fully grasped, though, the relation of our new expository society to + + [...] + + strikes, indefinite detention, or our new hypermilitarized police force at home. + But as the fog lifts from 9/11, the full picture becomes clear. The expository + society is merely the first prong of The Counterrevolution. And only by tying + together our digital exposure with our new mode of counterinsurgency + governance can we begin to grasp the whole architecture of our contemporary + political condition. And only by grasping the full implications of this new mode + of governing—The Counterrevolution—will we be able to effectively resist it + and overcome. + + [...] + + approach targeting small revolutionary insurgencies and what were mostly + Communist uprisings. Variously called “unconventional,” “antiguerrilla” or + “counterguerrilla,” “irregular,” “sublimited,” “counterrevolutionary,” or simply + “modern” warfare, this burgeoning domain of military strategy flourished during + France’s wars in Indochina and Algeria, Britain’s wars in Malaya and Palestine, + and America’s war in Vietnam. It too was nourished by the RAND Corporation, + which was one of the first to see the potential of what the French commander + Roger Trinquier called “modern warfare” or the “French view of + counterinsurgency.” It offered, in the words of one of its leading students, the + historian Peter Paret, a vital counterweight “at the opposite end of the spectrum + from rockets and the hydrogen bomb.” 2 + Like nuclear-weapon strategy, the counterinsurgency model grew out of a + + + [...] + + from rockets and the hydrogen bomb.” 2 + Like nuclear-weapon strategy, the counterinsurgency model grew out of a + combination of strategic game theory and systems theorizing; but unlike nuclear + strategy, which was primarily a response to the Soviet Union, it developed more + in response to another formidable game theorist, Mao Zedong. The formative + moment for counterinsurgency theory was not the nuclear confrontation that + characterized the Cuban Missile Crisis, but the earlier Chinese Civil War that led + to Mao’s victory in 1949—essentially, when Mao turned guerrilla tactics into a + revolutionary war that overthrew a political regime. The central methods and + practices of counterinsurgency warfare were honed in response to Mao’s + strategies and the ensuing anticolonial struggles in Southeast Asia, the Middle + East, and North Africa that imitated Mao’s approach. 3 Those struggles for + independence were the breeding soil for the development and perfection of + unconventional warfare. + By the turn of the twentieth century, when President George W. Bush would + + [...] + + T HE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL CAN BE TRACED BACK through several different + genealogies. One leads to British colonial rule in India and Southeast Asia, to the + insurgencies there, and to the eventual British redeployment and modernization + of counterinsurgency strategies in Northern Ireland and Britain at the height of + the Irish Republican Army’s independence struggles. This first genealogy draws + heavily on the writings of the British counterinsurgency theorist Sir Robert + Thompson, the chief architect of Great Britain’s antiguerrilla strategies in + Malaya from 1948 to 1959. Another genealogy traces back to the American + colonial experience in the Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth century. + Others lead back to Trotsky and Lenin in Russia, to Lawrence of Arabia during + the Arab Revolt, or even to the Spanish uprising against Napoleon—all + mentioned, at least briefly, in General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency field + manual. Alternative genealogies reach back to the political theories of + Montesquieu or John Stuart Mill, while some go even further to antiquity and to + the works of Polybius, Herodotus, and Tacitus. 1 + But the most direct antecedent of counterinsurgency warfare as embraced by + the United States after 9/11 was the French military response in the late 1950s + and 1960s to the anticolonial wars in Indochina and Algeria. This genealogy + passes through three important figures—the historian Peter Paret and the French + commanders David Galula and Roger Trinquier—and, through them, it traces + back to Mao Zedong. It is Mao’s idea of the political nature of + counterinsurgency that would prove so influential in the United States. Mao + politicized warfare in a manner that would come back to haunt us today. The + French connection also laid the seeds of a tension between brutality and legality + that would plague counterinsurgency practices to the present—at least, until the + United States discovered, or rediscovered, a way to resolve the tension by + legalizing the brutality. + + + [...] + + A founding principle of revolutionary insurgency—what Paret referred to as + “the principal lesson” that Mao taught—was that “an inferior force could + outpoint a modern army so long as it succeeded in gaining at least the tacit + support of the population in the contested area.” 4 The core idea was that the + military battle was less decisive than the political struggle over the loyalty and + allegiance of the masses: the war is fought over the population or, in Mao’s + words, “The army cannot exist without the people.” 5 + As a result of this interdependence, the insurgents had to treat the general + population well to gain its support. On this basis Mao formulated early on, in + 1928, his “Eight Points of Attention” for army personnel: + + 1. Talk to people politely. + 2. Observe fair dealing in all business transactions. + 3. Return everything borrowed from the people. + 4. Pay for anything damaged. + 5. Do not beat or scold the people. + 6. Do not damage crops. + 7. Do not molest women. + 8. Do not ill-treat prisoners-of-war. 6 + + Two other principles were central to Mao’s revolutionary doctrine: first, the + importance of having a unified political and military power structure that + consolidated, in the same hands, political and military considerations; and + second, the importance of psychological warfare. More specifically, as Paret + explained, “proper psychological measures could create and maintain ideological + cohesion among fighters and their civilian supporters.” 7 + Revolutionary warfare, in Paret’s view, boiled down to a simple equation: + + [...] + + the population.” 10 + Of course, neither Paret nor other strategists were so naïve as to think that + Mao invented guerrilla warfare. Paret spent much of his research tracing the + antecedents and earlier experiments with insurgent and counterinsurgency + warfare. “Civilians taking up arms and fighting as irregulars are as old as war,” + Paret emphasized. Caesar had to deal with them in Gaul and Germania, the + British in the American colonies or in South Africa with the Boers, Napoleon in + Spain, and on and on. In fact, as Paret stressed, the very term “guerrilla” + originated in the Spanish peasant resistance to Napoleon after the Spanish + monarchy had fallen between 1808 and 1813. Paret developed case studies of the + + [...] + + But for purposes of describing the “guerre révolutionnaire” of the 1960s, the + most pertinent and timely objects of study were Mao Zedong and the Chinese + revolution. And on the basis of that particular conception of revolutionary war, + Paret set forth a model of counterrevolutionary warfare. Drawing principally on + French military practitioners and theorists, Paret delineated a three-pronged + strategy focused on a mixture of intelligence gathering, psychological warfare on + both the population and the subversives, and severe treatment of the rebels. In + Guerrillas in the 1960’s, Paret reduced the tasks of “counterguerrilla action” to + the following: + 1. The military defeat of the guerrilla forces. + 2. The separation of the guerrilla from the population. + 3. The reestablishment of governmental authority and the development of a + viable social order. 12 + + [...] + + interact.” 13 + So the central task, according to Paret, was to attack the rebel’s popular + support so that he would “lose his hold over the people, and be isolated from + them.” There were different ways to accomplish this, from widely publicized + military defeats and sophisticated psychological warfare to the resettlement of + populations—in addition to other more coercive measures. But one rose above + the others for Paret: to encourage the people to form progovernment militias and + fight against the guerrillas. This approach had the most potential, Paret observes: + “Once a substantial number of members of a community commit violence on + + + [...] + + In sum, the French model of + counterrevolutionary warfare, in Paret’s view, had to be understood as the + inverse of revolutionary warfare. + + + [...] + + The main sources for Paret’s synthesis were the writings and practices of French + commanders on the ground, especially Roger Trinquier and David Galula, + though there were others as well. 15 Trinquier, one of the first French + commanders to theorize modern warfare based on his firsthand experience, had a + + + [...] + + persisting in repeating its efforts.” Trinquier argues that this new form of modern + warfare called for “an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, + psychological, military,” grounded on “Countrywide Intelligence.” As Trinquier + emphasizes, “since modern warfare asserts its presence on the totality of the + population, we have to be everywhere informed.” Informed, in order to know and + target the population and wipe out the insurgency. 17 + The other leading counterinsurgency theorist, also with deep firsthand + + + [...] + + time.’” 19 + From Mao, Galula drew the central lesson that societies were divided into + three groups and that the key to victory was to isolate and eradicate the active + minority in order to gain the allegiance of the masses. Galula emphasizes in + Counterinsurgency Warfare that the central strategy of counterinsurgency theory + “simply expresses the basic tenet of the exercise of political power”: + In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral + majority, and an active minority against the cause. + + [...] + + time.’” 19 + From Mao, Galula drew the central lesson that societies were divided into + three groups and that the key to victory was to isolate and eradicate the active + minority in order to gain the allegiance of the masses. Galula emphasizes in + Counterinsurgency Warfare that the central strategy of counterinsurgency theory + “simply expresses the basic tenet of the exercise of political power”: + In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral + majority, and an active minority against the cause. + + The technique of power consists in relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral + majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority.20 + The battle was over the general population, Galula emphasized in his + Counterinsurgency Warfare, and this tenet represented the key political + dimension of a new warfare strategy. + + [...] + + US general David Petraeus picked up right where David Galula and Peter Paret + left off. Widely recognized as the leading American thinker and practitioner of + counterinsurgency theory—eventually responsible for all coalition troops in Iraq + and the architect of the troop surge of 2007—General Petraeus would refine + + [...] + + On this political foundation, General Petraeus’s manual establishes three key + pillars—what might be called counterinsurgency’s core principles. + The first is that the most important struggle is over the population. In a short + set of guidelines that accompanies his field manual, General Petraeus + emphasizes: “The decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people are the center + + [...] + + The main battle, then, is over the populace. + The second principle is that the allegiance of the masses can only be secured + by separating the small revolutionary minority from the passive majority, and by + isolating, containing, and ultimately eliminating the active minority. In his + accompanying guidelines, General Petraeus emphasizes: “Seek out and eliminate + those who threaten the population. Don’t let them intimidate the innocent. Target + the whole network, not just individuals.” 