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diff --git a/books/economics.md b/books/economics.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f256e31 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/economics.md @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +[[!meta title="Livros - Economia"]] + +[[!inline pages="page(books/economics*)" archive="yes"]] diff --git a/books/economics/game-theory-critical-introduction.md b/books/economics/game-theory-critical-introduction.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..462b4aa --- /dev/null +++ b/books/economics/game-theory-critical-introduction.md @@ -0,0 +1,2397 @@ +[[!meta title="Game Theory: a Critical Introduction"]] + +## Index + +* Difference between meteorological and traffic-jam-style predictions: 18. +* Frequent assumption (but not always) on game theory that individuals knows + the rules of the game; that they even known their inner motives: 28. +* Individualism, separation of structure and choice, 31. +* MAD, 86; 88. +* Elimination of non-credible threats, 88. + +# Excerpts + +## Intro + +What is game theory: + + In many respects this enthusiasm is not difficult to understand. Game theory + was probably born with the publication of The Theory of Games and Economic + Behaviour by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (first published in + 1944 with second and third editions in 1947 and 1953). They defined a game + as any interaction between agents that is governed by a set of rules + specifying the possible moves for each participant and a set of outcomes for + each possible combination of moves. + +How it can help: + + If game theory does make a further substantial contribution, then we + believe that it is a negative one. The contribution comes through + demonstrating the limits of a particular form of individualism in social + science: one based exclusively on the model of persons as preference satisfiers. + This model is often regarded as the direct heir of David Hume’s (the 18th + century philosopher) conceptualisation of human reasoning and motivation. It + is principally associated with what is known today as rational choice theory, or + with the (neoclassical) economic approach to social life (see Downs, 1957, and + Becker, 1976). Our main conclusion on this theme (which we will develop + through the book) can be rephrased accordingly: we believe that game theory + reveals the limits of ‘rational choice’ and of the (neoclassical) economic + approach to life. In other words, game theory does not actually deliver Jon + Elster’s ‘solid microfoundations’ for all social science; and this tells us + something about the inadequacy of its chosen ‘microfoundations’. + +Assumptions: + + three key assumptions: agents are instrumentally + rational (section 1.2.1); they have common knowledge of this rationality + (section 1.2.2); and they know the rules of the game (section 1.2.3). + These assumptions set out where game theory stands on the big questions of + the sort ‘who am I, what am I doing here and how can I know about either?’. + The first and third are ontological. 1 They establish what game theory takes as + the material of social science: in particular, what it takes to be the essence of + individuals and their relation in society. The second raises epistemological + issues 2 (and in some games it is not essential for the analysis). It is concerned + with what can be inferred about the beliefs which people will hold about how + games will be played when they have common knowledge of their rationality. + +Instrumental rationality (_Homo economicus_): + + We spend more time discussing these assumptions than is perhaps usual in + texts on game theory because we believe that the assumptions are both + controversial and problematic, in their own terms, when cast as general + propositions concerning interactions between individuals. This is one respect + in which this is a critical introduction. The discussions of instrumental + rationality and common knowledge of instrumental rationality (sections 1.2.1 + and 1.2.2), in particular, are indispensable for anyone interested in game + theory. In comparison section 1.2.3 will appeal more to those who are + concerned with where game theory fits in to the wider debates within social + + [...] + + Individuals who are instrumentally rational have preferences over various + ‘things’, e.g. bread over toast, toast and honey over bread and butter, rock + over classical music, etc., and they are deemed rational because they select + actions which will best satisfy those preferences. One of the virtues of this + model is that very little needs to be assumed about a person’s preferences. + Rationality is cast in a means-end framework with the task of selecting the + most appropriate means for achieving certain ends (i.e. preference + satisfaction); and for this purpose, preferences (or ‘ends’) must be coherent + in only a weak sense that we must be able to talk about satisfying them more + or less. Technically we must have a ‘preference ordering’ because it is only + when preferences are ordered that we will be able to begin to make + judgements about how different actions satisfy our preferences in different + degrees. + + [...] + + Thus it appears a promisingly general model of action. For instance, it could + apply to any type of player of games and not just individuals. So long as the + State or the working class or the police have a consistent set of objectives/ + preferences, then we could assume that it (or they) too act instrumentally so + as to achieve those ends. Likewise it does not matter what ends a person + pursues: they can be selfish, weird, altruistic or whatever; so long as they + consistently motivate then people can still act so as to satisfy them best. + +An agent is "rational" in this conext when they have preference ordering" and +if "they select the action that maximizes those preferences: + + Readers familiar with neoclassical Homo economicus will need no further + introduction. This is the model found in standard introductory texts, where + preferences are represented by indifference curves (or utility functions) and + agents are assumed rational because they select the action which attains the + highest feasible indifference curve (maximises utility). For readers who have + not come across these standard texts or who have forgotten them, it is worth + explaining that preferences are sometimes represented mathematically by a + utility function. As a result, acting instrumentally to satisfy best one’s + preferences becomes the equivalent of utility maximising behaviour. + +Reason and slavery: + + Even when we accept the Kantian argument, it is plain that reason’s + guidance is liable to depend on characteristics of time and place. For + example, consider the objective of ‘owning another person’. This obviously + does not pass the test of the categorical imperative since all persons could + not all own a person. Does this mean then we should reject slave-holding? At + first glance, the answer seems to be obvious: of course, it does! But notice it + will only do this if slaves are considered people. Of course we consider + slaves people and this is in part why we abhor slavery, but ancient Greece + did not consider slaves as people and so ancient Greeks would not have been + disturbed in their practice of slavery by an application of the categorical + imperative. + +Reason dependent on culture: + + Wittgenstein suggests that if you want to know why people act in the way that + they do, then ultimately you are often forced in a somewhat circular fashion to + say that such actions are part of the practices of the society in which those + persons find themselves. In other words, it is the fact that people behave in a + particular way in society which supplies the reason for the individual person to + act: or, if you like, actions often supply their own reasons. This is shorthand + description rather than explanation of Wittgenstein’s argument, but it serves to + make the connection to an influential body of psychological theory which + makes a rather similar point. + +Cognitive dissonance and free market proponents: + + Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory proposes a model where + reason works to ‘rationalise’ action rather than guide it. The point is that we + often seem to have no reason for acting the way that we do. For instance, we + may recognise one reason for acting in a particular way, but we can equally + recognise the pull of a reason for acting in a contrary fashion. Alternatively, + we may simply see no reason for acting one way rather than another. In such + circumstances, Festinger suggests that we experience psychological distress. It + comes from the dissonance between our self-image as individuals who are + authors of our own action and our manifest lack of reason for acting. It is like + a crisis of self-respect and we seek to remove it by creating reasons. In short + we often rationalise our actions ex post rather than reason ex ante to take them + as the instrumental model suggests. + + [...] + + Research has shown that people seek out and read advertisements for + the brand of car they have just bought. Indeed, to return us to economics, it is + precisely this insight which has been at the heart of one of the Austrian and + other critiques of the central planning system when it is argued that planning + can never substitute for the market because it presupposes information + regarding preferences which is in part created in markets when consumers + choose. + +Infinite regress of the economics of information acquisiton (i.e learning, eg. +from a secret service): + + Actually most game theorists seem to agree on one aspect of the problem + of belief formation in the social world: how to update beliefs in the presence + of new information. They assume agents will use Bayes’s rule. This is explained + in Box 1.6. We note there some difficulties with transplanting a technique from + the natural sciences to the social world which are related to the observation we + have just made. We focus here on a slightly different problem. Bayes provides + a rule for updating, but where do the original (prior) expectations come from? + Or to put the question in a different way: in the absence of evidence, how do + agents form probability assessments governing events like the behaviour of + others? + + There are two approaches in the economics literature. One responds by + suggesting that people do not just passively have expectations. They do not + just wait for information to fall from trees. Instead they make a conscious + decision over how much information to look for. Of course, one must have + started from somewhere, but this is less important than the fact that the + acquisition of information will have transformed these original ‘prejudices’. + The crucial question, on this account, then becomes: what determines the + amount of effort agents put into looking for information? This is deceptively + easy to answer in a manner consistent with instrumental rationality. The + instrumentally rational agent will keep on acquiring information to the point + where the last bit of search effort costs her or him in utility terms the same + amount as the amount of utility he or she expects to get from the + information gained by this last bit of effort. The reason is simple. As long as + a little bit more effort is likely to give the agent more utility than it costs, + then it will be adding to the sum of utilities which the agent is seeking to + maximise. + + [...] + + This looks promising and entirely consistent with the definition of + instrumentally rational behaviour. But it begs the question of how the agent + knows how to evaluate the potential utility gains from a bit more information + _prior to gaining that information_. Perhaps he or she has formulated expectations of + the value of a little bit more information and can act on that. But then the + problem has been elevated to a higher level rather than solved. How did he or + she acquire that expectation about the value of information? ‘By acquiring + information about the value of information up to the point where the + marginal benefits of this (second-order) information were equal to the costs’, + is the obvious answer. But the moment it is offered, we have the beginnings of + an infinite regress as we ask the same question of how the agent knows the + value of this second-order information. To prevent this infinite regress, we + must be guided by something _in addition_ to instrumental calculation. But this + means that the paradigm of instrumentally rational choices is incomplete. The + only alternative would be to assume that the individual _knows_ the benefits that + he or she can expect on average from a little more search (i.e. the expected + marginal benefits) because he or she knows the full information set. But then + there is no problem of how much information to acquire because the person + knows everything! + +Infinite recursion of the common knowledge (CKR): + + If you want to form an expectation about what somebody does, what + could be more natural than to model what determines their behaviour and + then use the model to predict what they will do in the circumstances that + interest you? You could assume the person is an idiot or a robot or whatever, + but most of the time you will be playing games with people who are + instrumentally rational like yourself and so it will make sense to model your + opponent as instrumentally rational. This is the idea that is built into the + analysis of games to cover how players form expectations. We assume that + there is common knowledge of rationality held by the players. It is at once + both a simple and complex approach to the problem of expectation + formation. The complication arises because with common knowledge of + rationality I know that you are instrumentally rational and since you are + rational and know that I am rational you will also know that I know that you + are rational and since I know that you are rational and that you know that I + am rational I will also know that you know that I know that you are rational + and so on…. This is what common knowledge of rationality means. + + [...] + + It is difficult to pin down because common knowledge of X + (whatever X may be) cannot be converted into a finite phrase beginning with ‘I + know…’. The best one can do is to say that if Jack and Jill have common + knowledge of X then ‘Jack knows that Jill knows that Jack knows …that Jill + knows that Jack knows…X’—an infinite sentence. The idea reminds one of + what happens when a camera is pointing to a television screen that conveys the + image recorded by the very same camera: an infinite self-reflection. Put in this + way, what looked a promising assumption suddenly actually seems capable of + leading you anywhere. + + [...] + + The problem of expectation formation spins hopelessly out of control. + + Nevertheless game theorists typically assume CKR and many of them, and + certainly most people who apply game theory in economics and other + disciplines + +Uniformity: Consistent Alignment of Beliefs (CAB), another weak assumption +based on Harsanyi doctrine requiring equal information; followed by a +comparison with Socract dialectics: + + Put informally, the notion of _consistent alignment of beliefs_ (CAB) means that + no instrumentally rational person can expect another similarly rational + person who has the same infor mation to develop different thought + processes. Or, alternatively, that no rational person expects to be surprised + by another rational person. The point is that if the other person’s thought is + genuinely moving along rational lines, then since you know the person is + rational and you are also rational then your thoughts about what your + rational opponent might be doing will take you on the same lines as his or + her own thoughts. The same thing applies to others provided they respect + _your_ thoughts. So your beliefs about what your opponents will do are + consistently aligned in the sense that if you actually knew their plans, you + would not want to change your beliefs; and if they knew your plans they + would not want to change the beliefs they hold about you and which support + their own planned actions. + + Note that this does not mean that everything can be deterministically + predicted. + +Reason reflecting on itself: + + These observations are only designed to signal possible trouble ahead + and we shall examine this issue in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3. We + conclude the discussion now with a pointer to wider philosophical currents. + Many decades before the appearance of game theor y, the Ger man + philosophers G.F.W.Hegel and Immanuel Kant had already considered the + notion of the self-conscious reflection of human reasoning on itself. Their + main question was: can our reasoning faculty turn on itself and, if it can, + what can it infer? Reason can certainly help persons develop ways of + cultivating the land and, therefore, escape the tyranny of hunger. But can it + understand how it, itself, works? In game theory we are not exactly + concerned with this issue but the question of what follows from common + knowledge of rationality has a similar sort of reflexive structure. When + reason knowingly encounters itself in a game, does this tell us anything + about what reason should expect of itself? + + What is revealing about the comparison between game theory and + thinkers like Kant and Hegel is that, unlike them, game theory offers + something settled in the form of CAB. What is a source of delight, + puzzlement and uncertainty for the German philosophers is treated as a + problem solved by game theory. For instance, Hegel sees reason reflecting + on reason as it reflects on itself as part of the restlessness which drives + human history. This means that for him there are no answers to the + question of what reason demands of reason in other people outside of + human history. Instead history offers a changing set of answers. Likewise + Kant supplies a weak answer to the question. Rather than giving substantial + advice, reason supplies a negative constraint which any principle of + knowledge must satisfy if it is to be shared by a community of rational + people: any rational principle of thought must be capable of being followed + by all. O’Neill (1989) puts the point in the following way: + + [Kant] denies not only that we have access to transcendent meta- + physical truths, such as the claims of rational theology, but also that + reason has intrinsic or transcendent vindication, or is given in + consciousness. He does not deify reason. The only route by which we + can vindicate certain ways of thinking and acting, and claim that those + ways have authority, is by considering how we must discipline our + thinking if we are to think or act at all. This disciplining leads us not to + algorithms of reason, but to certain constraints on all thinking, + communication and interaction among any plurality. In particular we are + led to the principle of rejecting thought, act or communication that is + guided by principles that others cannot adopt. + (O’Neill p. 27) + +Summary: + + To summarise, game theory is avowedly Humean in orientation. [...] + The second [aspect] is that game theorists seem to assume _too much_ on behalf + of reason [even more than Hume did]. + +Giddens, Wittgenstein language games and the "organic or holistic view of the relation between action and structure" (pages 30-31): + + The question is ontological and it connects directly with the earlier + discussion of instrumental rationality. Just as instrumental rationality is not + the only ontological view of what is the essence of human rationality, there is + more than one ontological view regarding the essence of social interaction. + Game theory works with one view of social interaction, which meshes well + with the instrumental account of human rationality; but equally there are + other views (inspired by Kant, Hegel, Marx, Wittgenstein) which in turn + require different models of (rational) action. + +State (pages 32-33): + + Perhaps the most famous example of this type of + institutional creation comes from the early English philosopher Thomas + Hobbes who suggested in Leviathan that, out of fear of each other, + individuals would contract with each other to form a State. In short, they + would accept the absolute power of a sovereign because the sovereign’s + ability to enforce contracts enables each individual to transcend the dog- + eat-dog world of the state of nature, where no one could trust anyone and + life was ‘short, nasty and brutish’. + + Thus, the key individualist move is to draw attention to the way that + structures not only constrain; they also enable (at least those who are in a + position to create them). It is the fact that they enable which persuades + individuals consciously (as in State formation) or unconsciously (in the case + of those which are generated spontaneously) to build them. To bring out + this point and see how it connects with the earlier discussion of the + relation between action and structure it may be helpful to contrast Hobbes + with Rousseau. Hobbes has the State emerging from a contract between + individuals because it serves the interests of those individuals. Rousseau + also talked of a social contract between individuals, but he did not speak + this individualist language. For him, the political (democratic) process was + not a mere means of ser ving persons’ interests by satisfying their + preferences. It was also a process which changed people’s preferences. People + were socialised, if you like, and democracy helped to create a new human + being, more tolerant, less selfish, better educated and capable of cherishing + the new values of the era of Enlightenment. By contrast, Hobbes’ men and + women were the same people before and after the contract which created + the State. 4 + +Game theory as justification of individualism (pages 32-33), which reminds the +discussion made by Dany-Robert Dufour in La Cite Perverse; it is also noted +that the State is considered a "collective action agency": + + Where do structures come from when they are separate from actions? An + ambitious response which distinguishes methodological individualists of all + types is that the structures are merely the deposits of previous interactions + (potentially understood, of course, as games). This answer may seem to threaten + an infinite regress in the sense that the structures of the previous + interaction must also be explained and so on. But, the individualist will want + to claim that ultimately all social str uctures spring from interactions + between some set of asocial individuals; this is why it is ‘individualist’. + + [...] + + Returning to game theory’s potential contribution, we can see that, in so + far as individuals are modelled as Humean agents, game theory is well placed + to help assess the claims of methodological individualists. After all, game + theory purports to analyse social interaction between individuals who, as + Hume argued, have passions and a reason to serve them. Thus game theory + should enable us to examine the claim that, beginning from a situation with + no institutions (or structures), the self-interested behaviour of these + instrumentally rational agents will either bring about institutions or fuel their + evolution. An examination of the explanatory power of game theory in such + settings is one way of testing the individualist claims. + In fact, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, the recurring difficulty + + [...] + + Suppose we take the methodological individualist route and see + institutions as the deposits of previous interactions between individuals. + Individualists are not bound to find that the institutions which emerge in + this way are fair or just. Indeed, in practice, many institutions reflect the + fact that they were created by one group of people and then imposed on + other groups. All that any methodological individualist is committed to is + being able to find the origin of institutions in the acts of individuals qua + individuals. The political theory of liberal individualism goes a stage + further and tries to pass judgement on the legitimacy of particular + institutions. Institutions in this view are to be regarded as legitimate in so + far as all individuals who are governed by them would have broadly + ‘agreed’ to their creation. + + Naturally, much will turn on how ‘agreement’ is to be judged because + people in desperate situations will often ‘agree’ to the most desperate of + outcomes. Thus there are disputes over what constitutes the appropriate + reference point (the equivalent to Hobbes’s state of nature) for judging + whether people would have agreed to such and such an arrangement. We set + aside a host of further problems which emerge the moment one steps outside + liberal individualist premises and casts doubt over whether people’s + preferences have been autonomously chosen. Game theory has little to + contribute to this aspect of the dispute. However, it does make two + significant contributions to the discussions in liberal individualism with + respect to how we might judge ‘agreement’. + +Prisioner's dilemma and the hobbesian argument for the creation of a State (pages 36-37): +resolution would require a higher State in the next upper level of recursion: + + Finally there is the prisoners’ dilemma game (to which we have dedicated the + whole of Chapter 5 and much of Chapter 6). Recall the time when there were + still two superpowers each of which would like to dominate the other, if + possible. They each faced a choice between arming and disarming. When both + arm or both disarm, neither is able to dominate the other. Since arming is + costly, when both decide to arm this is plainly worse than when both decide to + disarm. However, since we have assumed each would like to dominate the + other, it is possible that the best outcome for each party is when that party + arms and the other disarms since although this is costly it allows the arming + side to dominate the other. These preferences are reflected in the ‘arbitrary’ + utility pay-offs depicted in Figure 1.4. + + Game theory makes a rather stark prediction in this game: both players will + arm (the reasons will be given later). It is a paradoxical result because each + does what is in their own interest and yet their actions are collectively self- + defeating in the sense that mutual armament is plainly worse than the + alternative of mutual disarmament which was available to them (pay-off 1 for + utility pay-offs depicted in Figure 1.4. + + Game theory makes a rather stark prediction in this game: both players will + arm (the reasons will be given later). It is a paradoxical result because each + does what is in their own interest and yet their actions are collectively self- + defeating in the sense that mutual armament is plainly worse than the + alternative of mutual disarmament which was available to them (pay-off 1 for + each rather than 2). The existence of this type of interaction together with the + inference that both will arm has provided one of the strongest arguments for + the creation of a State. This is, in effect, Thomas Hobbes’s argument in + Leviathan. And since our players here are themselves States, both countries + should agree to submit to the authority of a higher State which will enforce an + agreement to disar m (an argument for a strong, independent, United + Nations?). + +Too much trust in that type of instrumental rationality might lead to lower +outcomes in some games: + + The term rationalisable has been used to describe such strategies because a + player can defend his or her choice (i.e. rationalise it) on the basis of beliefs + about the beliefs of the opponent which are not inconsistent with the game’s + data. However, to pull this off, we need ‘more’ commonly known rationality + than in the simpler games in Figures 2.1 and 2.3. Looking at Figure 2.4 we see + that outcome (100, 90) is much more inviting than the rationalisable outcome + (1, 1). It is the deepening confidence in each other’s instrumental rationality + (fifth-order CKR, to be precise) which leads our players to (1, 1). In summary + notation, the rationalisable strategies R2, C2 are supported by the following + train of thinking (which reflects the six steps described earlier): + + -- 48 + +Nash-equilibrium: self-confirming strategy: + + A set of rationalisable strategies (one for each player) are in a Nash + equilibrium if their implementation confirms the expectations of each player + about the other’s choice. Put differently, Nash strategies are the only + rationalisable ones which, if implemented, confirm the expectations on which + they were based. This is why they are often referred to as self-confirming + strategies or why it can be said that this equilibrium concept requires that + players’ beliefs are consistently aligned (CAB). + + -- 53 + +Arguments against CAB: + + In the same spirit, it is sometimes argued (borrowing a line from John von + Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern) that the objective of any analysis of games is + the equivalent of writing a book on how to play games; and the minimum + condition which any piece of advice on how to play a game must satisfy is + simple: the advice must remain good advice once the book has been published. + In other words, it could not really be good advice if people would not want to + follow it once the advice was widely known. On this test, only (R2, C2) pass, + since when the R player follows the book’s advice, the C player would want to + follow it as well, and vice versa. The same cannot be said of the other + rationalisable strategies. For instance, suppose (R1, C1) was recommended: then + R would not want to follow the advice when C is expected to follow it by + selecting C1 and likewise, if R was expected to follow the advice, C would not + want to. + + Both versions of the argument with respect to what mutual rationality entails + seem plausible. Yet, there is something odd here. Does respect for each other’s + rationality lead each person to believe that neither will make a mistake in a + game? Anyone who has talked to good chess players (perhaps the masters of + strategic thinking) will testify that rational persons pitted against equally + rational opponents (whose rationality they respect) do not immediately assume + that their opposition will never make errors. On the contrary, the point in + chess is to engender such errors! Are chess players irrational then? One is + inclined to answer no, but why? And what is the difference as + + -- 57 + +Limits conceptualizing reason as an algorithm ("Humean approach to reason +is algorithmic"): + + Harsanyi doctrine seems to depend on a powerfully algorithmic and controversial + view of reason. Reason on this account (at least in an important part) is akin + to a set of rules of inference which can be used in moving from evidence to + expectations. That is why people using reason (because they are using the same + algorithms) should come to the same conclusion. However, there is genuine + puzzlement over whether such an algorithmic view of reason can apply to all + circumstances. Can any finite set of rules contain rules for their own + application to all possible circumstances? The answer seems to be no, since + under some sufficiently detailed level of description there will be a question of + whether the rule applies to this event and so we shall need rules for applying + the rules for applying the rules. And as there is no limit to the detail of the + description of events, we shall need rules for applying the rules for applying + the rules, and so on to infinity. In other words, every set of rules will require + creative interpretation in some circumstances and so in these cases it is + perfectly possible for two individuals who share the same rules to hold + divergent expectations. + + This puts a familiar observation from John Maynard Keynes and Frank + Knight regarding genuine uncertainty in a slightly different way, but + nevertheless it yields the same conclusion. There will be circumstances under + which individuals are unable to decide rationally what probability assessment + to attach to events because the events are uncertain and so it should not be + surprising to find that they disagree. Likewise, the admiration for + entrepreneurship found among economists of the Austrian school depends on + the existence of uncertainty. Entrepreneurship is highly valued precisely + because, as a result of uncertainty, people can hold different expectations + regarding the future. In this context, the entrepreneurs are those who back + their judgement against that of others and succeed. In other words, there + would be no job for entrepreneurs if we all held common expectations in a + world ruled by CAB! + + A similar conclusion regarding ineliminable uncertainty is shared by social + theorists who have been influenced by the philosophy of Kant. They deny that + reason should be understood algorithmically or that it always supplies answers + as to what to do. For Kantians reason supplies a critique of itself which is the + source of negative restraints on what we can believe rather than positive + instructions as to what we should believe. Thus the categorical imperative (see + section 1.2.1), which according to Kant ought to determine many of our + significant choices, is a sieve for beliefs and it rarely singles out one belief. + Instead, there are often many which pass the test and so there is plenty of + room for disagreement over what beliefs to hold. + + Perhaps somewhat surprisingly though, a part of Kant’s argument might + lend support to the Nash equilibrium concept. In particular Kant thought that + rational agents should only hold beliefs which are capable of being + universalised. This idea, taken by itself, might prove a powerful ally of Nash. + [...] Of course, a full Kantian perspective is + likely to demand rather more than this and it is not typically adopted by game + theorists. Indeed such a defence of Nash would undo much of the + foundations of game theory: for the categorical imperative would even + recommend choosing dominated strategies if this is the type of behaviour that + each wished everyone adopted. Such thoughts sit uncomfortably with the + Humean foundations of game theory and we will not dwell on them for now. + Instead, since the spirit of the Humean approach to reason is algorithmic, we + shall continue discussing the difficulties with the Harsanyi—Aumann defence + of Nash. + + -- 58-60 + +"Irrational" plays which might intend to send a message to other players: + + Indeed why should one assume in this way that players cannot (or + should not) try to make statements about themselves through patterning + their ‘trembles? The question becomes particularly sharp once it is recalled + that, on the conventional account, players must expect that there is always + some chance of a tremble. Trembles in this sense are part of normal + behaviour, and the critics argue that agents may well attempt to use them + as a medium for signalling something to each other. Of course, players will + not do so if they believe that their chosen pattern is going to be ignored + by others. But that is the point: why assume that this is what they will + believe from the beginning, especially when agents can see that the + generally accepted use of trembles as signals might secure a better + outcome for both players [...]? + + Note that this is not an argument against backward induction per se: it is an + argument against assuming CKR while working out beliefs via backward + induction (i.e. a criticism of Nash backward induction). When agents consider + patterning their ‘trembles’, they project forward about future behaviour given + that there are trembles now or in the past. What makes it ambiguous whether + they should do this, or stick to Nash backward induction instead, is that there + is no uniquely rational way of playing games like Figures 3.5 or 3.6 (unlike the + race to 20 game in which there is). In this light, the subgame perfect Nash + equilibrium offers one of many possible scenarios of how rational agents will + behave. + + -- 93 + +Why not expand this affirmation so _any_ move to signal some intention? + +## Misc + +Page 101: + + Hence these refinements (e.g. proper equilibria), likethe Nash + equilibrium project itself, seem to have to appeal to somethingother + than the traditional assumptions of game theory regarding + rationalaction in a social context. + +Page 102: + + regarding the relation betweenconvention following and instrumental + rationality. The worry here takes usback to the discussion of section + 1.2.3 where for instance it was suggested thatconventions might best be + understood in the way suggested by Wittgenstein orHegel. In short, the + acceptance of convention may actually require a radicalreassessment of + the ontological foundations of game theory. + +Page 102: + + actually require a radicalreassessment of the ontological foundations + of game theory. + +Page 103: + + Why not give up on the Nash concept altogether? This ‘giving up’ might + takeon one of two forms. Firstly, game theory could appeal to the + concept ofrationalisable strategies (recall section 2.4 of Chapter 2) + which seemuncontentiously to flow from the assumptions of instrumental + rationalityand CKR. The difficulty with such a move is that it concedes + that gametheory is unable to say much about many games (e.g. Figures + 2.6, 2.12, etc.).Naturally, modesty of this sort might be entirely + appropriate for gametheory, although it will diminish its claims as a + solid foundation for socialscience. + +Page 104: + + Unlike the instrumentally rational model, for Hegelians and Marxists + actionbased on preferences feeds back to affect preferences, and so on, + in an everunfolding chain. (See Box 3.1 for a rather feeble attempt to + blend desires andbeliefs.) Likewise some social psychologists might + argue that the key to actionlies less with preferences and more with + the cognitive processes used bypeople; and consequently we should + address ourselves to understanding theseprocesses. + +Page 105: + + 105 + +Page 106: + + Quite simply, the significant social processes which write history + cannot beunderstood through the lens of instrumental rationality. This + destines gametheory to a footnote in some future text on the history of + social theory. Welet the reader decide.3 + +Page 108: + + Thirdly, the sociology of the discipline may provide further clues. + Twoconditions would seem to be essential for the modern development of + adiscipline within the academy. Firstly the discipline must be + intellectuallydistinguishable from other disciplines. Secondly, there + must be some barriersto the amateur pursuit of the discipline. (A third + condition which goes withoutsaying is that the discipline must be able + to claim that what it does ispotentially worth while.) The first + condition reduces the competition fromwithin the academy which might + come from other disciplines (to do thisworthwhile thing) and the second + ensures that there is no effectivecompetition from outside the academy. + In this context, the rational choicemodel has served economics very + well. It is the distinguishing intellectualfeature of economics as a + discipline and it is amenable to such formalisationthat it keeps most + amateurs well at bay. Thus it is plausible to argue that thesuccess of + economics as a discipline within the social sciences has been + closelyrelated to its championing of the rational choice model. + +Page 108: + + kind of amnesia or lobotomy which thediscipline seems to have suffered + regarding most things philosophical duringthe postwar period. + +Page 108: + + It isoften more plausible to think of the academy as a battleground + betweendisciplines rather than between ideas and the disciplines which + have goodsurvival features (like the barriers to entry identified + above) + +Page 109: + + explanations willonly prosper in so far as they are both superior and + they are not institutionallyundermined by the rise of neoclassical + economics and the demise ofsociology. It is not necessary to see these + things conspiratorially to see thepoint of this argument. All academics + have fought their corner in battles overresources and they always use + the special qualities of their discipline asammunition in one way or + another. Thus one might explain in functionalist termsthe mystifying + attachment of economics and game theory to Nash. + +Page 110: + + We have no special reason to prioritise one strand of our + proposedexplanation. Yet, there is more than a hint of irony in the + last suggestionbecause Jon Elster has often championed game theory and + its use of the Nashequilibrium concept as an alternative to functional + arguments in social science.Well, if the use of Nash by game theorists + is itself to be explainedfunctionally, then… + +Page 111: + + Liberal theorists often explain the State with reference to state of + nature. Forinstance, within the Hobbesian tradition there is a stark + choice between astate of nature in which a war of all against all + prevails and a peacefulsociety where the peace is enforced by a State + which acts in the interest ofall. The legitimacy of the State derives + from the fact that people who wouldotherwise live in Hobbes’s state of + nature (in which life is ‘brutish, nasty andshort’) can clearly see the + advantages of creating a State. Even if a State had + +Page 111: + + not surfaced historically for all sorts of other reasons, it would have + to beinvented.Such a hypothesised ‘invention’ would require a + cooperative act of comingtogether to create a State whose purpose will + be to secure rights over life andproperty. Nevertheless, even if all + this were common knowledge, it wouldnot guarantee that the State will + be created. There is a tricky further issuewhich must be resolved. The + people must agree to the precise property rightswhich the State will + defend and this is tricky because there are typically avariety of + possible property rights and the manner in which the benefits ofpeace + will be distributed depends on the precise property rights which + areselected (see Box 4.1).In other words, the common interest in peace + cannot be the onlyelement in the liberal explanation of the State, as + any well-defined andpoliced property rights will secure the peace. The + missing element is anaccount of how a particular set of property rights + are selected and thiswould seem to require an analysis of how people + resolve conflicts ofinterest. This is where bargaining theory promises + to make an importantcontribution to the liberal theory of the State + because it is concernedprecisely with interactions of this sort. + +Page 112: + + State creation in Hobbes’s world provides one example (which + especiallyinterests us because it suggests that bargaining theory may + throw light onsome of the claims of liberal political theory with + respect to the State), butthere are many others. + +Page 113: + + The creation of the institutions for enforcing agreements (like the + State)which are presumed by cooperative game theory requires as we have + seenthat agents first solve the bargaining problem non-cooperatively. + +Page 113: + + Indeed for this reason, and following thepractice of most game + theorists, we have so far discussed the non-cooperative play of games + ‘as if ’ there was no communication, therebyimplicitly treating any + communication which does take place in the absenceof an enforcement + agency as so much ‘cheap talk’ + +Page 113: + + In cooperative games agents cantalk to each other and make agreements + which are binding on later play. Innon-cooperative games, no agreements + are binding. Players can say whateverthey like, but there is no + external agency which will enforce that they dowhat they have said they + will do. + +Page 114: + + Thus it will have shown not just what sort of State rational agents + mightagree to create, but also how rational agents might solve a host + of bargainingproblems in social life. Unfortunately we have reasons to + doubt therobustness of this analysis and it is not difficult to see our + grounds forscepticism. If bargaining games resemble the hawk-dove game + and thediscussion in Chapter 2 is right to point to the existence of + multipleequilibria in this game under the standard assumptions of game + theory, thenhow does bargaining theory suddenly manage to generate a + uniqueequilibrium? + +Page 114: + + 114face value, the striking result of the non-cooperative analysis of + thebargaining problem is that it yields the same solution to the + bargainingproblem as the axiomatic approach. If this result is robust, + then it seems thatgame theory will have done an extraordinary service + by showing thatbargaining problems have unique solutions (whichever + route is preferred).Thus it will have shown not just what sort of State + rational agents mightagree to create, but also how rational agents + might solve a host of bargainingproblems in social life. Unfortunately + we have reasons to doubt therobustness of this analysis and it is not + difficult to see our grounds forscepticism. If bargaining games + resemble the hawk-dove game and thediscussion in Chapter 2 is right to + point to the existence of multipleequilibria in this game under the + standard assumptions of game theory, thenhow does bargaining theory + suddenly manage to generate a uniqueequilibrium? + +Page 116: + + A threat or promise which, if carried out, costs more tothe agent who + issued it than if it is not carried out, iscalled an incredible threat + or promise. + +Page 138: + + However, this failure topredict should be welcomed by John Rawls and + Robert Nozick as it providesan opening to their contrasting views of + what counts as justice betweenrational agents. + +Page 138: + + If the Nash solution were unique, then game theory would have + answeredan important question at the heart of liberal theory over the + type of Statewhich rational agents might agree to create. In addition, + it would have solveda question in moral philosophy over what justice + might demand in this and avariety of social interactions. After all, + how to divide the benefits from socialcooperation seems at first sight + to involve a tricky question in moralphilosophy concerning what is + just, but if rational agents will only ever agreeon the Nash division + then there is only one outcome for rational agents.Whether we want to + think of this as just seems optional. But if we do or ifwe think that + justice is involved, then we will know, and for onceunambiguously, what + justice apparently demands between instrumentallyrational + agents.Unfortunately, though, it seems we cannot draw these inferences + becausethe Nash solution is not the unique outcome. Accepting this + conclusion, weare concerned in this section with what bargaining theory + then contributes tothe liberal project of examining the State as if it + were the result of rational + +Page 140: + + behind the veil of ignorance. + +Page 142: + + Torture: Another example in moral philosophy is revealed by the problem + oftorture for utilitarians. For instance, a utilitarian calculation + focuses onoutcomes by summing the individual utilities found in + society. In so doing itdoes not enquire about the fairness or otherwise + of the processes responsiblefor generating those utilities with the + result that it could sanction torture whenthe utility gain of the + torturer exceeds the loss of the person being tortured.Yet most people + would feel uncomfortable with a society which sanctionedtorture on + these grounds because it unfairly transgresses the ‘rights’ of + thetortured. + +Page 143: + + Granted that society (andthe State) are not the result of some + living-room negotiation, what kind of“axioms” would have generated the + social outcomes which we observe in agiven society?’ That is, even if + we reject the preceding fictions (i.e. of the Stateas a massive + resolution of an n-person bargaining game, or of the veil ofignorance) + as theoretically and politically misleading, we may still + pinpointcertain axioms which would have generated the observed income + distributions(or distributions of opportunities, social roles, property + rights, etc.) as a resultof an (utterly) hypothetical bargaining game. + +Page 143: + + Roemer (1988) considers a problem faced by an international + agencycharged with distributing some resources with the aim of + improving health(say lowering infant mortality rates). How should the + authority distributethose resources? This is a particularly tricky + issue because different countriesin the world doubtless subscribe to + some very different principles which theywould regard as relevant to + this problem; and so agreement on a particularrule seems unlikely. + Nevertheless, he suggests that we approach the problemby considering + the following constraints (axioms) which we might want toapply to the + decision rule because they might be the object of significantagreement. + +Page 144: + + rule which allocates resources in such a way as to raise the country + with thelowest infant survival rate to that of the second lowest, and + then if the budgethas not been exhausted, it allocates resources to + these two countries until theyreach the survival rate of the third + lowest country, and so on until the budgetis exhausted. + +Page 147: + + It is tempting to think that the problem only arises here because + theprisoners cannot communicate with one another. If they could get + togetherthey would quickly see that the best for both comes from ‘not + confessing’.But as we saw in the previous chapter, communication is not + all that isneeded. Each still faces the choice of whether to hold to an + agreement that + +Page 148: + + The recognition ofthis predicament helps explain why individuals might + rationally submit to theauthority of a State, which can enforce an + agreement for ‘peace’. Theyvoluntarily relinquish some of their freedom + that they enjoy in the(hypothesised) state of nature to the State + because it unlocks the prisoners’dilemma. (It should be added perhaps + that this is not to be taken as a literalaccount of how all States or + enforcement agencies arise. The point of theargument is to demonstrate + the conditions under which a State or enforcementagency would enjoy + legitimacy among a population even though it restrictedindividual + freedoms.) + +Page 148: + + their normal business with the result that they prosper and enjoy a + more‘commodious’ living (as Hobbes phrased it), choosing strategy + ‘peace’ is like‘not confessing’ above; when everyone behaves in this + manner it is much betterthan when they all choose ‘war’ (’confess’). + However, and in spite of wideranging recognition that peace is better + than war, the same prisoners’ dilemmaproblem surfaces and leads to war. + +Page 148: + + While Hobbes thought that the authority of the State should be absolute + soas to discourage any cheating on ‘peace’, he also thought the scope + of itsinterventions in this regard would be quite minimal. In contrast + much of themodern fascination with the prisoners’ dilemma stems from + the fact that theprisoners’ dilemma seems to be a ubiquitous feature of + social life. Forinstance, it plausibly lies at the heart of many + problems which groups + +Page 148: + + they have struck over ‘not confessing’. Is it in the interest of either + party tokeep to such an agreement? No, a quick inspection reveals that + the bestaction in terms of pay-offs is still to ‘confess’. As Thomas + Hobbes remarkedin Leviathan when studying a similar problem, ‘covenants + struck without thesword are but words’. The prisoners may trumpet the + virtue of ‘notconfessing’ but if they are only motivated instrumentally + by the pay-offs,then it is only so much hot air because each will + ‘confess’ when the timecomes for a decision. + +Page 148: + + What seems to be required to avoid this outcome is a mechanism + whichallows for joint or collective decision making, thus ensuring that + both actuallydo ‘not confess’. In other words, there is a need for a + mechanism for enforcingan agreement—Hobbes’s ‘sword’, if you like. And + it is this recognition whichlies at the heart of a traditional liberal + argument dating back to Hobbes for thecreation of the State which is + seen as the ultimate enforcement agency.(Notice, however, that such an + argument applies equally to some otherinstitutions which have the + capacity to enforce agreements, for example theMafia.) In Hobbes’s + story, each individual in the state of nature can behavepeacefully or + in a war-like fashion. Since peace allows everyone to go about + +Page 149: + + it is notuncommon to find the dilemma treated as the essential model of + social life + +Page 149: + + The following four sectionsand the next chapter, on repeated games, + discuss some of the developmentsin the social science literature which + have been concerned with how thedilemma might be unlocked without the + services of the State. In otherwords, the later sections focus on the + question of whether the widespreadnature of this type of interaction + necessarily points to the (legitimate inliberal terms) creation of an + activist State. Are there other solutions whichcan be implemented + without involving the State or any public institution?Since the scope + of the State’s activities has become one of the mostcontested issues in + contemporary politics, it will come as no surprise todiscover that the + discussions around alternative solutions to the dilemmahave assumed a + central importance in recent political (and especially inliberal and + neoliberal) theory. + +Page 149: + + It arises as a problem of trust in every elemental economic + exchangebecause it is rare for the delivery of a good to be perfectly + synchronised withthe payment for it and this affords the opportunity to + cheat on the + +Page 150: + + These are two-person examples of the dilemma, but it is probably the + ‘n-person’ version of the dilemma (usually called the free rider + problem) which hasattracted most attention. It creates a collective + action problem among groupsof individuals. Again the examples are + legion. + +Page 151: + + The instrumentally rational individual will recognise that the best + action is‘do not attach’ (i.e. defection) whatever the others do. This + means that in apopulation of like-minded individuals, all will decide + similarly with the resultthat each individual gains 2 utils. This is + plainly an inferior outcome for allbecause everyone could have attached + the device and if they all had done soeach would have enjoyed 3 + utils.In these circumstances the individuals in this economy might + agree to theState enforcing attachment of the device. Alternatively, it + is easy to see howanother popular intervention by the State would also + do the trick. The Statecould tax each individual who did not attach the + device a sum equivalent to 2utils and this would turn ‘attach’ (C) into + the dominant strategy. + +Page 151: + + There is nothinglike the State which can enforce contracts within the + household to keep akitchen clean, but interestingly within a family + household one oftenobserves the exercise of patriarchal or paternal + power instead. Of course,the potential difficulty with such an + arrangement is that the patriarch mayrule in a partial manner with the + result that the kitchen is clean but with nohelp from the hands of the + patriarch! The role of the State has in suchcases been captured, so to + speak, by an interested party determined bygender. Then gender becomes + the determinant of who bears the burdenand who has the more privileged + role. Social power which ‘solves’prisoners’ dilemmas can be thus + exercised without the direct involvementof the State (even though the + State often enshrines such power in its owninstitutions). + +Page 152: + + Hence the prisoners’ dilemma/free rider might plausibly lie atthe + distinction which is widely attributed to Marx in the discussion of + classconsciousness between a class ‘of itself’ and ‘for itself’ (see + Elster, 1986b). Onsuch a view a class transforms itself into a ‘class + for itself’, or a society avoidsdeficient demand, by unlocking the + dilemma. + +Page 153: + + Adam Smith’s account of how the self-interest of sellers combines with + thepresence of many sellers to frustrate their designs and to keep + prices lowmight also fit this model of interaction. If you are the + seller choosing from thetwo row strategies C and D, then imagine that C + and D translate into ‘charge ahigh price’ and ‘charge a low price’ + respectively. Figure 5.2 could reflect yourpreference ordering as high + prices for all might be better than low prices forall and charging a + low price when all others charge a high might be the bestoption because + you scoop market share. Presumably the same applies to yourcompetitors. + Thus even though all sellers would be happier with a high level + ofprices, their joint interest is subverted because each acting + individually quiterationally charges a low price. It is as if an + invisible hand was at work onbehalf of the consumers. + +Page 155: + + This is perhaps the most radical departure from the + conventionalinstrumental understanding of what is entailed by + rationality because, whileaccepting the pay-offs, it suggests that + agents should act in a different wayupon them. The notion of + rationality is no longer understood in the means—end framework as the + selection of the means most likely to satisfy given ends. + +Page 155: + + thus enabling‘rationality’ to solve the problem when there are + sufficient numbers ofKantian agents. + +Page 155: + + For instance, we mighthave wrongly assumed earlier that there is no + honour among thieves becauseacting honourably could be connected to + acting rationally in some fullaccount of rationality in which case the + dilemma might be unlocked withoutthe intervention of the State (or some + such agency). This general idea oflinking a richer notion of rational + agency with the spontaneous solution ofthe dilemma has been variously + pursued in the social science literature andthis section and the + following three consider four of the more prominentsuggestions. + +Page 155: + + The first connects rationality with morality and Kant provides a + readyreference. His practical reason demands that we should undertake + thoseactions which when generalised yield the best outcomes. It does + not matterwhether others perform the same calculation and actually + undertake thesame action as you. The morality is deontological and it + is rational for theagent to be guided by a categorical imperative (see + Chapter 1). Consequently,in the free rider problem, the application of + the categorical imperative willinstruct Kantian agents to follow the + cooperative action + +Page 156: + + Similarly partisans in occupied Europe during the Second World War + riskedtheir lives even when it was not clear that it was instrumentally + rational toconfront the Nazis. In such cases, it seems people act on a + sense of what isright. + +Page 156: + + Likewise, Hardin (1982) suggests thatthe existence of environmental and + other voluntary organisations usuallyentails overcoming a free rider + problem and in the USA this may beexplained in part by an American + commitment to a form ofcontractarianism whereby ‘people play fair if + enough others do’ + +Page 156: + + Instead, rationality is conceived more as an expression of what is + possible: ithas become an end in its own right. This is not only + radical, it is alsocontroversial. Deontological moral philosophy is + controversial for the obviousreason that it is not concerned with the + actual consequences of an action, aswell as for the move to connect it + with rationality. (Nevertheless, O’Neill(1989) presents a recent + argument and provides an extended discussion of thismoral psychology + and how it might be applied.)Kant’s morality may seem rather demanding + for these reasons, but thereare weaker or vaguer types of moral + motivation which also seem capableof unlocking the prisoners’ dilemma. + For example, a general altruisticconcern for the welfare of others may + provide a sufficient reason forpeople not to defect on the cooperative + arrangement. + +Page 157: + + Another departure from the strict instrumental model of rational action + comeswhen individuals make decisions in a context of norms and these + norms arecapable of overriding considerations of what is instrumentally + rational. + +Page 157: + + On the other hand, given the well-known difficultiesassociated with any + coherent system of ethics (like utilitarianism), it seemsquite likely + that a person’s ethical concerns will not be captured by a well-behaved + set of preferences (see for instance Sen (1970) on the problems ofbeing + a Paretian Liberal). Indeed rational agents may well base their actions + onreasons which are external to their preferences. + +Page 157: + + Of course, there is a tricky issue concerning whether these rather + weaker orvaguer moral motivations (like altruism, acting on what is + fair or what is right)mark a deep breach with the instrumental model of + action. It might be arguedthat such ethical concerns can be represented + in this model by introducing theconcept of ethical preferences. Thus + the influence of ethical preferencestransforms the pay-offs in the + game. + +Page 158: + + Disputeswithin Aboriginal society are neither perceived as simply + between twoindividuals nor subject to some established community + tribunal. It is for thisreason that the resolution of a major conflict + will involve a significant amountof negotiation between the parties. + Yet the informal laws which govern thecontents of the negotiations are + well entrenched in the tribal culture. Forexample, it is not uncommon + for family members of the perpetrator to beasked to accept ‘punishment’ + if the individual offender is in prison andtherefore unavailable. + +Page 159: + + First World War. This was a war of unprecedentedcarnage both at the + beginning and the end. Yet during a middle period, non-aggression + between the two opposing trenches emerged spontaneously in theform of a + ‘live and let live’ norm. Christmas fraternisation is one + well-knownexample, but the ‘live and let live’ norm was applied much + more widely.Snipers would not shoot during meal times and so both sides + could go abouttheir business ‘talking and laughing’ at these hours. + Artillery was predictablyused both at certain times and at certain + locations. So both sides couldappear to demonstrate aggression by + venturing out at certain times and tocertain locations, knowing that + the shells would fall predictably close to, butnot on, their chosen + route. Likewise, it was not considered ‘etiquette’ to fireon working + parties who had been sent out to repair a position or collect thedead + and so on. + +Page 159: + + For instance, it is sometimes argued that thenorms of Confucian + societies enable those economies to solve the prisoners’dilemma/free + rider problems within companies without costly contracting + andmonitoring activity and that this explains, in part, the economic + success ofthose economies (see Hargreaves Heap, 1991, Casson, 1991, + North, 1991).Akerlof ’s (1983) discussion of loyalty filters, where he + explains the relativesuccess of Quaker groups in North America by their + respect for the norm ofhonesty, is another example— + +Page 160: + + Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations1 is an obvious source for + this viewbecause he would deny that the meaning of something like a + person’sinterests or desires can be divorced from a social setting; and + this is a usefulopportunity to take that argument further. The + attribution of meaningrequires language rules and it is impossible to + have a private language. Thereis a long argument around the possibility + or otherwise of private languagesand it may be worth pursuing the point + in a slightly different way by askinghow agents have knowledge of what + action will satisfy the condition ofbeing instrumentally rational. Any + claim to knowledge involves a firstunquestioned premise: I know this + because I accept x. Otherwise an infiniteregress is inevitable: I + accept x because I accept y and I accept ybecause…and so on. + Accordingly, if each person’s knowledge of what isrational is to be + accessible to one another, then they must share the samefirst premises. + It was Wittgenstein’s point that people must share somepractices if + they are to attach meaning to words and so avoid the problem ofinfinite + redescription which comes with any attempt to specify the rules + forapplying the rules of a language. + +Page 161: + + There is another similarity and difference which might also be + usefullymarked. To make it very crudely one might draw an analogy + between thedifficulty which Wittgenstein encounters over knowledge + claims and a similardifficulty which Simon (1982) addresses. (Herbert + Simon is well known ineconomics for his claim that agents are + procedurally rational, or boundedlyrational, because they do not have + the computing capacity to work out whatis the best to do in complex + settings.) To be sure, Wittgenstein finds theproblem in an infinite + regress of first principles while Simon finds thedifficulty in the + finite computing capacity of the brain. Nevertheless, both + +Page 161: + + discussion of the Harsanyi doctrine because a similar claim seems to + underpinthat doctrine. Namely that all rational individuals must come + to the sameconclusion when faced by the same evidence. Wittgenstein + would agree to theextent that some such shared basis of interpretation + must be present ifcommunication is to be possible. But he would deny + that all societies andpeoples will share the same basis for + interpretations. The source of the sharingfor Wittgenstein is not some + universal ‘rationality’, as it is for Harsanyi; ratherit is the + practices of the community in which the people live, and these willvary + considerably across time and space. + +Page 162: + + let us make the view inspired by Wittgensteinvery concrete. The + suggestion is that what is instrumentally rational is notwell defined + unless one appeals to the prevailing norms of behaviour. Thismay seem a + little strange in the context of a prisoners’ dilemma where thedemands + of instrumental rationality seem plain for all to see: defect! But,in + reply, those radically inspired by Wittgenstein would complain that + thenorms have already been at work in the definition of the matrix and + itspay-offs because it is rare for any social setting to throw up + unvarnishedpay-offs. A social setting requires interpretation before + the pay-offs can beassigned and norms are implicated in those + interpretations. (See forexample Polanyi (1945) who argues, in his + celebrated discussion of the riseof industrial society, that the + incentives of the market system are onlyeffective when the norms of + society place value on private materialadvance.) + +Page 162: + + The last reflection on rationality comes from David Gauthier. He + remainsfirmly in the instrumental camp and ambitiously argues that its + dictates havebeen wrongly understood in the prisoners’ dilemma game. + Instrumental rationalitydemands cooperation and not defection! To make + his argument he distinguishesbetween two sorts of maximisers: a + straightforward maximiser (SM) and aconstrained maximiser (CM). A + straightforward maximiser defects (D)following the same logic that we + have used so far. The constrained maximiseruses a conditional strategy + of cooperating (C) with fellow constrainedmaximisers and defecting with + straightforward maximisers. He then asks:which disposition + (straightforward or constrained) should an instrumentallyrational + person choose to have? (The decision can be usefully compared with + asimilar one confronting Ulysses in connection with listening to the + Sirens, + +Page 164: + + The point is that if instrumental rationality is what motivates the CM + inthe prisoners’ dilemma, then a CM must want to defect + +Page 164: + + In other words, being a CM may be better than beingan SM, but the best + strategy of all is to label yourself a CM and then cheaton the deal. + And, of course, when people do this, we are back in a worldwhere + everyone defects. + +Page 164: + + Surely, this line of argument goes,it pays not to ‘zap’ a fellow CM + because your reputation as a CM is therebypreserved and this enables + you to interact more fruitfully with fellow CMs inthe future. Should + you zap a fellow CM now, then everyone will know that youare a rogue + and so in your future interactions, you will be treated as an SM. + Inshort, in a repeated setting, it pays to forgo the short run gain + from defectingbecause this ensures the benefits of cooperation over the + long run. Thusinstrumental calculation can make true CM behaviour the + best course ofaction. + +Page 165: + + Moreover, it achieved aremarkable degree of cooperation. + +Page 165: + + each program.Tit-for-Tat, submitted by Anatol Rapoport, won the + tournament. Theprogram starts with a cooperative move and then does + whatever theopponent did on the previous move. It was, as Axelrod + points out, not onlythe simplest program, it was also the best! + +Page 165: + + dilemma can be defeated without the intervention of a collective agency + likethe State—that is, provided the interaction is repeated + sufficiently often tomake the long term benefits outweigh the short + gains. + +Page 166: + + ‘Is the Prisoners’ dilemma all of sociology?’Of course, it is not, he + answers. Nevertheless, it has fascinated social scientistsand proved + extremely difficult to unlock in one-shot plays of the game—atleast, + without the creation of a coercive agency like the State which is + capableof enforcing a collective action or without the introduction of + norms or somesuitable form of moral motivation on the part of the + individuals playing thegame. Of course, many interactions are repeated + and so this stark conclusionmay be modified by the discussion of the + next chapter. + +Page 167: + + Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, mutualdefection remains the only Nash + equilibrium. The following two sectionsdiscuss, respectively, + indefinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma and therelated free rider + games. We show (section 6.4) that mutual cooperation isa possible Nash + equilibrium outcome in these games provided there is a‘sufficient’ + degree of uncertainty over when the repetition will cease.There are + some significant implications here both for liberal politicaltheory and + for the explanatory power of game theory. We notice that thisresult + means that mutual cooperation might be achieved without theintervention + of a collective agency like the State and/or withoutappealing to some + expanded notion of rational agency + +Page 168: + + the absence of a theory of equilibriumselection. + +Page 170: + + Firstly, it provides a theoretical warrant for the belief that + cooperation in theprisoners’ dilemma can be rationally sustained + without the intervention ofsome collective agency like the State, + provided there is sufficient (to be definedlater) doubt over when the + repeated game will end. Thus the presence of aprisoners’ dilemma + interaction does not necessarily entail either a poor socialoutcome or + the institutions of formal collective decision making. The + thirdalternative is for players to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy + rationally.1 If they adoptthis third alternative the socially inferior + outcome of mutual defection will beavoided without the interfering + presence of the State or some other formal(coercive) institution. + +Page 171: + + Equally, it is probable that both prisonersin the original example may + think twice about ‘confessing’ because each knowsthat they are likely + to encounter one another again (if not in prison, at leastoutside) and + so there are likely to be opportunities for exacting ‘punishment’ ata + later date. + +Page 171: + + Folk theorem + +Page 172: + + This is an extremely important result for the social sciences because + itmeans that there are always multiple Nash equilibria in such + indefinitelyrepeated games. Hence, even if Nash is accepted as the + appropriateequilibrium concept for games with individuals who are + instrumentally rationaland who have common knowledge of that + rationality, it will not explain howindividuals select their strategies + because there are many strategy pairs whichform Nash equilibria in + these repeated games. Of course, we have encounteredthis problem in + some one-shot games before, but the importance of this resultis that it + means the problem is always there in indefinitely repeated games.Even + worse, it is amplified by repetition. In other words, game theory needs + tobe supplemented by a theory of equilibrium selection if it is to + explain actionin these indefinitely repeated games, especially if it is + to explain howcooperation actually arises spontaneously in indefinitely + repeated prisoners’dilemma games. + +Page 175: + + Now consider a tit-for-tat strategy in this group which works in + thefollowing way. The strategy partitions the group into those who are + in ‘goodstanding’ and those who are in ‘no standing’ based on whether + the individualcontributed to the collective fund in the last time + period. Those in ‘goodstanding’ are eligible for the receipt of help + from the group if they fall ‘ill’ thistime period, whereas those who + are in ‘no standing’ are not eligible for help.Thus tit-for-tat + specifies cooperation and puts you in ‘good standing’ for thereceipt of + a benefit if you fall ‘ill’ (alternatively, to connect with the + earlierdiscussion, one might think of cooperating as securing a + ‘reputation’ whichputs one in ‘good standing’ + +Page 175: + + Notice your decision now will determine whether you are in ‘good + standing’from now until the next opportunity that you get to make this + decision (whichwill be the next period if you do not fall ‘ill’ or the + period after that if you fall‘ill’). So we focus on the returns from + your choice now until you next get theopportunity to choose. + +Page 176: + + Who needs the State? + +Page 176: + + Here we pick up threads of the Hobbesianargument for the State and see + what the result holds for this argument. At firstglance, the argument + for the State seems to be weakened because it appearsthat a group can + overcome the free rider problem without recourse to theState for + contract enforcement. So long as the group can punish free riders + byexcluding them from the benefits of cooperation (as for instance the + Pygmiespunished Cephu—see Chapter 5), then there is the possibility of + ‘spontaneous’public good provision through the generalisation of the + tit-for-tat strategy.Having noted this, nevertheless, the point seems + almost immediately to beblunted since the difference between a + Hobbesian State which enforcescollective agreements and the generalised + tit-for-tat arrangement is notaltogether clear and so in proving one we + are hardly undermining the other.After all, the State merely codifies + and implements the policies of‘punishment’ on behalf of others in a + very public way (with the rituals ofpolice stations, courts and the + like). But, is this any different from the golfclub which excludes a + member from the greens when the dues have not beenpaid or the Pygmies’ + behaviour towards Cephu? Or the gang which excludespeople who have not + contributed ‘booty’ to the common fund? + +Page 176: + + Box 6.2 + +Page 178: + + contract—that the creation of the State by the individual also helps + shape asuperior individual.) Hayek, however, prefers the ‘English + tradition’ because hedoubts (a) that the formation of the State is part + of a process which liberates(and moulds) the social agent and (b) that + there is the knowledge to informsome central design so that it can + perform the task of resolving free ridingbetter than spontaneously + generated solutions (like tit-for-tat). In other words,reason should + know its limits and this is what informs Hayek’s support forEnglish + pragmatism and its suspicion of the State.Of course there is a big ‘if + in Hayek’s argument. Although Beirut stillmanaged to function without a + grand design, most of its citizens prayed forone. In short, the + spontaneous solution is not always the best. Indeed, as wehave seen, + the cooperative solution is just one among many Nash equilibria + inrepeated games, so in the absence of some machinery of collective + decisionmaking, there seems no guarantee it will be selected. Against + this, however, itis sometimes argued that evolution will favour + practices which generate thecooperative outcome since societies that + achieve cooperation in these gameswill prosper as compared with those + which are locked in mutual defection.This is the cue for a discussion + of evolutionary game theory and we shall leavefurther discussion of the + State until we turn to evolutionary game theory + +Page 178: + + Instead the result seems important because it demythologises the + State.Firstly the State qua State (that is, the State with its police + force, its courts andthe like) is not required to intrude into every + social interaction which suffersfrom a free rider problem. There are + many practices and institutions which aresurrogates for the State in + this regard. Indeed, the Mafia has plausiblydisplaced the State in + certain areas precisely because it provides the services ofa State. + Likewise, during the long civil war years inhabitants of Beirutsomehow + still managed to maintain services which required the overcoming offree + rider problems.Secondly since something like the State as contract + enforcer might well arise‘spontaneously’ through the playing of free + rider games repeatedly, it need notrequire any grand design. There need + be no constitutional conventions. In thisway the result counts strongly + for what Hayek (1962) refers to as the Englishas opposed to the + European continental Enlightenment tradition. The latterstresses the + power of reason to construct institutions that overcome problemslike + those of the free rider. (It also often presupposes—recall Rousseau’s + social + +Page 178: + + different if you pay the State in the form of taxes or the Mafia in the + form oftribute? + +Page 185: + + example comes from strategicdecisions by the legislature when the + Executive is trying to push throughParliament a series of bills that + the latter is unsympathetic towards. + +Page 185: + + President proposes legislation. The Congress is notin sympathy with the + proposal and must decide whether to make amendments.If it decides to + make an amendment, then the President must decide whetherto fight the + amendment or acquiesce. Looking at the President’s pay-offs it + isobvious that, even though he or she prefers that the Congress does + not amendthe legislation, if it does, he or she would not want to fight + +Page 186: + + the Folk theorem ensures that aninfinity of war/acquiescence patterns + are compatible with instrumentalrationality. Nevertheless, the duration + of such games is usually finite andsometimes their length is + definite—e.g. US Presidents have a fixed term andincumbents have only a + fixed number of local markets that they wish todefend. What happens + then? Would it make sense for the President or theincumbent to put on a + show of strength early on (e.g. by fighting the Congressor unleashing a + price war) in order to create a reputation for belligerence thatwould + make the Congress and the entrant think that, in future rounds, + theywill end up with pay-off -1/2 if they dare them? + +Page 186: + + In the finitely repeated version of the game Nash backward + inductionargues against this conclusion. Just as in the case of the + prisoners’ dilemmain the previous subsection, it suggests that, since + there will be no fighting atthe last play of the game, the reputation + of the President/incumbent willunravel to the first stage and no + fighting will occur (rationally). Theconclusion changes again once we + drop CKR (or allow for different types ofplayers). + +Page 190: + + Of course, there may be actions that can be takenoutside the game and + which have a similar effect on the beliefs of others. Such‘signalling’ + behaviour is considered briefly in this section to round out + thediscussion of reputations. It is of potential relevance not only to + repeated, butalso to one-shot games. + +Page 192: + + when the game isrepeated and there is a unique Nash equilibrium things + change. The Nashequilibrium is attractive because as time goes by and + agents adjust theirexpectations of what others will do in the light of + experience, then they willseem naturally drawn to the Nash equilibrium + because it is the only restingplace for beliefs. Any other set of + beliefs will upset itself. + +Page 192: + + Nevertheless, there is still no guarantee that a Nash equilibrium + willsurface even if it exists and it is unique. + +Page 193: + + The strength of the Nash equilibrium is that forward looking agents + mayrealise that (R2, C2) is the only outcome that does not engender + such thoughts.We just saw that adaptive (or backward looking) + expectations will not do thetrick. If, however, after having been + around the pay-off matrix a few timesplayers ask themselves the + question ‘How can we reach a stable outcome?’,they may very well + conclude that the only such outcome is the Nashequilibrium (R2, C2).But + why would they want to ask such a question? What is so wrong + withinstability (and disequilibrium) after all? Indeed in the case of + Figure 2.6 ourplayers have an incentive to avoid a stable outcome + (observe that on averagethe cycle which takes them from one extremity + of the pay-off matrix toanother yields a much higher pay-off than the + Nash equilibrium result). If, onthe other hand, pay-offs were as in + Figure 6.4 below, they would be stronglymotivated to reach the Nash + equilibrium. + +Page 193: + + It is easy to see that this type of adaptivelearning will never lead + the players to the Nash equilibrium outcome (R2, C2).Instead, they will + be oscillating between outcomes (R1, C1), (R1, C3), (R3, C1)and (R3, + C3).Can they break away from this never ending cycle and hit the + Nashequilibrium? They can provided they converge onto a common + forwardlooking train of thought. For + +Page 194: + + Thus we conclude that whether repetition makes the Nashequilibrium more + or less likely when it is unique must depend on thecontingencies of how + people learn and the precise pay-offs from non-Nashbehaviour. + +Page 194: + + Broadly put, this is one and the same problem. It is a problem + withspecifying how agents come to hold beliefs which are extraneous to + the game(in the sense that they cannot be generated endogenously + through theapplication of the assumptions of instrumental rationality + and commonknowledge of instrumental rationality) + +Page 195: + + the insights of evolutionary game theory arecrucial material for many + political and philosophical debates, especially thosearound the State. + +Page 195: + + The argument for suchan agency turns on the general problem of + equilibrium selection and on theparticular difficulty of overcoming the + prisoners’ dilemma. When there aremultiple equilibria, the State can, + through suitable action on its own part, guidethe outcomes towards one + equilibrium rather than another. Thus the problemof equilibrium + selection is solved by bringing it within the ambit of + consciouspolitical decision making. Likewise, with the prisoners’ + dilemma/ free riderproblem, the State can provide the services of + enforcement. Alternativelywhen the game is repeated sufficiently and + the issue again becomes one ofequilibrium selection, then the State can + guide the outcomes towards thecooperative Nash equilibrium. + +Page 195: + + intransigent Right’ + +Page 196: + + —that is, the idea that you can turn social outcomes intomatters of + social choice through the intervention of a collective action + agencylike the State. The positive argument against ‘political + rationalism’, as the quoteabove suggests, turns on the idea that these + interventions are not evennecessary. The failure to intervene does not + spell chaos, chronic indecision,fluctuations and outcomes in which + everyone is worse off than they couldhave been. Instead, a ‘spontaneous + order’ will be thrown up as a result ofevolutionary processes. + +Page 196: + + Likewise, there are problems of ‘political failure’ that subvert the + ideal ofdemocratic decision making and which can match the market + failures that theState is attempting to rectify. For example, Buchanan + and Wagner (1977) andTullock (1965) argue that special interests are + bound to skew ‘democraticdecisions’ towards excessively large + bureaucracies and high governmentexpenditures. Furthermore there are + difficulties, especially after the Arrowimpossibility theorem, with + making sense of the very idea of something likethe ‘will of the people’ + in whose name the State might be acting (see Arrow,1951, Riker, 1982, + Hayek, 1962, and Buchanan, 1954).1These, so to speak, are a shorthand + list of the negative arguments comingfrom the political right against + ‘political rationalism’ or ‘socialconstructivism’ + +Page 196: + + Forinstance, there are problems of inadequate knowledge which can mean + thateven the best intentioned and executed political decision generates + unintendedand undesirable consequences. Indeed this has always been an + importanttheme in Austrian economics, featuring strongly in the 1920s + debate over thepossibility of socialist planning as well as + contemporary doubts over thewisdom of more minor forms of State + intervention. + +Page 196: + + Hayek (1962) himself tracesthe battlelines in the dispute back to the + beginning of Enlightenmentthinking:Hayek distinguished two intellectual + lines of thought about freedom, ofradically opposite upshot. The first + was an empiricist, essentially Britishtradition descending from Hume, + Smith and Ferguson, and seconded byBurke and Tucker, which understood + political development as aninvoluntary process of gradual institutional + improvement, comparable tothe workings of a market economy or the + evolution of common law. Thesecond was a rationalist, typically French + lineage descending fromDescartes through Condorcet to Comte, with a + horde of modernsuccessors, which saw social institutions as fit for + premeditatedconstruction, in the spirit of polytechnic engineering. The + former lineled to real liberty; the latter inevitably destroyed it. + +Page 197: + + evolutionary stable strategies + +Page 197: + + In particular, wesuggest that the evolutionary approach can help + elucidate the idea that poweris mobilised through institutions and + conventions. We conclude the chapterwith a summing-up of where the + issue of equilibrium selection and the debateover the State stands + after the contribution of the evolutionary approach. + +Page 197: + + The basic idea behind this equilibrium concept is that an ESS is a + strategywhich when used among some population cannot be ‘invaded’ by + anotherstrategy because it cannot be bested. So when a population uses + a strategy I,‘mutants’ using any other strategy J cannot get a toehold + and expand amongthat population. + +Page 197: + + This is why evolutionary game theory assumes significance in the + debateover an active State. It should help assess the claims of + ‘spontaneous order’made by those in the British corner and so advance + one of the central debatesin Enlightenment political thinking. + +Page 198: + + This is, if youlike, a version of Hobbes’s nightmare where there are no + property rightsand everyone you come across will potentially claim your + goods. + +Page 202: + + Secondly, and more specifically, there is the result that although the + symmetricalplay of this game yields a unique equilibrium, it becomes + unstable the momentrole playing begins and some players start to + recognise asymmetry. Sincecreative agents seem likely to experiment + with different ways of playing thegame, it would be surprising if there + was never some deviation based on anasymmetry. Indeed it would be more + than surprising because there is muchevidence to support the idea that + people look for ‘extraneous’ reasons whichmight explain what are in + fact purely random types of behaviour (see theadjacent box on winning + streaks).Formally, this leaves us with the old problem of how the + solution to thegame comes about. However, evolutionary game theory does + at least point usin the direction of an answer. The phase diagram in + Figure 7.2 reveals that theselection of an equilibrium depends + critically on the initial set of beliefs + +Page 202: + + once animperfect form of rationality is posited. In other words, it is + not beingdeduced as an implication of the common knowledge of + rationalityassumption which has been the traditional approach of + mainstream gametheory. + +Page 203: + + Thirdly, it can be noted that the selection of one ESS rather than + anotherembodies a convention + +Page 203: + + To put these observationsrather less blandly, since rationality on this + account is only responsible for thegeneral impulse towards mimicking + profitable behaviour, the history of thegame depends in part on what + are the idiosyncratic and unpredictable (non-rational, one might say, + as opposed to irrational) features of individual beliefsand learning. + +Page 204: + + Fourthly, the selection of one equilibrium rather than another + potentiallymatters rather deeply. In effect in the hawk—dove game over + contestedproperty, what happens in the course of moving to one of the + ESSs is theestablishment of a form of property rights. Either those + playing role R get theproperty and role C players concede this right, + or those playing role C get theproperty and role R players concede this + right. This is interesting not onlybecause it contains the kernel of a + possible explanation of property rights (onwhich we shall say more + later) but also because the probability of playing roleR or role C is + unlikely to be distributed uniformly over the population. Indeed,this + distribution will depend on whatever is the source of the distinction + usedto assign people to roles. + +Page 204: + + The question, then, of how a source of differentiation gets + establishedbecomes rather important. + +Page 204: + + Thus the behaviour at one of theseESSs is conventionally determined + and, to repeat the earlier point, we can plotthe emergence of a + particular convention with the use of this phase diagram.It will depend + both on the presumption that agents learn from experience(the rational + component of the explanation) and on the particularidiosyncratic (and + non-rational) features of initial beliefs and precise learningrules. + +Page 206: + + After all, perhaps the presence of these conventions can only + beaccounted for by a move towards a Wittgensteinian ontology, in which + casemainstream game theory’s foundations look decidedly wobbly. To + prevent thisdrift a more robust response is required.The alternative + response is to deny that the appeal to shared prominenceor salience + involves either an infinite regress or an acknowledgement + thatindividuals are necessarily ontologically social + +Page 206: + + There is a further and deeper problem with the concept of salience + basedon analogy because the attribution of terms like ‘possession’ + plainly begs thequestion by presupposing the existence of some sort of + property rights in thepast. In other words, people already share a + convention in the past and this isbeing used to explain a closely + related convention in the present. Thus we havenot got to the bottom of + the question concerning how people come to holdconventions in the first + place.3 + +Page 206: + + So, of course, we cannot hope to explainhow they actually achieve a new + coordination without appealing to thosebackground conventions. In this + sense, it would be foolish for socialscientists (and game theorists, in + particular) to ignore the social context inwhich individuals play new + games. + +Page 208: + + This conclusion reinforces the earlier result that the course of + historydepends in part on what seem from the instrumental account of + rationalbehaviour to be non-rational (and perhaps idiosyncratic) and + thereforefeatures of human beliefs and action which are difficult to + predict + +Page 209: + + mechanically. One can interpret this in the spirit of + methodologicalindividualism at the expense of conceding that + individuals are, in this regard,importantly unpredictable. On the one + hand, this does not look good for theexplanatory claims of the theory. + On the other hand, to render theindividuals predictable, it seems that + they must be given a shared history andthis will only raise the + methodological concern again of whether we canaccount for this sharing + satisfactorily without a changed ontology. Insummary, if individuals + are afforded a shared history, then social context is‘behind’ no one + and ‘in’ everyone and then the question is whether it is agood idea to + analyse behaviour by assuming (as methodological individualistsdo) the + separability of context and action.4 + +Page 213: + + The underlying point here is that discrimination may be + evolutionarystable if the dominated cannot find ways of challenging the + social conventionthat supports their subjugation. This conclusion is + not necessarily rightbecause there are other potential sources of + change. The insight that we preferto draw is that individual attempts + to buck an established convention areunlikely to succeed, whereas the + same is not true when individuals takecollective action. + +Page 213: + + Stasis, status quo: Thus the introduction of a convention will benefit + the average person, butif you happen to be so placed with respect to + the convention that you onlyplay the dominant role with a probability + of less than 1/3, then you would bebetter off without the convention. + This result may seem puzzling at first: whydo the people who play a + dominant role less than 1/3 of the time not revert tothe symmetric play + of the game and so undermine the convention? The answeris that even + though the individual would be better off if everyone quit + theconvention, it does not make sense to do so individually. After all, + aconvention will tell your opponent to play either H or D, and then + instruct youto play D or H respectively; and you can do no better than + follow thisconvention since the best reply to H remains D and likewise + the best reply toD is H. It is just tough luck if you happen to get the + D instruction all thetime!We take the force of this individual + calculation to be a powerful contributorto the status quo and it might + seem to reveal that evolutionary processes yieldto stasis. + +Page 213: + + Conventions, inequality and revolt + +Page 214: + + To summarise, we should expect a convention to emerge even though itmay + not suit everyone, or indeed even if it short-changes the majority. It + maybe discriminatory, inequitable, non-rational, indeed thoroughly + disagreeable, yetsome such convention is likely to arise whenever a + social interaction like hawk-dove is repeated. Which convention emerges + will depend on the sharedsalience of extraneous features of the + interaction, initial beliefs and the waythat people learn. + +Page 214: + + Standstill: A potential weakness of evolutionary game theory has just + becomeapparent. Once the bandwagon has come to a standstill, and one + conventionhas been selected, the theory cannot account for a potential + subversion of theestablished convention. Such an account would require, + as we argued in theprevious paragraph, an understanding of political + (that is, collective) actionbased on a more active form of human agency + than the one provided byinstrumental rationality. Can evolutionary game + theory go as far? + +Page 219: + + Recall the idea of a trembling hand in section 2.7.1 and suppose + thatplayers make mistakes sometimes. In particular, when they intend + tocooperate they occasionally execute the decision wrongly and they + defect. Inthese circumstances, playing t punishes you for the mistake + endlessly becauseit means that your opponent defects next round in + response to your mistakendefection. If in the next period you + cooperate, you are bound to get zapped.If you follow your t-strategy + next time, then you will be defecting while youropponent will be + cooperating and a frustrating sequence of alternatingdefections and + cooperations will ensue. One way out of this bind is toamend t to t’ + whereby, if you defect by mistake, then you cooperate twiceafterwards: + the first time as a gesture of acknowledging your mistake and thesecond + in order to coordinate your cooperative behaviour with that of + youropponent. In other words, the amended tit-for-tat instructs you to + cooperatein response to a defection which has been provoked by an + earlier mistakendefection on your part. + +Page 219: + + Eventhough strategy C would do equally well as a reply to t’, if your + opponentmade the mistake (last period) then you know that your opponent + willcooperate in the next two rounds no matter what you do this period. + Thusyour best response in this round is to defect + +Page 221: + + Conventions as covert social power + +Page 221: + + even more covert power that comes from being able to mould the + preferencesand the beliefs of others so that a conflict of interest is + not even latentlypresent. + +Page 221: + + with the interests of another.It is common in discussions of power to + distinguish between the overt andthe covert exercise of power. Thus, + for instance, Lukes (1974) distinguishesthree dimensions of power. + There is the power that is exercised in the politicalor the economic + arena where individuals, or firms, institutions, etc., are able + tosecure decisions which favour their interests over others quite + overtly. This isthe overt exercise of power