25 + The third core principle is that success turns on collecting information on + everyone in the population. Total information is essential to properly distinguish + friend from foe and then extract the revolutionary minority. It is intelligence— + total information awareness—that renders the counterinsurgency possible. It is + + [...] + + paraphrasing the French commander, underscores the primacy of political factors + in counterinsurgency. “General Chang Ting-chen of Mao Zedong’s central + committee once stated that revolutionary war was 80 percent political action and + only 20 percent military,” the manual reads. Then it warns: “At the beginning of + a COIN operation, military actions may appear predominant as security forces + conduct operations to secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents; + however, political objectives must guide the military’s approach.” 27 + Chapter Two opens with an epigraph from David Galula’s book: “Essential + + [...] + + General David Petraeus learned, but more importantly popularized, Mao + Zedong’s central lesson: counterinsurgency warfare is political. It is a strategy + for winning over the people. It is a strategy for governing. And it is quite telling + that a work so indebted to Mao and midcentury French colonial thinkers would + become so influential post-9/11. Petraeus’s manual contained a roadmap for a + new paradigm of governing. As the fog lifts from 9/11, it is becoming + increasingly clear what lasting impact Mao had on our government of self and + others today. + + [...] + + D eveloped by military commanders and strategists over decades of anticolonial + wars, counterinsurgency warfare was refined, deployed, and tested in the years + following 9/11. Since then, the modern warfare paradigm has been distilled into + a concise three-pronged strategy: + 1. Bulk-collect all intelligence about everyone in the population—every + piece of data and metadata available. (total information awareness) + + [...] + + 2. Identify and eradicate the revolutionary minority. Total information about + everyone makes it possible to discriminate between friend and foe. Once + suspicion attaches, individuals must be treated severely to extract all + possible information, with enhanced interrogation techniques if + necessary; and if they are revealed to belong to the active minority, they + must be disposed of through detention, rendition, deportation, or drone + strike—in other words, targeted assassination. Unlike conventional + soldiers from the past, these insurgents are dangerous because of their + + [...] + + 3. Pacify the masses. The population must be distracted, entertained, + satisfied, occupied, and most importantly, neutralized, or deradicalized if + necessary, in order to ensure that the vast preponderance of ordinary + individuals remain just that—ordinary. This third prong reflects the + “population-centric” dimension of counterinsurgency theory. Remember, + in this new way of seeing, the population is the battlefield. Its hearts and + minds must be assured. In the digital age, this can be achieved, first, by + targeting enhanced content (such as sermons by moderate imams) to + deradicalize susceptible persons—in other words, by deploying new + digital techniques of psychological warfare and propaganda. Second, by + providing just the bare minimum in terms of welfare and humanitarian + assistance—like rebuilding schools, distributing some cash, and + bolstering certain government institutions. As General Petraeus’s field + +### Torture and surveilance + + T HE ATTACK ON THE W ORLD T RADE C ENTER SHOWED THE weakness of American + intelligence gathering. Top secret information obtained by one agency was + silo’ed from others, making it impossible to aggregate intelligence and obtain a + full picture of the security threats. The CIA knew that two of the 9/11 hijackers + were on American soil in San Diego, but didn’t share the information with the + FBI, who were actively trying to track them down. 1 September 11 was a + crippling intelligence failure, and in the immediacy of that failure many in + President George W. Bush’s administration felt the need to do something radical. + Greater sharing of intelligence, naturally. But much more as well. Two main + solutions were devised, or revived: total surveillance and tortured interrogations. + They represent the first prong of the counterinsurgency approach. + In effect, 9/11 set the stage both for total NSA surveillance and torture as + forms of total information awareness. The former functioned at the most virtual + or ethereal, or “digital” level, by creating the material for data-mining and + analysis. The latter operated at the most bodily or physical, or “analog” level, + obtaining information directly from suspects and detainees in Iraq, Pakistan, + Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But both satisfied the same goal: total information + awareness, the first tactic of counterinsurgency warfare. + +Census + + What is clear, though—as I document in Exposed—is that the myriad NSA, + FBI, CIA, and allied intelligence agencies produce total information, the first + and most important prong of the counterinsurgency paradigm. Most important, + because both of the other prongs depend on it. As the RAND Corporation notes + in its lengthy 519-page report on the current state of counterinsurgency theory + and practice, “Effective governance depends on knowing the population, + demographically and individually.” The RAND report reminds us that this + insight is not novel or new. The report then returns, pointedly for us, to Algeria + and the French commander, David Galula: “Galula, in Counterinsurgency + Warfare, argued that ‘control of the population begins with a thorough census. + Every inhabitant must be registered and given a foolproof identity card.’” 5 + + [...] + + Today, that identity card is an IP address, a mobile phone, a digital device, facial + recognition, and all our digital stamps. These new digital technologies have + made everyone virtually transparent. And with our new ethos of selfies, tweets, + Facebook, and Internet surfing, everyone is now exposed. + +Enhanced interrogation: + + Second, tortured interrogation. The dual personality of counterinsurgency + warfare is nowhere more evident than in the intensive use of torture for + information gathering by the United States immediately after 9/11. Fulfilling the + first task of counterinsurgency theory—total surveillance—this practice married + the most extreme form of brutality associated with modern warfare to the + formality of legal process and the rule of law. The combination of inhumanity + and legality was spectacular. + In the days following 9/11, many in the Bush administration felt there was + only one immediate way to address the information shortfall, namely, to engage + in “enhanced interrogation” of captured suspected terrorists—another + euphemism for torture. Of course, torture of captured suspects would not fix the + problem of silo’ed information, but they thought it would at least provide + immediate information of any pending attacks. One could say that the United + States turned to torture because many in the administration believed the country + did not have adequate intelligence capabilities, lacking the spy network or even + the language abilities to infiltrate and conduct regular espionage on + organizations like Al Qaeda. 6 + The tortured interrogations combined the extremes of brutality with the + +Getting information or "truth" was not the only, perhaps not the main point +of torture sessions, and maybe not as well the main point for mass surveillance: + + Even the more ordinary instances of “enhanced interrogation” were + harrowing—and so often administered, according to the Senate report, after the + interrogators believed there was no more information to be had, sometimes even + before the detainee had the opportunity to speak. + +Torture template: + + Ramzi bin al-Shibh was subjected to this type of treatment immediately upon + arrival in detention, even before being interrogated or given an opportunity to + cooperate—in what would become a “template” for other detainees. Bin al- + Shibh was subjected first to “sensory dislocation” including “shaving bin al- + Shibh’s head and face, exposing him to loud noise in a white room with white + lights, keeping him ‘unclothed and subjected to uncomfortably cool + temperatures,’ and shackling him ‘hand and foot with arms outstretched over his + head (with his feet firmly on the floor and not allowed to support his weight with + his arms).’” Following that, the interrogation would include “attention grasp, + walling, the facial hold, the facial slap… the abdominal slap, cramped + confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours, + and the waterboard, as appropriate to [bin al-Shibh’s] level of resistance.” 8 This + template would be used on others—and served as a warning to all. + The more extreme forms of torture were also accompanied by the promise of + +"Bigeard shrimp": + + The more extreme forms of torture were also accompanied by the promise of + life-long solitary confinement or, in the case of death, cremation. + Counterinsurgency torture in the past had often been linked to summary + disappearances and executions. Under the Bush administration, it was tied to + what one might call virtual disappearances. + During the Algerian war, as noted already, the widespread use of brutal + interrogation techniques meant that those who had been victimized—both the + guilty and innocent—became dangerous in the eyes of the French military + leadership. FLN members needed to be silenced, forever; but so did others who + might be radicalized by the waterboarding or gégène. In Algeria, a simple + solution was devised: the tortured would be thrown out from helicopters into the + Mediterranean. They became les crevettes de Bigeard, after the notorious French + general in Algeria, Marcel Bigeard: “Bigeard’s shrimp,” dumped into the sea, + their feet in poured concrete—a technique the French military had apparently + experimented with earlier in Indochina. + + [...] + + The CIA would devise a different solution in 2002: either torture the suspect + accidentally to death and then cremate his body to avoid detection, or torture the + suspect to the extreme and then ensure that he would never again talk to another + human being. Abu Zubaydah received the latter treatment. Zubaydah had first + been seized and interrogated at length by the FBI, had provided useful + information, and was placed in isolation for forty-seven days, the FBI believing + that he had no more valuable information. Then the CIA took over, believing he + might still be a source. 10 The CIA turned to its more extreme forms of torture— + utilizing all ten of its most brutal techniques—but, as a CIA cable from the + interrogation team, dated July 15, 2002, records, they realized beforehand that it + would either have to cover up the torture if death ensued or ensure that + Zubaydah would never talk to another human being again in his lifetime. + According to the Senate report, “the cable stated that if Abu Zubaydah were to + die during the interrogation, he would be cremated. The interrogation team + closed the cable by stating: ‘regardless which [disposition] option we follow + however, and especially in light of the planned psychological pressure + techniques to be implemented, we need to get reasonable assurances that [Abu + Zubaydah] will remain in isolation and incommunicado for the remainder of his + life.’” 11 In response to this request for assurance, a cable from the CIA station + gave the interrogation team those assurances, noting that “it was correct in its + ‘understanding that the interrogation process takes precedence over preventative + medical procedures,’” and then adding in the cable: + +KUBARK + + routines were approved at the uppermost level of the US government, by the + president of the United States and his closest advisers. These practices were put + in place, designed carefully and legally—very legalistically, in fact—to be used + on suspected enemies. They were not an aberration. There are, to be sure, long + histories written of rogue intelligence services using unauthorized techniques; + there is a lengthy record, as well, of CIA ingenuity and creativity in this domain, + including, among other examples, the 1963 KUBARK Counterintelligence + Interrogation manual. 13 But after 9/11, the blueprint was drawn at the White + House and the Pentagon, and it became official US policy—deliberate, debated, + well-thought-out, and adopted as legal measures. + + + [...] + + The Janus face of torture was its formal legality amidst its shocking brutality. + Many of the country’s best lawyers and legal scholars, professors at top-ranked + law schools, top government attorneys, and later federal judges would pore over + statutes and case law to find legal maneuvers to permit torture. The felt need to + legitimate and legalize the brutality—and of course, to protect the officials and + operatives from later litigation—was remarkable. + The documents known collectively as the “torture memos” fell into two + categories: first, those legal memos regarding whether the Guantánamo detainees + were entitled to POW status under the Geneva Conventions (GPW), written + between September 25, 2001, and August 1, 2002; and second, starting in + August 2002, the legal memos regarding whether the “enhanced interrogation + techniques” envisaged by the CIA amounted to torture prohibited under + international law. + +How torture was defined to allow torture to happen: + + As Jay Bybee, then at the Office of Legal Counsel and now a + federal judge, wrote in his August 1, 2002, memo: + + We conclude that torture as defined in and proscribed by [18 US Code] Sections 2340-2340A, + covers only extreme acts. Severe pain is generally of the kind difficult for the victim to endure. + Where the pain is physical, it must be of an intensity akin to that which accompanies serious + physical injury such as death or organ failure. Severe mental pain requires suffering not just at the + moment of infliction but also requires lasting psychological harm, such as seen in mental disorders + like post-traumatic stress disorder. […] Because the acts inflicting torture are extreme, there is + significant range of acts that though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment + or punishment fail to rise to the level of torture.22 + + This definition of torture was so demanding that it excluded the brutal + practices that the United States was using. It set the federal legal standard, + essentially, at death or organ failure. + + [...] + + them 26 —and then, effectively, judicial opinions. The executive branch became a + minijudiciary, with no effective oversight or judicial review. And in the end, it + worked. The men who wrote these memos have never been prosecuted nor + seriously taken to task, as a legal matter, for their actions. The American people + allowed a quasi-judiciary to function autonomously, during and after. These self- + appointed judges wrote the legal briefs, rendered judgment, and wrote the + judicial opinions that legitimized these brutal counterinsurgency practices. In the + process, they rendered the counterinsurgency fully legal. They inscribed torture + within the fabric of law. + + One could go further. The torture memos accomplished a new resolution of + the tension between brutality and legality, one that we had not witnessed + previously in history. It was an audacious quasi-judicial legality that had rarely + been seen before. And by legalizing torture in that way, the Bush administration + provided a legal infrastructure for counterinsurgency-as-governance more + broadly. + + [...] + + And through this process of legalization, these broader torturous practices + spilled over into the second prong of counterinsurgency: the eradication of an + active minority. Torture began to function as a way to isolate, punish, and + eliminate those suspected of being insurgents. + +Bare existence, indefinite detention, incommunication: + + The indefinite detention and brutal ordinary measures served as a way to + eliminate these men—captured in the field or traded for reward monies, almost + like slaves from yonder. The incommunicado confinement itself satisfied the + second prong of counterinsurgency theory. 5 But somehow it also reached further + than mere detention, approximating a form of disappearance or virtual death. + The conditions these men found themselves in were so extreme, it is almost as if + they were as good as dead. + Reading Slahi’s numbing descriptions, one cannot help but agree with the + philosopher Giorgio Agamben that these men at Guantánamo were, in his words, + no more than “bare life.” 6 Agamben’s concept of bare existence captures well + the dimensions of dehumanization and degradation that characterized their lives: + the camp inmates were reduced to nothing more than bare animal existence. + They were no longer human, but things that lived. The indefinite detention and + torture at Guantánamo achieved an utter denial of their humanity. + Every aspect of their treatment at black sites and detention facilities + +### Drone strikes + + This debate between more population-centric proponents and more enemy- + centric advocates of counterinsurgency should sound familiar. It replays the + controversy over the use of torture or other contested methods within the + counterinsurgency paradigm. It replicates the strategic debates between the + ruthless and the more decent. It rehearses the tensions between Roger Trinquier + and David Galula. + + Yet just as torture is central to certain versions of modern warfare, the drone + strike too is just as important to certain variations of the counterinsurgency + approach. Drone strikes, in effect, can serve practically all the functions of the + second prong of counterinsurgency warfare. Drone strikes eliminate the + identified active minority. They instill terror among everyone living near the + active minority, dissuading them and anyone else who might contemplate joining + the revolutionaries. They project power and infinite capability. They show who + has technological superiority. As one Air Force officer says, “The real advantage + of unmanned aerial systems is that they allow you to project power without + projecting vulnerability.” 18 By terrifying and projecting power, drones dissuade + the population from joining the insurgents. + + [...] + + Covered extensively by the news media, + drone attacks are popularly believed to have caused even more civilian casualties + than is actually the case. The persistence of these attacks on Pakistani territory + offends people’s deepest sensibilities, alienates them from their government, and + contributes to Pakistan’s instability.” 19 + In July 2016, the Obama administration released a report estimating the + + + [...] + + Those in the affected countries typically receive far higher casualty reports. + The Pakistan press, for instance, reported that there are about 50 civilians killed + for every militant assassinated, resulting in a hit rate of about 2 percent. As + Kilcullen and Exum argue, regardless of the exact number, “every one of these + dead noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, + and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as + drone strikes have increased.” 25 + To those living in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and + neighboring countries, the Predator drones are terrifying. But again—and this is + precisely the central tension at the heart of counterinsurgency theory—the terror + may be a productive tool for modern warfare. It may dissuade people from + joining the active minority. It may convince some insurgents to abandon their + efforts. Terror, as we have seen, is by no means antithetical to the + counterinsurgency paradigm. Some would argue it is a necessary means. + Drones are by no means a flawless weapons system even for their proponents. + + [...] + + Regarding the first question, a drone should be understood as a blended + weapons system, one that ultimately functions at several levels. It shares + characteristics of the German V-2 missile, to be sure, but also the French + guillotine and American lethal injection. It combines safety for the attacker, with + relatively precise but rapid death, and a certain anesthetizing effect—as well as, + of course, utter terror. For the country administering the drone attack, it is + perfectly secure. There is no risk of domestic casualties. In its rapid and + apparently surgical death, it can be portrayed, like the guillotine, as almost + humane. And drones have had a numbing effect on popular opinion precisely + because of their purported precision and hygiene—like lethal injection has done, + for the most part, in the death-penalty context. Plus, drones are practically + invisible and out of sight—again, for the country using them—though, again, + terrifying for the targeted communities. + + [...] + + Chamayou’s second question is, perhaps, the most important. This new + weapons system has changed the US government’s relationship to its own + citizens. There is no better evidence of this than the deliberate, targeted drone + killing of US and allied nation citizens abroad—as we will see. 32 + + [...] + + An analogy from the death penalty may be helpful. There too, the means + employed affect the ethical dimensions of the practice itself. The gas chamber + and the electric chair—both used in the United States even after the Holocaust— + became fraught with meaning. Their symbolism soured public opinion on the + death penalty. By contrast, the clinical or medical nature of lethal injection at + first reduced the political controversy surrounding executions. Only over time, + with botched lethal injections and questions surrounding the drug cocktails and + their true effects, have there been more questions raised. But it has taken time for + the negative publicity to catch up with lethal injection. Drones, at this point, + remain far less fraught than conventional targeted assassinations. + +### Winning hearts and minds + + THE THIRD PRONG OF COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY CONSISTS in winning the + hearts and minds of the general population to stem the flow of new recruits to + the active minority and to seize the upper hand in the struggle. This goal can be + achieved by actively winning the allegiance of the population, or by pacifying an + already passive population, or even simply by distracting the masses. The bar, + ultimately, is low since, on the counterinsurgency view, the people are mostly + passive. As Roger Trinquier noted in 1961, “Experience has demonstrated that it + is by no means necessary to enjoy the sympathy of the majority of the people to + obtain their backing; most are amorphous, indifferent.” Or, as General Petraeus’s + manual states, the vast majority is “neutral” and “passive”; it represents an + “uncommitted middle” with “passive supporters of both sides.” 