along the first dimension. + In addition, there is themore covert power that comes from keeping + certain items off the politicalagenda. Some things simply do not get + discussed in the political arena and inthis way the status quo + persists. Yet the status quo advantages some rather thanothers and so + this privileging of the status quo by keeping certain issues offthe + political agenda is the second dimension of power. Finally, there is + the + +Page 222: + + The figure of Spartacus captured imaginations over theages, not so much + because of his military antics, but because he personifiedthe + possibility of liberating the slaves from the beliefs which sustained + theirsubjugation. + +Page 222: + + this is the power which works through the mind and which dependsfor its + influence on the involvement or agreement of large numbers of + thepopulation (again connecting with the earlier observation about the + force ofcollective action). + +Page 222: + + State were consciously to select a convention in these circumstances + thenwe might observe the kind of political haggling associated with the + overtexercise of power. Naturally when a convention emerges + spontaneously, we donot observe this because there is no arena for the + haggling to occur, yet theemergence of a convention is no less decisive + than a conscious politicalresolution in resolving the conflict of + interest.6Evolutionary game theory also helps reveal the part played by + beliefs,especially the beliefs of the subordinate group, in securing + the power of thedominant group (a point, for example, which is central + to Gramsci’s notion ofhegemony and Hart’s contention that the power of + the law requires voluntarycooperation). + +Page 224: + + Theannexing of virtue can happen as a result of well-recognised + patterns ofcognition. + +Page 224: + + Of course, like all theories of cognitive dissonance removal,this story + begs the question of whether the adjustment of beliefs can do thetrick + once one knows that the beliefs have been adjusted for the + purpose.Nevertheless, there seem to be plenty of examples of dissonance + removal + +Page 225: + + Our final illustration of how evolutionary game theory might help + sharpenour understanding of debates around power in the social sciences + relates tothe question of how gender and race power distributions are + constitutedand persist. The persistence of these power imbalances is a + puzzle to some. + +Page 227: + + Once a convention isestablished in this game, a set of property + relations are also established.Hence the convention could encode a set + of class relations for this gamebecause it will, in effect, indicate + who owns what and some may end upowning rather a lot when others own + scarcely anything. However, as wehave seen a convention of this sort + will only emerge once the game isplayed asymmetrically and this + requires an appeal to some piece ofextraneous information like sex or + age or race, etc. In short, the creationof private property relations + from the repeated play of these gamesdepends on the use of some other + asymmetry and so it is actuallyimpossible to imagine a situation of + pure class relations, as they couldnever emerge from an evolutionary + historical process. Or to put thisslightly differently: asymmetries + always go in twos!This understanding of the relation has further + interesting implications.For instance, an attack on gender + stratification is in part an attack on classstratification and vice + versa. + +Page 227: + + Likewise, however, it would be wrong toimagine that the attack on + either if successful would spell the end of theother. + +Page 227: + + On this account of powerthrough the working of convention, the + ideological battle aimed atpersuading people not to think of themselves + as subordinate is half thebattle because these beliefs are part of the + way that power is mobilised. + +Page 228: + + . The feedback mechanism, however, ispresent in this analysis and it + arises because there is ‘learning’. It is theassumption that people + shift towards practices which secure better outcomes(without knowing + quite why the practice works for the best) which is thefeedback + mechanism responsible for selecting the practices. Thus in the + debateover functional explanation, the analysis of evolutionary games + lends supportto van Parijs’s (1982) argument that ‘learning’ might + supply the generalfeedback mechanism for the social sciences which will + license functionalexplanations in exactly the same way as natural + selection does in the biologicalsciences. + +Page 228: + + effect, the explanation of gender and racial inequalities using + thisevolutionary model is an example of functional argument. + +Page 228: + + The differencebetween men and women or between whites and blacks has no + merit inthe sense that it does not explain why the differentiation + persists. Thedifferentiation has the unintended consequence of helping + the populationto coordinate its decision making in settings where there + are benefitsfrom coordination. It is this function of helping the + population to selectan equilibrium in a situation which would otherwise + suffer from theconfusion of multiple equilibria which explains the + persistence of thedifferentiation. + +Page 229: + + So far, however, the difference between the two camps (H&EVGT andMarx) + is purely based on value judgements: one argues that illusory moralsare + good for all, the other that they are not. In this sense, both + canprofitably make use of the analysis in evolutionary game theory. + Indeed, aswe have already implied in section 7.3.4, a radical political + project grounded + +Page 229: + + On the side of H&EVGT, Hume thinks that suchillusions play a positive + role (in providing the ‘cement’ which keeps societytogether) in + relation to the common good. So do neo-Humeans (like Sugden)who are, of + course, less confident that invocation of the ‘common good’ is agood + idea (as we mentioned in section 7.6.2) but who are still happy to + seeconventions (because of the order they bring) become entrenched in + sociallife even if this is achieved with the help of a few moral + ‘illusions’. On theother side, however, Marx insists that moral + illusions are never a good idea(indeed he dislikes all illusions). + Especially since, as he sees it, their socialfunction is to help some + dreadful conventions survive (recall how in section7.3.4 we showed that + disagreeable conventions may become stable even ifthey are detrimental + to the majority). Marx believed that we can + +Page 229: + + which sound quite like observations that Marxists might make: + theimportance of taking collective action if one wants to change a + convention;how power can be covertly exercised; how beliefs + (particularly moral beliefs)may become endogenous to the conventions we + follow; how propertyrelations might develop functionally; and so on. + +Page 229: + + Indeedmost of the ideas developed on the basis of H&EVGT in the + precedingpages would find Marx in agreement. + +Page 229: + + People may think that their beliefson such matters go beyond material + values (i.e. self-interest, which in ourcontext means pay-offs); that + they respond to certain universal ideals aboutwhat is ‘good’ and + ‘right’, when all along their moral beliefs are a direct(even if + unpredictable) repercussion of material conditions and interests. + +Page 230: + + An analysis of hawk—dove games, along the lines of H&EVGT, helpsexplain + the evolution of property rights in primitive societies. Once + theserights are in place and social production is under way, each group + in society(e.g. the owners of productive means, or those who do not own + tools, land,machines, etc.) develops its own interest. And since (as + H&EVGT concurs)conventions evolve in response to such interests, it is + not surprising thatdifferent conventions are generated within different + social groups in responseto the different interests. The result is + conflicting sets of conventions which + +Page 230: + + Finally, the established (stable) conventions acquire moral weight and + even leadpeople to believe in something called the common good—which is + most likelyanother illusion + +Page 230: + + In summary, H&EVGTbegins with a behavioural theory based on the + individual interest and eventuallylands on its agreeable by-product: + the species interest. There is nothing inbetween the two types of + interest. By contrast, Marx posits another type ofinterest in between: + class interest.Marx’s argument is that humans are very different from + other speciesbecause we produce commodities in an organised way before + distributingthem. Whereas other species share the fruits of nature + (hawk—dove games aretherefore ‘naturally’ pertinent in their state of + nature), humans have developedcomplex social mechanisms for producing + goods. Naturally, the norms ofdistribution come to depend on the + structure of these productive mechanisms.They involve a division of + labour and lead to social divisions (classes). Whichclass a person + belongs to depends on his or her location (relative to others)within + the process of production. The moment collective production (as in + thecase of Cephu and his tribe in Chapter 5) gave its place to a + separationbetween those who owned the tools of production and those who + workedthose tools, then groups with significantly different (and often + contradictory)interests developed. + +Page 230: + + in collective action is as compatible with evolutionary game theory as + is theneo-Humeanism of Sugden (1986, 1989). But is there something more + inMarx than a left wing interpretation of evolutionary game theory? We + thinkthere is. + +Page 231: + + lead to conflicting morals. Each set of morals becomes an ideology.9 + Which setof morals (or ideology) prevails at any given time? Marx + thinks that, inevitably,the social class which is dominant in the + sphere of production and distributionwill also be the one whose set of + conventions and morals (i.e. whose ideology)will come to dominate over + society as a whole.To sum up Marx’s argument so far, prevailing moral + beliefs are illusoryproducts of a social selection process where the + driving force is not somesubjective individual interest but objective + class interest rooted in thetechnology and relations of production. + Although there are many conflictingnorms and morals, at any particular + time the morality of the ruling class isuniquely evolutionary stable. + The mélange of legislation, moral codes, norms,etc., reflects this + dominant ideology.But is there a fundamental difference between the + method of H&EVGTand Marx? Or is it just a matter of introducing classes + in the analysiswithout changing the method? + +Page 231: + + So, how would Marx respond to evolutionary game theory if he werearound + today? He would, we think, be very interested in some of the + radicalconclusions in this chapter. However, he would also speak + derisively of thematerialism of H&EVGT Marx habitually poured scorn on + those (e.g.Spinoza and Feuerbach) who transplanted models from the + natural sciencesto the social sciences with little or no modification + to allow for the fact thathuman beings are very different to atoms, + planets and molecules.12 Wemention this because at the heart of H&EVGT + lies a simple Darwinianmechanism (witness that there is no analytical + difference between the modelsin the biology of John Maynard Smith and + the models in this chapter). Marxwould probably claim that the theory + is not sufficiently evolutionary because(a) its mechanism comes to a + standstill once a stable convention has evolved,and (b) of its reliance + on instrumental rationality which reduces humanactions to passive + reflex responses to some (meta-physical) self-interest. + +Page 232: + + Especially in hisphilosophical (as opposed to economic) works, Marx + argued strongly for anevolutionary (or more precisely historical) + theory of society with a modelof human agency which retains human + activity as a positive (creative) forceat its core. In addition, Marx + often spoke out against mechanism; againstmodels borrowed directly from + the natural sciences (astronomy andbiology are two examples that he + warned against). It is helpful to preservesuch an aversion since humans + are ontologically different to atoms andgenes. Of course Marx himself + has been accused of mechanism and,indeed, in the modern (primarily + Anglo-Saxon) social theory literature he istaken to be an exemplar of + 19th century mechanism. Nevertheless hewould deny this, pointing to the + dialectical method he borrowed fromHegel and which (he would claim) + allowed him to have a scientific, yetnon-mechanistic, outlook. Do we + believe him? As authors we disagree here.SHH does not, while YV does. + +Page 232: + + Of course there is always the answer that self-interest feeds into + moral beliefsand then moral beliefs feed back into self-interest and + alter people’s desires.And so on. But that would be too circular for + Marx. It would not explainwhere the process started and where it is + going. By contrast, his version ofmaterialism (which he labelled + historical materialism) starts from thetechnology of production and the + corresponding social organisation. Thelatter entails social classes + which in turn imbue people with interests; peopleact on those interests + and, mostly without knowing it, they shape theconventions of social + life which then give rise to morals. The process,however, is grounded + on the technology of production at the beginning of thechain. And as + this changes (through technological innovations) it provides theimpetus + for the destabilisation of the (temporarily) evolutionary + stableconventions at the other end of the chain. + +Page 232: + + Ifmorals are socially manufactured, then so is self-interest. + +Page 233: + + Perhaps our disagreement needs to be understood in terms of thelack of + a shared history in relation to these debates—one of us embarkingfrom + an Anglo-Saxon, the other from a (south) European, tradition. It + was,after all, one of our important points in earlier chapters that + game theoristsshould not expect a convergence of beliefs unless agents + have a sharedhistory! + +Page 234: + + most of the population. This would seem to provide ammunition for the + socialconstructivists, but of course it depends on them believing that + collectiveaction agencies like the State will have sufficient + information to distinguish thesuperior outcomes. Perhaps all that can + be said on this matter is that, if youreally believe that evolutionary + forces will do the best that is possible, then it isbeyond dispute that + these forces have thrown up people who are predisposedto take + collective action. Thus it might be argued that our + evolutionarysuperiority as a species derives in part precisely from the + fact that we are pro-active through collective action agencies rather + than reactive as we would beunder a simple evolutionary scheme. + +Page 234: + + Turning to another dispute, that between social constructivism and + spontaneousorder within liberal political theory, two clarifications + have occurred. The first isthat there can be no presumption that a + spontaneous order will deliveroutcomes which make everyone better off, + or even outcomes which favour + +Page 234: + + Thesetheoretical moves will threaten to dissolve the distinction + between action andstructure which lies at the heart of the game + theoretical depiction of social lifebecause it will mean that the + structure begins to supply reasons for action andnot just constraints + upon action. On the optimistic side, this might be seen asjust another + example of how discussions around game theory help to dissolvesome of + the binary oppositions which have plagued some debates in + socialscience—just as it helped dissolve the opposition between gender + and classearlier in this chapter. However, our concern here is not to + point to requiredchanges in ontology of a particular sort. The point is + that some change isnecessary, and that it is likely to threaten the + basic approach of game theory tosocial life. + +Page 234: + + Secondly, on the difficult cases where equilibrium selection + involveschoices over whose interests are to be favoured (i.e. it is not + a matter ofselecting the equilibrium which is better for everyone), + then it is notobvious that a collective action agency like the State is + any better placed tomake this decision than a process of spontaneous + order. This may come asa surprise, since we have spent most of our time + here focusing on theindeterminacy of evolutionary games when agents are + only weaklyinstrumentally rational. + +Page 235: + + In other words the very debate within liberal political theory over + socialconstructivism versus spontaneous order is itself unable to come + to aresolution precisely because its shared ontological foundations are + inadequatefor the task of social explanation. In short, we conclude + that not only willgame theory have to embrace some expanded form of + individual agency, if itis to be capable of explaining many social + interactions, but also that this isnecessary if it is to be useful to + the liberal debate over the scope of theState. + +Page 237: + + sabotage + +Page 238: + + What it does mean is thatour interpretation of results must be cautious + and that, ultimately,laboratory experiments may only be telling us how + people behave inlaboratories. + +Page 241: + + becausethere are some players who are unconditionally cooperative or + ‘altruistic’ in theway that they play this game and, secondly, because + whether someone iscooperative or not seems to be determined by one’s + background, rather thanby how clever (or rational) he or she is (see + adjacent box on the curse ofeconomics). In this sense, the evidence + seems to point to a falsification of theassumption of instrumentally + rational action based on the pay-offs + +Page 242: + + divisions of an army are stationed on two hill-tops overlooking a + valley inwhich an enemy division can be clearly seen. It is known that + if both divisionsattack simultaneously they will capture the enemy with + none, or very little, lossof life. However, there were no prior plans + to launch such an attack, as it wasnot anticipated that the enemy would + be spotted in that location. How will thetwo divisions coordinate their + attack (we assume that they must maintain visualand radio silence)? + Neither commanding officer will launch an attack unless heis sure that + the other will attack at the same time. Thus a classic + coordinationproblem emerges.Imagine now that a messenger can be sent + but that it will take him about anhour to convey the message. However, + it is also possible that he will be caughtby the enemy in the meantime. + If everything goes smoothly and the messengergets safely from one + hill-top to another, is this enough for a coordinated attackto be + launched? Suppose the message sent by the first commanding officer + tothe second read: ‘Let’s attack at dawn!’ Will the second officer + attack at dawn?No, unless he is confident that the first commanding + officer (who sent the + +Page 242: + + message) knows that the message has been received. So, the + secondcommanding officer sends the messenger back to the first with the + message:‘Message received. Dawn it is!’ Will the second officer attack + now? Not untilhe knows that the messenger has delivered his message. + Paradoxically, noamount of messages will do the trick since + confirmation of receipt of the lastmessage will be necessary regardless + of how many messages have been alreadyreceived. + +Page 242: + + We see that in a coordination game like the above, even a very + highdegree of common knowledge of the plan to attack at dawn is not + enough toguarantee coordination (see Box 8.3 for an example of how + different degreesof common knowledge can be engendered in the + laboratory). What is needed(at least in theory) is a consistent + alignment of beliefs (CAB) about the plan.1And yet this does not + exclude the possibility that the two commandingofficers will both + attack at dawn with very high probability. How successfullythey + coordinate will, however, depend on more than a high degree ofcommon + knowledge. Indeed the latter may even be un-necessary providedthe time + of the attack is carefully chosen. The classic early experiments + byThomas Schelling on behaviour in coordination games have confirmed + this— + +Page 246: + + Thus in experiments, Pareto superiority does not seem to be a + generalcriterion which players use to select between Nash equilibria + (see also Chapter7). In conclusion, so far it seems that the way people + actually play these gamesis neither directly controlled by the + strategic aspects of the game (i.e. thelocation of the best response + marks (+) and (-) in the matrix) nor by the size ofthe return from + coordinating on non-Nash outcomes such as (R3, C3): it is + aso-far-unexplained mixture of the two factors that decides. + +Page 251: + + To phrase this conclusion slightly differently, but in a way which + connectswith the results in the next section, bargaining is a ‘complex + socialphenomenon’ where people take cues from aspects of their social + life whichgame theory typically overlooks. Thus players seem to base + their behaviouron aspects of the social interaction which game theory + typically treats asextraneous; and when players share these extraneous + reference points such + +Page 258: + + What we have here is an evolution ofsocial roles. Players with the R + label develop a different attitude towardsreflective cooperation to + those players with the C role in spite of the fact that theRs and the + Cs are the same people. In other words, the signal which causes + theobserved pattern of cooperation seems to be emitted by the label R + or C. Thisreminds us of the discussion in Chapter 7 about the capacity + of sex, race andother extraneous features to pin down a convention on + which the structure ofdiscrimination is grounded. + +Page 258: + + Experimentation with game theory is good, clean fun. Can it be more + thanthat? Can it offer a way out of the obtuse debates on CKR, CAB, + NEMS,Nash backward induction, out-of-equilibrium behaviour, etc.? The + answerdepends on how we interpret the results. And as interpretation + leaves plentyof room for controversy, we should not expect the data + from the laboratoryunequivocally to settle any disputes. Our suspicion + is that experiments are togame theory what the latter is to liberal + individualism: a brilliant means ofcodifying its problems and of + creating a taxonomy of time-honoureddebates.There are, however, + important benefits from experimenting. Watchingpeople play games + reminds us of their inherent unpredictability, their sense offairness, + their complex motivation—of all those things that we tend to forgetwhen + we model humans as bundles of preferences moving around some pay- + +Page 258: + + radical breakwith the exclusive reliance of instrumental rationality is + also necessary. + +Page 260: + + At root we suspect that the major problem is the one that the + experimentsin the last chapter isolate: namely, that people appear to + be more complexlymotivated than game theory’s instrumental model allows + and that a part ofthat greater complexity comes from their social + location.We do not regard this as a negative conclusion. Quite the + contrary, it standsas a challenge to the type of methodological + individualism which has had afree rein in the development of game + theory. + +Page 260: + + Along the way to this conclusion, we hope also that you have had + fun.Prisoners’ dilemmas and centipedes are great party tricks. They are + easy todemonstrate and they are amenable to solutions which are + paradoxical enoughto stimulate controversy and, with one leap of the + liberal imagination, theaudience can be astounded by the thought that + the fabric of society (even theexistence of the State) reduces to these + seemingly trivial games—Fun andGames, as the title of Binmore’s (1992) + text on game theory neatly puts it. Butthere is a serious side to all + this. Game theory is, indeed, well placed toexamine the arguments in + liberal political theory over the origin and the scopeof agencies for + social choice like the State. In this context, the problems whichwe + have identified with game theory resurface as timely warnings of + thedifficulties any society is liable to face if it thinks of itself + only in terms ofliberal individualism. + +Page 260: + + The ambitious claim that game theory will provide a unified foundation + for allsocial science seems misplaced to diff --git a/books/epistemology/metodo.md b/books/epistemology/metodo.md index 848958f..40440d6 100644 --- a/books/epistemology/metodo.md +++ b/books/epistemology/metodo.md @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ ## Índice -[[!toc levels=4]] +[[!toc startlevel=2 levels=4]] * [Volume I](1). * [Volume II](2). diff --git a/books/epistemology/metodo/1.md b/books/epistemology/metodo/1.md index 4b00e17..95133df 100644 --- a/books/epistemology/metodo/1.md +++ b/books/epistemology/metodo/1.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ [[!meta title="O Método - Volume I"]] -[[!toc levels=4]] +[[!toc startlevel=2 levels=4]] ## Geral @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ Há também uma ligação fundamental entre simplexidade e bem viver. A complexidade não é complicação. O que é complicado pode se reduzir a um princípio simples como um emaranhado ou um nó cego. Certamente o mundo é muito complicado, mas se ele fosse apenas complicado, ou seja, emaranhado, multidependente, etc., bastaria - operar as reduçõe sbem conhecidas [...] O verdadeiro problema, portanto, não + operar as reduções bem conhecidas [...] O verdadeiro problema, portanto, não é devolver a complicação dos desenvolvimentos a regras de base simples. A complexidade está na base. diff --git a/books/epistemology/metodo/2.md b/books/epistemology/metodo/2.md index ba26fae..70b5dad 100644 --- a/books/epistemology/metodo/2.md +++ b/books/epistemology/metodo/2.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ [[!meta title="O Método - Volume II"]] -[[!toc levels=4]] +[[!toc startlevel=2 levels=4]] ## Geral diff --git a/books/epistemology/metodo/3.md b/books/epistemology/metodo/3.md index 8f2960e..a9a00db 100644 --- a/books/epistemology/metodo/3.md +++ b/books/epistemology/metodo/3.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ [[!meta title="O Método - Volume III"]] -[[!toc levels=4]] +[[!toc startlevel=2 levels=4]] ## Geral diff --git a/books/epistemology/metodo/4.md b/books/epistemology/metodo/4.md index df491ab..7963389 100644 --- a/books/epistemology/metodo/4.md +++ b/books/epistemology/metodo/4.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ [[!meta title="O Método - Volume IV"]] -[[!toc levels=4]] +[[!toc startlevel=2 levels=4]] ## Geral diff --git a/books/epistemology/metodo/5.md b/books/epistemology/metodo/5.md index ea0835e..b154d0e 100644 --- a/books/epistemology/metodo/5.md +++ b/books/epistemology/metodo/5.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ [[!meta title="O Método - Volume V"]] -[[!toc levels=4]] +[[!toc startlevel=2 levels=4]] ## Geral diff --git a/books/epistemology/metodo/6.md b/books/epistemology/metodo/6.md index 61a3ee4..2e6eac8 100644 --- a/books/epistemology/metodo/6.md +++ b/books/epistemology/metodo/6.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ [[!meta title="O Método - Volume VI"]] -[[!toc levels=4]] +[[!toc startlevel=2 levels=4]] ## Geral diff --git a/books/history/death-of-nature.md b/books/history/death-of-nature.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..828215e --- /dev/null +++ b/books/history/death-of-nature.md @@ -0,0 +1,280 @@ +[[!meta title="The Death of Nature"]] + +## Topics + +* Bohm's process physics. +* Ilya Prigogine new thermodynamics. + +## Excerpts + +> Between the sixteenth andseventeenth cerfturies the image of an organic +> cosmos with a living female earth at its ceriter gave way to a mechanistic +> world view in which nature was reconstructed as dead and passive, to be +> dominated and controlled by hufuans. The Death efNature deals with the +> economic, cultural, and scientific changes through which this vast +> transformation came about. In seeking to understand how people conceptualized +> nature in the Scientific Revolution, I am asking not about unchanging +> essences, but about connections between social change and changing +> constructions of nattlre". Similarly. when women today attempt to change +> society's domination of nature, 1:\1~¥.,~e acting to overturn moder_n +> constructions of nature and women as culturally passive and subordinate. +> +> [...] +> +> Today's feminist and ecological consciousness can be used to examine the +> historical interconnections between women and nature that developed as the +> modern scientific and economic world took form in the sixteenth and +> seventeenth centuries-a transformation that shaped and pervades today's +> mainstream values and perceptions. Feminist history in the broadest sense +> requires that we look at +> +> [...] +> +> My intent is instead to examine the values associated with the images of +> women and nature as they relate to the formation of our modern world and +> their implications for 'our lives today. +> +> In investigating the roots of our current environmental dilemma and its +> connections to science, technology, and the economy, we must reexamine the +> formation of a world view and a science that, by reconceptualizing reality as +> a machine rather than a living organism, sanctioned the domination of both +> nature and women. The contributions of such founding "fathers" of modern +> science as Francis Bacon, William Harvey, Rene Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, and +> Isaac Newton must be reevaluated. The fate of other options, alternative +> philosophies, and social groups shaped by the organic world view and +> resistant to the growing exploitative mentality needs reappraisal. To +> understand why one road rather than the other was taken requires a broad +> synthesis of both the natural and cultural environments of Western society at +> the historical turning point. This book elaborates an ecological perspective +> that includes both + +### Terminology + +Nature, art, organic and mechanical: + +> A distinction was commonly made between natura naturans, or nature creating, +> and natura naturata, the natural creation. +> +> Nature was contrasted with art (techne) and with artificially created things. +> It was personified as a female-being, e.g., Dame Nature; she was alternately +> a prudent lady, an empress, a mother, etc. The course of nature and the laws +> of nature were the actualization of her force. The state of nature was the +> state of mankind prior to social organization and prior to the state of +> grace. Nature spirits, nature deities, virgin nymphs, and elementals were +> thought to reside in or be associated with natural objects. +> +> In both Western and non-Western cultures, nature was traditionally feminine. +> +> [...] +> +> In the early modern period, the term organic usually referred to the bodily +> organs, structures, and organization of living beings, while organicism was +> the doctrine that organic structure was the result of an inherent, adaptive +> property in matter. The word organical, however, was also sometimes used to +> refer to a machine or an instrument. Thus a clock was sometimes called an +> "organical body," while som~ machines were said to operate by organical, +> rather than mechanical, action if the touch of a person was involved. +> +> Mechanical referred to the machine and tool trades; the manual operations of +> the handicrafts; inanimate machines that lacked spontaneity, volition, and +> thought; and the mechanical sciences. 1 + +### Nature that nurtures and thats also uncontrollable, replaced by "the machine" + +> NATURE AS NURTURE: CONTROLLING IMAGERY. Central to the organic theory was the +> identification of nature, especially the earth, with a nurturing mother: a +> kindly beneficent female who provided for the needs of mankind in an ordered, +> planned universe. But another opposing image of nature as female was also +> prevalent: wild and uncontrollable nature that could render violence, storms, +> droughts, and general chaos. Both were identified with the female sex and +> were projections of human perceptions onto the external world. The metaphor +> of the earth as a nurturing mother was gradually to vanish as a dominant +> image as the Scientific Revolution pro- ceeded to mechanize and to +> rationalize the world view. The second image, nature as disorder, called +> forth an important modern idea, that of power over nature. Two new ideas, +> those of mechanism and of the domination and mastery of nature, became core +> concepts of the modern world. An organically oriented mentality in which +> female principles played an important role was undermined and replaced by a +> mechanically oriented mentality that either eliminated or used female +> principles in an exploitative manner. As Western culture became increasingly +> mechanized in the 1600s, the female earth and virgin earth spirit were +> subdued by the machine. 1 + +### Mining and the female body + +> The image of the earth as a living organism and nurturing mother had served +> as a cultural constraint restricting the actions of human beings. One does +> not readily slay a mother, dig into her entrails for gold or mutilate her +> body, although commercial mining would soon require that. As long as the +> earth was considered to be alive and sensitive, it could be considered a +> breach of human ethical behavior to carry out destructive acts against it. +> For most traditional cultures, minerals and metals ripened in the uterus of +> the Earth Mother, mines were compared to her vagina, and metallurgy was the +> human hastening of the birth of the living metal in the artificial womb of +> the furnace-an abortion of the metal's natural growth cycle before its time. +> Miners offered propitiation to the deities of the soil and subterranean +> world, performed ceremonial sacrifices, · and observed strict cleanliness, +> sexual abstinence, and fasting before violating the sacredness of the living +> earth by sinking a mine. Smiths assumed an awesome responsibility in +> precipitating the metal's birth through smeltin,.g, fusing, and beating it +> with hammer and anvil; they were often accorded the status of shaman in +> tribal rituals and their tools were thought to hold special powers. + +Is there a relation between torture (basanos), extraction of "truth" and +mining gold out of a mine? See discussions both on "The Counterrevolution" +and "Torture and Truth". + +### Hidden norms: controlling images + +> Controlling images operate as ethical restraints or as ethical sanctions-as +> subtle "oughts" or "ought-nots." Thus as the descriptive metaphors and images +> of nature change, a behavioral restraint can be changed into a sanction. Such +> a change in the image and description of nature was occurring during the +> course of the Scientific Revolution. +> +> It is important to recognize the normative import of descriptive statements +> about nature. Contemporary philosophers of language have critically +> reassessed the earlier positivist distinction between the "is" of science and +> the "ought" of society, arguing that descriptions and norms are not opposed +> to one another by linguistic sepa- ration into separate "is" and "ought" +> statements, but are contained within each other. Descriptive statements about +> the world can presuppose the normative; they are then ethic-laden. +> +> [...] +> +> The writer or culture may not be conscious of the ethical import yet may act +> in accordance with its dictates. The hidden norms may become conscious or +> explicit when an alternative or contradiction presents it- self. Because +> language contains a culture within itself, when language changes, a culture +> is also changing in important way~~ By examining changes in descriptions of +> nature, we can then perceive something of the changes in cultural values. + +### Renaissance: hierarchical order + +> The Renaissance view of nature and society was based on the organic analogy +> between the human body, or microcosm, and the larger world, or macrocosm. +> +> [...] +> +> But while the pastoral tradition symbolized nature as a benevolent female, it +> contained the implication that nature when plowed and cultivated could be +> used as a commodity and manipulated as a resource. Nature, tamed and subdued, +> could be transformed into a garden to provide both material and spiritual +> food to enhance the comfort and soothe the anxieties of men distraught by the +> demands of the urban world and the stresses of the marketplace. It depended +> on a masculine perception of nature as a mother and bride whose primary +> function was to comfort; nurture, and provide for the wellbeing of the male. +> In pastoral imagery, both nature and women are subordinate and essentially +> passive. They nurture but do not control or exhibit disruptive passion. The +> pastoral mode, although it viewed nature as benevolent, was a model created +> as an antidote to the pressures of urbanization and mechanization. It +> represented a fulfillment of human needs for nurture, but by conceiving of +> nature as passive, it nevertheless allowed for the possibility of its use and +> manipulation. Unlike the dialectical image of nature as the active uni- ty of +> opposites in tension, the Arcadian image rendered nature passive and +> manageable. + +### Undressing + +> An allegory (1160) by Alain of Lille, of the School of Chartres, portrays +> Natura, God's powerful but humble servant, as stricken with grief at the +> failure of man (in contrast to other species) to obey her laws. Owing to +> faulty supervision by Venus, human beings engage in adulterous sensual love. +> In aggressively penetrating the secrets of heaven, they tear Natura's +> undergarments, exposing her to the view of the vulgar. She complains that "by +> the unlawful assaults of man alone the garments of my modesty suffer disgrace +> and division." +> +> [...] +> +> Such basic attitudes toward ·male-female roles in biological generation where +> the female and the earth are both passive receptors could easily become +> sanctions for exploitation as the organic context was transformed by the rise +> of commercial capitalism. +> +> [...] +> +> The macrocosm theory, as we have seen, likened the cosmos to the human body, +> soul, and spirit with male and female reproductive components. Similarly, the +> geocosm theory compared the earth to the living human body, with breath, +> blood, sweat, and elimination systems. +> +> [...] +> +> The earth's springs were akin to the human blood system; its other various +> fluids were likened to the mucus, saliva, sweat, and other forins of +> lubrication in the human body, the earth being organized "'. .. much after +> the plan of our bodies, in which there are both veins and arteries, the +> former blood vessels, the latter air vessels .... So exactly alike is the +> resemblance to our bodies in nature's formation of the earth, that our +> ancestors have spoken of veins [springs] of water." Just as the human body +> contained blood, marrow, mucus, saliva, tears, and lubricating fluids, so in +> the earth there were various fluids. Liquids that turned hard became metals, +> such as gold and silver; other fluids turned into stones, bitumens, and veins +> of sulfur. Like the human body, the earth gave forth sweat: "There is often a +> gathering of thin, scattered moisture like dew, which from many points flows +> into one spot. The dowsers call it sweat, because a kind of drop is either +> squeezed out by the pressure of the ground or raised by the heat." +> +> Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) enlarged the Greek analogy between the waters +> of the earth and the ebb and flow of human blood through the veins and heart +> +> [...] +> +> A widely held alchemical belief was the growth of the baser metals into gold +> in womblike matrices in the earth. The appearance of silver in lead ores or +> gold in silvery assays was evidence that this transformation was under way. +> Just as the child grew in the warmth of the female womb, so the growth of +> metals was fostered + +### Matrix + +> The earth in the Paracelsian philosophy was the mother or matrix +> giving birth to plants, animals, and men. + +### Renaissance was diverse + +> In general, the Renaissance view was that all things were permeated by life, +> there being no adequate method by which to designate the inanimate from the +> animate. [...] but criteria by which to differentiate the living from the +> nonliving could not successfully be formulated. This was due not only to the +> vitalistic framework of the period but to striking similarities between them. +> +> [...] +> +> Popular Renaissance literature was filled with hundreds of images associating +> nature, matter, and the earth with the female sex. +> +> [...] +> +> In the 1960s, the Native-American became a symbol in the ecology movement's +> search for alternatives to Western exploitative attitudes. The Indian +> animistic belief-system and reverence for the earth as a · mother were +> contrasted with the Judeo-Christian heritage of dominion over nature and with +> capitalist practices resulting in the "tragedy of the commons" (exploitation +> of resources available for any person's or nation's use). But as will be +> seen, European culture was more complex and varied than this judgment allows. +> It ignores the Renaissance philosophy of the nurturing earth as well as those +> philosophies and social movements resistant to mainstream economic change. + +### Mining as revealing the hidden secrets + +> In his defense, the miner argued that the earth was not a real mother, but a +> wicked stepmother who hides and conceals the metals in her inner parts +> instead of making them available for human use. +> +> [...] +> +> In the old hermit's tale, we have a fascina,ting example·of the re:· +> lationship between images and values. The older view of nature as a kindly +> mother is challenged by the growing interests of the mining industry in +> Saxony, Bohemia, and the Harz Mountains, regions of newly found prosperity +> (Fig. 6). The miner, representing these newer commercial activities, +> transforms the irnage of the nurturing mother into that of a stepmother who +> wickedly conceals her bounty from the deserving and needy children. In the +> seventeenth century, the image will be seen to undergo yet another +> transformation, as natural philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626) sets forth +> the need for prying into nature's nooks and crannies in searching out her +> secrets for human improvement. +> +> -- 33 diff --git a/books/history/ibm-holocaust.md b/books/history/ibm-holocaust.md index 6205c17..8581ad5 100644 --- a/books/history/ibm-holocaust.md +++ b/books/history/ibm-holocaust.md @@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ [[!img dehomag.png link="no"]] +## Contents + +[[!toc startlevel=2 levels=4]] + ## About * [IBM and the Holocaust](http://www.ibmandtheholocaust.com/). @@ -827,7 +831,7 @@ development of the transistor. Something to check out. -- 110 -## 1933 census was just a rehearsal +### 1933 census was just a rehearsal Top racial experts of the Interior Ministry flew in for the assignment. Working with drafts shuttled between Hitler's abode and police headquarters, twin @@ -1903,18 +1907,36 @@ That was before the US entering the war. * http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/1/eaau7292/tab-pdf * https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/operation-reinhard-einsatz-reinhard - Operation Reinhard (1942–1943) was the largest single murder campaign of the - Holocaust, during which some 1.7 million Jews from German-occupied Poland were - murdered by the Nazis. Most perished in gas chambers at the death camps Belzec, - Sobibor, and Treblinka. However, the tempo, kill rates, and spatial dynamics of - these events were poorly documented. Using an unusual dataset originating from - railway transportation records, this study identifies an extreme phase of - hyperintense killing when >1.47 million Jews—more than 25% of the Jews killed - in all 6 years of World War II—were murdered by the Nazis in an intense,100-day - (~3-month) surge. Operation Reinhard is shown to be an extreme event, based on - kill rate, number, and proportion (>99.9%) of the population murdered in camps, - highlighting its singularly violent character, even compared to other more - recent genocides. The Holocaust kill rate is some 10 times higher than - estimates suggested by authorities on comparative genocide. + > Operation Reinhard (1942–1943) was the largest single murder campaign of the + > Holocaust, during which some 1.7 million Jews from German-occupied Poland were + > murdered by the Nazis. Most perished in gas chambers at the death camps Belzec, + > Sobibor, and Treblinka. However, the tempo, kill rates, and spatial dynamics of + > these events were poorly documented. Using an unusual dataset originating from + > railway transportation records, this study identifies an extreme phase of + > hyperintense killing when >1.47 million Jews—more than 25% of the Jews killed + > in all 6 years of World War II—were murdered by the Nazis in an intense,100-day + > (~3-month) surge. Operation Reinhard is shown to be an extreme event, based on + > kill rate, number, and proportion (>99.9%) of the population murdered in camps, + > highlighting its singularly violent character, even compared to other more + > recent genocides. The Holocaust kill rate is some 10 times higher than + > estimates suggested by authorities on comparative genocide. + +* Unsorted: + * [IBM Archives: 1933](https://www.ibm.com/ibm/history/history/year_1933.html) + * [IBM100 - A Culture of Think](https://www.