1 The third prong, + then, is aimed mostly at assuaging, pacifying perhaps, or merely distracting the + indifferent masses. + + [...] the third prong has translated, principally, into three tactics: investments in + infrastructure, new forms of digital propaganda, and generalized terror. [...] + Undergirding them both, though, is the third tactic, the threat of + generalized terror, that serves as a foundational method and looming constant. + + [...] + + In How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, Rosa + Brooks writes that since 9/11 we have witnessed the expansion of the military + and its encroachment on civilian affairs. “We’ve seen,” in her words, “the steady + militarization of US foreign policy as our military has been assigned many of the + tasks once given to civilian institutions.” Brooks warns us of a new world where + “the boundaries between war and nonwar, military and nonmilitary have + eroded.” + + [...] + + We are indeed facing, as Brooks powerfully demonstrates, a new world of an + ever-encroaching military. But what this reveals, more than anything, is the rise + of the counterinsurgency paradigm of government. It is the model of + counterinsurgency warfare—of Galula’s early turn to building schools and health + facilities, to focusing on the hearts and minds of the general population—that + has pushed the military into these traditionally civilian domains, including total + surveillance, rule-of-law projects, artificial intelligence, entertainment, etc. In + effect, it is the counterinsurgency paradigm of government that has become + everything, and everything that has become counterinsurgency. The blurring of + boundaries between war and peaceful governance is not merely the contingent + result of 9/11, it is instead the culmination of a long and deliberate process of + modernizing warfare. + +Providing the basic needs: + + Providing basic necessities, labeled “essential services” in the field manual, is + a key counterinsurgency practice. It consists primarily of ensuring that there is + “food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment” for the general + population. General Petraeus’s manual explains the rationale in very simple + terms: “People pursue essential needs until they are met, at any cost and from + any source. People support the source that meets their needs. If it is an insurgent + source, the population is likely to support the insurgency. If the [host nation] + government provides reliable essential services, the population is more likely to + support it. Commanders therefore identify who provides essential services to + each group within the population.” 5 + +That, in most cases, involve funneling american taxpayer's money to enrich corporations +with "insane profit margins" for rebuilding countries along with US guidelines. See +Naomi Klein's Shock Doctrine for more details. + + A second approach to securing the neutrality of the majority is more + psychological. In the early days of modern warfare, examples of this approach + included measures such as the resettlement of populations, in the words of + counterinsurgency experts, “to control them better and to block the insurgents’ + support.” This is what the British did in Malaya, and the French in Algeria. + Other examples included basic propaganda campaigns. 16 + + As time has gone by, new digital technologies have enabled new forms of + psychological counterinsurgency warfare. One of the newest involves digital + propaganda, reflected most recently in the Center for Global Engagement set up + under the Obama administration in early 2016. Created with the objective to + prevent the radicalization of vulnerable youth, the center adopted strategies + pioneered by the giants of Silicon Valley—Google, Amazon, Netflix—and was + originally funded at the level of about $20 million. It targeted susceptible + persons suspected of easier radicalization and sent them enhanced and improved + third-party content in order to try to dissuade them, subliminally, from + radicalizing or joining ISIS. In the words of an investigative journalist, “The + Obama administration is launching a stealth anti-Islamic State messaging + campaign, delivered by proxies and targeted to individual would-be extremists, + the same way Amazon or Google sends you shopping suggestions based on your + online browsing history.” 17 + +Terror e tortura: + + The third set of measures was even more basic: terror. The most formidable way + to win hearts and minds is to terrorize the local population to make sure they do + not sympathize with or aid the active minority. + + [...] + + The brutality of counterinsurgency serves, of course, to gather information + and eradicate the revolutionary minority. But it also aims higher and reaches + further: its ambition, as General Aussaresses recognized well, is to terrorize the + insurgents, to scare them to death, and to frighten the local population in order to + prevent them from joining the insurgent faction. Today, the use of unusually + brutal torture, the targeted drone assassination of high-value suspects, and the + indefinite detention under solitary conditions aim not only to eviscerate the + enemy, but also to warn others, strike fear, and win their submission and + obedience. Drones and indefinite detention crush those they touch, and strike + [...] Terror, in the end, is a key component of the third core strategy of + counterinsurgency. + +Torture and civilization: + + Since antiquity, terror has served to demarcate the civilized from the + barbarian, to distinguish the free citizen from the enslaved. The free male in + ancient Greece had the privilege of swearing an oath to the gods, of testifying on + his word. The slave, by contrast, could only give testimony under torture. + Torture, in this sense, defined freedom and citizenship by demeaning and + marking—by imposing stigmata—on those who could be tortured. It served to + demarcate the weak. It marked the vulnerable. And it also, paradoxically, served + to delineate the “more civilized.” This is perhaps the greatest paradox of the + brutality of counterinsurgency: to be civilized is to torture judiciously. This + paradox was born in antiquity, but it journeys on. + + [...] + + The judicious administration of terror is the hallmark of civilization. To be + civilized is to terrorize properly, judiciously, with restraint, according to the + rules. Only the barbarians tortured savagely, viciously, unrestrainedly. The + civilized, by contrast, knew how and when to tame torture, how to rein it terror, + to apply it with judgment and discretion. Compared to the barbarians—the + beheadings of ISIS is a modern case on point—we are tame and judicious, even + when we torture, not like those barbarians. And since 9/11, the judicious use of + terror has been a key US strategy. In the end, terror functions in myriad ways to + win the hearts and minds of the masses under the counterinsurgency paradigm of + governing. + +Terror in many levels of governing: + + Now, terror is not an unprecedented component of governing, even if its role + in the counterinsurgency model may be uniquely constitutive. It has been with us + since slavery in antiquity, through the many inquisitions, to the internment and + concentration camps of modern history. And there too, in each of its + manifestations, it functioned at multiple levels to bolster different modes of + governing. Looking back through history, terror has done a lot of work. Today as + well. And to see all that terror achieves today—above and beyond the three + prongs of counterinsurgency theory—it is useful to look back through history + and recall its different functions and the work it has done. The reflections today + are stunning. + +Torture and truth: + + The first episode reaches back to antiquity, but represents a recurring theme + throughout history: terror has often served to manufacture its own truth— + especially in terms of its efficacy. “They all talk.” [...] + + [...] + + Trying to convince a suspect that he will talk, telling him that he will—this is, + of course, a psychological technique, but it is more than that. It is also a firm + belief of counterinsurgency theorists outside the interrogation room. Roger + + [...] + + Manufacturing truth: that is, perhaps, the first major function of terror. It is + the power of terror, especially in the face of ordinary men and women, of + humans, all too human. It has been that way since the inquisitions of the Middle + Ages, and before, since antiquity. On this score, little has changed. + In her book on slavery in Greek antiquity, Torture and Truth, Page duBois + argues that the idea of truth dominant today in Western thought is indissolubly + tied to the practice of torture, while torture itself is deeply connected to the will + to discover something that is always beyond our grasp. As a result, society after + society returns to torture, in almost an eternal recurrence, to seek out the truth + that is always beyond our reach. In ancient times, duBois shows, torture + functioned as the metaphorical touchstone of truth and as a means to establish a + social hierarchy. In duBois’s words, “the desire to create an other and the desire + to extract truth are inseparable, in that the other, because she or he is an other, is + constituted as a source of truth.” Truth, in sum, is always “inextricably linked + with the practice of torture.” 