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/think_culture/transform/) + * [Dehomag (Deutsche Hollerith Maschinen) D11 tabulator - Collections Search - United States Holocaust Memorial Museum](https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn521586) + * [Dehomag D11 sorter - Collections Search - United States Holocaust Memorial Museum](https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn521587) + * [How IBM Technology Jump Started the Holocaust](https://gizmodo.com/how-ibm-technology-jump-started-the-holocaust-5812025) + * [IBM, Hitler and the Holocaust: A Terrible Tale of Capitalism Without Conscience | Corporate Greed & Corruption Chronicles](https://corporategreedchronicles.wordpress.com/2011/11/15/ibm-hitler-and-the-holocaust-a-terrible-tale-of-capitalism-without-conscience/) + * [IBM & "Death's Calculator"](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ibm-and-quot-death-s-calculator-quot) + * [Computing at Columbia Timeline](http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/index.html#1939) + * [ibm carbine For Sale – Buy ibm carbine at GunBroker.com](https://www.gunbroker.com/All/search?Keywords=ibm%20carbine) + * [Hollerith Census Machine dials | Marcin Wichary | Flickr](https://www.flickr.com/photos/mwichary/2632673143/in/photostream/) + * [Henri Georges Trainson: Annexe III - Le réseau Marco-Polo](https://hgtrainson.blogspot.com/2011/08/annexe-iii-le-reseau-marco-polo.html) + * [Réseau Marco Polo : définition de Réseau Marco Polo et synonymes de Réseau Marco Polo (français)](http://dictionnaire.sensagent.leparisien.fr/R%C3%A9seau%20Marco%20Polo/fr-fr/) + * [Klaus Barbie - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Klaus_Barbie) + * [Nikolaus “Klaus” Barbie: The Butcher of Lyon | Holocaust Encyclopedia](https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/nikolaus-klaus-barbie-the-butcher-of-lyon) + * [Klaus Barbie: women testify of torture at his hands](http://www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/Holocaust/barbie.html) + * [PBS Frontline: Klaus Barbie The American Connection (1983) - YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58FVOCktU5U) [[!tag tecnology history sociology]] diff --git a/books/philosophy/cidade-perversa.md b/books/philosophy/cidade-perversa.md index b9c389f..d725442 100644 --- a/books/philosophy/cidade-perversa.md +++ b/books/philosophy/cidade-perversa.md @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ do nosso nascimento prematuro: 229 Três respostas básicas seriam possíveis: do neurótico, do perverso e do psicótico: - + Dessa estrutura circular em que o um (s) supõe o Outro (S) que “sub-põe” o um, é possível sair de três maneiras: pela neurose, pela perversão ou pela psicose. O que retoma em novas condições a intuição de Freud, que havia distinguido três @@ -348,43 +348,43 @@ Três respostas básicas seriam possíveis: do neurótico, do perverso e do psic 1. Neurose: "dívida simbólica contraída em relação ao Outro", lembando que "sujeito" vem de "sujeição", de se sujeitar: - Se a histeria constitui o protótipo da neurose, é porque o(a) histérico(a) é - aquele(a) que venera o Outro por lhe ter tudo dado e ao mesmo tempo o detesta - por tê-lo(a) posto na situação de tanto e tudo lhe dever. Ele/ela amará o Outro - detestando-o ou o detestará amando-o. É o lugar de um nó psíquico importante, - no qual constantemente se remotiva o conflito neurótico em todas as suas formas - possíveis. Por exemplo, esta, que faz as delícias do histérico: seduzir o Outro - — sob a figura de Deus, de um mestre, de um grande homem, etc. — ao mesmo tempo - escapando-lhe. + Se a histeria constitui o protótipo da neurose, é porque o(a) histérico(a) é + aquele(a) que venera o Outro por lhe ter tudo dado e ao mesmo tempo o detesta + por tê-lo(a) posto na situação de tanto e tudo lhe dever. Ele/ela amará o Outro + detestando-o ou o detestará amando-o. É o lugar de um nó psíquico importante, + no qual constantemente se remotiva o conflito neurótico em todas as suas formas + possíveis. Por exemplo, esta, que faz as delícias do histérico: seduzir o Outro + — sob a figura de Deus, de um mestre, de um grande homem, etc. — ao mesmo tempo + escapando-lhe. 2. Psicose: o caso-limite, "mais onerosa. Ela diz que se Deus é, então eu não sou": - Um combate que pode assumir duas formas opostas e complementares. Uma forma - paranoica, como tal perseguida: existe um Deus que está constantemente querendo - roubar meu ser, que me espiona e me persegue. E uma forma esquizofrênica e - triunfante: Deus, na verdade, sou eu. Nos dois casos, essa potência - manifesta-se como sobrenatural, o mais das vezes através de uma voz imperiosa - que ocupa o sujeito, no sentido de tomar posse dele, de se apoderar dele. + Um combate que pode assumir duas formas opostas e complementares. Uma forma + paranoica, como tal perseguida: existe um Deus que está constantemente querendo + roubar meu ser, que me espiona e me persegue. E uma forma esquizofrênica e + triunfante: Deus, na verdade, sou eu. Nos dois casos, essa potência + manifesta-se como sobrenatural, o mais das vezes através de uma voz imperiosa + que ocupa o sujeito, no sentido de tomar posse dele, de se apoderar dele. 3. Perversão: - Quanto à enunciação perversa, ela se esclarece nesse esquema. Ela permite - entender que o que está em jogo no grande circuito enunciativo (com o “Ele”) - vem a atuar no pequeno, de tal maneira que o “eu” ocupe, diante do “tu”, a - posição eminente que o “Ele” ocupa em relação a todo sujeito falante (“eu” e - “tu”). Em suma, o perverso coloca-se, diante de todo outro, na posição do - Outro. A definição poderá ser estranhada. Mas seria um equívoco, pois ela - encontra e confere sentido à maneira como Lacan definia o perverso: “O perverso - imagina ser o Outro para garantir seu gozo.”302 De fato, essa proposição só - pode ser realmente entendida mobilizando-se as teorias da enunciação baseadas - na análise da relação de lugar entre as três pessoas verbais: “eu” (o um), “tu” - (o outro) e “Ele” (o Outro). A perversão surge então como uma negação da grande - estrutura, compensada por um inchaço da pequena, como se essa estrutura - secundária pudesse e devesse suportar sozinha o que está em jogo na grande. - Poderíamos falar aqui de uma translação do que está em jogo na estrutura - principal para a estrutura secundária. O que, provavelmente, explica a - seriedade com que o perverso maquina suas encenações, às vezes deploráveis, - como se ele ocupasse diante de seu alter ego o lugar do Outro. + Quanto à enunciação perversa, ela se esclarece nesse esquema. Ela permite + entender que o que está em jogo no grande circuito enunciativo (com o “Ele”) + vem a atuar no pequeno, de tal maneira que o “eu” ocupe, diante do “tu”, a + posição eminente que o “Ele” ocupa em relação a todo sujeito falante (“eu” e + “tu”). Em suma, o perverso coloca-se, diante de todo outro, na posição do + Outro. A definição poderá ser estranhada. Mas seria um equívoco, pois ela + encontra e confere sentido à maneira como Lacan definia o perverso: “O perverso + imagina ser o Outro para garantir seu gozo.”302 De fato, essa proposição só + pode ser realmente entendida mobilizando-se as teorias da enunciação baseadas + na análise da relação de lugar entre as três pessoas verbais: “eu” (o um), “tu” + (o outro) e “Ele” (o Outro). A perversão surge então como uma negação da grande + estrutura, compensada por um inchaço da pequena, como se essa estrutura + secundária pudesse e devesse suportar sozinha o que está em jogo na grande. + Poderíamos falar aqui de uma translação do que está em jogo na estrutura + principal para a estrutura secundária. O que, provavelmente, explica a + seriedade com que o perverso maquina suas encenações, às vezes deploráveis, + como se ele ocupasse diante de seu alter ego o lugar do Outro. Os modos de operação individuais variariam de acordo com a ênfase dos caminhos do circuito de enunciação subjetiva. @@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ produção e o consumo capitalistas. Resumiria o livro com o trocadilho: "Sade, Smith e Lacan: um laço realmente estranho, mas não eterno". E poderíamos pensar em outros tipos de diagramas e máquinas possíveis para a constituição -da relação sujeito/objeto/outro, com Sujeito-Deus, Sujeito-Leviatã, e até de Sujeito como composto +da relação sujeito/objeto/outro, com Sujeito-Deus, Sujeito-Leviatã, e até de Sujeito como composto por redes de `eu <-> tu`, incluindo também outros seres. Teríamos assim a possibilidade de inúmeras montagens e configurações de redes relacionais, hierárquicas, anárquicas, poliárquicas... uma modelagem desse tipo poderia ajudar na análise de dinâmicas sociais. diff --git a/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md b/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..57a0e92 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +[[!meta title="Stasis Before the State: Nine Theses on Agonistic Democracy"]] + +* Athor: Dimitris Vardoulakis +* References: + * https://www.worldcat.org/title/stasis-before-the-state-nine-theses-on-agonistic-democracy/oclc/1000452218 + * https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/2009359 + * https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1xhr6vd + * https://www.academia.edu/35908382/Vardoulakis_Stasis_Before_the_State_--_Introduction + * https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823277414/stasis-before-the-state/ +* Topics: + * Ruse of sovereignty. + * Diference between justification and judgement. + +## Excerpts + + This question would be trivial if sovereignty is under + stood simply as the sovereignty of specific states. The + question is pertinent when we consider the violence + functioning as the structural principle of sovereignty. + Sovereignty can only persist and the state that it sup + ports can only ever reproduce its structures—political, + economic, legal, and so on—through recourse to certain + forms of violence. Such violence is at its most effective + the less visible and hence the less bloody it is. This in + sight has been developed brilliantly by thinkers such + as Gramsci, u + nder the rubric of hegemony; Althusser, + through the concept of ideology; and Foucault, as the + notion of power. It is in this context that we should also + consider Carl Schmitt’s definition of the political as the + identification of the e nemy. They all agree on the essen + tial or structural violence defining sovereignty—their + divergent accounts of that violence notwithstanding. + The problem of a space outside sovereignty is com + + [...] + + Posing the question of an outside to sovereignty + within the context of the mechanism of exclusion turns + the spotlight to what I call the ruse of sovereignty. This + essentially consists in the paradox that the assertion of + a space outside sovereignty is nothing other than the as + sertion of an excluded space and consequently signals + the mobilization of the logic of sovereignty. + + [...] + + To put this in the vocabulary used h + ere, the at- + tempt to exclude exclusion is itself exclusory and thus + reproduces the logic of exclusion. + + [...] + + Turning to Solon’s first democratic constitution, + I will suggest in this book that it is possible by identify + ing the conflictual nature of democracy—or what the + ancient Greeks called stasis. Agonistic monism holds + that stasis is the definitional characteristic of democ + racy and of any other possible constitutional form. Sta + sis or conflict as the basis of all political arrangements + then becomes another way of saying that democracy is + the form of e very constitution. Hence, stasis comes be- + fore any conception of the state that relies on the ruse of + sovereignty. + + The obvious objection to this position would be about + the nature of this conflict. Hobbes makes the state of + nature — which he explicitly identifies with democracy — + also the precondition of the commonwealth. Schmitt + defines the political as the identification of the enemy. + + [...] + + ent power. Is t here a way out of this entangled knot? + Antonio Negri’s most significant contribution to po + litical philosophy is, in my opinion, precisely at this + juncture. His intervention starts with his book on Spi + noza, The Savage Anomaly, in which he distinguishes + between potentia (constituent power) and potestas (con + stituted power). 20 It is most explicitly treated in Insur- + gencies, which provides an account of the development + of constituent power in philosophical texts from early + modernity onward and examines the function of con + stituent power in significant historical events. 21 The + starting premise of this investigation is the rejection of + ent power. Is t here a way out of this entangled knot? + Antonio Negri’s most significant contribution to po + litical philosophy is, in my opinion, precisely at this + juncture. His intervention starts with his book on Spi + noza, The Savage Anomaly, in which he distinguishes + between potentia (constituent power) and potestas (con + stituted power). 20 It is most explicitly treated in Insur- + gencies, which provides an account of the development + of constituent power in philosophical texts from early + modernity onward and examines the function of con + stituent power in significant historical events. 21 The + starting premise of this investigation is the rejection of + and avoiding the ruse of sovereignty. 23 + The appeal to constituent power gives Negri the means + to provide an account of democracy as creative activity. + This has a wide spectrum of aspects and implications + that I can only gesture t oward here. For instance, this + approach shows how democracy requires a convergence + of the ontological, the ethical, and the political—which + is also a position central to my own project (see Thesis + 6). Consequently, democracy is not reducible to a con + stituted form, and thus Negri can provide a nonrepre + sentational account of democracy. This is important + because it enables Marx’s own distaste for representative + democracy to resonate with contemporary sociology + and political economy—a project that starts with Negri’s + involvement in Italian workerism and culminates in his + collaborations with Michael Hardt. Besides the details, + which Negri has been developing for four decades, the + important point is that this description of democracy + and constituent power is consistently juxtaposed to the + political tradition that privileges constituted power and + sovereignty. 24 + + There is, however, a significant drawback in Negri’s + approach. It concerns the lack of a consistent account of + violence in his work. + + [...] + + Without a + consideration of violence, radical democracy w ill never + discover its agonistic aspect, namely, that conflict or + stasis is the precondition of the political and that, as + such, all political forms are effects of the democratic. In + other words, Negri’s obfuscation of the question of vio + lence can never lead to agonistic monism. + +Production of the real: + + Second, the state of emergency leading to justification + does not have to be “real”—it simply needs to be credi + ble. Truth or falsity are not properties of power—as Fou + cault very well recognized—and the reason for this, I + would add, is that power’s justifications are rhetorical + strategies and hence unconcerned with validity. This is + the point where my account significantly diverges from + + [...] + + If we are to understand better sovereign violence, we + need to investigate further the ways in which violence is + justified. Sovereignty uses justification rhetorically. In + stead of being concerned with w + hether the justifications + of actions are true or false, sovereignty is concerned + with whether its justifications are believed by those it af + fects. + +Torture: + + Greek political philosophy. 4 Hannah Arendt also pays + particular attention to this metaphor. According to Ar + endt, Plato needs the metaphor of the politician as a + craftsman in order to compensate for the lack of the no + tion of authority in Greek thought. These Platonic meta + phorics include the metaphor of the statesman as a + physician who heals an ailing polis. 5 The metaphor of + craftsmanship is used as a justification of political power. + craftsmanship is used as a justification of political power. + The metaphor persists in modernity, and we can find + examples much closer to home. Mao Zedong justifies + the purges of the Cultural Revolution on the following + grounds: “Our object in exposing errors and criticizing + shortcomings is like that of curing a disease. The entire + purpose is to save the person.” 6 Whoever does not con + form to the Maoist ideal is “ill” and needs to be “cured.” + Similarly, George Papadopoulos, the colonel who headed + the Greek junta from 1967 to 1974, repeatedly described + Greece as an ill patient requiring an operation. The dic + tatorial regime justified its violence by drawing an anal + ogy of its exceptional powers to the powers of the head + surgeon in a hospital emergency room. Th + ese operations + on “patients” took place not in hospitals but in dark po + lice cells or in various forms of prisons or concentration + camps. And the instruments of the “operations” were + not t hose of the surgeon but rather of the torturer and + in many cases also of the executioner. The analogy be + tween the surgeon and the torturer is mobilized to pro + vide reasons for the exercise of violence. An emergency + mobilizes rhetorical strategies that justify violence, ir + respective of the fact that such a justification may be + completely fabulatory. + + -- 32-33 + +Razão instrumental: + + Let us return to consider more carefully how sover + eign violence always strives for justification. This means + that we can characterize the acts of sovereignty as con + forming to a rationalized instrumentalism. Sovereign + violence is instrumental in the sense that it always aims + toward something—it is not vio + + lence for vio + lence’s + sake. This means that the desired outcome of sover + eign violence is calculated with the help of reason. The + extrapolation of violence in instrumental terms is noth + ing new. For instance, Hannah Arendt presents instru + mentalism as the defining feature of violence. 7 Yet the + instrumentalism of sovereign violence is not as self- + evident as it may at first appear. For instance, as Fran + çois Jullien shows, the conception of an instrumental + thinking as appropriate to the political arises in ancient + Greece, and it does not characterize the Chinese cul + ture, including even the ways in which warfare is con + ceived. 8 The important point, then, is to remember that + the instrumentality of reason in the serv ice of a justifi + cation of violence is a characteristic of sovereignty as it + is developed in the Western political and philosophical + tradition. + The “invention” of the instrumentality of reason is + an important moment in the history of thought, and + its “inventors,” the ancient Greeks, amply recognized its + importance. In fact, their tragedies are concerned pre + cisely with the clash between the older forms of thinking + and new forms exemplified by instrumental reason. The + best example of this is perhaps the Oresteia. In the first + play of the trilogy, Agamemnon is murdered by his wife, + Clytemnestra. In the second play, Orestes, Agamem + non’s son, responds by killing his mother. In the third + play, the Eumenides, the court of Athens is called to de + cide w + hether Orestes’s murder was justified. The alter + natives are that he is e ither guilty of matricide pure and + simple or that his act was a political one aiming to free + Argos of a tyrant. Th + ere is, then, a standstill or stasis— + and I draw again attention to this word, to which I w + ill + return later—between the two different l egal frame + works: one legality privileging kinship, the other privi + leging instrumental rationality whereby the murder of + Clytemnestra is justified by the end of saving the city + from a tyrant. The judges’ vote is a tie, at which point + the goddess Athena, who presides over the proceedings, + casts the vote to f ree Orestes of the charge of matricide. + Calculative reason prevails as the mode of the political. + But at the same time, it should not be forgotten that the + vote was equally split. For the ancient Athenians, it is + impossible to reconcile the two different legalities—the + politics of kinship and the politics of instrumental + reason. Justice persists in this irreconcilability, despite + its tragic consequences. + + -- 33-35 + +Soberania como persuasão e interpretação: + + In other words, the absoluteness of + sovereignty has nothing to do with the power of sover + eignty as it is exercised through its institutions—the + police, the army, the judiciary, and so on. Rather, the + absoluteness of sovereignty is an expression of the rhe + torical and logical mechanisms whereby sovereignty + uses the justification of violence to dominate public de + bate and to persuade the citizens. The exercise of sover + eignty is the effect of an interpretative process. Differently + put, this entails that the justification of violence is more + primary than the legitimate forms assumed by constituded power. + Without an effective justification, any government loses its + mandate to govern, even though its + decisions and political actions, its policies, and its legis + lative agenda may perfectly conform to the law of the + state. + + -- 52-53 + +Democracia: + + How can democracy as the other of sovereignty be + mobilized to respond to sovereignty’s justification of + violence? This final question is, I believe, the most fun + damental political question. It essentially asks about + the relation of sovereignty and democracy. What is re + quired at this juncture in order to broach the relation + between democracy and sovereignty further is a better + determination of democracy. + + -- 53 + +> The first ever democracy was instituted through the Solonian reforms that were +> introduced to counteract a chronical political no less than social crisis in +> Athens. The crisis was the result of a protracted animosity between the rich +> and the poor parties. The confrontation was largely because of material +> inequalities, such as the requirement to hold property in order to be a +> citizen, and the economic inequalities that were threatening to turn into +> slaves a large portion of the poor population who had defaulted on their +> payments. Unsurprisingly, given the sensitivity of these issues, tensions +> ran high, and the city often found itself in conflict or stasis, with the two +> sides taking arms against each other. The situation had reached an acute +> crisis, at which point the Athenians re solved that they had to take decisive +> action. They turned to Solon, who was largely viewed as impartial and wise, to +> write a new constitution for the city. He responded by compiling the first ever +> democratic constitution. +> +> [...] +> +> The crisis is the condition of citizenship and residency within +> Athens and even of the possibility of the operation of the state. Solon's law +> does not describe measures whereby the crisis can be avoided. Instead, it +> describes how everyone is required to participate in it -- as if the aim is to +> accentuate the crisis. Those who avoid conflict will be punished. The +> democratic overcoming of crisis consists in the institutionalization of +> crisis within the constitution. According to Solon, his fellow Athenians need +> to recognize the illusion that the implementation of measures can always +> prevent crisis. According to Solon, democracy consists in the dispelling of +> that illusion. This does not mean that certain measures or policies cannot and +> should not be devised to ameliorate or evade predictable crises. Rather, it +> highlights that such measures are never adequate. Or, to put it the other +> way around, Solon sees crisis as a way of being, as a condition of existence, +> and he is determined that his democratic constitution aknowledges this. +> +> -- 57-58 + +> Democracy does not seek to be charitable to the other but instead affords the +> other the respect to give them a voice to express their opinions as well as to +> debate and rebuke these opinions. +> +> -- 73 + +> These insights amount to saying that a democratic being is conflictual +> -- which is to say that it cannot find certainty in any political regime +> promising unity or in a state characterized by order, peace, and stability. +> Rather, democracy in this sense is a regime that is inherently open to the +> possibility of conflict without any underlying structure to regulate this +> conflict or to resolve it to some thing posited as higher. +> +> -- 76 diff --git a/books/philosophy/torture-and-truth.md b/books/philosophy/torture-and-truth.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4dcb3a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/philosophy/torture-and-truth.md @@ -0,0 +1,956 @@ +[[!meta title="Torture and Truth"]] + +* [Torture and Truth](https://www.worldcat.org/title/torture-and-truth/oclc/20823386). +* By Page duBois. + +## About + + First published in 1991, this book — through the examination of ancient + Greek literary, philosophical and legal texts — analyses how the Athenian + torture of slaves emerged from and reinforced the concept of truth as something + hidden in the human body. It discusses the tradition of understanding truth as + something that is generally concealed and the ideas of ‘secret space’ in both + the female body and the Greek temple. This philosophy and practice is related + to Greek views of the ‘Other’ (women and outsiders) and considers the role of + torture in distinguishing slave and free in ancient Athens. A wide range of + perspectives — from Plato to Sartre — are employed to examine the subject. + +## Topics + +* Example of actual tortures that took place: see defense of Andokides. Footnote 6. + +## Excerpts + +### Machine atroci + + Inside sat other devices. The iron maiden of Frankfurt, a + larger-than-life-size female body, cast in iron, strangely reminiscent of one + of those Russian dolls, a rounded maternal peasant body that opens horizontally + to reveal another identical doll inside, that opens again and again until one + reaches a baby, perhaps, I can’t recall, in its deepest inside. This body, + propped open, had been cast with a vertical split, its interior consisting of + two sets of sharp iron spikes that, when the maiden was closed on a captive + human body, penetrated that body, trapping it upright as it killed in a + grotesque parody of pregnancy made a coffin. + + [...] + + For me, the pear was not the most compelling “machine” on display. There + sat, on one of the tables inside the Quirinale Palace, a simple modern device, + looking something like a microphone, with electrodes dangling from it. The + catalogue acknowledged that critics had objected to the inclusion of this + instrument in the exhibit. + + [...] + + As I recognized what it must be, pieced together an idea of its functions from + recently read accounts of refugees from the Argentinian junta and from Central + America, recalled films of the Algerian war, news stories of the reign of the + colonels in Greece, this instrument composed of the only too familiar elements + of modern technology defamiliarized the devices on exhibit; removing them from + the universe of the museum, it identified them with the calculated infliction + of human agony. It recontextualized all the other objects, prevented them from + being an aesthetic series, snatched them from the realm of the commodified + antique, recalled suffering. + + The ancient Greeks and Romans routinely tortured slaves as part of their legal + systems. So what? Is the recollection of this fact merely a curiosity, a memory + of the “antique” which allows us to marvel at our progress from the past of + Western culture, our abolition of slavery? Some of us congratulate ourselves on + our evolution from a barbaric pagan past, from the world of slave galleys and + crucifixions, of vomitoria and gladiatorial contests, of pederasty and + polytheism. But there is another, supplementary or contestatory narrative told + about ancient Greek culture—a narrative about the noble origins of Western + civilization. This narrative has analogies with the Quirinale exhibit—it + represents the past as a set of detached objects, redolent with antique + atmosphere. This alternate and prejudicially selective gaze at the high culture + of antiquity, the achievement of those ancient Greeks and Romans to whom we + point when we discuss our golden age, produces an ideological text for the + whole world now, mythologies about democracy versus communist totalitarianism, + about progress, civilized values, human rights. Because we are descended from + this noble ancient culture, from the inventors of philosophy and democracy, we + see ourselves as privileged, as nobly obliged to guide the whole benighted + world toward Western culture’s version of democracy and enlightenment. But even + as we gaze at high culture, at its origins in antiquity, at its present + manifestations in the developed nations, the “base” practices of torturers + throughout the world, many of them trained by North Americans, support this + narrative by forcing it on others, by making it the hegemonic discourse about + history. So-called high culture—philosophical, forensic, civic discourses and + practices—is of a piece from the very beginning, from classical antiquity, with + the deliberate infliction of human suffering. It is my argument in this book + that more is at stake in our recognition of this history than antiquarianism, + than complacency about our advances from barbarism to civilization. That truth + is unitary, that truth may finally be extracted by torture, is part of our + legacy from the Greeks and, therefore, part of our idea of “truth.” + +### Sartre + + "Torture is senseless violence, born in fear. The purpose of it is to force + from one tongue, amid its screams and its vomiting up of blood, the secret of + everything. Senseless violence: whether the victim talks or whether he dies + under his agony, the secret that he cannot tell is always somewhere else and + out of reach. It is the executioner who becomes Sisyphus. If he puts the + question at all, he will have to continue forever." + +### Tradition, secrets, truth and torture + + The Gestapo taught the French, who taught the Americans in Indo-China, and + they passed on some of their expertise to the Argentinian, Chilean, El + Salvadoran torturers. But this essay is not meant to be a genealogy of modern + torture. Rather I am concerned with what Sartre calls “the secret of + everything” with the relationship between torture and the truth, which “is + always somewhere else and out of reach.” + +A crucial point (an "crucial" also in the sense of the crucified, tortured body): + + I want to show how the logic of our philosophical tradition, of some of our + inherited beliefs about truth, leads almost inevitably to conceiving of the + body of the other as the site from which truth can be produced, and to using + violence if necessary to extract that truth. + + [...] + + I want to work out how the Greek philosophical idea of truth was produced + in history and what role the social practice of judicial torture played in its + production. + + I don’t want to suggest that the ancient Greeks invented torture, or that it + belongs exclusively to the Western philosophical tradition, or that abhorrence + of torture is not also part of that tradition. But I also refuse to adopt the + moral stance of those who pretend that torture is the work of “others,” that it + belongs to the third world, that we can condemn it from afar. To stand thus is + to eradicate history, to participate both in the exportation of torture as a + product of Western civilization, and in the concealment of its ancient and + perhaps necessary coexistence with much that we hold dear. The very idea of + truth we receive from the Greeks, those ancestors whom Allan Bloom names for + us,3 is inextricably linked with the practice of torture, which has almost + always been the ultimate attempt to discover a secret “always out of reach.” + + [...] + + The ancient Greek word for torture is basanos. It means first of all the + touchstone used to test gold for purity; the Greeks extended its meaning to + denote a test or trial to determine whether something or someone is real or + genuine. It then comes to mean also inquiry by torture, “the question,” + torture.4 In the following pages I will discuss the semantic field of the word + basanos, its uses in various contexts, both literal and metaphorical. [...] + This analysis will lead me to consideration of the idea of truth as secret in + ancient Greek thought, in literary, ritual, and philosophical practices + + [...] + + The desire for a reliable test to determine the fidelity of a suspect + intimate recurs in Greek poetry, and later poets often employ the metaphor of + the testing of metal to describe the necessity and unreliability of testing for + the fidelity of friends. + + The Lydians of Asia Minor had invented the use of metal currency, of money, in + the seventh century B.C.E. The polis or city-state of Aegina was reputed to be + the first Greek city to establish a silver coinage; in the classical period + several different coinages circulated. By the fifth century B.C.E. coins of + small enough denominations existed to enter into the economic transactions of + daily life. In Euripides’ Hippolytus the Athenian king Theseus, bewildered by + contradictory accounts of an alleged seduction attempt by his son against his + wife, uses monetary language to convey his confusion about the mysteries of + domestic intimacy: + + [...] + + Theseus employs the language of the banker, of the money-lender, to suggest + that one of his friends, that is, of those dear to him, either his son or his + wife, is false and counterfeit. + + [...] + + pollution is a religious term, connected with the impurity of blood shed, + of unclean sacrificial practices or murder.10 + In the archaic period, the state of freedom from pollution is sometimes + connected with notions of inherited purity, of uncontaminated descent from the + generations of heroes, from the gods, ideas of inherited excellence through + which the aristocrats justified their dominance in the archaic cities. + +### Governing, the steering of a ship in the hands of the aristocracy + + The very last lines of the poem echo the concerns of Theognis, a recognition of + the political disturbances of the ancient city, and the desire of the + aristocratic poet for a steady hand, sanctioned by blood and tradition, at the + city’s helm: + + Let us praise + his brave brothers too, because + they bear on high the ways of Thessaly + and bring them glory. + In their hands + belongs the piloting of cities, their fathers’ heritage. + (68-72) [poet Pindar, in Pythian 10] + + This last phrase might be rendered: “in the care of the good men [Theognis’s + agathoi, a political term] lie the inherited, paternal pilotings, governings + [following the metaphor of the ship of state] of cities.” The city is a ship + that must be guided by those who are capable by birth of piloting it, that is + to say, the agathoi, the good, the aristocrats. The basanos reveals the good, + separates base metal from pure gold, aristocrat from commoner. + +### A change of meaning + + The Sophoclean language, and its ambiguity, reveal the gradual transition of + the meaning of the word basanos from “test” to “torture.” The literal meaning, + “touchstone,” gives way to a figurative meaning, “test,” then over time changes + to “torture,” as the analogy is extended to the testing of human bodies in + juridical procedures for the Athenian courts. Is the history of basanos itself + in ancient Athens a process of refiguration, the alienation of the test from a + metal to the slave, the other? Such a transfer is literally catachresis, the + improper use of words, the application of a term to a thing which it does not + properly denote, abuse or perversion of a trope or metaphor (OED); George + Puttenham, the Elizabethan rhetorician, calls catachresis “the figure of + abuse.” The modern English word touchstone is similarly employed by people who + have no idea of the archaic reference to the lapis Lydius, also called in + English basanite . The figurative use of the word touchstone has taken the + place of the literal meaning. + + [...] + + The forensic language of Oedipus Rex fuses heroic legend with the poetic + representation of the city’s institutions. The mythic narrative of Oedipus’s + encounter with the Sphinx, set in the most remote past, and the struggle + between Kreon and Oedipus over the investigation of an ancient and mythic + homicide, here meet the daily life of the democratic polis. The language of + Sophokles’ tragedy might be said to exemplify not only the contradictions + between the tyranny of the fictional past and the “secret ballots,” alluded to + disparagingly by Pindar, of the audience’s present, but also to represent + dramatically, in an almost Utopian manner, a synthesis of the Greeks’ legendary + origins and their political processes. The chorus’s attempt to judge Oedipus + resembles the aristocratic reveler’s testing of his fellow symposiasts, using + as it does archaic, lyric language; it is also like the democratic jury’s + testing of a citizen on trial, alluding obliquely at the same time to the + juridical torture of slaves in the Athenian legal system, a process which by + this time was referred to as the basanos. + + Some of the semantic processes that transformed basanos as touchstone into the + term for legal torture can be seen in the use of the term in the Oedipus + Coloneus. This tragedy is only obliquely concerned with the process of + democracy, with the new institutions of the mid-fifth century which mediated + between the city’s aristocratic past and its democratic present. It speaks + instead of the exhaustion of the political, of disillusionment with parties and + with war, of metaphysical solutions to problems too bitter to be resolved in + mortal agones. + + [...] + + The basanos, no longer an autonomous, inert, inanimate tool for assaying + metal, has become a struggle between two forces, a contest that assumes + physical violence, a reconcretizing of the “touchstone,” which is neither the + literal stone nor a metaphorical ordeal. Hands, pitted one against the other, + rematerialize the test. The touchstone sets stone against metal; the test of + friends sets one against another; here the agon, the contest implicit in the + notion of basanos, takes on a new connotation, one of combat between enemies. + + Some historians of the ancient city believe that the word basanos refers not to + physical torture, but to a legal interrogation that does not involve violence. + Others claim that the threat of torture may have been present in the word, but + that there is no evidence that torture was actually ever practiced.16 It seems + to me very unlikely , even though the ancient evidence does not describe + directly any single case of torture, that the frequent mentions of basanos in + contexts of physical intimidation can refer to anything but the practice of + torture. The accidents of survival of ancient material may mean that we have no + single documented instance of torture having been applied, but the many uses of + the term, not only in the context of the law court, suggest a cultural + acceptance of the meaning “torture” for basanos, and an assumption that torture + occurred. For example, the historian Herodotos, in recounting an incident that + took place during the Persian Wars, in the early years of the fifth century + B.C.E., describes the Athenian hero Themistokles’ secret negotiations with the + Persian emperor Xerxes after the battle of Salamis: + + Themistocles lost no time in getting a message through to Xerxes. The men he + chose for this purpose were all people he could trust to keep his instructions + secret [sigan], even under torture [es pasan basanon]. + + [...] + + This passage suggests not only that basanos was not merely interrogation, but + that with the meaning torture it formed part of the vocabulary of daily life, + and that torture figured in the relations between ancient states as well as in + the legal processes of the democratic city. Themistokles had to take into + account the ability of his emissaries to resist physical torture, pasan + basanon, “any, all torture,” when deciding whom to send to the Persian emperor. + He required silence under extreme interrogation, since he was claiming falsely + to have protected Xerxes from the pursuit of the Greeks after the Persians’ + defeat. And Herodotos uses the word basanos as if the meaning “torture” were + common currency. + + As do Sophokles’ Oedipus plays, Herodotos’s text offers a double vision, + providing further evidence about the place of torture in the democracy and in + its prehis-tory. Sophokles writes from within the democracy about episodes from + the archaic, legendary past of the city. Herodotos writes from the world of the + mid-fifth century, the time of Sophokles and the great imperial age of Athens, + looking back half a century. The victories of Athens in the Persian Wars had + enabled and produced the great flowering of Athenian culture and ambition in + the middle of the fifth century. Herodotos’s retrospective gaze at the origins + of the democracy and its empire paints the portrait of Themistokles, one of the + great aristocrats whose power and vision shaped the evolution of the democratic + city. His encouragement, for example, of the policy of spending the city’s + mining wealth on its fleet, rather than distributing of monies to the citizens, + meant that the poorest citizens in Athens, who manned the fleet, participated + actively and powerfully in the political and military decisions of the + following years. In the incident Herodotos describes, Themistokles takes care + to ensure that his self-interested machinations not be known by the Athenians + he led. Themistokles, like Oedipus, has become a creature of legend. + + [...] + + Silence under torture may be coded as an aristocratic virtue. [...] it + indicates the degree to which silence under pain is ideologically associated + with nobility. The slave has no resources through which to resist submitting to + pain and telling all. In contrast the aristocratic soldier, noble by both birth + and training, maintains laconic silence in the face of physical abuse. + +### Comedy and inversion + + We find a comic parody of the use of basanos for the courtroom in Aristophanes’ + Frogs.20 The comedy is devoted to themes of judgment, discrimination, and + evaluation . Dionysos and his slave Xanthias have set off on a journey to Hades + to retrieve the tragic poet Euripides, but end by choosing Aeschylus to bring + back with them, claiming him over Euripides as the superior poet. Dionysos had + dressed for the trip as Herakles, who had once successfully entered and, more + importantly, departed the realm of the dead, but when he learns that Herakles + is persona non grata in Hades, he forces his slave to trade costumes with him. + When Xanthias is mistaken for Herakles and about to be arrested as a + dog-napper, for the stealing of Kerberos, the slave offers to give up his own + supposed slave, really the god Dionysos, to torture + + [...] + + The result is a beating contest in which Xanthias seems sure to win, accustomed + as he, a real slave, is to such beatings. The beatings constitute not + punishment but torture, and the language of the comedy reflects this fact. The + torture will reveal the truth, show which of the two is a god, which a slave. + The comedy works on the reversal of slave and god; Xanthias claims a god would + not be hurt by a beating, but the slave, the lowest of mortal beings, might in + fact be thought, because of experience, most easily to endure a whipping. + Dionysos begins to weep under the beating, but claims it’s due to onions. + Aiakos is finally unable to decide which of the two is divine. + + In the parabasis, the address to the audience, that follows, the theme of noble + and base currency emerges once again, as if connected by free association with + this scene of torture, of the basanos or touchstone. The chorus appeals to the + Athenian populace, complaining that Athenians who had committed one fault in a + battle at sea were to be put to death, while slaves who had fought alongside + their masters had been given their freedom. This seems to the chorus to be a + perversion of traditional hierarchical thinking: + + [...] + + The comic beating is quite hilarious, of course. But it does not put into + question the reality of torture. The exchange has a carnival quality, Dionysos + masquerading as slave, slave masquerading as Dionysos masquerading as Herakles, + the god beaten like a common slave. The slave remains uppity and insolent, the + god cowardly and ridiculous. Comedy permits this representation of the + quotidian reality of the polis, the exposure of what cannot be alluded to + directly in tragedy, the violence and domination implicit in the situation of + bondage. Comedy allows the fictional depiction of the unspeakable, the + representation of the lowly slave, the allusion to ordinary cruelty, a + commentary on the difficulty of perceiving the essential difference between + divine and enslaved beings. + [...] If Aristophanes is so iconoclastic as to mock the gods, and to treat + the slave as if he were a human character, he does not go so far as to question + the institution of the basanos. + +### Testing + + The slave on the rack waits like the metal, pure or alloyed, to be tested. + [...] The test assumes that its result will be truth; [...] The truth is + generated by torture from the speech of the slave; the sounds of the slave on + the rack must by definition contain truth, which the torture produces. And when + set against other testimony in a court case, that necessary truth, like a + touchstone itself, will show up the truth or falsity of the testimony. The + process of testing has been spun out from the simple metallurgist’s experiment, + to a new figuration of the work of interrogating matter. It is the slave’s + body, not metal, which receives the test; but how can that body be demonstrated + to be true or false, pure or alloyed, loyal or disloyal? The basanos assumes + first that the slave always lies, then that torture makes him or her always + tell the truth, then that the truth produced through torture will always expose + the truth or falsehood of the free man’s evidence. + +### Athenian democracy and torture + + Yet the Athenian democracy was at best a sort of oligarchy, one that denied + legal and political rights to all women, even daughters of citizens, and to + foreigners and slaves residing in Attica. The practice of slave torture is + consistent with the democracy’s policies of exclusion, scapegoating, ostracism, + and physical cruelty and violence; to overlook or justify torture is to + misrecognize and idealize the Athenian state. + + MacDowell describes the place of torture in the Athenian legal system: + + A special rule governed the testimony of slaves: they could not appear in + court, but a statement which a slave, male or female, had made under torture + (basanos) could be produced in court as evidence.3 + + The party in a trial who wished a slave to be tortured would put his questions + in writing, specifying which slaves he wished to have tortured and the + questions they were to be asked, and also agreeing to pay the slave’s owner for + any permanent damage inflicted on the slave. Athenian citizens could not be + tortured. + + MacDowell reasons as follows about the rule that slave’s testimony could + be received in the courtroom only if the slave had been tortured: + + The reason for this rule must have been that a slave who knew anything material + would frequently belong to one of the litigants, and so would be afraid to say + anything contrary to his owner’s interests, unless the pressure put on him to + reveal the truth was even greater than the punishment for revealing it which he + could expect from his master.4 + + A. R. W. Harrison believes that the right to testify freely in court may have + been seen as a privilege, perhaps because witnesses who appeared in court were + once thought of as “compurgators,” witnesses who swore to the credibility of a + party in a law suit. “Torture must therefore be applied to the slave as a mark + of the fact that he was not in himself a free agent entitled to support one + side or the other.”5 Since the slave was a valuable piece of property, liable + to damage from torture, she or he could not be tortured without permission of + the owner.6 If that permission were denied, the opponent often claimed that the + evidence which would have been obtained under torture would of certainty have + been damning to the slave’s owner. + +### Slavery and freedom + + Jean-Paul Sartre’s [...] says: “Algeria cannot contain two human species, but + requires a choice between them”.1 The soldiers who practiced torture on + Algerian revolutionaries attempted to reduce their opponents to pure + materiality, to the status of animals. + + [...] + + Free men and women could be enslaved at any time, although in Athens the + Solonian reforms of the sixth century B.C.E. + + [...] + + In the Politics Aristotle claims that some people are slaves “by nature” + + [...] + + The discourse on the use of torture in ancient Athenian law forms part of an + attempt to manage the opposition between slave and free, and it betrays both + need and anxiety: need to have a clear boundary between servile and free, + anxiety about the impossibility of maintaining this difference. + +### Tendency of suspend democracy protections (coup) during crisis + + [The] incident of the mutilation of the herms shook the stability of the + Athenian state, but also points to the future tendencies among the aristocratic + and oligarchic parties to suspend democratic protections in a moment of crisis. + The logical tendency would seem to be either to extend torture to all who could + give evidence, or to forbid torture of any human being. The instability of the + distinctions between slave and free, citizen and noncitizen, Greek and + foreigner, becomes apparent in these debates on the possibility of state + torture of citizens. Athenian citizens treasured the freedom from torture as a + privilege of their elevated status; Peisander’s eagerness to abrogate this + right is a premonition of the violence and illegality of the oligarchic coup of + 411 and of the bloody rule of the Thirty after the defeat of the Athenians by + the Spartans in 404.5 + +### Truth-making and the secret of everything + + Another kind of truth, what Sartre calls “the secret of everything,” is named + by many Greek writers as the explicit aim of judicial torture. [,,,] + In the Greek legal system, the torture of slaves figured as a guarantor of + truth, as a process of truth-making. + +### Secret ballots and lawyers + + Jurors received pay for their service in the courts [...] A case was required + to be completed within a day at most; several private cases would be tried + within a single day. The time alloted for arguments by the opponents in a trial + was measured by a water-clock; the amount of water allowed for each side was + determined by the seriousness of the charges. After each of the litigants + spoke, brought forward witnesses, and had evidence read, the jurors placed + disks or pebbles into urns to determine the winner of the suit. + [...] At the end of the fifth century it became customary to employ professional + writers to compose one’s speech for the court. + + Thus the scene in the court resembled the great assemblies of the democratic + city, with up to six thousand men adjudicating disputes. [...] + In this context, the evidence from the torture of slaves is evidence from + elsewhere, from another place, another body. It is evidence from outside the + community of citizens, of free men. Produced by the basanistês, the torturer, + or by the litigant in another scene, at the time of torture, such evidence + differs radically from the testimony of free witnesses in the court. It is + temporally estranged, institutionally, conventionally marked as evidence of + another order; what is curious is that speakers again and again privilege it as + belonging to a higher order of truth than that evidence freely offered in the + presence of the jurors by present witnesses. + + [...] + + There are many such passages. The slave body has become, in the democratic + city, the site of torture and of the production of truth. + + The argument concerning the greater value of slave evidence frequently occurs + in accusations against an opponent who has refused to allow his slaves to be + tortured. The speaker claims then that this failure to produce slave witnesses + proves indirectly that their testimony would condemn their owner. + +### Slaves are bodies; citizens possess logos + + Lykourgos argues against Leokrates [...]: + + Every one of you knows that in matters of dispute it is considered by far the + just and most democratic [dêmotikôtatori] course, when there are male or female + slaves, who possess the necessary information, to examine these by torture and + so have facts to go upon instead of hearsay, particularly when the case + concerns the public and is of vital interest to the state. + + He argues that by nature the tortured slaves would have told the truth; does + this mean that any human being, when tortured, will produce the truth, or that + it is the nature of slaves to tell the truth under torture? Free citizen men + will be deceived by clever arguments; slaves by nature will not be misled + because they think with their bodies. Slaves are bodies; citizens possess + logos, reason. [...] This appeal to the practice of torture as an integral + and valued part of the legal machinery of the democracy points up the + contradictory nature of Athenian democracy, and the ways in which the + application of the democratic reforms of Athens were carefully limited to the + lives of male citizens, and intrinsic to the production and justification of + this notion of male citizenship. + +### Notions of truth and the real of the untorturable, the dead + + In another speech attributed to Antiphon, this one part of a case presumably + actually tried, torture again plays an important role in the defense of a man + accused of murder, Euxitheos [...] + + Probably both of these considerations induced him to make the false charges + against me which he did; he hoped to gain his freedom, and his one immediate + wish was to end the torture. I need not remind you, I think, that witnesses + under torture are biased in favour of those who do most of the torturing; they + will say anything likely to gratify them. It is their one chance of salvation, + especially when the victims of their lies happen not to be present. Had I + myself proceeded to give orders that the slave should be racked [strebloun] for + not telling the truth, that step in itself would doubtless have been enough to + make him stop incriminating me falsely. (5.31-32) + + The speaker, because for once forced to confront the evidence of a tortured + slave, rather than bemoaning the lack of slave evidence, here points out the + absolute unreliability of slave evidence, based as it is on the will of the + torturer. Bizarrely, however, he ends by claiming that the true truth would + have emerged, another truth truer than the first, if he himself had been the + torturer. If so, it is interesting that the defendant distinguishes between + an essentialist notion of truth and a pragmatic notion of truth in the case of + the slave, but not in the case of the free foreigner, where a reversion to the + essentialist notion appears to occur. And the logic he exposes, that the slave + will say anything to gratify his torturer, is dropped as soon as he himself + becomes the torturer. We can imagine the body of the slave ripped apart in a + tug-of-war between two litigants, in a law case in which he was implicated only + by proximity. + + This very slave, who had been purchased by the prosecution, in fact later + changed his testimony, according to the speaker because he recognized his + imminent doom. Nonetheless the prosecution put him to death. The defendant + continues: + + Clearly, it was not his person, but his evidence, which they required; had the + man remained alive, he would have been tortured by me in the same way, and the + prosecution would be confronted with their plot: but once he was dead, not only + did the loss of his person mean that I was deprived of my opportunity of + establishing the truth, but his false statements are assumed to be true. + (5.35) + + All of the prosecution’s case rests on the testimony of the tortured and now + dead slave; the defendant claims to be completely frustrated, since now the + truth lies in a realm inaccessible to him. He cannot torture the dead man and + discover the “real” truth. Even though the slave had at first insisted on the + defendant’s innocence, he had under torture called him guilty: + + At the start, before being placed on the wheel [trokhon], in fact, until + extreme pressure was brought to bear, the man adhered to the truth [alêtheia] + and declared me innocent. It was only when on the wheel, and when driven to it, + that he falsely incriminated me, in order to put an end to the torture. + (5.40-41) + + The persistence of the defendant’s desire himself to torture this slave claims + our attention; even after the inevitability of false testimony under torture + stands exposed, he bemoans the retreat of the slave into the realm of the + untorturable, of the dead. + + I repeat, let no one cause you to forget that the prosecution put the informer + to death, that they used every effort to prevent his appearance in court and to + make it impossible for me to take him and examine him under torture on my + return.… Instead, they bought the slave and put him to death, entirely on their + own initiative [idia], (5.46-47) + +### Reasoning attributed to a free man, but foreigner + + The free man knew that the torture would end; he also could not be bribed by + promises of freedom for giving the answers the torturers desired to hear. In + this case, the defendant gives priority to the free man’s unfree testimony; + unlike the free testimony of an Athenian in a courtroom, this evidence was + derived from torture, but the defendant seeks to give it the added authority of + the free man in spite of its origin in this procedure tainted with unfreedom, + because it supports his view of the case. + +### Truth even if it cost lives + + You do not need to be reminded, gentlemen, that the one occasion when + compulsion [anagkai] is as absolute and as effective as is humanly possible, + and when the rights of a case are ascertained thereby most surely and most + certainly, arises when there is an abundance of witnesses, both slave and free, + and it is possible to put pressure [anagkazein] upon the free men by exacting + an oath or word of honour, the most solemn and the most awful form of + compulsion known to free men, and upon the slaves by other devices [heterais + anagkais], which will force them to tell the truth even if their revelations + are bound to cost them their lives, as the compulsion of the moment [he gar + parousa anagkê] has a stronger influence over each than the fate which he will + suffer by compulsion afterwards. (6.25) + + That is, the free man is compelled by oaths; he might lose his rights as a + citizen if he lied under oath. The slave, even though he will certainly be put + to death as a consequence of what he reveals under torture, will nonetheless, + under torture, reveal the truth. The two kinds of compulsion are equated, one + appropriate for the free man, one for the slave. + +### Torturability + + Torture serves not only to exact a truth, some truth or other, which will + benefit one side of the case or the other. It also functions as a gambit in the + exchange between defendant and prosecution; if for any reason one of them + refuses to give up slaves to torture, the other can claim that the missing + testimony would of a certainty support his view of things. And as I argued + earlier, torture also serves to mark the boundary between slave and free + beings. Torture can be enacted against free, non-Greek beings as well as + slaves; all “barbarians” are assimilated to slaves. Slaves are barbarians, + barbarians are slaves; all are susceptible to torture. Torturability creates a + difference which is naturalized. And even the sophistry of the First Tetralogy, + which wants to create a category of virtually free in the case of the slave who + would have been freed had he lived, seeks to support this division of human + beings into free, truth-telling creatures, and torturable slave/barbarians, who + will only produce truth on the wheel. + +### The Slave's Truth + + Torture performs at least two functions in the Athenian state. As an instrument + of demarcation, it delineates the boundary between slave and free, between the + untouchable bodies of free citizens and the torturable bodies of slaves. The + ambiguity of slave status, the difficulty of sustaining an absolute sense of + differences, is addressed through this practice of the state, which carves the + line between slave and free on the bodies of the unfree. In the work of the + wheel, the rack, and the whip, the torturer carries out the work of the polis; + citizen is made distinct from noncitizen, Greek from barbarian, slave from + free. The practice of basanos administers to the anxiety about enslavement, + hauntingly evoked in the texts of Athenian tragedy that recall the fall of + cities, particularly the fall of Troy, evoked as well in the histories that + recount Athenian destruction of subject allies. + + [...] + + But the desire to clarify the respective status of slave and free is not the + motive, never the explicit motive, of torture. Rather, again and again, even in + the face of arguments discounting evidence derived from torture, speakers in + the courts describe the basanos as a search for truth. How is this possible? + And how are the two desires related? The claim is made that truth resides in + the slave body. + + [...] + + That is, the master possesses reason, logos. When giving evidence in court, he + knows the difference between truth and falsehood, he can reason and produce + true speech, logos, and he can reason about the consequences of falsehood , the + deprivation of his rights as a citizen. The slave, on the other hand, + possessing not reason, but rather a body strong for service (iskhura pros ten + anagkaian khrêsin), must be forced to utter the truth, which he can apprehend, + although not possessing reason as such. Unlike an animal, a being that + possesses only feelings, and therefore can neither apprehend reason, logos, nor + speak, legein, the slave can testify when his body is tortured because he + recognizes reason without possessing it himself. + + [...] + + Thus, according to Aristotle’s logic, representative or not, the slave’s truth + is the master’s truth; it is in the body of the slave that the master’s truth + lies, and it is in torture that his truth is revealed. The torturer reaches + through the master to the slave’s body, and extracts the truth from it. The + master can conceal the truth, since he possesses reason and can choose between + truth and lie, can choose the penalty associated with false testimony. His own + point of vulnerability is the body of his slave, which can be compelled not to + lie, can be forced to produce the truth. If he decides to deny the body of his + slave to the torturer, assumptions Will be made that condemn him. + + [...] + + Aristotle advocates the pragmatic approach; one can argue either side concerning + the truth of torture. + + [...] + + As Gernet says, “Proof is institutional.” Proof, and therefore truth, are + constituted by the Greeks as best found in the evidence derived from torture. + Truth, alêtheia, comes from elsewhere, from another place, from the place of + the other. + +### Torture and Writing + + The tortured body retains scars, marks that recall the violence inflicted upon + it by the torturer. In part because slaves were often tattooed in the ancient + world, such marks of torture resonate in the Greek mind with tattoos, and with + other forms of metaphorical inscription, in Greek thinking considered analogous + to writing on the body.1 I have discussed the topos of corporeal inscription + elsewhere. The woman’s body was in ancient Greece sometimes likened to a + writing tablet, a surface to be ”ploughed,” inscribed by the hand, the plough, + the penis of her husband and master.2 + +The famous case of the tatooed head: + + One especially intriguing mention of slave tattooing occurs in Herodotos’s + Histories, in a narrative in which the possibility of torture remains implicit. + Although I have discussed this episode elsewhere, I want here to draw out its + implications for a consideration of the relationship between torture and truth. + Histiaios of Miletus sends a message urging revolt to a distant ally by shaving + the head of his most trusted slave, tattooing the message on the slave’s head, + then waiting for the slave’s hair to grow back. He sends the slave on his + journey, ordering him to say at the journey’s end only that the “destinataire,” + the receiver of the message, should shave off his hair and look at his head. + The message reaches its goal, and Aristagoras the receiver revolts (Herodotos, + Histories 5.35). + + The tattooed head is a protection against torture. If the slave were captured + and tortured, he would not himself know the message of revolt. He could not + betray his master if questioned and interrogated specifically about his + master’s intentions to rise up against those who have enslaved him. He did not + know the content of Histiaios’ communication with Aristagoras. But he did know + the instructions he bore to Aristagoras, to shave his head and read the message + inscribed there. The ruse only displaces the discovery of the message’s truth + by a single step, but in this case it succeeds in protecting the message. Here + the tattooing, the inscription on the slave’s body, subverts the intention of + torture to expose the truth. + +"Branding": + + In other contexts in ancient Greece, slave tattooing serves as a sort of label. + It is as if writing on the slave body indicated the contents of that body. Such + a function of writing recalls the work of Denise Schmandt-Besserat, who argues + that writing originates in the markings on the outside of packages recording + their contents.3 Aristotle points out in the Politics, as we have seen, that + the slave body ought to reveal its truth, ought to be immediately perceptible + as a servile body to the eye, but in fact sometimes it is not. A tattoo on a + slave reveals his or her true status. In Aristophanes’ Babylonians, of which + only fragments remain, we learn that prisoners of war were sometimes branded or + inscribed with a mark indicating the city they served.4 + + [...] + + though he is a human being, he does not know himself, soon he will know, having + this inscription on his forehead. (74_79)6 + + Herodes invokes the inscription at Delphi, also cited by Plato: gnôthi seauton, + “Know yourself.”7 + + [...] + + This placement of the “epigram,” whatever it is, if it is that, on the metope, + the forehead of the slave, makes the inscription a sign. The message of + Herodotos’s slave was concealed by his hair, directed to a specified other, the + recipient who received the slave as a vehicle for his master’s words. The + communication was not directed to the slave himself. In the case of Herodes’ + slave, the man named “Belly” would bear a sign meant to remind him of his + humble status. + +### Buried Truth + + If torture helped to manage the troublesome differentiation between slave and + free in the ancient city, it also served as a redundant practice reinforcing + the dominant notion of the Greeks that truth was an inaccessible, buried + secret. In his valuable book Les maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque, + Marcel Detienne describes a historical shift in the Greeks’ ideas about truth + that corresponds to the historical shift from mythic to rational thought.1 + According to Detienne, Alêtheia is at first conceived of by the Greeks in an + ambiguous relationship with Lethe, forgetting; truth is the possession of the + poet and the just king, who has access to this truth through memory. Alêtheia + is caught up in a relationship of ambiguity with Lêthê because, for example, + the poet who speaks truth by using memory also confers truth’s other, + forgetfulness, oblivion of pain and sorrow, on his listeners. His + “magico-religious” speech, as Detienne calls it, which exists in an ambiguous + relationship with truth, persists as the dominant form in the Greek world until + the speech of warriors, the citizens who form the city’s phalanxes, a speech of + dialogue, comes to dominate the social world in the time of the polis. Detienne + associates a resultant secularization of poetic Alêtheia with the name of the + poet Simonides. Doxa, seeming, becomes the rival province of sophistic and + rhetorical speech, while Alêtheia comes to belong to an unambiguously + “philosophico-religious” domain. In this field of discourse the logic of + ambiguity typical of the Alêtheia-Lêthê relationship is replaced by a logic of + contradiction, in which Alêtheia is opposed to Apatê, deception, as its other. + The common use of memory provides a link between these two stages of thinking + truth; the secularization of speech marks a break between a mythic and a + rationalist semantic field in which the term Alêtheia persists. + +### The modern word Tortura + + A word used in addition to alêthês in the Odyssey is atrekês, real, genuine, + with a connotation perhaps of that which does not distort or deviate. The Latin + word torqueo means “to twist tightly, to wind or wrap, to subject to torture, + especially by the use of the rack.” This word may come from the root trek-, + also occurring in Greek, which may give us atraktos, “spindle,” and also + “arrow.”6 (Tortor is used as a cult title of Apollo, “perhaps”, according to + the Oxford Latin Dictionary, “from the quarter at Rome occupied by the + torturers.”)7 Our English word “torture” is taken from this Latin root. The + Oxford English Dictionary defines “torture,” an adaptation of the Latin + tortura, in the following way: + + The infliction of excruciating pain, as practised by cruel tyrants, savages, + brigands, etc., from the delight in watching the agony of a victim, in hatred + or revenge, or as a means of extortion; spec. judicial torture, inflicted by a + judicial or quasi-judicial authority, for the purpose of forcing an accused or + suspected person to confess, or an unwilling witness to give evidence or + information.8 Although the writers of the dictionary list first tyrants, + savages, and brigands as the agents of torture, the first entry in their + citations of the use of the word in English refers to the Acts of the Privy + Council of 1551. This set of connotations, to return to the point, links the + English word torture with the twisted, the distorted, and suggests that the + truth gained as a confession is in English not conceived of as a straight line, + but is rather bent, extorted from time on the rack. + + In Greek, however, not passing through Latin into English for our etymology + (etumos is another word used for “true” in Greek), we have, parallel to + atrekês, the word alêtheia with its suggestion of hiddenness and forgetting. + The connotations of the alternative words nêmertês and atrekês are respectively + “not missing the mark”, and “not deviating from an existing model”; the weight + of alêthês rests instead on the trace of something not forgotten, not slipping + by unnoticed.9 + + [...] + + Even in the texts of the Hippocratic tradition, the body is seen to contain + secrets that must be interpreted, elicited by signs that emerge onto the body’s + surface, as the emanation from the earth arises to possess the Pythia. + + [...] + + Each of these sites of meaning in ancient culture—the epic, oracles, sacred + buildings, the medicalized body—lay out a pattern of obscure, hidden truth that + must be interpreted. + +### Heraclitian truth differs + + The works of the pre-Socratic philosophers (even to presume to call them + philosophers may be to presume too much) present problems of reading for the + historian of philosophy, for the literary and cultural critic. Even the problem + of who is disciplinarily responsible for these texts is insoluble. And the + incompleteness of many pre-Socratic texts causes unease. How can one speak of + philosophical development when only one line, one metaphor, one aphorism + remains, torn out of context, lines repeated to illustrate a well-known point? + The ellipses in the published pre-Socratic fragments recall stopped mouths, + messages gone astray, the utter failure of communication across a distance of + centuries. + + [...] + + The very search for integrity and indivisibility in all things has been called + into question by the heirs of Nietzsche, among them those feminists who see the + emphasis on wholeness and integrity, on the full body, as a strategy of + scholarship that has traditionally excluded the female, who has been identified + as different, heterogeneous, disturbing the integrity of the scholarly body, + incomplete in herself. Aristotle describes the female as a “deformed” + (pepêrômenon) male (Generation of Animals 737a), and argues further that her + contribution to reproduction lacks a crucial ingredient, the principle of soul + (psukhe). The project of scientific textual studies has been to supply the + text’s lack, to reduce the fragmented, partial quality of embodied, material + texts, to reject the defective text as it rejects the defective female. Like + the slave body that needs the supplement of the basanos to produce truth, the + female body and the fragmentary text are both constructed as lacking. + + [...] + + Elsewhere Herakleitos seems to argue against an innate hierarchy of mortal + beings: “War is father of all, and king of all. He renders some gods, others + men; he makes some slaves, others free” (fr. 53). Mortal and immortal status + depends on human history, on events. There is no essence, no absolute truth in + the differences among beings. Circumstances, history, time affect relations of + difference and power.2 This relativism establishes a ground for the vision of + equality among citizens in ancient democratic ideology, and even further, a + point from which to examine the commonly held view that some human beings are + slaves by nature. + + Herakleitos represents an alternative to the essentializing concept of truth as + a buried, hidden substance; he offers a temporal notion of truth, that the + basanos of the physician is good at one time, at another time bad, that war + creates slaves and free, a relative notion of truth. [...] + Herakleitos’s relationship to time, change and process prefigures values of the + democracy and of the pre-Socratic sophists whom the aristocratic philosophical + tradition despised: “As they step into the same rivers, different and (still) + different waters flow upon them” (fr. 12); “we step and do not step into the + same rivers; we are and are not” (fr. 49a). His is not a doctrine of + superficial appearance and deep truth, but rather a celebration of the + mutability and interdependence of all things. The Heraclitean truth, read + within his words, fragmentary as they are, celebrating flux, time, difference, + allows for an alternative model to a hidden truth. [...] + for him truth is process and becoming, obtained through + observation, rather than a fixed, divine and immutable truth of eternity. + +### Truth and memory + + The word anagkê, “constraint,” is associated with the yoke of slavery.10 All of + human experience suffers from its subjection to necessity; the slave offers an + extreme example of the general human condition. In one of her many forms the + goddess who instructs the youth, the Kouros, is mistress of “brute force,” or + of the bonds associated with enslavement, and is therefore binding the + “what-is,” the “true,” in captivity. Like the slave who yields the truth to the + torturer, the “what-is” is bound in domination, and delivers up its truth under + necessity. + + [...] + + Does truth as eternally located elsewhere, either hidden in the body, or hidden + in the earth, or hidden inside or beyond human existence, in some realm + inaccessible to ordinary consciousness, lead by some tortuous path to the + necessity for torture? Can we posit a truth of process and becoming, and + another truth of eternity? If so, the word a-lêtheia seems to carry buried + within it support for the view of hidden truth, of truth brought up from the + depths. The possibility of forgetting leads to the imagination of a buried + realm, the realm of forgetting, of Lethe, which can be represented either + positively or negatively. It is good to forget suffering and pain, regrettable + to forget a message, to forget crucial information that must be transmitted to + a listener; in either case Lethe—or, to coin a word, “letheia”—remains a domain + beyond consciousness. + + [...] + + The dominance of a notion of truth as alêtheia, not forgetting, he attributes + in part to the gradual shift to literacy taking place in the fifth and fourth + centuries.14 The legal corpus reflects the state of the problem of truth in the + fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E. Charles Segal has discussed eloquently the + ways in which growing literacy affects concepts of the self and truth in Greek + tragedy.15 + + [...] + + In the dominant literary and philosophical paradigm, the truth is seen to be + forgettable, slipping away from notice, buried, inaccessible, then retrieved + through an effort of memory, through the invocation of divine possession, + through the interrogation by a privileged seeker of some enlightened source; + seeking the truth may involve a journey, a passage through a spatial narrative + of some sort, a request, a sinking down into the past, into the interiority of + memory. This model of truth seeking is consistent with other such paradigms + already suggested earlier, in the law courts, where, as we saw, the violence of + the torturer is thought to be necessary to enforce the production of truth from + the slave, either to force him or her to recall the truth, or to force him or + her to speak the truth for the benefit of the court. + + The slave’s body is thus construed as one of these sites of truth, like the + adyton, the underworld, the interiority of the woman’s body, the elsewhere + toward which truth is always slipping, a Utopian space allowing a less + mediated, more direct access to truth, where the truth is no longer forgotten, + slipping away. The basanos gives the torturer the power to exact from the + other, seen as like an oracular space, like the woman’s hystera, like the + inside of the earth, the realm of Hades, as other and as therefore in + possession of the truth. The truth is thus always elsewhere, always outside the + realm of ordinary human experience, of everyday life, secreted in the earth, in + the gods, in the woman, in the slave. To recall it from this other place + sometimes requires patience, sometimes payment of gifts, sometimes seduction, + sometimes violence. + +### Torture and commodification + + Does it have to do with the invention of coinage, with the idea of abstract + exchange value, and the slave as an exchangeable body, a thing to be tested + like a coin, like a marker for exchange? In the Laws the Athenian says men are + like puppets with strings, and that they should follow the soft, golden string, + the “golden and hallowed drawing of judgment which goes by the name of the + public law of the city” (644-45). diff --git a/books/scifi/machine-stops.md b/books/scifi/machine-stops.md index 1da0e36..8dd3484 100644 --- a/books/scifi/machine-stops.md +++ b/books/scifi/machine-stops.md @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ [...] Few travelled in these days, for, thanks to the advance of science, the earth - was exactly alike all over. + was exactly alike all over. [...] @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Beneath those corridors of shining tiles were rooms, tier below tier, reaching far into the earth, and in each room there sat a human being, eating, or - sleeping, or producing ideas. And buried deep in the hive was her own room. + sleeping, or producing ideas. And buried deep in the hive was her own room. [...] diff --git a/books/sociology/anarchist-cybernetics.md b/books/sociology/anarchist-cybernetics.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cdc9f0c --- /dev/null +++ b/books/sociology/anarchist-cybernetics.md @@ -0,0 +1,301 @@ +[[!meta title="Anarchist Cybernetics"]] + +* https://lra.le.ac.uk/bitstream/2381/37597/1/2016swanntrphd.pdf +* https://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/phir/staff/thomas-swann/ +* https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.686573 +* https://lra.le.ac.uk/handle/2381/37597 +* https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2017/3/12/1642612/-Anti-Capitalist-Meetup-Swann-s-Way-anarchist-cybernetics-amp-organizational-dynamics-in-politics + +## Excerpts + + goals. The metaphor of a dance with complexity echoes the way Ashby describes the + process of control as being similar to a fencer facing an opponent. ‘(I)f a fencer faces an + opponent who has various modes of attack available,’ he writes, ‘the fencer must be + provided with at least an equal number of modes of defence’ ([1958] 2003, p. 356; see + also Ashby, 1962)). Control and regulation are processes of responding to the + unpredictable moves of another dancer (again, the complexity can be threatening or, in + the case of a dance or in fencing, it can be more of a friendly game or a negotiation). 11 + Control is not something enacted by an entity, be it an individual or a group, over an + + [...] + + Self-organisation is a sticky concept for cybernetics. Ashby, for example, argues that it + cannot exist. He bases his argument on the second-order cybernetic position that + viability or effectiveness is always determined as such by an observer of a system. Self- + organisation suggests that a system responds effectively by itself to complexity. Along + these lines, self-organisation is not a property of the system itself but of the observation + (1962; see also von Foerster, [1960] 2003; Duda, 2012, p. 89). While this may apply to + mathematical, biological and engineering applications of cybernetics, it is + fundamentally at odds with organisational cybernetics and the cybernetics of social and + political organisation more generally. A more fitting account of self-organisation, one + that is applicable to both the cybernetic need for control and the specific nature of social + and political organisations, is the more common one of a group of people deciding + amongst themselves, to achieve some goal(s). Stewart Umpleby (1987) highlights this + simple definition by contrasting two situations: + A teacher can organize a class into groups by assigning each child to a specific group and + + [...] + + One of the core ideas in cybernetic thought when it comes to communication is that of + feedback. Beer in fact highlights feedback as ‘the most important concept of all’ ([1981] + 1994, p. 32). Feedback explains how information, 12 from the environment but also the + internal workings of the organisation itself, plays a role in how the various parts of the + organisation operate autonomously. Beer is keen to stress that feedback does not mean + what it is commonly thought to mean, i.e. a response to something. Instead, feedback + refers to the way in which information about the changes a part of an organisation or + system faces are used to help that part maintain an agreed level of operation or to work + towards an agreed goal. Information coming into an operating unit of an organisation or + system about what is happening, both internally and externally, allows it to direct its + + [...] + + account of the free market as a tool for allowing order to emerge from chaos (Cooper, + 2011; see also Gilbert, 2005). Hayek was of course one of the key architects of the + theories that supported neoliberalism and, in a sad irony, was involved in advising the + dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet that had toppled the government of Salvador Allende + in Chile that Beer had become so invested in (Harvey, 2005). While complexity has + been discussed thus far in relation to the potential for self-organisation in a way that + may well run parallel to radically political accounts (see also Maeckelbergh, 2009, pp. + 203-210; Purkis, 2004, pp. 51-52), it is important to note that there is a competing + narrative around complexity theory, one that takes it in a dramatically different + direction. + Autonomy and ideas of self-organisation and horizontality, too, have been subject to + + [...] + + This initial affinity between anarchism and organisational cybernetics comes through in + how Kropotkin characterises centralised, top-down forms of government as being not + only politically and morally objectionable but at the same time ineffectual. Kropotkin + writes (1927, pp. 76-7) that ‘in all production there arise daily thousands of difficulties + which no government can solve or foresee.’ Against the plans of those socialists who + wish to use the state to manage this complexity, ‘the governmentalists’ to use + McEwan’s term, he argues that ‘production and exchange represented an undertaking so + complicated that the plans of the state socialists, which lead inevitably to a party + directorship, would prove to be absolutely ineffective as soon as they were applied to + life.’ 21 As an alternative to centralised attempts at attenuating variety in society (which + would lead to an oppression of individuals’ right to live their lives as they see fit) and + amplifying variety in the state as an organising body (resulting in a massive + bureaucracy), Kropotkin proposes that the workers themselves and their unions + administer production in an autonomous manner. 22 As political science scholar Marius + + [...] + + 22 + An alternative approach to anarchism and cybernetics that focuses on feedback loops can be found in + Roel van Duijn’s Message of a Wise Kabouter (1972). In a conversation I had with van Duijn in 2013 he + suggested that he had come to cybernetics as a result of discussions between himself and Murray + Bookchin in the 1960s. Bookchin does use the term ‘cybernetics’ but does so to refer to high-technology + and links it to a centralised, authoritarian corporate state (e.g. 1985), so it seems that he had not engaged + with the cybernetics of Wiener and Beer. Van Duijn may have been put onto cybernetics through reading + + [...] + + John Duda (2013, p. 64) describes the approach to anarchism of McEwan as ‘a shift + away from a moral vision of anarchism, outraged at the scandal of domination’ towards + a paradigm focussed on the ‘superior productivity of anarchist organisational + methodology’, but I would suggest that it in fact tries to show that anarchism trumps + top-down government on both counts, without prioritising one over the other. Indeed, + the fact that it is present in Kropotkin’s work supports the view that it is not a shift that + took place in light of anarchist engagements with cybernetics but is a dual-perspective + that is present in at least some forms of anarchism from relatively early in the canon. + This could be thought of as ‘the two sides of the anarchist coin’. On the one hand there + is the ethical and political concern for autonomy, while on the other there is the + functional concern for effective organisation. + The connections between anarchism and cybernetics were also picked up on by one of + + [...] + + While this is framed within a typically-hierarchical organisational structure with an + executive and a receptionist, the point Pask is getting at is that the hierarchy is also one + of levels of language. The highest level in the hierarchy involves a metalanguage that is + used to talk about lower levels, which too have a metalanguage to talk about levels + lower than them. Although this is clearly a hierarchy such that a level thrice removed + from the top, for example, would have difficulty communicating directly with the top + and vice versa given the difference in languages, Pask is very clear that this describes a + + [...] + + She goes so far as to point out that System Five in the VSM, the part of the organisation + involved in defining the identity and overall goals of the organisation, can be ‘just a + routine or an activity’ and ‘does not necessarily need to be an extra set of people’ (2013, + p. 12; see also 1999). + McEwan follows Pask’s account by making explicit the distinction between the two + + [...] + + command such that each level is subordinate to the levels above it and where the top + level has overall control over decision making in the organisation. Functional + hierarchy, however, applies to an organisation where ‘there are two or more levels of + information structure operating in the system’ (McEwan, [1963] 1987, p. 44). + + [...] + + the working groups consider their activities and adjust them if necessary in line with the + decided-upon goals of the organisation. Crucially, for an anarchist cybernetics and + VSM, everyone involved in the working groups can, potentially, be involved in the + General Assemblies and so in these System Three discussions. The same individuals + step out of their functional role as working group members and into that of reflecting on + their practice within working groups. System Four involves the same individuals again, + and also in the General Assemblies, reflecting on the activities of the working groups + and the organisation as a whole as well as its overall strategy in relation to events in the + outside world. Adjustments to both tactics and strategy can be made in light of changes + + [...] + + Elsewhere, Bakunin similarly argues that ‘all organizations must proceed by way of + federation from the base to the summit, from the commune to the coordinating + association of the country or nation’ (1971b: 82-83, italics in original). Here we have a + picture of a federated form of organisation in which smaller local organisations, free + associations or cooperatives, link up with one another at the level of the commune. + Communes then link up in a regional council and so on to the level of an international + council. This too is reflective of the recursivity that is essential to the VSM: any viable + system is itself a part of another viable system and has within it multiple viable systems. + Not only does the decision-making structure of an anarchist federation relate favourably + to that of organisational cybernetics, but so too does the very principle of federated + organisation, something Wiener in fact hints at (1961, p. 155) and of which Beer is + sometimes quite explicit in his support (see Medina, 2011, pp. 159-160). + McEwan, in his Anarchy article, makes this link between this syndicalist model of + + [...] + + Importantly, this is not enough for an anarchist version of cybernetics. A more explicitly + ethical and political autonomy, which values autonomy as an individual and collective + good over-and-above its role within organisational structure, needs to be introduced. + This brings into play a crucial distinction between the firm, as Beer conceives of it, and + radical left and anarchist organisation. While the firm may be viable on cybernetic + terms by including a functional autonomy, whereby individual operating units have + some scope for self-organisation and independent decision making, it will be shown that + radical left and anarchist organisation must combine this cybernetic demand with the + ethical and political demand that values individual and collective autonomy in and of + itself. The two sides of the anarchist coin, as I have described them above, must be + brought together. For now it is enough to note that while Beer’s work focusses on the + firm and, one can argue, takes that as a model of social organisation in general, an + anarchist cybernetics highlights a distinction that must be made between the firm, which + takes as a necessary condition autonomy as a function, and radical left and anarchist + + [...] + + Thinking about cybernetics and organisation along these lines, the work of science and + technology studies scholar Andrew Pickering (2010) becomes extremely important. + Rather than being focussed on representing an external reality with accuracy, + Pickering’s cybernetics is instead involved in performance. Performance is understood + as the actions we undertake in the world that demand a pragmatic and constructed + knowledge as opposed to a detailed representation of reality. 24 He describes this as a + ‘performative epistemology’: ‘a vision of knowledge as part of performance rather than + 24 + This owes something of a debt to the American Pragmatism of Pierce, Dewey and others, although this + + [...] + + as an external control of it’ (ibid., p. 25, italics in original). The cybernetician, therefore, + is not engaged in unpacking and describing a reality (be it a machine, an animal, a + human being or a social phenomenon) but in facilitating performances or practices that + he or she is a part of. Cybernetics, in this regard, is committed to action and not simply + theorising about the nature of knowledge. This is evident in the work of Beer who, as I + have shown in the second chapter, was throughout his life heavily involved in practicing + cybernetics. Pickering highlights the fact that the very definition of cybernetics as + steering shows this connection with performance and practice (ibid., p. 30). It is a + science not of representing the objective mechanisms of control and communication but + of doing control and communication. + Interestingly, this turn towards science as performance in fact brings to the fore another + + + [...] + + He also speaks of the importance of ‘radical transformation and listening’ (2010, pp. 42- + 43). While many more could be added, these seven goals (mutual respect, cooperation, + egalitarian decision-making, promotion of radical democratic vision, deconstruction of + borders, radical transformation and listening) will serve to demonstrate how a virtuous + anarchist mode of research can be conceived. In order to act virtuously as an anarchist, a + researcher must act so as to embody these goals. The researcher should aim to: (1) be + respectful of participants in research; (2) encourage cooperation in the research on the + part of the participants; (3) engage in egalitarian relationships with the participants; (4) + promote the radical democratic ideal of anarchism; (5) conduct the research in a + borderless fashion; (6) be radically transformative (i.e. live as radically transformed); + and (7) listen to participants. It should be noted that according to the prefigurative virtue + ethics outlined by Franks, these virtues and goals are negotiable and specific to + + [...] + + While it is not the focus of cybernetics, such an ethical approach can also be seen in the + work of von Foerster. In line with the second-order cybernetic concern for the + researcher as ‘a person who considers oneself to be a participant actor in the drama of + mutual interaction of the give and take in the circularity of human relations’ ([1991] + 2003, p. 289), von Foerster frames ethics as an understanding of the norms that govern + the practices we engage in. Rather than seeing scientific research as a practice involving + truth, von Foerster recasts it as involving trust, understanding, responsibility, reaching + out for the other and ‘a conspiracy, whose customs, rules, and regulations we are now + inventing’ (ibid., p. 294). 27 On this understanding, an ethics of research is + fundamentally an ethics of co-producing knowledge and von Foerster’s account of + second-order cybernetics links up well with the anarchist research ethics defined by + + [...] + + who wish to hinder and frustrate the movement with invaluable information about how + practices are organised. Franks (1992) warns that ‘the social sciences are the third + section of the intelligence gathering services. […] The state's liberal surveillance wing, + sociology, informs on what working class people are thinking and doing.’ He goes on to + say that sociologists aim to show ‘when working class people's actions and attitudes are + showing signs of becoming a threat to the stability of [the ruling] class’s dominant + position.’ This is a rather dramatic and perhaps unfair characterisation, but in general + concerns related to research as surveillance are warranted. There is a serious risk + + [...] + + associated with anarchist research that detailed information about successful anarchist + organising would be at the same time a guide to countering such organising. This is + perhaps especially true in the case of the research carried out here as this could provide + detailed information on the organisational dynamics of radical left groups and their + communication practices, and would allow security services to disrupt organisation and + communications at key points. In writing this thesis, care has therefore been taken to + reduce the risk of it being useful to those wishing to disrupt the movement. I have + allowed activists to review the transcripts of their interviews and highlight any details + that they would prefer to not be included or that they would prefer not attributed to + them. + This anarchist, prefigurative research ethics has much in common with ethics of care in + + [...] + + levels of an organisation is through the notions of tactics and strategy. Beer does just + this when he suggests that Systems One and Two are involved in tactics while System + Three is involved in strategy (ibid., p. 360; see also, e.g. Pickering, 2010, p. 245). This + is, I would argue, misleading as for Beer Systems Three and Four operate along similar + lines but with System Three focused on the internal environment and what happens at + Systems One and Two while System Four is focused on the external environment and + the potential future of the organisation. I want to think, therefore, of Systems Three and + + [...] + + important tactically to what radical left groups and activists do. In a social centre I used + to frequent there was a small model of a kitchen sink with written on it: ‘First the + washing up, then the revolution’. 41 The tactical repertoire of radical left groups includes + all this and more. + How does this distinction between tactics and strategy operate in anarchist organisation, + + [...] + + As an extension of the tactics-strategy dichotomy presented above, this suggests the role + of a third element of the politics of radical left groups and movements, what I want here + to refer to as ‘grand strategy’. The term ‘grand strategy’ was coined by American + military theorist John Boyd during the Cold War. 45 Boyd defines grand strategy as + pursuing ‘the national goal’ and amplifying ‘our spirit and strength (while undermining + and isolating our adversaries)’ (2005, slide 140). The notion of a ‘national goal’ is of + course very specific to a state-centred geo-political project such as a war and is certainly + at extreme odds with anarchism’s anti-militarism and anti-nationalism. Indeed, even the + idea of competition contained in Boyd’s definition of grand strategy is antithetical to the + relationships of mutual aid and cooperation. While ideas such as these are common in + some business and management accounts of strategy (see, e.g. Carter, Clegg and + + [...] + + Hopefully, I have shown that the answer to both of these has to be negative. For Beer, + organisational cybernetics is about defining the necessary and sufficient conditions, + based on the need to handle complexity, for viable organisation. This does not need to + result in a centralised, bureaucratic and authoritarian structure but can be grounded in + one that relies on autonomy. By formulating an anarchist cybernetics, I want to show + that while Beer maintains the basic structure of capitalist enterprise, with a middle + management layer and a senior executive level at the top, these are not necessary for + viability. This is the core difference between Beer’s cybernetics and the anarchist + cybernetics I am arguing for here. To give Beer the credit he is due, his account of how + organisations should determine goals does touch on non-hierarchical processes, as + Pickering argues (2010: 272). Anarchist cybernetics shows how tactics, strategy and diff --git a/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md b/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..86934fa --- /dev/null +++ b/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md @@ -0,0 +1,1875 @@ +[[!meta title="The Counterrevolution"]] + +* [The Counterrevolution](http://bernardharcourt.com/the-counterrevolution/). +* By Bernard E. Harcourt. + +## Index + +[[!toc startlevel=2 levels=4]] + +## Genealogy + +### Mass-scale warfare + +* MAD +* Massive retaliation +* Game theory +* Systems analisys +* Nuclear war + +### Counterinsurgency + +* Modern warfare +* Unconventional, counter-guerrila +* Special Ops +* Surgical operations + +### Mao's “Eight Points of Attention” plus two principles + +1. Talk to people politely. +2. Observe fair dealing in all business transactions. +3. Return everything borrowed from the people. +4. Pay for anything damaged. +5. Do not beat or scold the people. +6. Do not damage crops. +7. Do not molest women. +8. Do not ill-treat prisoners-of-war. + + Two other principles were central to Mao’s revolutionary doctrine: first, the + importance of having a unified political and military power structure that + consolidated, in the same hands, political and military considerations; and + second, the importance of psychological warfare. More specifically, as Paret + explained, “proper psychological measures could create and maintain ideological + cohesion among fighters and their civilian supporters.” 