4 + + [...] + + Truth, duBois argues, “resides in the slave body.” 5 + + [...] + + Even more, terror produced social difference and hierarchy. The limits on + torture in ancient societies served to define what it meant to be among those who + could be tortured—what it meant to be a slave or to be free. In ancient times, the + testimony of a slave could only be elicited, and only became admissible in + litigation, under torture. Only free male citizens could take an oath or resolve a + controversy by sermon. The rules about who could be tortured in ancient times + did not just regulate the victims of torture, the rules themselves were constitutive + of what it meant to be a slave. The laws demarcated and defined freedom itself + —what it looked like, what it entailed. + Sophocles’s tragedy Oedipus Rex has captured our imagination for centuries + on questions of fate and power. But it is perhaps on the question of terror and + truth that the play turns. At the climax of Sophocles’s tragedy—at the pivotal + moment when truth finally emerges for all to see and to recognize—there is a + scene of terror. The shepherd slave who held the knowledge of Oedipus’s + ancestry is threatened with torture. And that threat of torture alone—at the + culmination of a whole series of unsuccessful inquiries—produces the truth: + torture provokes the shepherd’s confession and that allows Oedipus to recognize + his fate. But more than that, torture reaffirms the social order in Thebes—a + social order where gods rule, oracles tell truth, prophets divine, fateful kings + govern, and slaves serve. It is, ultimately, the right to terrorize that reveals + Oedipus’s power and the shepherd’s place in society. + + [...] + + In a similar way, terror today produces its own truth—about the effectiveness + of torture in eliciting truth, about its effectiveness in subjugating the insurgents, + about the justness of counterinsurgency. + + [...] + + Second, terror—or more specifically the regulatory framework that surrounds + terror—legitimizes the practices of terror itself. This may sound paradoxical or + circular—but it has often been true in history. The structures that frame and + regulate the administration of terrorizing practices have the effect, unexpectedly, + [...] The extreme nature of torture, once brought within the fabric of the law, + concentrated power in the hands of those + who had the knowledge and skill, the techne, to master the brutality. The + Justinian codification served as a model to later codifications during the early + Middle Ages and to the practices of the Inquisition. + Extreme practices call for expert oversight and enable a concentration of + + [...] + + Torture was brought into the fabric of the law and rarified at the + same time. The rarefication in the Medieval Period served a political end: to + make torture even more foreboding. Had torture become too generalized or too + frequent, it might have lost its exceptionality and terrorizing effect. + Torture was rarely applied, and, as one historian notes, inflicted with “the + + [...] + + The rarity achieved by the limited use and legal regulation of torture in the + Medieval Period served to ensure its persistence and role as a social + epistemological device—as a producer of truths, especially truth about itself. + Centuries later, the Bush administration and its top lawyers re-created a legal + architecture surrounding the use of torture. + + [...] + + Third, the legal regulation of terror also legitimizes the larger political regime. + + [...] + + It may seem surprising or paradoxical that the antebellum courts would + protect a slave accused of poisoning her master. But there is an explanation: the + intricate legal framework surrounding the criminalization and punishment of + errant slaves during the antebellum period served to maintain and stabilize + chattel slavery in the South—it served to equilibrate the political economy of + slavery. It served to balance interests in such a way that neither the slave owners + nor the slaves would push the whole system of slavery into disarray. And the + courts and politicians carefully handled this delicate balance. + + [...] + + In fact, the financial loss associated with the execution of a slave was viewed + as the only way to guarantee that owners made sure their slaves received a fair + trial. During the 1842–1843 legislative session, the general assembly passed a + + [...] + + These complex negotiations over the criminal rules accompanied the + practices of slavery in Alabama—a form of terror—and served to legitimize the + larger political economy of chattel slavery. They offered stability to the slave + economy by making the different participants in the criminal process and in + slavery—the slave owners, the foremen, the magistrates, and the public at large + —more confident in the whole enterprise. The extensive legal regulation of the + torture of slaves was not about justifying torture, nor about resolving + philosophical or ethical questions. Instead, it served to strike a balance and + stabilize the institution of slavery. + + [...] + + Fourth, the ability to terrorize—and to get away with it—has a powerful effect + on others. The audacity and the mastery impress the general masses. Something + about winning or beating others seduces the population. People like winners, and + winning is inscribed in terrorizing others. + +Masculinity: + + Fifth, and relatedly, terror is gendered, which also tends to reinforce the power + and appeal of the more brutal counterinsurgency practices. Brutality is most + often associated with the dominant half of the couple, the one who controls, and + however much we might protest, this tends to strengthen the attraction. + +Horrorism: + + Terror works in other ways as well, and many other historical episodes could + shed light on the complex functioning of terror today—of what Adriana + Cavarero refers to as “horrorism.” 45 Terror, for instance, operates to control and + manage one’s comrades. It can serve to keep the counterrevolutionary minority + in check. The willingness to engage in extreme forms of brutality, in senseless + violence, in irrational excess signals one’s own ruthlessness to one’s peers or + inferiors. It can frighten and discipline both inferiors and superiors. It + demonstrates one’s willingness to be cruel—which can be productive, in fact + necessary, to a counterinsurgency. + +Counterinsurgency goes domestic: + + The operations of COINTELPRO—the Counter Intelligence Program + developed by the FBI in the 1950s to disrupt the American Communist Party, + and extended into the 1960s to eradicate the Black Panthers—took precisely the + form of counterinsurgency warfare. The notorious August 1967 directive of FBI + director J. Edgar Hoover to “expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise + neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and + groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters”; 16 the + police raids on Black Panther headquarters in 1968 and 1969; the summary + execution of the charismatic chairman of the Chicago Black Panther Party, Fred + Hampton; the first SWAT operations carried out against the Panthers in Los + Angeles—these all had the trappings of modern warfare. + + Hoover’s FBI targeted the Panthers in a manner that drew on the foundational + principles of counterinsurgency: first, to collect as much intelligence on the + Black Panther Party as possible through the use of FBI informants and total + surveillance; second, to isolate the Panthers from their communities by making + their lives individually so burdened with surveillance and so difficult that they + were forced to separate themselves from their friends and family members; third, + to turn the Panther movement into one that was perceived, by the general + population, as a radicalized extremist organization, as a way to delegitimize the + Panthers and reduce their appeal and influence; and ultimately, to eliminate and + eradicate them, initially through police arrests, then through criminal + prosecutions (for instance, of the New York 21) and justified homicides [...] + and ultimately by fomenting conflict and divisiveness within the party + + [...] + + The linchpin of a domesticated counterinsurgency is to bring total + information awareness home. Just as it was developed abroad, it is total + surveillance alone that makes it possible to distinguish the active minority on + domestic soil from the passive masses of Americans. A fully transparent + population is the first requisite of the counterinsurgency method. In General + Petraeus’s field manual, it received a full chapter early on, “Intelligence in + Counterinsurgency,” with a pithy and poignant epigraph: “Everything good that + happens seems to come from good intelligence.” And as the manual began, so it + ended, with the following simple mantra: “The ultimate success or failure of the + [counterinsurgency] mission depends on the effectiveness of the intelligence effort." + + [...] + + American is a potential insurgent. + Constant vigilance of the American population is necessary—hand in hand + with the appearance of trust. Appearances are vital. A domesticated + counterinsurgency must suspect everyone in the population, but not let it be + known. This posture, developed in counterinsurgency theory decades ago, was at + the core of the paradigm. David Galula had refined it to a witty statement he + would tell his soldiers in Algeria: “One cannot catch a fly with vinegar. My rules + are: outwardly you must treat every civilian as a friend; inwardly you must + consider him as a rebel ally until you have positive proof to the contrary.” 2 This + mantra has become the rule today—at home. + + [...] + + In Exposed, I proposed a new way to understand how power circulates in the + digital age and, especially, a new way to comprehend our willingness to expose + ourselves to private corporations and the government alike. The metaphors + commonly used to describe our digital condition, such as the “surveillance + state,” Michel Foucault’s panopticon prison, or even George Orwell’s Big + Brother, are inadequate, I argued there. In the new digital age we are not forcibly + imprisoned in panoptic cells. There is no “telescreen” anchored to the wall of our + apartments by the state. No one is trying to crush our passions, or wear us down + into submission with the smell of boiled cabbage and old rag mats, coarse soap, + and blunt razors. The goal is not to displace our pleasures with hatred—with + “hate” sessions, “hate songs,” “hate weeks.” Today, instead, we interact by + means of “likes,” “shares,” “favorites,” “friending,” and “following.” We + gleefully hang smart TVs on the wall that record everything we say and all our + preferences. The drab uniforms and grim grayness of Orwell’s 1984 have been + replaced by the iPhone 5c in its radiant pink, yellow, blue, and green. “Colorful + through and through,” its marketing slogan promises, and the desire for color- + filled objects—for the sensual swoosh of a sent e-mail, the seductive click of the + iPhone camera “shutter,” and the “likes,” clicks, and hearts that can be earned by + sharing—seduce us into delivering ourselves to the surveillance technologies. + And as the monitoring and marketing of our private lives changes who we + sharing—seduce us into delivering ourselves to the surveillance technologies. + + And as the monitoring and marketing of our private lives changes who we + are, power circulates in a new way. Orwell depicted the perfect totalitarian + society. Guy Debord described ours rather as a society of the spectacle, in which + the image makers shape how we understand the world and ourselves. Michel + Foucault spoke instead of “the punitive society” or what he called + “panopticism,” drawing on Jeremy Bentham’s design of the panoptic prison. + Gilles Deleuze went somewhat further and described what he called “societies of + control.” But in our digital age, total surveillance has become inextricably linked + with pleasure. We live in a society of exposure and exhibition, an expository + society. + + [...] + + And that’s what happened: taxpayers would pay the telecoms to hold the data + for the government. So, before, AT&T surreptitiously provided our private + personal digital data to the intelligence services free of charge. Now, American + taxpayers will pay them to collect and hold on to the data for when the + intelligence services need them. A neoliberal win-win solution for everyone— + except, of course, the ordinary, tax-paying citizen who wants a modicum of + privacy or protection from the counterinsurgency. + + [...] + + In my previous book, however, I failed to fully grasp how our expository + society fits with the other features of our contemporary political condition— + from torture, to Guantánamo, to drone strikes, to digital propaganda. In part, I + could not get past the sharp contrast between the fluidity of our digital surfing + and surveillance on the one hand, and the physicality of our military + interventions and use of torture on the other. To be sure, I recognized the deadly + reach of metadata and reiterated those ominous words of General Michael + Hayden, former director of both the NSA and the CIA: “We kill people based on + metadata.” 