7 + +### Paret's (1960) tasks of “counterguerrilla action” + +1. The military defeat of the guerrilla forces. +2. The separation of the guerrilla from the population. +3. The reestablishment of governmental authority and the development of a viable social order. + +### Petraeus: 3 key pillars + +1. "The first is that the most important struggle is over the population." + +2. "Allegiance of the masses can only be secured + by separating the small revolutionary minority from the passive majority, and by + isolating, containing, and ultimately eliminating the active minority. In his + accompanying guidelines," + +3. "Success turns on collecting information on + everyone in the population. Total information is essential to properly distinguish + friend from foe and then extract the revolutionary minority. It is intelligence— + total information awareness—that renders the counterinsurgency possible." + +## Excerpts + +### Torture + + In Modern Warfare, Trinquier quietly but resolutely condoned torture. The + interrogations and related tasks were considered police work, as opposed to + military operations, but they had the exact same mission: the complete + destruction of the insurgent group. Discussing the typical interrogation of a + detainee, captured and suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization, + Trinquier wrote: “No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner + gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not, + specialists must force his secret from him. Then, as a soldier, he must face the + suffering, and perhaps the death, he has heretofore managed to avoid.” Trinquier + described specialists forcing secrets out of suspects using scientific methods that + did not injure the “integrity of individuals,” but it was clear what those + “scientific” methods entailed. 4 As the war correspondent Bernard Fall suggests, + the political situation in Algeria offered Trinquier the opportunity to develop “a + Cartesian rationale” to justify the use of torture in modern warfare. 5 + Similarly minded commanders championed the use of torture, indefinite + detention, and summary executions. They made no bones about it. + + [...] + + In his autobiographical account published in 2001, Services Spéciaux. Algérie + 1955–1957, General Paul Aussaresses admits to the brutal methods that were the + cornerstone of his military strategy. 6 He makes clear that his approach to + counterinsurgency rested on a three-pronged strategy, which included first, + intelligence work; second, torture; and third, summary executions. The + intelligence function was primordial because the insurgents’ strategy in Algeria + was to infiltrate and integrate the population, to blend in perfectly, and then + gradually to involve the population in the struggle. To combat this insurgent + strategy required intelligence—the only way to sort the dangerous + revolutionaries from the passive masses—and then, violent repression. “The first + step was to dispatch the clean-up teams, of which I was a part,” Aussaresses + writes. “Rebel leaders had to be identified, neutralized, and eliminated discreetly. + By seeking information on FLN leaders I would automatically be able to capture + the rebels and make them talk.” 7 + The rebels were made to talk by means of torture. Aussaresses firmly + believed that torture was the best way to extract information. It also served to + terrorize the radical minority and, in the process, to reduce it. The practice of + torture was “widely used in Algeria,” Aussaresses acknowledges. Not on every + prisoner, though; many spoke freely. “It was only when a prisoner refused to talk + or denied the obvious that torture was used.” 8 + Aussaresses claims he was introduced to torture in Algeria by the policemen + there, who used it regularly. But it quickly became routine to him. “Without any + hesitation,” he writes, “the policemen showed me the technique used for + ‘extreme’ interrogations: first, a beating, which in most cases was enough; then + other means, such as electric shocks, known as the famous ‘gégène’; and finally + water.” Aussaresses explains: “Torture by electric shock was made possible by + generators used to power field radio transmitters, which were extremely + common in Algeria. Electrodes were attached to the prisoner’s ears or testicles, + then electric charges of varying intensity were turned on. This was apparently a + well-known procedure and I assumed that the policemen at Philippeville [in + Algeria] had not invented it.” 9 (Similar methods had, in fact, been used earlier in + Indochina.) + + Aussaresses could not have been more clear: + + The methods I used were always the same: beatings, electric shocks, and, in particular, water + torture, which was the most dangerous technique for the prisoner. It never lasted for more than one + hour and the suspects would speak in the hope of saving their own lives. They would therefore + either talk quickly or never. + + The French historian Benjamin Stora confirms the generalized use of torture. + He reports that in the Battle of Algiers, under the commanding officer, General + Jacques Massu, the paratroopers conducted massive arrests and “practiced + torture” using “electrodes […] dunking in bathtubs, beatings.” General Massu + himself would later acknowledge the use of torture. In a rebuttal he wrote in + 1971 to the film The Battle of Algiers, Massu described torture as “a cruel + necessity.” 10 According to Aussaresses, torture was condoned at the highest + levels of the French government. “Regarding the use of torture,” Aussaresses + + [...] + + For Aussaresses, as for Roger Trinquier, torture and disappearances were + simply an inevitable byproduct of an insurgency—inevitable on both sides of the + struggle. Because terrorism was inscribed in revolutionary strategy, it had to be + used in its repression as well. In a fascinating televised debate in 1970 with the + FLN leader and producer of The Battle of Algiers, Saadi Yacef, Trinquier + confidently asserted that torture was simply a necessary and inevitable part of + modern warfare. Torture will take place. Insurgents know it. In fact, they + anticipate it. The passage is striking: + + I have to tell you. Whether you’re for or against torture, it makes no difference. Torture is a + weapon that will be used in every insurgent war. One has to know that… One has to know that in + an insurgency, you are going to be tortured. + And you have to mount a subversive organization in light of that and in function of torture. It is + not a question of being for or against torture. You have to know that all arrested prisoners in an + insurgency will speak—unless they commit suicide. Their confession will always be obtained. So a + subversive organization must be mounted in function of that, so that a prisoner who speaks does + not give away the whole organization.16 + + “Torture?” asks the lieutenant aide de camp in Henri Alleg’s 1958 exposé + The Question. “You don’t make war with choirboys.” 18 Alleg, a French + journalist and director of the Alger républicain newspaper, was himself detained + and tortured by French paratroopers in Algiers. His book describes the + experience in detail, and in his account, torture was the inevitable product of + colonization and the anticolonial struggle. As Jean-Paul Sartre writes in his + + [...] + + In an arresting part of The Battle of Algiers it becomes clear that many of the + French officers who tortured suspected FLN members had themselves, as + members of the French Resistance, been victims of torture at the hands of the + Gestapo. It is a shocking moment. We know, of course, that abuse often begets + abuse; but nevertheless, one would have hoped that a victim of torture would + recoil from administering it to others. Instead, as Trinquier suggests, torture + became normalized in Algeria. This is, as Sartre describes it, the “terrible truth”: + “If fifteen years are enough to transform victims into executioners, then this + behavior is not more than a matter of opportunity and occasion. Anybody, at any + time, may equally find himself victim or executioner.” 20 + +### Misc + + The central tenet of counterinsurgency theory is that populations—originally + colonial populations, but now all populations, including our own—are made up + of a small active minority of insurgents, a small group of those opposed to the + insurgency, and a large passive majority that can be swayed one way or the other. + The principal objective of counterinsurgency is to gain the allegiance of that + passive majority. And its defining feature is that counterinsurgency is not just a + military strategy, but more importantly a political technique. Warfare, it turns + out, is political. + + On the basis of these tenets, counterinsurgency theorists developed and + refined over several decades three core strategies. First, obtain total information: + every communication, all personal data, all metadata of everyone in the + population must be collected and analyzed. Not just the active minority, but + everyone in the population. Total information awareness is necessary to + distinguish between friend and foe, and then to cull the dangerous minority from + the docile majority. Second, eradicate the active minority: once the dangerous + minority has been identified, it must be separated from the general population + + [...] + + and eliminated by any means possible—it must be isolated, contained, and + ultimately eradicated. Third, gain the allegiance of the general population: + everything must be done to win the hearts and minds of the passive majority. It is + their allegiance and loyalty, and passivity in the end, that matter most. + Counterinsurgency warfare has become our new governing paradigm in the + + [...] + + imagination. It drives our foreign affairs and now our domestic policy as well. + But it was not always that way. For most of the twentieth century, we + governed ourselves differently in the United States: our political imagination + was dominated by the massive battlefields of the Marne, of Verdun, by the + Blitzkrieg and the fire-bombing of Dresden—and by the use of the atomic bomb. + + [...] + + warfare. + Yet the transition from large-scale battlefield warfare to anticolonial struggles + and the Cold War in the 1950s, and to the war against terrorism since 9/11, has + brought about a historic transformation in our political imagination and in the + way that we govern ourselves. In contrast to the earlier sweeping military + paradigm, we now engage in surgical microstrategies of counterinsurgency + abroad and at home. This style of warfare—the very opposite of large-scale + battlefield wars like World War I or II—involves total surveillance, surgical + operations, targeted strikes to eliminate small enclaves, psychological tactics, + and political techniques to gain the trust of the people. The primary target is no + longer a regular army, so much as it is the entire population. It involves a new + + [...] + + The result is radical. We are now witnessing the triumph of a counterinsurgency + model of government on American soil in the absence of an insurgency, or + uprising, or revolution. The perfected logic of counterinsurgency now applies + regardless of whether there is a domestic insurrection. We now face a + counterinsurgency without insurgency. A counterrevolution without revolution. + The pure form of counterrevolution, without a revolution, as a simple modality + of governing at home—what could be called “The Counterrevolution.” + Counterinsurgency practices were already being deployed domestically in the + + [...] + + new internal enemies. It is vital that we come to grips with this new mode of + governing and recognize its unique dangers, that we see the increasingly + widespread domestication of counterinsurgency strategies and the new + technologies of digital surveillance, drones, and hypermilitarized police for what + they are: a counterrevolution without a revolution. We are facing something + radical, new, and dangerous. It has been long in the making, historically. It is + time to identify and expose it. + + + [...] + + so on. I argued that we have become an “expository society” where we + increasingly exhibit ourselves online, and in the process, freely give away our + most personal and private data. No longer an Orwellian or a panoptic society + characterized by a powerful central government forcibly surveilling its citizens + from on high, ours is fueled by our own pleasures, proclivities, joys, and + narcissism. And even when we try to resist these temptations, we have + practically no choice but to use the Internet and shed our digital traces. + I had not fully grasped, though, the relation of our new expository society to + + [...] + + strikes, indefinite detention, or our new hypermilitarized police force at home. + But as the fog lifts from 9/11, the full picture becomes clear. The expository + society is merely the first prong of The Counterrevolution. And only by tying + together our digital exposure with our new mode of counterinsurgency + governance can we begin to grasp the whole architecture of our contemporary + political condition. And only by grasping the full implications of this new mode + of governing—The Counterrevolution—will we be able to effectively resist it + and overcome. + + [...] + + approach targeting small revolutionary insurgencies and what were mostly + Communist uprisings. Variously called “unconventional,” “antiguerrilla” or + “counterguerrilla,” “irregular,” “sublimited,” “counterrevolutionary,” or simply + “modern” warfare, this burgeoning domain of military strategy flourished during + France’s wars in Indochina and Algeria, Britain’s wars in Malaya and Palestine, + and America’s war in Vietnam. It too was nourished by the RAND Corporation, + which was one of the first to see the potential of what the French commander + Roger Trinquier called “modern warfare” or the “French view of + counterinsurgency.” It offered, in the words of one of its leading students, the + historian Peter Paret, a vital counterweight “at the opposite end of the spectrum + from rockets and the hydrogen bomb.” 2 + Like nuclear-weapon strategy, the counterinsurgency model grew out of a + + + [...] + + from rockets and the hydrogen bomb.” 2 + Like nuclear-weapon strategy, the counterinsurgency model grew out of a + combination of strategic game theory and systems theorizing; but unlike nuclear + strategy, which was primarily a response to the Soviet Union, it developed more + in response to another formidable game theorist, Mao Zedong. The formative + moment for counterinsurgency theory was not the nuclear confrontation that + characterized the Cuban Missile Crisis, but the earlier Chinese Civil War that led + to Mao’s victory in 1949—essentially, when Mao turned guerrilla tactics into a + revolutionary war that overthrew a political regime. The central methods and + practices of counterinsurgency warfare were honed in response to Mao’s + strategies and the ensuing anticolonial struggles in Southeast Asia, the Middle + East, and North Africa that imitated Mao’s approach. 3 Those struggles for + independence were the breeding soil for the development and perfection of + unconventional warfare. + By the turn of the twentieth century, when President George W. Bush would + + [...] + + T HE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL CAN BE TRACED BACK through several different + genealogies. One leads to British colonial rule in India and Southeast Asia, to the + insurgencies there, and to the eventual British redeployment and modernization + of counterinsurgency strategies in Northern Ireland and Britain at the height of + the Irish Republican Army’s independence struggles. This first genealogy draws + heavily on the writings of the British counterinsurgency theorist Sir Robert + Thompson, the chief architect of Great Britain’s antiguerrilla strategies in + Malaya from 1948 to 1959. Another genealogy traces back to the American + colonial experience in the Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth century. + Others lead back to Trotsky and Lenin in Russia, to Lawrence of Arabia during + the Arab Revolt, or even to the Spanish uprising against Napoleon—all + mentioned, at least briefly, in General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency field + manual. Alternative genealogies reach back to the political theories of + Montesquieu or John Stuart Mill, while some go even further to antiquity and to + the works of Polybius, Herodotus, and Tacitus. 1 + But the most direct antecedent of counterinsurgency warfare as embraced by + the United States after 9/11 was the French military response in the late 1950s + and 1960s to the anticolonial wars in Indochina and Algeria. This genealogy + passes through three important figures—the historian Peter Paret and the French + commanders David Galula and Roger Trinquier—and, through them, it traces + back to Mao Zedong. It is Mao’s idea of the political nature of + counterinsurgency that would prove so influential in the United States. Mao + politicized warfare in a manner that would come back to haunt us today. The + French connection also laid the seeds of a tension between brutality and legality + that would plague counterinsurgency practices to the present—at least, until the + United States discovered, or rediscovered, a way to resolve the tension by + legalizing the brutality. + + + [...] + + A founding principle of revolutionary insurgency—what Paret referred to as + “the principal lesson” that Mao taught—was that “an inferior force could + outpoint a modern army so long as it succeeded in gaining at least the tacit + support of the population in the contested area.” 4 The core idea was that the + military battle was less decisive than the political struggle over the loyalty and + allegiance of the masses: the war is fought over the population or, in Mao’s + words, “The army cannot exist without the people.” 5 + As a result of this interdependence, the insurgents had to treat the general + population well to gain its support. On this basis Mao formulated early on, in + 1928, his “Eight Points of Attention” for army personnel: + + 1. Talk to people politely. + 2. Observe fair dealing in all business transactions. + 3. Return everything borrowed from the people. + 4. Pay for anything damaged. + 5. Do not beat or scold the people. + 6. Do not damage crops. + 7. Do not molest women. + 8. Do not ill-treat prisoners-of-war. 6 + + Two other principles were central to Mao’s revolutionary doctrine: first, the + importance of having a unified political and military power structure that + consolidated, in the same hands, political and military considerations; and + second, the importance of psychological warfare. More specifically, as Paret + explained, “proper psychological measures could create and maintain ideological + cohesion among fighters and their civilian supporters.” 7 + Revolutionary warfare, in Paret’s view, boiled down to a simple equation: + + [...] + + the population.” 10 + Of course, neither Paret nor other strategists were so naïve as to think that + Mao invented guerrilla warfare. Paret spent much of his research tracing the + antecedents and earlier experiments with insurgent and counterinsurgency + warfare. “Civilians taking up arms and fighting as irregulars are as old as war,” + Paret emphasized. Caesar had to deal with them in Gaul and Germania, the + British in the American colonies or in South Africa with the Boers, Napoleon in + Spain, and on and on. In fact, as Paret stressed, the very term “guerrilla” + originated in the Spanish peasant resistance to Napoleon after the Spanish + monarchy had fallen between 1808 and 1813. Paret developed case studies of the + + [...] + + But for purposes of describing the “guerre révolutionnaire” of the 1960s, the + most pertinent and timely objects of study were Mao Zedong and the Chinese + revolution. And on the basis of that particular conception of revolutionary war, + Paret set forth a model of counterrevolutionary warfare. Drawing principally on + French military practitioners and theorists, Paret delineated a three-pronged + strategy focused on a mixture of intelligence gathering, psychological warfare on + both the population and the subversives, and severe treatment of the rebels. In + Guerrillas in the 1960’s, Paret reduced the tasks of “counterguerrilla action” to + the following: + 1. The military defeat of the guerrilla forces. + 2. The separation of the guerrilla from the population. + 3. The reestablishment of governmental authority and the development of a + viable social order. 12 + + [...] + + interact.” 13 + So the central task, according to Paret, was to attack the rebel’s popular + support so that he would “lose his hold over the people, and be isolated from + them.” There were different ways to accomplish this, from widely publicized + military defeats and sophisticated psychological warfare to the resettlement of + populations—in addition to other more coercive measures. But one rose above + the others for Paret: to encourage the people to form progovernment militias and + fight against the guerrillas. This approach had the most potential, Paret observes: + “Once a substantial number of members of a community commit violence on + + + [...] + + In sum, the French model of + counterrevolutionary warfare, in Paret’s view, had to be understood as the + inverse of revolutionary warfare. + + + [...] + + The main sources for Paret’s synthesis were the writings and practices of French + commanders on the ground, especially Roger Trinquier and David Galula, + though there were others as well. 15 Trinquier, one of the first French + commanders to theorize modern warfare based on his firsthand experience, had a + + + [...] + + persisting in repeating its efforts.” Trinquier argues that this new form of modern + warfare called for “an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, + psychological, military,” grounded on “Countrywide Intelligence.” As Trinquier + emphasizes, “since modern warfare asserts its presence on the totality of the + population, we have to be everywhere informed.” Informed, in order to know and + target the population and wipe out the insurgency. 17 + The other leading counterinsurgency theorist, also with deep firsthand + + + [...] + + time.’” 19 + From Mao, Galula drew the central lesson that societies were divided into + three groups and that the key to victory was to isolate and eradicate the active + minority in order to gain the allegiance of the masses. Galula emphasizes in + Counterinsurgency Warfare that the central strategy of counterinsurgency theory + “simply expresses the basic tenet of the exercise of political power”: + In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral + majority, and an active minority against the cause. + + [...] + + time.’” 19 + From Mao, Galula drew the central lesson that societies were divided into + three groups and that the key to victory was to isolate and eradicate the active + minority in order to gain the allegiance of the masses. Galula emphasizes in + Counterinsurgency Warfare that the central strategy of counterinsurgency theory + “simply expresses the basic tenet of the exercise of political power”: + In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral + majority, and an active minority against the cause. + + The technique of power consists in relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral + majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority.20 + The battle was over the general population, Galula emphasized in his + Counterinsurgency Warfare, and this tenet represented the key political + dimension of a new warfare strategy. + + [...] + + US general David Petraeus picked up right where David Galula and Peter Paret + left off. Widely recognized as the leading American thinker and practitioner of + counterinsurgency theory—eventually responsible for all coalition troops in Iraq + and the architect of the troop surge of 2007—General Petraeus would refine + + [...] + + On this political foundation, General Petraeus’s manual establishes three key + pillars—what might be called counterinsurgency’s core principles. + The first is that the most important struggle is over the population. In a short + set of guidelines that accompanies his field manual, General Petraeus + emphasizes: “The decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people are the center + + [...] + + The main battle, then, is over the populace. + The second principle is that the allegiance of the masses can only be secured + by separating the small revolutionary minority from the passive majority, and by + isolating, containing, and ultimately eliminating the active minority. In his + accompanying guidelines, General Petraeus emphasizes: “Seek out and eliminate + those who threaten the population. Don’t let them intimidate the innocent. Target + the whole network, not just individuals.” 25 + The third core principle is that success turns on collecting information on + everyone in the population. Total information is essential to properly distinguish + friend from foe and then extract the revolutionary minority. It is intelligence— + total information awareness—that renders the counterinsurgency possible. It is + + [...] + + paraphrasing the French commander, underscores the primacy of political factors + in counterinsurgency. “General Chang Ting-chen of Mao Zedong’s central + committee once stated that revolutionary war was 80 percent political action and + only 20 percent military,” the manual reads. Then it warns: “At the beginning of + a COIN operation, military actions may appear predominant as security forces + conduct operations to secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents; + however, political objectives must guide the military’s approach.” 27 + Chapter Two opens with an epigraph from David Galula’s book: “Essential + + [...] + + General David Petraeus learned, but more importantly popularized, Mao + Zedong’s central lesson: counterinsurgency warfare is political. It is a strategy + for winning over the people. It is a strategy for governing. And it is quite telling + that a work so indebted to Mao and midcentury French colonial thinkers would + become so influential post-9/11. Petraeus’s manual contained a roadmap for a + new paradigm of governing. As the fog lifts from 9/11, it is becoming + increasingly clear what lasting impact Mao had on our government of self and + others today. + + [...] + + D eveloped by military commanders and strategists over decades of anticolonial + wars, counterinsurgency warfare was refined, deployed, and tested in the years + following 9/11. Since then, the modern warfare paradigm has been distilled into + a concise three-pronged strategy: + 1. Bulk-collect all intelligence about everyone in the population—every + piece of data and metadata available. (total information awareness) + + [...] + + 2. Identify and eradicate the revolutionary minority. Total information about + everyone makes it possible to discriminate between friend and foe. Once + suspicion attaches, individuals must be treated severely to extract all + possible information, with enhanced interrogation techniques if + necessary; and if they are revealed to belong to the active minority, they + must be disposed of through detention, rendition, deportation, or drone + strike—in other words, targeted assassination. Unlike conventional + soldiers from the past, these insurgents are dangerous because of their + + [...] + + 3. Pacify the masses. The population must be distracted, entertained, + satisfied, occupied, and most importantly, neutralized, or deradicalized if + necessary, in order to ensure that the vast preponderance of ordinary + individuals remain just that—ordinary. This third prong reflects the + “population-centric” dimension of counterinsurgency theory. Remember, + in this new way of seeing, the population is the battlefield. Its hearts and + minds must be assured. In the digital age, this can be achieved, first, by + targeting enhanced content (such as sermons by moderate imams) to + deradicalize susceptible persons—in other words, by deploying new + digital techniques of psychological warfare and propaganda. Second, by + providing just the bare minimum in terms of welfare and humanitarian + assistance—like rebuilding schools, distributing some cash, and + bolstering certain government institutions. As General Petraeus’s field + +### Torture and surveilance + + T HE ATTACK ON THE W ORLD T RADE C ENTER SHOWED THE weakness of American + intelligence gathering. Top secret information obtained by one agency was + silo’ed from others, making it impossible to aggregate intelligence and obtain a + full picture of the security threats. The CIA knew that two of the 9/11 hijackers + were on American soil in San Diego, but didn’t share the information with the + FBI, who were actively trying to track them down. 1 September 11 was a + crippling intelligence failure, and in the immediacy of that failure many in + President George W. Bush’s administration felt the need to do something radical. + Greater sharing of intelligence, naturally. But much more as well. Two main + solutions were devised, or revived: total surveillance and tortured interrogations. + They represent the first prong of the counterinsurgency approach. + In effect, 9/11 set the stage both for total NSA surveillance and torture as + forms of total information awareness. The former functioned at the most virtual + or ethereal, or “digital” level, by creating the material for data-mining and + analysis. The latter operated at the most bodily or physical, or “analog” level, + obtaining information directly from suspects and detainees in Iraq, Pakistan, + Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But both satisfied the same goal: total information + awareness, the first tactic of counterinsurgency warfare. + +Census + + What is clear, though—as I document in Exposed—is that the myriad NSA, + FBI, CIA, and allied intelligence agencies produce total information, the first + and most important prong of the counterinsurgency paradigm. Most important, + because both of the other prongs depend on it. As the RAND Corporation notes + in its lengthy 519-page report on the current state of counterinsurgency theory + and practice, “Effective governance depends on knowing the population, + demographically and individually.” The RAND report reminds us that this + insight is not novel or new. The report then returns, pointedly for us, to Algeria + and the French commander, David Galula: “Galula, in Counterinsurgency + Warfare, argued that ‘control of the population begins with a thorough census. + Every inhabitant must be registered and given a foolproof identity card.’” 5 + + [...] + + Today, that identity card is an IP address, a mobile phone, a digital device, facial + recognition, and all our digital stamps. These new digital technologies have + made everyone virtually transparent. And with our new ethos of selfies, tweets, + Facebook, and Internet surfing, everyone is now exposed. + +Enhanced interrogation: + + Second, tortured interrogation. The dual personality of counterinsurgency + warfare is nowhere more evident than in the intensive use of torture for + information gathering by the United States immediately after 9/11. Fulfilling the + first task of counterinsurgency theory—total surveillance—this practice married + the most extreme form of brutality associated with modern warfare to the + formality of legal process and the rule of law. The combination of inhumanity + and legality was spectacular. + In the days following 9/11, many in the Bush administration felt there was + only one immediate way to address the information shortfall, namely, to engage + in “enhanced interrogation” of captured suspected terrorists—another + euphemism for torture. Of course, torture of captured suspects would not fix the + problem of silo’ed information, but they thought it would at least provide + immediate information of any pending attacks. One could say that the United + States turned to torture because many in the administration believed the country + did not have adequate intelligence capabilities, lacking the spy network or even + the language abilities to infiltrate and conduct regular espionage on + organizations like Al Qaeda. 6 + The tortured interrogations combined the extremes of brutality with the + +Getting information or "truth" was not the only, perhaps not the main point +of torture sessions, and maybe not as well the main point for mass surveillance: + + Even the more ordinary instances of “enhanced interrogation” were + harrowing—and so often administered, according to the Senate report, after the + interrogators believed there was no more information to be had, sometimes even + before the detainee had the opportunity to speak. + +Torture template: + + Ramzi bin al-Shibh was subjected to this type of treatment immediately upon + arrival in detention, even before being interrogated or given an opportunity to + cooperate—in what would become a “template” for other detainees. Bin al- + Shibh was subjected first to “sensory dislocation” including “shaving bin al- + Shibh’s head and face, exposing him to loud noise in a white room with white + lights, keeping him ‘unclothed and subjected to uncomfortably cool + temperatures,’ and shackling him ‘hand and foot with arms outstretched over his + head (with his feet firmly on the floor and not allowed to support his weight with + his arms).’” Following that, the interrogation would include “attention grasp, + walling, the facial hold, the facial slap… the abdominal slap, cramped + confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours, + and the waterboard, as appropriate to [bin al-Shibh’s] level of resistance.” 8 This + template would be used on others—and served as a warning to all. + The more extreme forms of torture were also accompanied by the promise of + +"Bigeard shrimp": + + The more extreme forms of torture were also accompanied by the promise of + life-long solitary confinement or, in the case of death, cremation. + Counterinsurgency torture in the past had often been linked to summary + disappearances and executions. Under the Bush administration, it was tied to + what one might call virtual disappearances. + During the Algerian war, as noted already, the widespread use of brutal + interrogation techniques meant that those who had been victimized—both the + guilty and innocent—became dangerous in the eyes of the French military + leadership. FLN members needed to be silenced, forever; but so did others who + might be radicalized by the waterboarding or gégène. In Algeria, a simple + solution was devised: the tortured would be thrown out from helicopters into the + Mediterranean. They became les crevettes de Bigeard, after the notorious French + general in Algeria, Marcel Bigeard: “Bigeard’s shrimp,” dumped into the sea, + their feet in poured concrete—a technique the French military had apparently + experimented with earlier in Indochina. + + [...] + + The CIA would devise a different solution in 2002: either torture the suspect + accidentally to death and then cremate his body to avoid detection, or torture the + suspect to the extreme and then ensure that he would never again talk to another + human being. Abu Zubaydah received the latter treatment. Zubaydah had first + been seized and interrogated at length by the FBI, had provided useful + information, and was placed in isolation for forty-seven days, the FBI believing + that he had no more valuable information. Then the CIA took over, believing he + might still be a source. 10 The CIA turned to its more extreme forms of torture— + utilizing all ten of its most brutal techniques—but, as a CIA cable from the + interrogation team, dated July 15, 2002, records, they realized beforehand that it + would either have to cover up the torture if death ensued or ensure that + Zubaydah would never talk to another human being again in his lifetime. + According to the Senate report, “the cable stated that if Abu Zubaydah were to + die during the interrogation, he would be cremated. The interrogation team + closed the cable by stating: ‘regardless which [disposition] option we follow + however, and especially in light of the planned psychological pressure + techniques to be implemented, we need to get reasonable assurances that [Abu + Zubaydah] will remain in isolation and incommunicado for the remainder of his + life.’” 11 In response to this request for assurance, a cable from the CIA station + gave the interrogation team those assurances, noting that “it was correct in its + ‘understanding that the interrogation process takes precedence over preventative + medical procedures,’” and then adding in the cable: + +KUBARK + + routines were approved at the uppermost level of the US government, by the + president of the United States and his closest advisers. These practices were put + in place, designed carefully and legally—very legalistically, in fact—to be used + on suspected enemies. They were not an aberration. There are, to be sure, long + histories written of rogue intelligence services using unauthorized techniques; + there is a lengthy record, as well, of CIA ingenuity and creativity in this domain, + including, among other examples, the 1963 KUBARK Counterintelligence + Interrogation manual. 13 But after 9/11, the blueprint was drawn at the White + House and the Pentagon, and it became official US policy—deliberate, debated, + well-thought-out, and adopted as legal measures. + + + [...] + + The Janus face of torture was its formal legality amidst its shocking brutality. + Many of the country’s best lawyers and legal scholars, professors at top-ranked + law schools, top government attorneys, and later federal judges would pore over + statutes and case law to find legal maneuvers to permit torture. The felt need to + legitimate and legalize the brutality—and of course, to protect the officials and + operatives from later litigation—was remarkable. + The documents known collectively as the “torture memos” fell into two + categories: first, those legal memos regarding whether the Guantánamo detainees + were entitled to POW status under the Geneva Conventions (GPW), written + between September 25, 2001, and August 1, 2002; and second, starting in + August 2002, the legal memos regarding whether the “enhanced interrogation + techniques” envisaged by the CIA amounted to torture prohibited under + international law. + +How torture was defined to allow torture to happen: + + As Jay Bybee, then at the Office of Legal Counsel and now a + federal judge, wrote in his August 1, 2002, memo: + + We conclude that torture as defined in and proscribed by [18 US Code] Sections 2340-2340A, + covers only extreme acts. Severe pain is generally of the kind difficult for the victim to endure. + Where the pain is physical, it must be of an intensity akin to that which accompanies serious + physical injury such as death or organ failure. Severe mental pain requires suffering not just at the + moment of infliction but also requires lasting psychological harm, such as seen in mental disorders + like post-traumatic stress disorder. […] Because the acts inflicting torture are extreme, there is + significant range of acts that though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment + or punishment fail to rise to the level of torture.22 + + This definition of torture was so demanding that it excluded the brutal + practices that the United States was using. It set the federal legal standard, + essentially, at death or organ failure. + + [...] + + them 26 —and then, effectively, judicial opinions. The executive branch became a + minijudiciary, with no effective oversight or judicial review. And in the end, it + worked. The men who wrote these memos have never been prosecuted nor + seriously taken to task, as a legal matter, for their actions. The American people + allowed a quasi-judiciary to function autonomously, during and after. These self- + appointed judges wrote the legal briefs, rendered judgment, and wrote the + judicial opinions that legitimized these brutal counterinsurgency practices. In the + process, they rendered the counterinsurgency fully legal. They inscribed torture + within the fabric of law. + + One could go further. The torture memos accomplished a new resolution of + the tension between brutality and legality, one that we had not witnessed + previously in history. It was an audacious quasi-judicial legality that had rarely + been seen before. And by legalizing torture in that way, the Bush administration + provided a legal infrastructure for counterinsurgency-as-governance more + broadly. + + [...] + + And through this process of legalization, these broader torturous practices + spilled over into the second prong of counterinsurgency: the eradication of an + active minority. Torture began to function as a way to isolate, punish, and + eliminate those suspected of being insurgents. + +Bare existence, indefinite detention, incommunication: + + The indefinite detention and brutal ordinary measures served as a way to + eliminate these men—captured in the field or traded for reward monies, almost + like slaves from yonder. The incommunicado confinement itself satisfied the + second prong of counterinsurgency theory. 5 But somehow it also reached further + than mere detention, approximating a form of disappearance or virtual death. + The conditions these men found themselves in were so extreme, it is almost as if + they were as good as dead. + Reading Slahi’s numbing descriptions, one cannot help but agree with the + philosopher Giorgio Agamben that these men at Guantánamo were, in his words, + no more than “bare life.” 6 Agamben’s concept of bare existence captures well + the dimensions of dehumanization and degradation that characterized their lives: + the camp inmates were reduced to nothing more than bare animal existence. + They were no longer human, but things that lived. The indefinite detention and + torture at Guantánamo achieved an utter denial of their humanity. + Every aspect of their treatment at black sites and detention facilities + +### Drone strikes + + This debate between more population-centric proponents and more enemy- + centric advocates of counterinsurgency should sound familiar. It replays the + controversy over the use of torture or other contested methods within the + counterinsurgency paradigm. It replicates the strategic debates between the + ruthless and the more decent. It rehearses the tensions between Roger Trinquier + and David Galula. + + Yet just as torture is central to certain versions of modern warfare, the drone + strike too is just as important to certain variations of the counterinsurgency + approach. Drone strikes, in effect, can serve practically all the functions of the + second prong of counterinsurgency warfare. Drone strikes eliminate the + identified active minority. They instill terror among everyone living near the + active minority, dissuading them and anyone else who might contemplate joining + the revolutionaries. They project power and infinite capability. They show who + has technological superiority. As one Air Force officer says, “The real advantage + of unmanned aerial systems is that they allow you to project power without + projecting vulnerability.” 18 By terrifying and projecting power, drones dissuade + the population from joining the insurgents. + + [...] + + Covered extensively by the news media, + drone attacks are popularly believed to have caused even more civilian casualties + than is actually the case. The persistence of these attacks on Pakistani territory + offends people’s deepest sensibilities, alienates them from their government, and + contributes to Pakistan’s instability.” 19 + In July 2016, the Obama administration released a report estimating the + + + [...] + + Those in the affected countries typically receive far higher casualty reports. + The Pakistan press, for instance, reported that there are about 50 civilians killed + for every militant assassinated, resulting in a hit rate of about 2 percent. As + Kilcullen and Exum argue, regardless of the exact number, “every one of these + dead noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, + and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as + drone strikes have increased.” 25 + To those living in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and + neighboring countries, the Predator drones are terrifying. But again—and this is + precisely the central tension at the heart of counterinsurgency theory—the terror + may be a productive tool for modern warfare. It may dissuade people from + joining the active minority. It may convince some insurgents to abandon their + efforts. Terror, as we have seen, is by no means antithetical to the + counterinsurgency paradigm. Some would argue it is a necessary means. + Drones are by no means a flawless weapons system even for their proponents. + + [...] + + Regarding the first question, a drone should be understood as a blended + weapons system, one that ultimately functions at several levels. It shares + characteristics of the German V-2 missile, to be sure, but also the French + guillotine and American lethal injection. It combines safety for the attacker, with + relatively precise but rapid death, and a certain anesthetizing effect—as well as, + of course, utter terror. For the country administering the drone attack, it is + perfectly secure. There is no risk of domestic casualties. In its rapid and + apparently surgical death, it can be portrayed, like the guillotine, as almost + humane. And drones have had a numbing effect on popular opinion precisely + because of their purported precision and hygiene—like lethal injection has done, + for the most part, in the death-penalty context. Plus, drones are practically + invisible and out of sight—again, for the country using them—though, again, + terrifying for the targeted communities. + + [...] + + Chamayou’s second question is, perhaps, the most important. This new + weapons system has changed the US government’s relationship to its own + citizens. There is no better evidence of this than the deliberate, targeted drone + killing of US and allied nation citizens abroad—as we will see. 32 + + [...] + + An analogy from the death penalty may be helpful. There too, the means + employed affect the ethical dimensions of the practice itself. The gas chamber + and the electric chair—both used in the United States even after the Holocaust— + became fraught with meaning. Their symbolism soured public opinion on the + death penalty. By contrast, the clinical or medical nature of lethal injection at + first reduced the political controversy surrounding executions. Only over time, + with botched lethal injections and questions surrounding the drug cocktails and + their true effects, have there been more questions raised. But it has taken time for + the negative publicity to catch up with lethal injection. Drones, at this point, + remain far less fraught than conventional targeted assassinations. + +### Winning hearts and minds + + THE THIRD PRONG OF COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY CONSISTS in winning the + hearts and minds of the general population to stem the flow of new recruits to + the active minority and to seize the upper hand in the struggle. This goal can be + achieved by actively winning the allegiance of the population, or by pacifying an + already passive population, or even simply by distracting the masses. The bar, + ultimately, is low since, on the counterinsurgency view, the people are mostly + passive. As Roger Trinquier noted in 1961, “Experience has demonstrated that it + is by no means necessary to enjoy the sympathy of the majority of the people to + obtain their backing; most are amorphous, indifferent.” Or, as General Petraeus’s + manual states, the vast majority is “neutral” and “passive”; it represents an + “uncommitted middle” with “passive supporters of both sides.” 1 The third prong, + then, is aimed mostly at assuaging, pacifying perhaps, or merely distracting the + indifferent masses. + + [...] the third prong has translated, principally, into three tactics: investments in + infrastructure, new forms of digital propaganda, and generalized terror. [...] + Undergirding them both, though, is the third tactic, the threat of + generalized terror, that serves as a foundational method and looming constant. + + [...] + + In How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, Rosa + Brooks writes that since 9/11 we have witnessed the expansion of the military + and its encroachment on civilian affairs. “We’ve seen,” in her words, “the steady + militarization of US foreign policy as our military has been assigned many of the + tasks once given to civilian institutions.” Brooks warns us of a new world where + “the boundaries between war and nonwar, military and nonmilitary have + eroded.” + + [...] + + We are indeed facing, as Brooks powerfully demonstrates, a new world of an + ever-encroaching military. But what this reveals, more than anything, is the rise + of the counterinsurgency paradigm of government. It is the model of + counterinsurgency warfare—of Galula’s early turn to building schools and health + facilities, to focusing on the hearts and minds of the general population—that + has pushed the military into these traditionally civilian domains, including total + surveillance, rule-of-law projects, artificial intelligence, entertainment, etc. In + effect, it is the counterinsurgency paradigm of government that has become + everything, and everything that has become counterinsurgency. The blurring of + boundaries between war and peaceful governance is not merely the contingent + result of 9/11, it is instead the culmination of a long and deliberate process of + modernizing warfare. + +Providing the basic needs: + + Providing basic necessities, labeled “essential services” in the field manual, is + a key counterinsurgency practice. It consists primarily of ensuring that there is + “food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment” for the general + population. General Petraeus’s manual explains the rationale in very simple + terms: “People pursue essential needs until they are met, at any cost and from + any source. People support the source that meets their needs. If it is an insurgent + source, the population is likely to support the insurgency. If the [host nation] + government provides reliable essential services, the population is more likely to + support it. Commanders therefore identify who provides essential services to + each group within the population.” 5 + +That, in most cases, involve funneling american taxpayer's money to enrich corporations +with "insane profit margins" for rebuilding countries along with US guidelines. See +Naomi Klein's Shock Doctrine for more details. + + A second approach to securing the neutrality of the majority is more + psychological. In the early days of modern warfare, examples of this approach + included measures such as the resettlement of populations, in the words of + counterinsurgency experts, “to control them better and to block the insurgents’ + support.” This is what the British did in Malaya, and the French in Algeria. + Other examples included basic propaganda campaigns. 16 + + As time has gone by, new digital technologies have enabled new forms of + psychological counterinsurgency warfare. One of the newest involves digital + propaganda, reflected most recently in the Center for Global Engagement set up + under the Obama administration in early 2016. Created with the objective to + prevent the radicalization of vulnerable youth, the center adopted strategies + pioneered by the giants of Silicon Valley—Google, Amazon, Netflix—and was + originally funded at the level of about $20 million. It targeted susceptible + persons suspected of easier radicalization and sent them enhanced and improved + third-party content in order to try to dissuade them, subliminally, from + radicalizing or joining ISIS. In the words of an investigative journalist, “The + Obama administration is launching a stealth anti-Islamic State messaging + campaign, delivered by proxies and targeted to individual would-be extremists, + the same way Amazon or Google sends you shopping suggestions based on your + online browsing history.” 17 + +Terror e tortura: + + The third set of measures was even more basic: terror. The most formidable way + to win hearts and minds is to terrorize the local population to make sure they do + not sympathize with or aid the active minority. + + [...] + + The brutality of counterinsurgency serves, of course, to gather information + and eradicate the revolutionary minority. But it also aims higher and reaches + further: its ambition, as General Aussaresses recognized well, is to terrorize the + insurgents, to scare them to death, and to frighten the local population in order to + prevent them from joining the insurgent faction. Today, the use of unusually + brutal torture, the targeted drone assassination of high-value suspects, and the + indefinite detention under solitary conditions aim not only to eviscerate the + enemy, but also to warn others, strike fear, and win their submission and + obedience. Drones and indefinite detention crush those they touch, and strike + [...] Terror, in the end, is a key component of the third core strategy of + counterinsurgency. + +Torture and civilization: + + Since antiquity, terror has served to demarcate the civilized from the + barbarian, to distinguish the free citizen from the enslaved. The free male in + ancient Greece had the privilege of swearing an oath to the gods, of testifying on + his word. The slave, by contrast, could only give testimony under torture. + Torture, in this sense, defined freedom and citizenship by demeaning and + marking—by imposing stigmata—on those who could be tortured. It served to + demarcate the weak. It marked the vulnerable. And it also, paradoxically, served + to delineate the “more civilized.” This is perhaps the greatest paradox of the + brutality of counterinsurgency: to be civilized is to torture judiciously. This + paradox was born in antiquity, but it journeys on. + + [...] + + The judicious administration of terror is the hallmark of civilization. To be + civilized is to terrorize properly, judiciously, with restraint, according to the + rules. Only the barbarians tortured savagely, viciously, unrestrainedly. The + civilized, by contrast, knew how and when to tame torture, how to rein it terror, + to apply it with judgment and discretion. Compared to the barbarians—the + beheadings of ISIS is a modern case on point—we are tame and judicious, even + when we torture, not like those barbarians. And since 9/11, the judicious use of + terror has been a key US strategy. In the end, terror functions in myriad ways to + win the hearts and minds of the masses under the counterinsurgency paradigm of + governing. + +Terror in many levels of governing: + + Now, terror is not an unprecedented component of governing, even if its role + in the counterinsurgency model may be uniquely constitutive. It has been with us + since slavery in antiquity, through the many inquisitions, to the internment and + concentration camps of modern history. And there too, in each of its + manifestations, it functioned at multiple levels to bolster different modes of + governing. Looking back through history, terror has done a lot of work. Today as + well. And to see all that terror achieves today—above and beyond the three + prongs of counterinsurgency theory—it is useful to look back through history + and recall its different functions and the work it has done. The reflections today + are stunning. + +Torture and truth: + + The first episode reaches back to antiquity, but represents a recurring theme + throughout history: terror has often served to manufacture its own truth— + especially in terms of its efficacy. “They all talk.” [...] + + [...] + + Trying to convince a suspect that he will talk, telling him that he will—this is, + of course, a psychological technique, but it is more than that. It is also a firm + belief of counterinsurgency theorists outside the interrogation room. Roger + + [...] + + Manufacturing truth: that is, perhaps, the first major function of terror. It is + the power of terror, especially in the face of ordinary men and women, of + humans, all too human. It has been that way since the inquisitions of the Middle + Ages, and before, since antiquity. On this score, little has changed. + In her book on slavery in Greek antiquity, Torture and Truth, Page duBois + argues that the idea of truth dominant today in Western thought is indissolubly + tied to the practice of torture, while torture itself is deeply connected to the will + to discover something that is always beyond our grasp. As a result, society after + society returns to torture, in almost an eternal recurrence, to seek out the truth + that is always beyond our reach. In ancient times, duBois shows, torture + functioned as the metaphorical touchstone of truth and as a means to establish a + social hierarchy. In duBois’s words, “the desire to create an other and the desire + to extract truth are inseparable, in that the other, because she or he is an other, is + constituted as a source of truth.” Truth, in sum, is always “inextricably linked + with the practice of torture.” 4 + + [...] + + Truth, duBois argues, “resides in the slave body.” 5 + + [...] + + Even more, terror produced social difference and hierarchy. The limits on + torture in ancient societies served to define what it meant to be among those who + could be tortured—what it meant to be a slave or to be free. In ancient times, the + testimony of a slave could only be elicited, and only became admissible in + litigation, under torture. Only free male citizens could take an oath or resolve a + controversy by sermon. The rules about who could be tortured in ancient times + did not just regulate the victims of torture, the rules themselves were constitutive + of what it meant to be a slave. The laws demarcated and defined freedom itself + —what it looked like, what it entailed. + Sophocles’s tragedy Oedipus Rex has captured our imagination for centuries + on questions of fate and power. But it is perhaps on the question of terror and + truth that the play turns. At the climax of Sophocles’s tragedy—at the pivotal + moment when truth finally emerges for all to see and to recognize—there is a + scene of terror. The shepherd slave who held the knowledge of Oedipus’s + ancestry is threatened with torture. And that threat of torture alone—at the + culmination of a whole series of unsuccessful inquiries—produces the truth: + torture provokes the shepherd’s confession and that allows Oedipus to recognize + his fate. But more than that, torture reaffirms the social order in Thebes—a + social order where gods rule, oracles tell truth, prophets divine, fateful kings + govern, and slaves serve. It is, ultimately, the right to terrorize that reveals + Oedipus’s power and the shepherd’s place in society. + + [...] + + In a similar way, terror today produces its own truth—about the effectiveness + of torture in eliciting truth, about its effectiveness in subjugating the insurgents, + about the justness of counterinsurgency. + + [...] + + Second, terror—or more specifically the regulatory framework that surrounds + terror—legitimizes the practices of terror itself. This may sound paradoxical or + circular—but it has often been true in history. The structures that frame and + regulate the administration of terrorizing practices have the effect, unexpectedly, + [...] The extreme nature of torture, once brought within the fabric of the law, + concentrated power in the hands of those + who had the knowledge and skill, the techne, to master the brutality. The + Justinian codification served as a model to later codifications during the early + Middle Ages and to the practices of the Inquisition. + Extreme practices call for expert oversight and enable a concentration of + + [...] + + Torture was brought into the fabric of the law and rarified at the + same time. The rarefication in the Medieval Period served a political end: to + make torture even more foreboding. Had torture become too generalized or too + frequent, it might have lost its exceptionality and terrorizing effect. + Torture was rarely applied, and, as one historian notes, inflicted with “the + + [...] + + The rarity achieved by the limited use and legal regulation of torture in the + Medieval Period served to ensure its persistence and role as a social + epistemological device—as a producer of truths, especially truth about itself. + Centuries later, the Bush administration and its top lawyers re-created a legal + architecture surrounding the use of torture. + + [...] + + Third, the legal regulation of terror also legitimizes the larger political regime. + + [...] + + It may seem surprising or paradoxical that the antebellum courts would + protect a slave accused of poisoning her master. But there is an explanation: the + intricate legal framework surrounding the criminalization and punishment of + errant slaves during the antebellum period served to maintain and stabilize + chattel slavery in the South—it served to equilibrate the political economy of + slavery. It served to balance interests in such a way that neither the slave owners + nor the slaves would push the whole system of slavery into disarray. And the + courts and politicians carefully handled this delicate balance. + + [...] + + In fact, the financial loss associated with the execution of a slave was viewed + as the only way to guarantee that owners made sure their slaves received a fair + trial. During the 1842–1843 legislative session, the general assembly passed a + + [...] + + These complex negotiations over the criminal rules accompanied the + practices of slavery in Alabama—a form of terror—and served to legitimize the + larger political economy of chattel slavery. They offered stability to the slave + economy by making the different participants in the criminal process and in + slavery—the slave owners, the foremen, the magistrates, and the public at large + —more confident in the whole enterprise. The extensive legal regulation of the + torture of slaves was not about justifying torture, nor about resolving + philosophical or ethical questions. Instead, it served to strike a balance and + stabilize the institution of slavery. + + [...] + + Fourth, the ability to terrorize—and to get away with it—has a powerful effect + on others. The audacity and the mastery impress the general masses. Something + about winning or beating others seduces the population. People like winners, and + winning is inscribed in terrorizing others. + +Masculinity: + + Fifth, and relatedly, terror is gendered, which also tends to reinforce the power + and appeal of the more brutal counterinsurgency practices. Brutality is most + often associated with the dominant half of the couple, the one who controls, and + however much we might protest, this tends to strengthen the attraction. + +Horrorism: + + Terror works in other ways as well, and many other historical episodes could + shed light on the complex functioning of terror today—of what Adriana + Cavarero refers to as “horrorism.” 45 Terror, for instance, operates to control and + manage one’s comrades. It can serve to keep the counterrevolutionary minority + in check. The willingness to engage in extreme forms of brutality, in senseless + violence, in irrational excess signals one’s own ruthlessness to one’s peers or + inferiors. It can frighten and discipline both inferiors and superiors. It + demonstrates one’s willingness to be cruel—which can be productive, in fact + necessary, to a counterinsurgency. + +Counterinsurgency goes domestic: + + The operations of COINTELPRO—the Counter Intelligence Program + developed by the FBI in the 1950s to disrupt the American Communist Party, + and extended into the 1960s to eradicate the Black Panthers—took precisely the + form of counterinsurgency warfare. The notorious August 1967 directive of FBI + director J. Edgar Hoover to “expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise + neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and + groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters”; 16 the + police raids on Black Panther headquarters in 1968 and 1969; the summary + execution of the charismatic chairman of the Chicago Black Panther Party, Fred + Hampton; the first SWAT operations carried out against the Panthers in Los + Angeles—these all had the trappings of modern warfare. + + Hoover’s FBI targeted the Panthers in a manner that drew on the foundational + principles of counterinsurgency: first, to collect as much intelligence on the + Black Panther Party as possible through the use of FBI informants and total + surveillance; second, to isolate the Panthers from their communities by making + their lives individually so burdened with surveillance and so difficult that they + were forced to separate themselves from their friends and family members; third, + to turn the Panther movement into one that was perceived, by the general + population, as a radicalized extremist organization, as a way to delegitimize the + Panthers and reduce their appeal and influence; and ultimately, to eliminate and + eradicate them, initially through police arrests, then through criminal + prosecutions (for instance, of the New York 21) and justified homicides [...] + and ultimately by fomenting conflict and divisiveness within the party + + [...] + + The linchpin of a domesticated counterinsurgency is to bring total + information awareness home. Just as it was developed abroad, it is total + surveillance alone that makes it possible to distinguish the active minority on + domestic soil from the passive masses of Americans. A fully transparent + population is the first requisite of the counterinsurgency method. In General + Petraeus’s field manual, it received a full chapter early on, “Intelligence in + Counterinsurgency,” with a pithy and poignant epigraph: “Everything good that + happens seems to come from good intelligence.” And as the manual began, so it + ended, with the following simple mantra: “The ultimate success or failure of the + [counterinsurgency] mission depends on the effectiveness of the intelligence effort." + + [...] + + American is a potential insurgent. + Constant vigilance of the American population is necessary—hand in hand + with the appearance of trust. Appearances are vital. A domesticated + counterinsurgency must suspect everyone in the population, but not let it be + known. This posture, developed in counterinsurgency theory decades ago, was at + the core of the paradigm. David Galula had refined it to a witty statement he + would tell his soldiers in Algeria: “One cannot catch a fly with vinegar. My rules + are: outwardly you must treat every civilian as a friend; inwardly you must + consider him as a rebel ally until you have positive proof to the contrary.” 2 This + mantra has become the rule today—at home. + + [...] + + In Exposed, I proposed a new way to understand how power circulates in the + digital age and, especially, a new way to comprehend our willingness to expose + ourselves to private corporations and the government alike. The metaphors + commonly used to describe our digital condition, such as the “surveillance + state,” Michel Foucault’s panopticon prison, or even George Orwell’s Big + Brother, are inadequate, I argued there. In the new digital age we are not forcibly + imprisoned in panoptic cells. There is no “telescreen” anchored to the wall of our + apartments by the state. No one is trying to crush our passions, or wear us down + into submission with the smell of boiled cabbage and old rag mats, coarse soap, + and blunt razors. The goal is not to displace our pleasures with hatred—with + “hate” sessions, “hate songs,” “hate weeks.” Today, instead, we interact by + means of “likes,” “shares,” “favorites,” “friending,” and “following.” We + gleefully hang smart TVs on the wall that record everything we say and all our + preferences. The drab uniforms and grim grayness of Orwell’s 1984 have been + replaced by the iPhone 5c in its radiant pink, yellow, blue, and green. “Colorful + through and through,” its marketing slogan promises, and the desire for color- + filled objects—for the sensual swoosh of a sent e-mail, the seductive click of the + iPhone camera “shutter,” and the “likes,” clicks, and hearts that can be earned by + sharing—seduce us into delivering ourselves to the surveillance technologies. + And as the monitoring and marketing of our private lives changes who we + sharing—seduce us into delivering ourselves to the surveillance technologies. + + And as the monitoring and marketing of our private lives changes who we + are, power circulates in a new way. Orwell depicted the perfect totalitarian + society. Guy Debord described ours rather as a society of the spectacle, in which + the image makers shape how we understand the world and ourselves. Michel + Foucault spoke instead of “the punitive society” or what he called + “panopticism,” drawing on Jeremy Bentham’s design of the panoptic prison. + Gilles Deleuze went somewhat further and described what he called “societies of + control.” But in our digital age, total surveillance has become inextricably linked + with pleasure. We live in a society of exposure and exhibition, an expository + society. + + [...] + + And that’s what happened: taxpayers would pay the telecoms to hold the data + for the government. So, before, AT&T surreptitiously provided our private + personal digital data to the intelligence services free of charge. Now, American + taxpayers will pay them to collect and hold on to the data for when the + intelligence services need them. A neoliberal win-win solution for everyone— + except, of course, the ordinary, tax-paying citizen who wants a modicum of + privacy or protection from the counterinsurgency. + + [...] + + In my previous book, however, I failed to fully grasp how our expository + society fits with the other features of our contemporary political condition— + from torture, to Guantánamo, to drone strikes, to digital propaganda. In part, I + could not get past the sharp contrast between the fluidity of our digital surfing + and surveillance on the one hand, and the physicality of our military + interventions and use of torture on the other. To be sure, I recognized the deadly + reach of metadata and reiterated those ominous words of General Michael + Hayden, former director of both the NSA and the CIA: “We kill people based on + metadata.” 20 And I traced the haunting convergence of our digital existence and + of correctional supervision: the way in which the Apple Watch begins to + function like an electronic bracelet, seamlessly caging us into a steel mesh of + digital traces. But I was incapable then of fully understanding the bond between + digital exposure and analog torture. + + It is now clear, though, that the expository society fits seamlessly within our + new paradigm of governing. The expository society is precisely what allows the + counterinsurgency strategies to be applied so impeccably “at home” to the very + people who invented modern warfare. The advent of the expository society, as + well as the specific NSA surveillance programs, makes domestic total + information awareness possible, and in turn lays the groundwork for the other + two prongs of counterinsurgency in the domestic context. + + [...] + + This idea of an occupied territory, of a colony within a nation, resonates + perfectly with what we have witnessed in terms of the domestication of the + counterinsurgency. I would just push the logic further: we have not simply + created an internal colony, we have turned the nation itself into a colony. We + govern ourselves through modern counterinsurgency warfare as if the entire + United States was now a colonial dominion like Algeria, Malaya, or Vietnam. + + [...] + + These incidents—large and small, but all devastating for those targeted—also + serve another objective of the domesticated counterinsurgency: to make the rest + of us feel safe and secure, to allow us to continue our lives unaffected, to avoid + disrupting our consumption and enjoyment. They serve to reassure, and also, in + demonizing a phantom minority, to bring us all together against the specter of + the frightening and dangerous other. It makes us believe that there would be, + lurking in the quiet suburbs of Dallas or Miami, dangerous insurgents—were it + not for our government. And these effects feed into the third prong of a + + [...] + + We had seen earlier, within counterinsurgency theory, similar debates + between population-centric and enemy-centric theorists. The enemy-centric + approach tended to be the more brutal, but more focused. The population-centric + favored the more legal and social-investment approaches. I argued then that they + were just two facets of the same paradigm. + + Here the debate is between population-and/or-enemy-centric theories versus + individual-centric theory. But here too, I would argue, this is a false dichotomy. + Again, these are just two facets of the same thing: a counterinsurgency paradigm + of warfare with three core strategies. Like the population-and/or-enemy-centric + theories, individual-centric theory naturally entails both incapacitating the + individual terrorist or insurgent—eliminating him and all of the active minority + —and preventing or deterring his substitution or replacement. + + [...] + + But rather than buy into this dichotomy of counterinsurgency and leaner + antiterrorism, what history shows instead is a growing convergence of the two + models in the United States since the 1960s. Counterinsurgency and domestic + antiterrorism efforts, entwined from the start, have converged over time. The + individual incapacitation strategy meshes perfectly into the counterinsurgency + approach. And it leads seamlessly from the domestication of the second prong of + counterinsurgency to the domestication of the third. + +### Distraction and diversion + + MANY OF US WILL NOT RECOGNIZE OURSELVES, OR A MERICA for that matter, in + these dreadful episodes—in the waterboarding and targeted assassinations + abroad or in the militarization of our police forces, in the infiltration of Muslim + mosques and student groups or in the constant collection of our personal data at + home. Many of us have no firsthand experience of these terrifying practices. Few + of us actually read the full Senate torture report, and even fewer track drone + strikes. Some of us do not even want to know of their existence. Most of us are + blissfully ignorant—at least most of the time—of these counterinsurgency + practices at home or abroad, and are consumed instead by the seductive + distractions of our digital age. + + And that’s the way it is supposed to be. As counterinsurgency is + domesticated, it is our hearts and minds that are daily being assuaged, numbed, + pacified—and blissfully satisfied. We, the vast majority of us, are reassured + daily: there are threats everywhere and color-coded terror alerts, but + counterinsurgency strategies are protecting us. We are made to feel that + everything’s under control, that the threat is exterior, that we can continue with + our daily existence. Even more, that these counterinsurgency strategies will + prevail. That our government is stronger and better equipped, prepared to do + everything necessary to win, and will win. That the guardians are protecting us. + The effort to win the hearts and minds of the passive American majority is + the third aspect of the domestication of counterinsurgency practices—perhaps + the most crucial component of all. And it is accomplished through a remarkable + mixture of distraction, entertainment, pleasure, propaganda, and advertising— + now rendered all so much more effective thanks to our rich digital world. In + Rome, after the Republic, this was known as “bread and circus” for the masses. + Today, it’s more like Facebook and Pokémon GO. + + We saw earlier how the expository society entices us to share all our personal + data and how this feeds into the first prong of counterinsurgency—total + information awareness. There is a flip side to this phenomenon: keeping us + distracted. The exposure is so pleasurable and engaging that we are mostly kept + content, with little need for a coordinated top-down effort to do so. We are + entranced—absorbed in a fantastic world of digitally enhanced reality that is + totally consuming, engrossing, and captivating. We are no longer being rendered + docile in a disciplinarian way, as Michel Foucault argued in Discipline and + Punish. We are past notions of docility. We are actively entranced—not + passively, not in a docile way. We are actively clicking and swiping, jumping + from one screen to another, checking one platform then another to find the next + fix—Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Google, YouTube, and on and on. + Winning over and assuaging the passive majority might be accomplished— + indeed, has been accomplished in the past—through traditional propaganda, such + as broadcast misinformation about the insurgent minority, and through the top- + down provision of entertainment to keep us from thinking about politics. The + new digital world we live in has rendered these older strategies obsolete. As the + counterinsurgency’s mandate to pacify the masses has been turned on the + American people, the third prong of modern warfare looks and works differently + than it did in previous times and in other places. + Things have changed. Just a few years ago, our politicians still had to tell us + + [...] + + Pokémon GO has already run its course, but that is to be expected. Another + digital obsession will follow. These platforms are supposed to capture all of our + attention for a while, to captivate us, to distract us—and simultaneously to make + us expose ourselves and everything around us. This is the symbiosis between the + third and first prongs of the domesticated counterinsurgency: while it pacifies us, + a game like Pokémon GO taps into all our personal information and captures all + our data. At first, the game required that players share all their personal contacts. + Although that was eventually dropped, the game collects all our GPS locations, + captures all the video of our surroundings in perfectly GPS-coded data, and + tracks us wherever we are. Plus, even though it is free, many players are buying + add-ons and in the process sharing their consumption and financial data. The + more we play, the more we are distracted and pacified, and the more we reveal + about ourselves. + + [...] + + The distractions are everywhere: e-mail notifications, texts, bings and pings, + new snapchats and instagrams. The entertainment is everywhere as well: free + Wi-Fi at Starbucks and McDonald’s, and now on New York City streets, that + allow us to stream music videos and watch YouTube videos. And of course, the + advertising is everywhere, trying to make us consume more, buy online, + subscribe, and believe. Believe not only that we need to buy the recommended + book or watch the suggested Netflix, but also believe that we are secure and safe, + protected by the most powerful intelligence agencies and most tenacious military + force. Believe that we can continue to mind our own business—and remain + distracted and absorbed in the digital world—because our government is + watching out for us. + + The fact is, the domestication of counterinsurgency has coincided with the + explosion of this digital world and its distractions. There is a real qualitative + difference between the immediate post–9/11 period and today. One that is + feeding directly into the third strategy of modern warfare. + Meanwhile, for the more vulnerable—those who are more likely to veer + astray and perhaps sympathize with the purported internal enemy—the same + digital technologies target them for enhanced propaganda. The Global + Engagement Center, or its equivalents, will profile them and send improved + content from more moderate voices. The very same methods developed by the + most tech-savvy retailers and digital advertisers—by Google and Amazon—are + deployed to predict, identify, enhance, and target our own citizens. + were before or that we are experiencing a waning of civil and political + engagement. While I agree that the growing capacity of the state and + corporations to monitor citizens may well threaten the private sphere, I am not + convinced that this is producing new apathy or passivity or docility among + citizens, so much as a new form of entrancement. The point is, we were once + kept apathetic through other means, but are now kept apathetic through digital + distractions. + +Voting turnout and Trump election: + + The voting patterns of American registered voters has remained constant— + and apathetic—for at least fifty years. Even in the most important presidential + elections, voter turnout in this country over the past fifty years or more has + pretty much fluctuated between 50 percent and 63 percent. By any measure, + American democracy has been pretty docile for a long time. In fact, if you look + over the longer term, turnout has been essentially constant since the 1920s and + the extension of the suffrage to women. Of course, turnout to vote is not the only + measure of democratic participation, but it is one quantifiable measure. And + electoral voting is one of the more reliable longitudinal measures of civic + participation. But our record, in the United States, is not impressive. + + [...] + + Despite all this, over 62 million people voted for Donald Trump, resulting in + his Electoral College victory. And it was by no means an unusual election. Voter + turnout in 2016 was typical for this country. About 60.2 percent of the + approximately 231 million eligible voters turned out to vote, representing about + 139 million votes case. That number is consonant with historical turnout in this + country, almost squarely between voter turnout in 2012 (58.6 percent) and in + 2008 (61.6 percent), but still above most presidential election year turnouts since + 1972. 16 In all categories of white voters, Trump prevailed. + + [...] + + The cable news network CNN captured this best in a pithy lead to a story titled + “Trump: The Social Media President?”: “FDR was the first ‘radio’ president. + JFK emerged as the first ‘television’ president. Barack Obama broke through as + the first ‘Internet’ president. Next up? Prepare to meet Donald Trump, possibly + the first ‘social media’ and ‘reality TV’ president.” 10 + + [...] + + This new mode of existence and digital consumption pleases and distracts the + majority of Americans. The old-fashioned TV has now been enhanced and + augmented, displaced by social media on digital devices of all sorts and sizes— + from the Apple Watch and tablet, through the MacBook Air and Mac Pro, to the + giant screen TV and even the Jumbotron. And all of it serves to pacify the + masses and ensure that they do not have the time or attention span to question + the domestication of the counterinsurgency. + + And, then, it all feeds back into total information awareness. Hand in hand, + government agencies, social media, Silicon Valley, and large retailers and + corporations have created a mesmerizing new digital age that simultaneously + makes us expose ourselves and everything we do to government surveillance and + that serves to distract and entertain us. All kinds of social media and reality TV + consume and divert our attention, making us give our data away for free. A + profusion of addictive digital platforms—from Gmail, Facebook, and Twitter, to + YouTube and Netflix, Amazon Prime, Instagram, and Snapchat, and now + Pokémon GO—distract us into exposing all our most private information, in + order to feed the new algorithms of commerce and intelligence services: to + profile us for both watch lists and commercial advertising. + +This is compatible with Shoshana Zuboff's Dispossession Cycle: + + This third aspect of counterinsurgency’s domestication is perhaps the most + important, because it targets the most prized military and political objective: the + general masses. And today, in the expository society, the new algorithms and + digital-advertising methods have propelled the manipulation and propaganda to + new heights. We are being encouraged by government and enticed by + multination corporations and social media to expose and express ourselves as + much as possible, leaving digital traces that permit both government and + corporations to profile us and then try to shape us accordingly. To make model + citizens out of us all—which means docile, entranced consumers. The governing + paradigm here is to frenetically encourage digital activity—which in one sense is + the opposite of docility—in order to then channel that activity in the right + direction: consumption, political passivity, and avoiding the radical extremes. + + What we are witnessing is a new form of digital entrancement that shapes us + as subjects, blunts our criticality, distracts us, and pacifies us. We spend so much + time on our phones and devices, we barely have any time left for school or work, + let alone political activism. In the end, the proper way to think about this all is + not through the lens of docility, but through the framework of entrancement. It is + crucial to understand this in the proper way, because breaking this very + entrancement is key to seeing how counterinsurgency governance operates more + broadly. Also, because the focus on docility—along an older register of + discipline—is likely to lead us into an outdated focus on top-down propaganda. + +### Counterrevolution + + The paradigm was refined + and systematized, and has now reached a new stage: the complete and systematic + domestication of counterinsurgency against a home population where there is no + real insurgency or active minority. This new stage is what I call “The + Counterrevolution.” + + The Counterrevolution is a new paradigm of governing our own citizens at + home, modeled on colonial counterinsurgency warfare, despite the absence of + any domestic uprising. It is aimed not against a rebel minority—since none + really exists in the United States—but instead it creates the illusion of an active + minority which it can then deploy to target particular groups and communities, + and govern the entire American population on the basis of a counterinsurgency + warfare model. It operates through the three main strategies at the heart of + modern warfare, which, as applied to the American people, can be recapitulated + as follows: + + 1. Total information awareness of the entire American population…: [by the] + [...] “counterrevolutionary minority.” + + [...] + + 2. … in order to extract an active minority at home… + +Shock and Awe: + + 3. … and win the hearts and minds of Americans: Meanwhile, the + counterrevolutionary minority works to pacify and assuage the general + population in order to ensure that the vast majority of Americans remain + just that: ordinary consuming Americans. They encourage and promote a + rich new digital environment filled with YouTube, Netflix, Amazon + Prime, tweets, Facebook posts, instagrams, snapchats, and reality TV that + consume attention while digitally gathering personal data—and at times, + pushing enhanced content. They direct digital propaganda to susceptible + users. And they shock and awe the masses with their willingness to + torture suspected terrorists or kill their own citizens abroad. In the end, + entertaining, distracting, entrancing, and assuaging the general population + is the key to success—our new form of bread and circus. + +The "new shape" of the State (and it's partners), as a "loose network": + + These three key strategies now guide governance at home, as they do military + and foreign affairs abroad. What has emerged today is a new and different art of + governing. It forms a coherent whole with, at its center, a security apparatus + composed of White House, Pentagon, and intelligence officials, high-ranking + congressional members, FISC judges, security and Internet leaders, police + intelligence divisions, social-media companies, Silicon Valley executives, and + multinational corporations. This loose network, which collaborates at times and + competes at others, exerts control by collecting and mining our digital data. Data + control has become the primary battlefield, and data, the primary resource— + perhaps the most important primary resource in the United States today. + + [...] + + This new mode of governing has no time horizon. It has no sunset provision. And it is + marked by a tyrannous logic of violence. [...] It is part and parcel of the new + paradigm of governing that reconciles brutality with legality. + +The unprecedented, self-fulfilling profecy: + + We govern ourselves + differently in the United States now: no longer through sweeping social + programs like the New Deal or the War on Poverty, but through surgical + counterinsurgency strategies against a phantom opponent. The intensity of the + domestication now is unprecedented. + + [...] + + Counterinsurgency, with its tripartite scheme (active minority, passive masses, + counterrevolutionary minority) and its tripartite strategy (total awareness, + eliminate the active minority, pacify the masses) is a deeply counterproductive + self-fulfilling prophecy that radicalizes individuals against the United States. + + [...] + + “The Islamic State has called it ‘the blessed ban’ because it + supports the Islamic State’s position that America hates Islam. The clause in the + order that gives Christians preferential treatment will be seen as confirming the + Islamic State’s apocalyptic narrative that Islam is in a fight to the death against + the Christian crusaders. The images of Muslim visitors being turned away at + American airports will only inflame those who seek to do us harm.” 6 + + [...] + + We are headed not, as Kant would have it, toward perpetual peace, but + instead, sounding the refrain of Nietzsche’s eternal return, toward an endless + state of counterinsurgency warfare. + +### Not exactly a state of exception, but of legality + + MANY COMMENTATORS ARGUE THAT WE NOW LIVE, IN THE United States and in the + West more broadly, in a “state of exception” characterized by suspended legality. + In this view, our political leaders have placed a temporary hold on the rule of + law, with the tacit understanding that they will resume their adherence to liberal + legal values when the political situation stabilizes. Some commentators go + further, arguing that we have now entered a “permanent state of exception.” + + This view, however, misperceives one particular tactic of counterinsurgency + —namely, the state of emergency—for the broader rationality of our new + political regime. It fails to capture the larger ambition of our new mode of + governing. The fact is, our government does everything possible to legalize its + counterinsurgency measures and to place them solidly within the rule of law— + through endless consultations with government lawyers, hypertechnical legal + arguments, and lengthy legal memos. The idea is not to put law on hold, not + even temporarily. It is not to create an exception, literally or figuratively. On the + contrary, the central animating idea is to turn the counterinsurgency model into a + fully legal strategy. So, the governing paradigm is not one of exceptionality, but + of counterinsurgency and legality. + + [...] + + The logic today is based on a model of + counterinsurgency warfare with, at its heart, the resolution of that central tension + between brutality and legality. The counterrevolutionary model has resolved the + inherited tension and legalized the brutality. + + [...] + + Agamben’s idea of a permanent state of exception pushes this + further, but simultaneously undermines the defining element of the exception, + since it becomes the rule. For the most part, though, the state of exception is + presented as aberrational but temporary. + + [...] + + The problem with the state-of-exception view is that it mistakes tactics for + the overarching logic of our new paradigm of governing and, in the process, fails + to see the broader framework of The Counterrevolution. The state-of-exception + framework rests on an illusory dichotomy between rule and exception, a myth + that idealizes and reifies the rule of law. The point is, the use of torture at CIA + black sites and the bulk collection of American telephony metadata were not + exceptions to the rule of law, but were rendered fully legalized and regulated + practices—firmly embedded in a web of legal memos, preauthorized formalities, + and judicial or quasi-judicial oversight. In this sense, hardly anything that + occurred was outside or exceptional to the law, or could not be brought back in. + + The Counterrevolution, unlike the state of exception, does not function on a + binary logic of rule and exception, but on a fully coherent systematic logic of + counterinsurgency that is pervasive, expansive, and permanent. It does not have + limits or boundaries. It does not exist in a space outside the rule of law. It is all + encompassing, systematic, and legalized. + + Of course, the rhetoric of “exception” is extremely useful to The + Counterrevolution. “States of emergency” are often deployed to seize control + over a crisis and to accelerate the three prongs of counterinsurgency. + + [...] + + The ultimate exercise of power, Foucault argued, is precisely to transform + ambiguities about illegalisms into conduct that is “illegal.” + + [...] + + During the ancien régime, Foucault argues, the popular and the privileged + classes worked together to evade royal regulations, fees, and impositions. + Illegalisms were widespread throughout the eighteenth century and well + distributed across the different strata of society + + [...] + + As wealth became increasingly mobile after the French Revolution, new + forms of wealth accumulation—of moveable goods, stocks, and supplies as + opposed to landed wealth—exposed massive amounts of chattel property to the + workers who came in direct contact with this new commercial wealth. The + accumulation of wealth began to make popular illegalisms less useful—even + dangerous—to the interests of the privileged. The commercial class seized the + mechanisms of criminal justice to put an end to these popular illegalisms + [...] The privileged seized the administrative and + police apparatus of the late eighteenth century to crack down on popular + illegalisms. + + [...] + + They effectively turned popular illegalisms into + illegalities, and, in the process, created the notion of the criminal as social + enemy—Foucault even talks here of creating an “internal enemy.” + + [...] + + In The Counterrevolution—by contrast to the bourgeois revolutions of the + early nineteenth century—the process is turned on its head. Illegalisms and + illegalities are inverted. Rather than the privileged turning popular illegalisms + into illegalities, the guardians are turning their own illegalisms into legalities. + [...] The strategy here is to paper one’s way into the legal realm through elaborate + memorandums and advice letters that justify the use of enhanced interrogation or the + assassination of American citizens abroad. + + [...] + + On the one hand, there is a strict division of responsibilities: the intelligence + agencies and the military determine all the facts outside the scope of the legal + memorandum. [...] Everything is compartmentalized. + + [...] + + On the other hand, the memo authorizes: it allows the political authority to + function within the bounds of the law. It sanitizes the political decision. It cleans + the hands of the military and political leaders. It produces legalities. + +A circular, feedback loop: + + None of this violates the rule of law or transgresses the boundaries of legal + liberalism. Instead, the change was rendered “legal.” If this feels circular, it is + because it is: there is a constant feedback effect in play here. The + counterinsurgency practices were rendered legal, and simultaneously justice was + made to conform to the counterinsurgency paradigm. The result of the feedback + loop was constantly new and evolving meanings of due process. And however + rogue they may feel, they had gone through the correct procedural steps of due + process to render them fully lawful and fully compliant with the rule of law. + + [...] + + “Abnormal,” in 1975, Foucault explored how the clash between the juridical + power to punish and the psychiatric thirst for knowledge produced new medical + diagnoses that then did work. + + [...] + + In his 1978 lecture on the invention of the notion of dangerousness in French + psychiatry, Foucault showed how the idea of future dangerousness emerged from + the gaps and tensions in nineteenth-century law. 37 + + [...] + + There are surely gaps here too in The Counterrevolution—tensions between + rule-boundedness on the one hand and a violent warfare model on the other. + Those tensions give momentum to the pendulum swings of brutality that are then + resolved by bureaucratic legal memos. + +### System analysis and Operations Research + + The RAND Corporation played a seminal role in the development of + counterinsurgency practices in the United States and championed for decades— + and still does—a systems-analytic approach that has come to dominate military + strategy. Under its influence, The Counterrevolution has evolved into a logical + and coherent system that regulates and adjusts itself, a fully reasoned and + comprehensive approach. + + [...] + + Systems analysis was often confused with OR, but it was distinct in several + regards. OR tended to have more elaborate mathematical models and solved + lower-level problems; in systems analysis, by contrast, the pure mathematical + computation was generally applied only to subparts of the overall problem. + Moreover, SA took on larger strategic questions that implicated choices between + major policy options. In this sense, SA was, from its inception, in the words of + one study, “less quantitative in method and more oriented toward the analysis of + broad strategic and policy questions, […] particularly […] seeking to clarify + choice under conditions of great uncertainty.” 