20 And I traced the haunting convergence of our digital existence and + of correctional supervision: the way in which the Apple Watch begins to + function like an electronic bracelet, seamlessly caging us into a steel mesh of + digital traces. But I was incapable then of fully understanding the bond between + digital exposure and analog torture. + + It is now clear, though, that the expository society fits seamlessly within our + new paradigm of governing. The expository society is precisely what allows the + counterinsurgency strategies to be applied so impeccably “at home” to the very + people who invented modern warfare. The advent of the expository society, as + well as the specific NSA surveillance programs, makes domestic total + information awareness possible, and in turn lays the groundwork for the other + two prongs of counterinsurgency in the domestic context. + + [...] + + This idea of an occupied territory, of a colony within a nation, resonates + perfectly with what we have witnessed in terms of the domestication of the + counterinsurgency. I would just push the logic further: we have not simply + created an internal colony, we have turned the nation itself into a colony. We + govern ourselves through modern counterinsurgency warfare as if the entire + United States was now a colonial dominion like Algeria, Malaya, or Vietnam. + + [...] + + These incidents—large and small, but all devastating for those targeted—also + serve another objective of the domesticated counterinsurgency: to make the rest + of us feel safe and secure, to allow us to continue our lives unaffected, to avoid + disrupting our consumption and enjoyment. They serve to reassure, and also, in + demonizing a phantom minority, to bring us all together against the specter of + the frightening and dangerous other. It makes us believe that there would be, + lurking in the quiet suburbs of Dallas or Miami, dangerous insurgents—were it + not for our government. And these effects feed into the third prong of a + + [...] + + We had seen earlier, within counterinsurgency theory, similar debates + between population-centric and enemy-centric theorists. The enemy-centric + approach tended to be the more brutal, but more focused. The population-centric + favored the more legal and social-investment approaches. I argued then that they + were just two facets of the same paradigm. + + Here the debate is between population-and/or-enemy-centric theories versus + individual-centric theory. But here too, I would argue, this is a false dichotomy. + Again, these are just two facets of the same thing: a counterinsurgency paradigm + of warfare with three core strategies. Like the population-and/or-enemy-centric + theories, individual-centric theory naturally entails both incapacitating the + individual terrorist or insurgent—eliminating him and all of the active minority + —and preventing or deterring his substitution or replacement. + + [...] + + But rather than buy into this dichotomy of counterinsurgency and leaner + antiterrorism, what history shows instead is a growing convergence of the two + models in the United States since the 1960s. Counterinsurgency and domestic + antiterrorism efforts, entwined from the start, have converged over time. The + individual incapacitation strategy meshes perfectly into the counterinsurgency + approach. And it leads seamlessly from the domestication of the second prong of + counterinsurgency to the domestication of the third. + +### Distraction and diversion + + MANY OF US WILL NOT RECOGNIZE OURSELVES, OR A MERICA for that matter, in + these dreadful episodes—in the waterboarding and targeted assassinations + abroad or in the militarization of our police forces, in the infiltration of Muslim + mosques and student groups or in the constant collection of our personal data at + home. Many of us have no firsthand experience of these terrifying practices. Few + of us actually read the full Senate torture report, and even fewer track drone + strikes. Some of us do not even want to know of their existence. Most of us are + blissfully ignorant—at least most of the time—of these counterinsurgency + practices at home or abroad, and are consumed instead by the seductive + distractions of our digital age. + + And that’s the way it is supposed to be. As counterinsurgency is + domesticated, it is our hearts and minds that are daily being assuaged, numbed, + pacified—and blissfully satisfied. We, the vast majority of us, are reassured + daily: there are threats everywhere and color-coded terror alerts, but + counterinsurgency strategies are protecting us. We are made to feel that + everything’s under control, that the threat is exterior, that we can continue with + our daily existence. Even more, that these counterinsurgency strategies will + prevail. That our government is stronger and better equipped, prepared to do + everything necessary to win, and will win. That the guardians are protecting us. + The effort to win the hearts and minds of the passive American majority is + the third aspect of the domestication of counterinsurgency practices—perhaps + the most crucial component of all. And it is accomplished through a remarkable + mixture of distraction, entertainment, pleasure, propaganda, and advertising— + now rendered all so much more effective thanks to our rich digital world. In + Rome, after the Republic, this was known as “bread and circus” for the masses. + Today, it’s more like Facebook and Pokémon GO. + + We saw earlier how the expository society entices us to share all our personal + data and how this feeds into the first prong of counterinsurgency—total + information awareness. There is a flip side to this phenomenon: keeping us + distracted. The exposure is so pleasurable and engaging that we are mostly kept + content, with little need for a coordinated top-down effort to do so. We are + entranced—absorbed in a fantastic world of digitally enhanced reality that is + totally consuming, engrossing, and captivating. We are no longer being rendered + docile in a disciplinarian way, as Michel Foucault argued in Discipline and + Punish. We are past notions of docility. We are actively entranced—not + passively, not in a docile way. We are actively clicking and swiping, jumping + from one screen to another, checking one platform then another to find the next + fix—Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Google, YouTube, and on and on. + Winning over and assuaging the passive majority might be accomplished— + indeed, has been accomplished in the past—through traditional propaganda, such + as broadcast misinformation about the insurgent minority, and through the top- + down provision of entertainment to keep us from thinking about politics. The + new digital world we live in has rendered these older strategies obsolete. As the + counterinsurgency’s mandate to pacify the masses has been turned on the + American people, the third prong of modern warfare looks and works differently + than it did in previous times and in other places. + Things have changed. Just a few years ago, our politicians still had to tell us + + [...] + + Pokémon GO has already run its course, but that is to be expected. Another + digital obsession will follow. These platforms are supposed to capture all of our + attention for a while, to captivate us, to distract us—and simultaneously to make + us expose ourselves and everything around us. This is the symbiosis between the + third and first prongs of the domesticated counterinsurgency: while it pacifies us, + a game like Pokémon GO taps into all our personal information and captures all + our data. At first, the game required that players share all their personal contacts. + Although that was eventually dropped, the game collects all our GPS locations, + captures all the video of our surroundings in perfectly GPS-coded data, and + tracks us wherever we are. Plus, even though it is free, many players are buying + add-ons and in the process sharing their consumption and financial data. The + more we play, the more we are distracted and pacified, and the more we reveal + about ourselves. + + [...] + + The distractions are everywhere: e-mail notifications, texts, bings and pings, + new snapchats and instagrams. The entertainment is everywhere as well: free + Wi-Fi at Starbucks and McDonald’s, and now on New York City streets, that + allow us to stream music videos and watch YouTube videos. And of course, the + advertising is everywhere, trying to make us consume more, buy online, + subscribe, and believe. Believe not only that we need to buy the recommended + book or watch the suggested Netflix, but also believe that we are secure and safe, + protected by the most powerful intelligence agencies and most tenacious military + force. Believe that we can continue to mind our own business—and remain + distracted and absorbed in the digital world—because our government is + watching out for us. + + The fact is, the domestication of counterinsurgency has coincided with the + explosion of this digital world and its distractions. There is a real qualitative + difference between the immediate post–9/11 period and today. One that is + feeding directly into the third strategy of modern warfare. + Meanwhile, for the more vulnerable—those who are more likely to veer + astray and perhaps sympathize with the purported internal enemy—the same + digital technologies target them for enhanced propaganda. The Global + Engagement Center, or its equivalents, will profile them and send improved + content from more moderate voices. The very same methods developed by the + most tech-savvy retailers and digital advertisers—by Google and Amazon—are + deployed to predict, identify, enhance, and target our own citizens. + were before or that we are experiencing a waning of civil and political + engagement. While I agree that the growing capacity of the state and + corporations to monitor citizens may well threaten the private sphere, I am not + convinced that this is producing new apathy or passivity or docility among + citizens, so much as a new form of entrancement. The point is, we were once + kept apathetic through other means, but are now kept apathetic through digital + distractions. + +Voting turnout and Trump election: + + The voting patterns of American registered voters has remained constant— + and apathetic—for at least fifty years. Even in the most important presidential + elections, voter turnout in this country over the past fifty years or more has + pretty much fluctuated between 50 percent and 63 percent. By any measure, + American democracy has been pretty docile for a long time. In fact, if you look + over the longer term, turnout has been essentially constant since the 1920s and + the extension of the suffrage to women. Of course, turnout to vote is not the only + measure of democratic participation, but it is one quantifiable measure. And + electoral voting is one of the more reliable longitudinal measures of civic + participation. But our record, in the United States, is not impressive. + + [...] + + Despite all this, over 62 million people voted for Donald Trump, resulting in + his Electoral College victory. And it was by no means an unusual election. Voter + turnout in 2016 was typical for this country. About 60.2 percent of the + approximately 231 million eligible voters turned out to vote, representing about + 139 million votes case. That number is consonant with historical turnout in this + country, almost squarely between voter turnout in 2012 (58.6 percent) and in + 2008 (61.6 percent), but still above most presidential election year turnouts since + 1972. 16 In all categories of white voters, Trump prevailed. + + [...] + + The cable news network CNN captured this best in a pithy lead to a story titled + “Trump: The Social Media President?”: “FDR was the first ‘radio’ president. + JFK emerged as the first ‘television’ president. Barack Obama broke through as + the first ‘Internet’ president. Next up? Prepare to meet Donald Trump, possibly + the first ‘social media’ and ‘reality TV’ president.” 10 + + [...] + + This new mode of existence and digital consumption pleases and distracts the + majority of Americans. The old-fashioned TV has now been enhanced and + augmented, displaced by social media on digital devices of all sorts and sizes— + from the Apple Watch and tablet, through the MacBook Air and Mac Pro, to the + giant screen TV and even the Jumbotron. And all of it serves to pacify the + masses and ensure that they do not have the time or attention span to question + the domestication of the counterinsurgency. + + And, then, it all feeds back into total information awareness. Hand in hand, + government agencies, social media, Silicon Valley, and large retailers and + corporations have created a mesmerizing new digital age that simultaneously + makes us expose ourselves and everything we do to government surveillance and + that serves to distract and entertain us. All kinds of social media and reality TV + consume and divert our attention, making us give our data away for free. A + profusion of addictive digital platforms—from Gmail, Facebook, and Twitter, to + YouTube and Netflix, Amazon Prime, Instagram, and Snapchat, and now + Pokémon GO—distract us into exposing all our most private information, in + order to feed the new algorithms of commerce and intelligence services: to + profile us for both watch lists and commercial advertising. + +This is compatible with Shoshana Zuboff's Dispossession Cycle: + + This third aspect of counterinsurgency’s domestication is perhaps the most + important, because it targets the most prized military and political objective: the + general masses. And today, in the expository society, the new algorithms and + digital-advertising methods have propelled the manipulation and propaganda to + new heights. We are being encouraged by government and enticed by + multination corporations and social media to expose and express ourselves as + much as possible, leaving digital traces that permit both government and + corporations to profile us and then try to shape us accordingly. To make model + citizens out of us all—which means docile, entranced consumers. The governing + paradigm here is to frenetically encourage digital activity—which in one sense is + the opposite of docility—in order to then channel that activity in the right + direction: consumption, political passivity, and avoiding the radical extremes. + + What we are witnessing is a new form of digital entrancement that shapes us + as subjects, blunts our criticality, distracts us, and pacifies us. We spend so much + time on our phones and devices, we barely have any time left for school or work, + let alone political activism. In the end, the proper way to think about this all is + not through the lens of docility, but through the framework of entrancement. It is + crucial to understand this in the proper way, because breaking this very + entrancement is key to seeing how counterinsurgency governance operates more + broadly. Also, because the focus on docility—along an older register of + discipline—is likely to lead us into an outdated focus on top-down propaganda. + +### Counterrevolution + + The paradigm was refined + and systematized, and has now reached a new stage: the complete and systematic + domestication of counterinsurgency against a home population where there is no + real insurgency or active minority. This new stage is what I call “The + Counterrevolution.” + + The Counterrevolution is a new paradigm of governing our own citizens at + home, modeled on colonial counterinsurgency warfare, despite the absence of + any domestic uprising. It is aimed not against a rebel minority—since none + really exists in the United States—but instead it creates the illusion of an active + minority which it can then deploy to target particular groups and communities, + and govern the entire American population on the basis of a counterinsurgency + warfare model. It operates through the three main strategies at the heart of + modern warfare, which, as applied to the American people, can be recapitulated + as follows: + + 1. Total information awareness of the entire American population…: [by the] + [...] “counterrevolutionary minority.” + + [...] + + 2. … in order to extract an active minority at home… + +Shock and Awe: + + 3. … and win the hearts and minds of Americans: Meanwhile, the + counterrevolutionary minority works to pacify and assuage the general + population in order to ensure that the vast majority of Americans remain + just that: ordinary consuming Americans. They encourage and promote a + rich new digital environment filled with YouTube, Netflix, Amazon + Prime, tweets, Facebook posts, instagrams, snapchats, and reality TV that + consume attention while digitally gathering personal data—and at times, + pushing enhanced content. They direct digital propaganda to susceptible + users. And they shock and awe the masses with their willingness to + torture suspected terrorists or kill their own citizens abroad. In the end, + entertaining, distracting, entrancing, and assuaging the general population + is the key to success—our new form of bread and circus. + +The "new shape" of the State (and it's partners), as a "loose network": + + These three key strategies now guide governance at home, as they do military + and foreign affairs abroad. What has emerged today is a new and different art of + governing. It forms a coherent whole with, at its center, a security apparatus + composed of White House, Pentagon, and intelligence officials, high-ranking + congressional members, FISC judges, security and Internet leaders, police + intelligence divisions, social-media companies, Silicon Valley executives, and + multinational corporations. This loose network, which collaborates at times and + competes at others, exerts control by collecting and mining our digital data. Data + control has become the primary battlefield, and data, the primary resource— + perhaps the most important primary resource in the United States today. + + [...] + + This new mode of governing has no time horizon. It has no sunset provision. And it is + marked by a tyrannous logic of violence. [...] It is part and parcel of the new + paradigm of governing that reconciles brutality with legality. + +The unprecedented, self-fulfilling profecy: + + We govern ourselves + differently in the United States now: no longer through sweeping social + programs like the New Deal or the War on Poverty, but through surgical + counterinsurgency strategies against a phantom opponent. The intensity of the + domestication now is unprecedented. + + [...] + + Counterinsurgency, with its tripartite scheme (active minority, passive masses, + counterrevolutionary minority) and its tripartite strategy (total awareness, + eliminate the active minority, pacify the masses) is a deeply counterproductive + self-fulfilling prophecy that radicalizes individuals against the United States. + + [...] + + “The Islamic State has called it ‘the blessed ban’ because it + supports the Islamic State’s position that America hates Islam. The clause in the + order that gives Christians preferential treatment will be seen as confirming the + Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative that Islam is in a fight to the death against + the Christian crusaders. The images of Muslim visitors being turned away at + American airports will only inflame those who seek to do us harm.” 6 + + [...] + + We are headed not, as Kant would have it, toward perpetual peace, but + instead, sounding the refrain of Nietzsche’s eternal return, toward an endless + state of counterinsurgency warfare. + +### Not exactly a state of exception, but of legality + + MANY COMMENTATORS ARGUE THAT WE NOW LIVE, IN THE United States and in the + West more broadly, in a “state of exception” characterized by suspended legality. + In this view, our political leaders have placed a temporary hold on the rule of + law, with the tacit understanding that they will resume their adherence to liberal + legal values when the political situation stabilizes. Some commentators go + further, arguing that we have now entered a “permanent state of exception.” + + This view, however, misperceives one particular tactic of counterinsurgency + —namely, the state of emergency—for the broader rationality of our new + political regime. It fails to capture the larger ambition of our new mode of + governing. The fact is, our government does everything possible to legalize its + counterinsurgency measures and to place them solidly within the rule of law— + through endless consultations with government lawyers, hypertechnical legal + arguments, and lengthy legal memos. The idea is not to put law on hold, not + even temporarily. It is not to create an exception, literally or figuratively. On the + contrary, the central animating idea is to turn the counterinsurgency model into a + fully legal strategy. So, the governing paradigm is not one of exceptionality, but + of counterinsurgency and legality. + + [...] + + The logic today is based on a model of + counterinsurgency warfare with, at its heart, the resolution of that central tension + between brutality and legality. The counterrevolutionary model has resolved the + inherited tension and legalized the brutality. + + [...] + + Agamben’s idea of a permanent state of exception pushes this + further, but simultaneously undermines the defining element of the exception, + since it becomes the rule. For the most part, though, the state of exception is + presented as aberrational but temporary. + + [...] + + The problem with the state-of-exception view is that it mistakes tactics for + the overarching logic of our new paradigm of governing and, in the process, fails + to see the broader framework of The Counterrevolution. The state-of-exception + framework rests on an illusory dichotomy between rule and exception, a myth + that idealizes and reifies the rule of law. The point is, the use of torture at CIA + black sites and the bulk collection of American telephony metadata were not + exceptions to the rule of law, but were rendered fully legalized and regulated + practices—firmly embedded in a web of legal memos, preauthorized formalities, + and judicial or quasi-judicial oversight. In this sense, hardly anything that + occurred was outside or exceptional to the law, or could not be brought back in. + + The Counterrevolution, unlike the state of exception, does not function on a + binary logic of rule and exception, but on a fully coherent systematic logic of + counterinsurgency that is pervasive, expansive, and permanent. It does not have + limits or boundaries. It does not exist in a space outside the rule of law. It is all + encompassing, systematic, and legalized. + + Of course, the rhetoric of “exception” is extremely useful to The + Counterrevolution. “States of emergency” are often deployed to seize control + over a crisis and to accelerate the three prongs of counterinsurgency. + + [...] + + The ultimate exercise of power, Foucault argued, is precisely to transform + ambiguities about illegalisms into conduct that is “illegal.” + + [...] + + During the ancien régime, Foucault argues, the popular and the privileged + classes worked together to evade royal regulations, fees, and impositions. + Illegalisms were widespread throughout the eighteenth century and well + distributed across the different strata of society + + [...] + + As wealth became increasingly mobile after the French Revolution, new + forms of wealth accumulation—of moveable goods, stocks, and supplies as + opposed to landed wealth—exposed massive amounts of chattel property to the + workers who came in direct contact with this new commercial wealth. The + accumulation of wealth began to make popular illegalisms less useful—even + dangerous—to the interests of the privileged. The commercial class seized the + mechanisms of criminal justice to put an end to these popular illegalisms + [...] The privileged seized the administrative and + police apparatus of the late eighteenth century to crack down on popular + illegalisms. + + [...] + + They effectively turned popular illegalisms into + illegalities, and, in the process, created the notion of the criminal as social + enemy—Foucault even talks here of creating an “internal enemy.” + + [...] + + In The Counterrevolution—by contrast to the bourgeois revolutions of the + early nineteenth century—the process is turned on its head. Illegalisms and + illegalities are inverted. Rather than the privileged turning popular illegalisms + into illegalities, the guardians are turning their own illegalisms into legalities. + [...] The strategy here is to paper one’s way into the legal realm through elaborate + memorandums and advice letters that justify the use of enhanced interrogation or the + assassination of American citizens abroad. + + [...] + + On the one hand, there is a strict division of responsibilities: the intelligence + agencies and the military determine all the facts outside the scope of the legal + memorandum. [...] Everything is compartmentalized. + + [...] + + On the other hand, the memo authorizes: it allows the political authority to + function within the bounds of the law. It sanitizes the political decision. It cleans + the hands of the military and political leaders. It produces legalities. + +A circular, feedback loop: + + None of this violates the rule of law or transgresses the boundaries of legal + liberalism. Instead, the change was rendered “legal.” If this feels circular, it is + because it is: there is a constant feedback effect in play here. The + counterinsurgency practices were rendered legal, and simultaneously justice was + made to conform to the counterinsurgency paradigm. The result of the feedback + loop was constantly new and evolving meanings of due process. And however + rogue they may feel, they had gone through the correct procedural steps of due + process to render them fully lawful and fully compliant with the rule of law. + + [...] + + “Abnormal,” in 1975, Foucault explored how the clash between the juridical + power to punish and the psychiatric thirst for knowledge produced new medical + diagnoses that then did work. + + [...] + + In his 1978 lecture on the invention of the notion of dangerousness in French + psychiatry, Foucault showed how the idea of future dangerousness emerged from + the gaps and tensions in nineteenth-century law. 37 + + [...] + + There are surely gaps here too in The Counterrevolution—tensions between + rule-boundedness on the one hand and a violent warfare model on the other. + Those tensions give momentum to the pendulum swings of brutality that are then + resolved by bureaucratic legal memos. + +### System analysis and Operations Research + + The RAND Corporation played a seminal role in the development of + counterinsurgency practices in the United States and championed for decades— + and still does—a systems-analytic approach that has come to dominate military + strategy. Under its influence, The Counterrevolution has evolved into a logical + and coherent system that regulates and adjusts itself, a fully reasoned and + comprehensive approach. + + [...] + + Systems analysis was often confused with OR, but it was distinct in several + regards. OR tended to have more elaborate mathematical models and solved + lower-level problems; in systems analysis, by contrast, the pure mathematical + computation was generally applied only to subparts of the overall problem. + Moreover, SA took on larger strategic questions that implicated choices between + major policy options. In this sense, SA was, from its inception, in the words of + one study, “less quantitative in method and more oriented toward the analysis of + broad strategic and policy questions, […] particularly […] seeking to clarify + choice under conditions of great uncertainty.” 5 + + [...] + + As this definition made clear, there were two meanings of the term system in + systems analysis: first, there was the idea that the world is made up of systems, + with internal objectives, that need to be analyzed separately from each other in + order to maximize their efficiency. Along this first meaning, the analysis would + focus on a particular figurative or metaphorical system—such as a weapons + system, a social system, or, in the case of early counterinsurgency, a colonial + system. Second, there was the notion of systematicity that involved a particular + type of method—one that began by collecting a set of promising alternatives, + constructing a model, and using a defined criterion. + + [...] + + This method of systems analysis became influential in government and + eventually began to dominate governmental logics starting in 1961 when Robert + McNamara acceded to the Pentagon under President John F. Kennedy. + + [...] + + According to its proponents, systems analysis + would allow policy makers to put aside partisan politics, personal preferences, + and subjective values. It would pave the way to objectivity and truth. As RAND + expert and future secretary of defense James R. Schlesinger explained: + “[Systems analysis] eliminates the purely subjective approach on the part of + devotees of a program and forces them to change their lines of argument. They + must talk about reality rather than morality.” 13 With systems analysis, + Schlesinger argued, there was no longer any need for politics or value + judgments. The right answer would emerge from the machine-model that + independently evaluated cost and effectiveness. All that was needed was a + narrow and precise objective and good criteria. The model would then spit out + the most effective strategy. + + [...] + + Counterinsurgency theory blossomed at precisely the moment that systems + analysis was, with RAND’s backing, gaining influence in the Pentagon and at + the White House. The historian Peter Paret pinpoints this moment, in fact, to the + very first year of the Kennedy administration: “In 1961, the Cuban revolution + combined with the deteriorating Western position in Southeast Asia + + [...] + + It convened, as mentioned earlier, the seminal + counterinsurgency symposium in April 1962, where RAND analysts discovered + David Galula and commissioned him to write his memoirs. RAND would + publish his memoirs as a confidential classified report in 1963 under the title + + [...] + + Counterinsurgency theory blossomed at precisely the moment that systems + analysis was, with RAND’s backing, gaining influence in the Pentagon and at + the White House. The historian Peter Paret pinpoints this moment, in fact, to the + very first year of the Kennedy administration: “In 1961, the Cuban revolution + combined with the deteriorating Western position in Southeast Asia to shift + + [...] + + One recent episode regarding interrogation + methods is telling. It involved the evaluation of different tactics to obtain + information from informants, ranging from truth serums to sensory overload to + torture. These alternatives were apparently compared and evaluated using a SA + approach at a workshop convened by RAND, the CIA, and the American + Psychological Association (APA). Again, the details are difficult to ascertain + fully, but the approach seemed highly systems-analytic. + + [...] a series of workshops on “The Science of Deception” + + [...] + + More specifically, according to this source, the workshops probed and + compared different strategies to elicit information. The systems-analytic + approach is reflected by the set of questions that the participants addressed: How + important are differential power and status between witness and officer? What + pharmacological agents are known to affect apparent truth-telling behavior? + What are sensory overloads on the maintenance of deceptive behaviors? How + might we overload the system or overwhelm the senses and see how it affects + deceptive behaviors? These questions were approached from a range of + disciplines. The workshops were attended by “research psychologists, + psychiatrists, neurologists who study various aspects of deception and + representatives from the CIA, FBI and Department of Defense with interests in + intelligence operations. In addition, representatives from the White House Office + of Science and Technology Policy and the Science and Technology Directorate + of the Department of Homeland Security were present.” 31 + + [...] + + And in effect, from a counterinsurgency perspective, these various tactics— + truth serums, sensory overloads, torture—are simply promising alternatives that + need to be studied, modeled, and compared to determine which ones are superior + at achieving the objective of the security system. Nothing is off limits. + Everything is fungible. The only question is systematic effectiveness. This is the + systems-analytic approach: not piecemeal, but systematic. + Incidentally, a few years later, Gerwehr apparently went to Guantánamo, but + refused to participate in any interrogation because the CIA was not using video + cameras to record the interrogations. Following that, in the fall of 2006 and in + 2007, Gerwehr made several calls to human-rights advocacy groups and + reporters to discuss what he knew. A few months later, in 2008, Gerwehr died of + a motorcycle accident on Sunset Boulevard. 32 He was forty years old. + + [...] + + Sometimes, depending on the practitioner, the analysis favored torture or summary + execution; at other times, it leaned toward more “decent” tactics. But these + variations must now be understood as internal to the system. Under President + Bush’s administration, the emphasis was on torture, indefinite detention, and + illicit eavesdropping; under President Obama’s, it was on drone strikes and total + surveillance; in the first months of the Trump presidency, on special operations, + drones, the Muslim ban, and building the wall. What unites these different + strategies is counterinsurgency’s coherence as a system—a system in which + brutal violence is heart and center. That violence is not aberrational or rogue. It + is to be expected. It is internal to the system. Even torture and assassination are + merely variations of the counterinsurgency logic. + + Counterinsurgency abroad and at home has been legalized and systematized. It + has become our governing paradigm “in any situation,” and today “simply + expresses the basic tenet of the exercise of political power.” It has no sunset + provision. It is ruthless, game theoretic, systematic—and legal. And with all of + the possible tactics at the government’s disposal—from total surveillance to + indefinite detention and solitary confinement, to drones and robot-bombs, even + to states of exception and emergency powers—this new mode of governing has + never been more dangerous. + + In sum, The Counterrevolution is our new form of tyranny. |