5 + + [...] + + As this definition made clear, there were two meanings of the term system in + systems analysis: first, there was the idea that the world is made up of systems, + with internal objectives, that need to be analyzed separately from each other in + order to maximize their efficiency. Along this first meaning, the analysis would + focus on a particular figurative or metaphorical system—such as a weapons + system, a social system, or, in the case of early counterinsurgency, a colonial + system. Second, there was the notion of systematicity that involved a particular + type of method—one that began by collecting a set of promising alternatives, + constructing a model, and using a defined criterion. + + [...] + + This method of systems analysis became influential in government and + eventually began to dominate governmental logics starting in 1961 when Robert + McNamara acceded to the Pentagon under President John F. Kennedy. + + [...] + + According to its proponents, systems analysis + would allow policy makers to put aside partisan politics, personal preferences, + and subjective values. It would pave the way to objectivity and truth. As RAND + expert and future secretary of defense James R. Schlesinger explained: + “[Systems analysis] eliminates the purely subjective approach on the part of + devotees of a program and forces them to change their lines of argument. They + must talk about reality rather than morality.” 13 With systems analysis, + Schlesinger argued, there was no longer any need for politics or value + judgments. The right answer would emerge from the machine-model that + independently evaluated cost and effectiveness. All that was needed was a + narrow and precise objective and good criteria. The model would then spit out + the most effective strategy. + + [...] + + Counterinsurgency theory blossomed at precisely the moment that systems + analysis was, with RAND’s backing, gaining influence in the Pentagon and at + the White House. The historian Peter Paret pinpoints this moment, in fact, to the + very first year of the Kennedy administration: “In 1961, the Cuban revolution + combined with the deteriorating Western position in Southeast Asia + + [...] + + It convened, as mentioned earlier, the seminal + counterinsurgency symposium in April 1962, where RAND analysts discovered + David Galula and commissioned him to write his memoirs. RAND would + publish his memoirs as a confidential classified report in 1963 under the title + + [...] + + Counterinsurgency theory blossomed at precisely the moment that systems + analysis was, with RAND’s backing, gaining influence in the Pentagon and at + the White House. The historian Peter Paret pinpoints this moment, in fact, to the + very first year of the Kennedy administration: “In 1961, the Cuban revolution + combined with the deteriorating Western position in Southeast Asia to shift + + [...] + + One recent episode regarding interrogation + methods is telling. It involved the evaluation of different tactics to obtain + information from informants, ranging from truth serums to sensory overload to + torture. These alternatives were apparently compared and evaluated using a SA + approach at a workshop convened by RAND, the CIA, and the American + Psychological Association (APA). Again, the details are difficult to ascertain + fully, but the approach seemed highly systems-analytic. + + [...] a series of workshops on “The Science of Deception” + + [...] + + More specifically, according to this source, the workshops probed and + compared different strategies to elicit information. The systems-analytic + approach is reflected by the set of questions that the participants addressed: How + important are differential power and status between witness and officer? What + pharmacological agents are known to affect apparent truth-telling behavior? + What are sensory overloads on the maintenance of deceptive behaviors? How + might we overload the system or overwhelm the senses and see how it affects + deceptive behaviors? These questions were approached from a range of + disciplines. The workshops were attended by “research psychologists, + psychiatrists, neurologists who study various aspects of deception and + representatives from the CIA, FBI and Department of Defense with interests in + intelligence operations. In addition, representatives from the White House Office + of Science and Technology Policy and the Science and Technology Directorate + of the Department of Homeland Security were present.” 31 + + [...] + + And in effect, from a counterinsurgency perspective, these various tactics— + truth serums, sensory overloads, torture—are simply promising alternatives that + need to be studied, modeled, and compared to determine which ones are superior + at achieving the objective of the security system. Nothing is off limits. + Everything is fungible. The only question is systematic effectiveness. This is the + systems-analytic approach: not piecemeal, but systematic. + Incidentally, a few years later, Gerwehr apparently went to Guantánamo, but + refused to participate in any interrogation because the CIA was not using video + cameras to record the interrogations. Following that, in the fall of 2006 and in + 2007, Gerwehr made several calls to human-rights advocacy groups and + reporters to discuss what he knew. A few months later, in 2008, Gerwehr died of + a motorcycle accident on Sunset Boulevard. 32 He was forty years old. + + [...] + + Sometimes, depending on the practitioner, the analysis favored torture or summary + execution; at other times, it leaned toward more “decent” tactics. But these + variations must now be understood as internal to the system. Under President + Bush’s administration, the emphasis was on torture, indefinite detention, and + illicit eavesdropping; under President Obama’s, it was on drone strikes and total + surveillance; in the first months of the Trump presidency, on special operations, + drones, the Muslim ban, and building the wall. What unites these different + strategies is counterinsurgency’s coherence as a system—a system in which + brutal violence is heart and center. That violence is not aberrational or rogue. It + is to be expected. It is internal to the system. Even torture and assassination are + merely variations of the counterinsurgency logic. + + Counterinsurgency abroad and at home has been legalized and systematized. It + has become our governing paradigm “in any situation,” and today “simply + expresses the basic tenet of the exercise of political power.” It has no sunset + provision. It is ruthless, game theoretic, systematic—and legal. And with all of + the possible tactics at the government’s disposal—from total surveillance to + indefinite detention and solitary confinement, to drones and robot-bombs, even + to states of exception and emergency powers—this new mode of governing has + never been more dangerous. + + In sum, The Counterrevolution is our new form of tyranny. diff --git a/books/sociology/jogos-homens.md b/books/sociology/jogos-homens.md index 105b13c..dee1c44 100644 --- a/books/sociology/jogos-homens.md +++ b/books/sociology/jogos-homens.md @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ Original: ## Índice +* Jogo, noção de totalidade fechada, preciosa inovação num mundo incerto, 10; noção complexa, 11. + * Regras versus sem regras (jogos de imitação por exemplo), 28. * Regras das regras: jogos como atividades: 1. livres; 2; delimitadas; 3. @@ -125,7 +127,7 @@ Original: ## Azar e a matemática Os jogos de competição conduzem ao desporto, os jogos de imitação e de ilusão - prefiguram as religiões do espectáculo. Os jogos de azar e de cominação + prefiguram as religiões do espectáculo. Os jogos de azar e de combinação estiveram na origem de vários desenvolvimentos das matemáticas, do cálculo de probabilidades à topologia. @@ -195,7 +197,7 @@ Foi lendo mais ou menos o seguinte trecho que me veio a ideia de que pode haver alguma articulação -- que aliás é um dos sentidos da palavra jogo, "o mecanismo ter jogo" -- entre os conceitos de máquina, sistema e jogo: - Qualquer instituição funciona, em parte, como um jogo, de al forma que se + Qualquer instituição funciona, em parte, como um jogo, de tal forma que se apresenta também como um jogo que foi necessário instaurar, baseado em novos princípios e que ocupou o lugar reservado a um jogo antigo. Esse jogo singular responde a outras necessidades, favorece certas normas e legislações, exige diff --git a/books/sociology/ruptura.md b/books/sociology/ruptura.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c1c5ac --- /dev/null +++ b/books/sociology/ruptura.md @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +[[!meta title="Ruptura"]] + +## Trechos + + Os únicos que se sustentam são aqueles que não fingem mais governar nada, mas + que usam o poder simplesmente para fornecer a parcelas da população o gosto + drogado da autorização da violência contra os vulneráveis. + + -- 11 + + Só governos fracos são violentos. Eles têm de vigiar todos os poros, pois + sabem que seu fim pode vir de qualquer lugar. Governos fortes são magnânimos, + porque vislumbram tranquila- mente sua perpetuação. O que se contrapõe a nós é + fraco e desesperado. Ele cairá. É hora de fazê-lo cair. + + -- 13 + + Generais e almirantes tomam o poder. Eles exterminam seus predecessores de + esquerda, exilam os opositores, aprisionam os intelectuais dissidentes, sufocam + os sindicatos, controlam a imprensa e paralisam toda atividade política. Mas, + nesta variante do fascismo de mercado, os che- fes militares tomam distância + das decisões eco- nômicas. Eles não planificam a economia nem aceitam suborno. + Eles confiam toda a economia a fanáticos religiosos – fanáticos cuja religião é + o laissez-faire do mercado (...) Então o relógio da história anda para trás. O + mercado é liberado e a massa monetária estritamente controlada. Os créditos de + ajuda social são cortados, os trabalha- dores devem aceitar qualquer coisa ou + morrer de fome (...) A inflação baixa reduz-se a quase nada (...) A liberdade + política estando fora de circula- ção, as desigualdades de rendimentos, consumo + e riqueza tendem a crescer. + + É evidente que as elucubrações de Samuelson a respeito do “fascismo de mercado” + se inspiravam no Chile da ditadura de Augusto Pinochet (1973- 1990). Esse + regime sucedeu um governo que ten- tava construir o socialismo pela via + eleitoral e foi derrubado por uma articulação envolvendo a social- -democracia + cristã, grupos terroristas neofascistas, entidades patronais e Washington, num + processo que culminou no bombardeio do Palácio de La Moneda em 11 de setembro + de 1973. A partir daí, Pinochet aniquilou a oposição com uma brutali- dade + poucas vezes vista. O Estado chileno torturou cerca de 30 mil opositores, em + centros espalhados por todo o território nacional, e assassinou milhares + de pessoas. Apenas assim foi possível impor à população as políticas dos + fanáticos do laissez-faire. Iniciava-se o experimento neoliberal imposto pelos + Chicago boys. Após o golpe, esse grupo de econo- mistas, ligados ao teórico e + guru Milton Friedman, ocuparia todos os espaços do Estado ditatorial, dos + ministérios à presidência do Banco Central. + + No mesmo momento em que o neoliberalismo aparecia como modelo de gestão social + nas democracias liberais do Reino Unido de Margaret Thatcher e dos EUA de + Ronald Reagan, a ditadura chilena explicitava a linha de fuga para a qual o + capitalismo mundial se encaminhava. Essa junção de brutalidade política e + neoliberalismo econômico, aplicada inicialmente no Chile, agora se mostra como + a tendência generalizada do capitalismo atual e tem no Brasil seu mais recente + laboratório. Tal processo ocorre precisamente no momento em que a farsa da + livre concorrência foi definitivamente rasgada pelo retorno a práticas de + acumulação primitiva, fazendo com que até mesmo a democracia + liberal-parlamentar tenda a ser descartada – especialmente aqui, na periferia + do capitalismo. + + [...] + + Por isso, segundo Hayek, o único regime totalitário que a América do Sul + conheceu até os anos 1980 não teria sido o Brasil dos militares, a Argentina de + Videla ou o Chile de Pinochet, mas o governo da Unidade Popular de Allende. A + tese implícita era de que um modo de vida e de produção não baseado na + propriedade privada dos meios de produção seria a definição mesma de + totalitarismo. Mas esse conceito liberal de liberdade só poderia se impor à + base de choques. Afinal, as sociedades não aceitam sem resistência limitar seus + desejos e sua inquietude à liberdade de empreender (reservada para alguns). A + experiência histórica das lutas por liberdade revela justamente a insistência + em livrar a atividade da submissão à forma do trabalho, da ânsia pela igualdade + radical e pelo fim da naturalização da exploração, da vontade de liberação do + mundo das coisas dos contratos de propriedade. Sendo assim, apenas uma fina + engenharia social, que envolveria todas as instâncias do governo e do capital e + que mobilizaria tanto o soldado de baixa patente como o burocrata do primeiro + escalão, seria capaz de neutralizar esses desejos, criando uma homofonia + social. Embora paradoxal, a liberdade de empreender exige “mais” e não “menos” + Estado, que se impõe na forma de repressão sanguinária e vigilância constante. + + [...] + + A aproximação entre Hayek e o principal jurista do Terceiro Reich, Carl + Schmitt, não deixa dúvida sobre sua concepção de democracia. + + [...] + + O autoritarismo, portanto, não é um acidente do capitalismo e não é a antítese + da democracia burguesa. Ele é parte constitutiva desse modo de gestão de + populações. Afinal, foi no esteio da belle époque das grandes potências + ocidentais que se consumou o holocausto dos povos coloniais, primeiro + laboratório do caos. + + -- 17-25 diff --git a/books/sociology/secrecy.md b/books/sociology/secrecy.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d10430 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/sociology/secrecy.md @@ -0,0 +1,768 @@ +[[!meta title="The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies"]] + +By Georg Simmel: + +* [Original article](http://doi.org/10.1086/211418). +* [Full text](https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Simmel/Simmel_1906.html). +* [Comments and references](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sociological_aspects_of_secrecy). + +## Excerpts + + [...] + + All relationships of people to each other rest, as a matter of + course, upon the precondition that they know something about + each other. The merchant knows that his correspondent wants + + [...] + + rough and ready way, to the degree necessary in order that the + needed kinds of intercourse may proceed. That we shall know + with whom we have to do, is the first precondition of having + anything to do with another. The customary reciprocal ptresenta- + + [...] + + reciprocally recognized. Their necessity is usually observed only + when they happen to be wanted. It would be a profitable + scientific labor to investigate the sort and degree of reciprocal + apprehension which is needed for the various relationships + between human beings. It would be worth while to know + how the general psychological presumptions with which each + approaches each are interwoven with the special experiences + with reference to the individual who is in juxtaposition with us; + how in many ranges of association the reciprocal apprehension + does or does not need to be equal, or may or may not be permitted + to be equal; how conventional relationships are determined in + their development only through that reciprocal or unilateral + knowledge developing with reference to the other party. The + investigation should finally proceed in the opposite direction; + + [...] + + given by the total relationship of the knower to the known. + Since one never can absolutely know another, as this would mean + knowledge of every particular thought and feeling; since we + must rather form a conception of a personal unity out of the + fragments of another person in which alone he is accessible to + us, the unity so formed necessarily depends upon that portion of + the other which our standpoint toward him permits us to see. + + [...] + + on the other hand the actual reciprocity of the individuals is based + tupon the picture which they derive of each other. Here we have + one of the deep circuits of the intellectual life, inasmuch as one + element presupposes a second, but the second presupposes the + first. While this is a fallacy within narrow ranges, and thus + + [...] + + or by dissimulation he may deceive us as to the truth. No other + object of knowledge can thus of its own initiative, either + enlighten us with reference to itself or conceal itself, as a human + being can. No other knowable object modifies its conduct from + consideration of its being understood or misunderstood. 'Tlhis + + [...] + + in misconception about the true intention of the person who + tells the lie. Veracity and mendacity are thus of the most far- + reaching significance for the relations of persons with each + other. Sociological structures are most characteristically dif- + ferentiated by the measure of mendacity that is operative in + them. To begin with, in very simple relationships a lie is + much more harmless foir the persistence of the group than + in complex associations. Primitive man, living in communities + of restricted extent, providing for his needs by his own produc- + tion or by direct co-operation, limiting his spiritual interests to + personal experience or to simple tradition, surveys and controls + the material of his existence more easily and completely than the + man of higher culture. In the latter case life rests upon a thou- + sand presuppositions which the individual can never trace back + to their origins, and verify; but which he must accept upon faith + and belief. In a much wider degree than people are accustomed + the economic system + to realize, modern civilized life -from + which is constantly becoming more and more a credit-economy, + + [...] + + to the pursuit of science, in which the majority of investigators + must use countless results obtained by others, and not directly + subject to verification- depends upon faith in the honor of + others. We rest our most serious decisions upon a complicated + system of conceptions, the majority of which presuppose con- + fidence that we have nlot been deceived. Hence prevarication in + modern circumstances becomes something much more devasta- + ting, something placing the foundations of life much more in + jeopardy, than was earlier the case. If lying appeared today + among us as a sin as permissible as among the Greek divinities, + the Hebrew patriarchs, or the South Sea Islanders; if the + extremne severity of the moral law did not veto it, the progressive + upbuilding of modern life would be simply impossible, since + modern life is, in a much wider than the economic sense, a + "credit-economy." This relationship of the times recurs in the + case of differences of other dimensions. The farther third per- + sons are located from the center of our personality, the easier can + we adjust ourselves practically, but also subjectively, to their lack + of integrity. On the other hand, if the few persons in our imme- + dia<te environment lie to us, life becomes intolerable. This + + + [...] + + in the majority as compared with the liar who gets his advantage + from the lie. Consequently that enlightenment which aims at + elimination of the element of deception from social life is always + of a democratic character. + Human intercourse rests normally upon the condition that + + [...] + + development may gain vitality by alternate concession and resist- + ance. Relationships of an intimate character, the formal vehicle + of which is psycho-physical proximity, lose the charm, and even + the content, of their intimacy, unless the proximity includes, at + the same time and alternately, distance and intermission. Finally + -and + this is the matter with which we are now concerned -the + reciprocal knowledge, which is the positive condition of social + relationships, is not the sole condition. On the contrary, such as + those relationships are, they actually presuppose also a certain + + [...] + + By virtue of the situation just noticed, that antecedent or + consequent form of knowledge with reference to an individual- + viz., confidence in him, evidently one of the most important syn- + thetic forces within society -gains + a peculiar evolution. Confi- + dence, as the hypothesis of future conduct, which is sure enough + to become the basis of practical action, is, as hypothesis, a mediate + condition between knowing and not knowing another person. + The possession of full knowledge does away with the need o,f + trusting, while complete absence of knowledge makes trust evi- + dentlv impossible.' Whatever quantities of knowing and not + knowing must comnimingle, in order to make possible the detailed + practical decision based upon confidence, will be determined by + the historic epoch, the ranges of interests, and the individuals. + + [...] + + what is not forbidden is permitted, and, what is not permitted is + forbidden. Accordingly, the relationships of men are differen- + tiated by the question of knowledge with reference to each other: + what is not concealed may be known, and what is not revealed + may yet not be known. The last determination corresponds to the + otherwise effective consciousness that an ideal sphere surrounds + every human being, different in various directionsi and toward + different persons; a sphere varying in extent, into which one may + not venture to penetrate without disturbing the personal value of + the individual. Honor locates such an area. Language indi- + cates very nicely an invasion of this sort by such phrases as + "coming too near" (zu nahe treten). The radius of that sphere, + so to speak, marks the distance which a stranger may not cross + without infringing up,on another's honor. Another sphere of + like form corresponds to that which we designate as the "signifi- + cance" (Bedeutung) of another personality. Towards the + "significant" man there exists an inner compulsion to keep one's + + [...] + + signifies violation of the ego, at its center. Discretion is nothing + other than the sense of justice with respect to the sphere of the + intimate contents of life. Of co-urse, this sense is various in its + + + [...] + + voluntarily reveal to us-must + necessity. But in finer and less simple form, in fragmentary + passages of association and in unuttered revelations, all commerce + of men with each other rests upon the condition that each knows + something more of the other than the latter voluntarily reveals + to him; and in many respects this is of a sort the knowledge of + which, if possible, would have been prevented by the party so + revealed. While this, judged as an individual affair, may count + as indiscretion, although in the social sense it is necessary as a + + [...] + + voluntarily reveal to us-must + necessity. But in finer and less simple form, in fragmentary + passages of association and in unuttered revelations, all commerce + of men with each other rests upon the condition that each knows + something more of the other than the latter voluntarily reveals + to him; and in many respects this is of a sort the knowledge of + which, if possible, would have been prevented by the party so + revealed. While this, judged as an individual affair, may count + as indiscretion, although in the social sense it is necessary as a + condition for the existing closeness and vitality of the inter- + change, yet the legal boundary of this invasion upon the spiritual + private property of another is extremely difficult to draw. In + general, men credit themselves with the right to know everything + which, without application of external illegal means, through + purely psychological observation and reflection, it is possible to + ascertain. In point of fact, however, indiscretion exercised in + this way may be quite as violent, and morally quite as unjusti- + fiable, as listening at keyholes and prying into the letters of + + [...] + + strangers. To anyone with fine psychological perceptions, men + betray themselves and their inmost thoughts and characteristics + in countless fashions, not only in spite of efforts not to' do so, but + often for the very reason that they anxiously attempt to guard + themselves. The greedy spying upon every unguarded word; + the boring persistence of inquiry as to the meaning of every slight + action, or tone of voice; what may be inferred from. such and + such expressions; what the blush at the mention of a given name + may betray-all this does, not overstep the boundary o'f external + discretion; it is entirely the labor of one's own mind, and there- + fore apparently within the unquestionable rights of the agent. + This is all the more the case, since such misuse of psychological + superiority oiften occurs as a purely involuntary procedure. Very + often it is impossible for us to, restrain our interpretation of + another, our theory of his subjective characteristics and inten- + tions. However positively an honorable person may forbid him- + + [...] + + so unavoidable, the division line between the permitted and the + non-permitted is the more indefinite. To what extent discretion + must restrain itself from mental handling " of all that which is its + own," to what extent the interests of intercourse, the reciprocal + interdependence of the members of the same group, limits this + duty of discretion - this is a question for the answer to, which + neither moral tact, nor survey of the o'bj ective relationships and + their demands, can alone be sufficient, since both factors must + rather always work together. The nicety and complexity of this + question throw it back in a much higher degree upon the respon- + sibility of the individual for decision, without final recourse to + any authoritative general norm, than is the case in connection + with a question of private property in the material sense. + In contrast with this preliminary form, or this attachment of + + [...] + + quently friendship, in which this intensity, but also this + inequality of devotion, is lacking, may more easily attach the + whole person to the whole person, may more easily break up + the reserves of the soul, not indeed by so impulsive a process, + but throoughout a wider area and during a longer succession. + This complete intimacy of confidence probably becomes, with + the changing differentiation of men, more and more difficult. + Perhaps the modern man has too much to conceal to make a + friendship in the ancient sense possible; perhaps personalities + also, except in very early years, are too peculiarly individualized + for the complete reciprocality of understanding, to which + always so much divination and productive phantasy are essen- + tial. It appears that, for this reason, the mo,dern type of + feeling inclines more to differentiated friendships; that is, to + those which have their territory only upon one side of the person- + ality at a time, and in which the rest of the personality plays no + part. Thus a quite special type of friendship emerges. For our + problem, namely, the degree of intrusion or of reserve within the + friendly relationship, this type is of the highest significance. + + [...] + + must come sooner or later. + In marriage, as in free relationships of analogous types, the + temptation is very natural to open oneself to the other at the + outset without limit; to abandon the last reserve of the soul + equally with those of the body, and thus to. lose oneself completely + in another. This, however, usually threatens the future of the + relationship. Only those people can without danger give them- + selves entirely to each other who canntot possibly give themselves + entirely, because the wealth of their soul rests in constant pro- + gressive development, which follows every devotion immediately + with the growth of new treasures. Complete devotion is safe + only in the case of those people who, have an inexhaustible fund + of latent spiritual riches, and therefore can no more alienate them + in a single confidence than a tree can give up the fruits of next + year by letting go what it produces at the present moment. The + case is quite different, however, with those people who, so to + speak, draw from their capital all their betrayals of feeling and + + [...] + + intensity so soon as it is confronted by a purpose of discovery. + Thereupon follows that purposeful concealment, that aggressive + defense, so to speak, against the other party, which we call + secrecy in the most real sense. Secrecy in this sense- i. e., whichi + is effective through negative or positive means of concealment + is one of the greatest accomplishments of humanity. In contrast + with the juvenile condition in which every mental picture is at + + [...] + + by the fact that what was formerly putblic passes under the pro- + tection of secrecy, and that, on the contrary, what was formerly + secret ceases to require such protection and proclaims itself. This + is analogous with that other evolution o,f mind in which move- + ments at first executed consciously become unconsciously me- + chanical, and, on the other hand, what was unconscious and + instinctive rises into the light of consciousness. + How this + development is distributed over the various formations of private + + [...] + + essential and significant. The natural impulse to idealization, and + the natural timidity of men, operate to one and the samne end in + the presence of secrecy; viz., to heighten it by phantasy, and to + distinguish it by a degree of attention that published reality could + not command. + Singularly enough, these attractions of secrecy enter into + + [...] + + not command. + Singularly enough, these attractions of secrecy enter into + combination with those of its logical opposite; viz., treason or + betrayal of secrets, which are evidently no less sociological in + their nature. Secrecy involves a tension which, at the moment of + revelation, finds its release. This constitutes the climax in the + development of the secret; in it the whole charm of secrecy con- + centrates and rises to its highest pitch - just as the moment of the + disappearance of an object brings out the feeling of its value in + the most intense degree. The sense of power connected with + possession of money is most comnpletely and greedily concentrated + for the soul of the spendthrift at the moment at which this power + slips from his hands. Secrecy also is sustained by the conscious- + + [...] + + 466 + THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY + ness that it might be exploited, and therefore confers power to + modify fo,rtunes, to produce surprises, joys, and calamities, even + if the latter be only misfortunes to ourselves. Hence the possi- + bility and the temptation of treachery plays around the secret, and + the external danger off being discovered is interwoven with the + internal danger of self-discovery, which has the fascination of the + brink o,f a precipice. Secrecy sets barriers between men, but at + the same time offers the seductive temptation to break through the + barriers by gossip or confession. This temptation accompanies + the psychical life of the secret like an overtone. Hence the socio- + logical significance of the secret, its practical measure, and the + mode o,f its workings must be found in the capacity or the inclina- + tion of the initiated to, keep the secret to' himself, or in his resist- + ance or weakness relative to the temptation to, betrayal. From the + play of these two interests, in concealment and in revelation, + spring shadings and fortunes of human reciprocities throughout + their whole range. If, according to our previous analysis, every + human relationship has, as one of its traits, the degree of secrecy + within or around it, it follows that the further development of the + relationship in this respect depends on the combining proportions + of the retentive and the communicative energies -the + former + sustained by the practical interest and the formal attractiveness + of secrecy as such, the latter by inability to, endture longer the + tension of reticence, and by the superiority which is latent, so to + speak, in secrecy, but which is actualized for the feelings only at + the moment o'f revelation, and o'ften also, on the other hand, by + the joy of confession, which may contain that s,ense o,f power in + negative and perverted form, as self-abasement and contrition. + All these factors, which determine the sociological role of + + + [...] + + too great temptation to disclose what might otherwise be hidden. + But in this case there is no need of secrecy in a high degree, + because this social formation usually tends to level its members, + and every peculiarity of being, acting, or possessing the persist- + ence of which requires secrecy is abhorrent to it. That all this + changes to its opposite in case of large widening of the circle is + a matter-of-course. In this connection, as in so many other par- + ticulars, the facts of monetary relationships reveal most distinctly + the specific traits of the large circle. Since transfers of economic + values have occurred principally by means of money, an otherwise + unattainable secrecy is possible in such transactions. Three pecu- + liarities of the money form of values are here important: first, + its compressibility, by virtue of which it is possible to, make a man + rich by slipping into his hand a check without attracting attention; + second, its abstractness and absence of qualitative character, in + consequence of which numberless sorts of acquisitions and trans- + fers of possessions may be covered up and guarded from publicity + in a fashion impossible so long as values could be possessed only + as extended, tangible objects; third, its long-distance effective- + ness, by virtue of which we may invest it in the most widely + removed and constantly changing values, and thus withdraw it + utterly from the view of our nearest neighbors. These facilities + of dissimulation which inhere in the degree of extension in the + use of money, and which disclose their dangers particularly in + dealings with foreign money, have called forth, as protective pro- + visions, publicity of the financial operations of corporations. + This points to a closer definition of the formula of evolution dis- + cussed above; viz., that throughout the form of secrecy there + occurs a permanent in- and out-flow of content, in which what is + originally open becomes secret, and what was originally concealed + throws off its mystery. Thus we might arrive at the paradoxical + idea that, under otherwise like circumstances, human associations + require a definite ratio of secrecy which merely changes its + + + [...] + + this exchange it keeps its quantum unvaried. We may even fill + out this general scheme somewhat more exactly. It appears that + with increasing telic characteristics of culture the affairs of + people at large become more and more public, those of individuals + more and more secret. In less developed conditions, as observed + above, the circumstances of individual persons cannot protect + themselves in the same degree from reciprocal prying and inter- + fering as within modern types of life, particularly those that have + developed in large cities, where we find a quite new degree of + reserve and discretion. On the other hand, the public function- + aries in undeveloped states envelop themselves in a mystical + authority, while in maturer and wider relations, through exten- + sion of the range of their prerogatives, through the objectivity of + their technique, through the distance that separates them from + most of the individuals, a security and a dignity accrue to them + which are compatible with publicity of their behavior. That + earlier secrecy of public functions, however, betrayed its essential + + [...] + + Footnote 2 This counter-movement occurs also in the reverse direction. + It has been + observed, in connection with the history of the English court, that the actual + court cabals, the secret whisperings, the organized intrigues, do not spring up + under despotism, but only after the king has constitutional advisers, when the + government is to that extent a system open to view. After that time- + and this + applies especially since Edward II-the + king begins to form an unofficial, and + at the same time subterranean, circle of advisers, in contrast with the ministers + somehow forced upon him. This body brings into existence, within itself, and + through endeavors to join it, a chain of concealments and conspiracies. + + + [...] + + have thought possible. Accordingly, politics, administration, + justice, have lost their secrecy and inaccessibility in precisely the + degree in which the individual has gained possibility of more com- + plete privacy, since modern- life has elaborated a technique for + isolation of the affairs of individuals, within the crowded condi- + tions of great cities, possible in former times only by means of + spatial separation. + + To what extent this development is to be regarded as advan- + tageous depends upon social standards of value. Democracies are + bound to regard publicity as the condition desirable in itself. + This follows from the fundamental idea that each should be + informed about all the relationships and occurrences with which + he is concerned, since this is a condition of his doing his part with + reference to them, and every community of knowledge contains + also the psychological stimulation to community of action. It is + immaterial whether this conclusion is entirely binding. If an + objective controlling structure has been built up, beyond the + individual interests, but nevertheless to their advantage, such + a structure may very well, by virtue of its formal inde- + pendence, have a rightful claim to carry on a certain amount + of secret functioning without prejudice to its public char- + acter, so far as real consideration of the interests of all is con- + cerned. A logical connection, therefore, which would necessitate + the judgment of superior worth in favor of the condition of pub- + licity, does not exist. On the other hand, the universal scheme of + cultural differentiation puts in an appearance here: that which + pertains to the public becomes more public, that which belongs to + the individual becomes more private. Moreover, this historical + development brings o-ut the deeper real significance: that which + in its nature is public, wvhich in its content concerns all, becomes + also externally, in its sociological form, more and more public; + while that which in its inmost nature refers to the self alone- + also, gain + that is, the centripetal affairs of the individual -must + in so-ciological position a more and more private character, a + more decisive possibility of remaining secret. + While secrecy, therefore, is a sociological ordination which + + [...] + + As a general proposition, the secret society + emerges everywhere as correlate of despotism and of police con- + trol. It acts as protection alike of defense and of offense against + the violent pressure of central powers. This is true, not alone in + political relations, but in the same way within the church, the + school, and the family. + + [...] + + Thus the secret society + cotinterbalances the separatistic factor which is peculiar to, every + secret by the very fact that it is society. + + [...] + + lating will; for growth from within, constructive purposefulness. + This rationalistic factor in their upbuilding cannot express itself + more distinctly than in their carefully considered and clear-cut + architecture. I cite as example the structure of the Czechic secret + order, Omlaidina, which was organized on the model of a group + of the Carbonari, and became known in consequence of a judicial + process in I893. The leaders of the Omladina are divided into + "thumbs" and "fingers." In secret session a "thumb" is chosen + by the members. He selects four "fingers." The latter then + choose another " thumb," and this second " thumb " presents himn- + self to the first "thumb." The second "thumb" proceeds to + choose four more "fingers"; these, another "thumb;" and so + the articulation continues. The first " thumb " knows all the + other " thumbs," but the remaining " thumbs " do not know each + other. Of the "fingers" only those four know each other who + are subordinate to one and the same "thumb." All transactions + + [...] + + of the Omladina are conducted by the first "thumb," the " dicta- + tor." He informs the other "thumbs" of all proposed under- + takings. The "thumbs" then issue orders to their respective + subordinates, the "fingers." The latter in turn instruct the mem- + bers of the Omnladina assigned to each. The circumstance that + the secret society must be built up, from its base by calculation and + conscious volition evidently affords free play for the peculiar + passion which is the natural accompaniment of such arbitrary + processes of construction, such foreordaining programs. All + schematology - of science, of conduct, of society - contains a + reserved power of compulsion. It subjects a material which is + outside of thought to a form which thought has cast. If this is + true of all attempts to organize groups according to a priori prin- + ciples, it is true in the highest degree of the secret society, which + does not grow, which is built by design, which has to reckon with + a smaller quantum of ready-made building material than any + despotic or socialistic scheme. Joined to the interest in making + + [...] + + The secret society must seek to create among the cate- + gories peculiar to itself, a species of life-totality. Around the + nucleus of purposes which the society strongly emphasizes, it + therefore builds a structure of formulas, like a body around a + soul, and places both alike under the protection of secrecy, because + only so can a harmonious whole come into, being, in which one + part supports the other. That in this scheme secrecy of the + external is strongly accentuated, is necessary, because secrecy is + not so much a matter of course with reference to these super- + ficialities, and not so directly demanded as in the case of the real + interests of the society. This is not greatly different from the + situation in military organizations and religious communities. + The reason why, in both, schematism, the body of forms, the fixa- + tion of behavior, occupies so large space, is that, 'as a general pro- + position, both the military and the religious career demand the + wvhole man; that is, each of them projects the whole life upon a + special plane; each composes a variety of energies and interests, + from a particular point of view, into a correlated unity. The + secret society usually tries to do the same. + + + [...] + + The secret society must seek to create among the cate- + gories peculiar to itself, a species of life-totality. Around the + nucleus of purposes which the society strongly emphasizes, it + therefore builds a structure of formulas, like a body around a + soul, and places both alike under the protection of secrecy, because + only so can a harmonious whole come into, being, in which one + part supports the other. That in this scheme secrecy of the + external is strongly accentuated, is necessary, because secrecy is + not so much a matter of course with reference to these super- + ficialities, and not so directly demanded as in the case of the real + interests of the society. This is not greatly different from the + situation in military organizations and religious communities. + The reason why, in both, schematism, the body of forms, the fixa- + tion of behavior, occupies so large space, is that, 'as a general pro- + position, both the military and the religious career demand the + wvhole man; that is, each of them projects the whole life upon a + special plane; each composes a variety of energies and interests, + from a particular point of view, into a correlated unity. The + secret society usually tries to do the same. One of its essential + characteristics is that, even when it takes hold of individuals only + + [...] + +Counterpart of the official world, detachment from larger structures in +which it's contained (the next level of recursion): + + Moreover, through such formalism, + just as through the hierarchical structure above discussed, the + secret society constitutes itself a sort of counterpart of the official + world with which it places itself in antithesis. Here we have a + case of the universally emerging sociological norm; viz., struc- + tures, which place themselves in opposition to and detachment + from larger structures in which they are actually contained, + nevertheless repeat in themselves the forms of the greater struc- + tures. Only a structure that in some way can count as a whole + is in a situation to hold its elements firmly together. It borrows + the sort of organic completeness, by virtue of which its members + are actually the channels of a unifying life-stream, from that + greater whole to which its individual members were already + adapted, and to which it can most easily offer a parallel by means + of this very imitation. + + -- 482 + +Freedom and law from the inside: + + In exercise of this freedom a territory is occupied to which the norms of the + surrounding society do not apply. The nature of the secret + society as such is autonomy. It is, however, of a sort which + approaches anarchy. Withdrawal from the bonds of unity which + procure general coh,erence very easily has as consequences for the + secret society a condition of being without roots, an absence of + firm touch with life (Lebensgefiihl), and of restraining reserva- + tions. The fixedness and detail of the ritual serve in part to + counterbalance this deficit. Here also is manifest how much men + need a settled proportion between freedom and law; and, further- + more, in case the relative quantities of the two are not prescribed + for him from a single source, how he attempts to reinforce the + given quantum of the one by a quantum of the other derived from + any source whatsoever, until such settled proportion is reached. + + -- 482 + +Existem a partir de sociedes públicas e de forma exclusiva:: + + The secret society, on the other hand, is a secondary structure; + i. e., it arises always only within an already complete society. + + [...] + + That they can build them selves up with such characteristics is possible, however, only + under the presupposition of an already existing society. The + secret society sets itself as a special society in antithesis with the + wider association included within the greater society. This anti- + thesis, whatever its purpose, is at all events intended in the spirit + of exclusion. Even the secret society which proposes only to + render the whole community a definite service in a completely + unselfish spirit, and to dissolve itself after performing the service, + obviously regards its temporary detachment from that totality as + the unavoidable technique for its purpose. Accordingly, none of + the narrower groups which are circumscribed by larger groiups + are compelled by their sociological constellation to insist so + strongly as the secret society upon their formal self-sufficiency. + Their secret encircles them like a boundary, beyond which there is + nothing but the materially, o,r at least formally, antithetic, which + therefore shuts up the society within itself as a complete unity. + In the groupings of every other sort, the content of the group- + +Aristocracy: + + This significance of secret associations, as intensification of + sociological exclusiveness in general, appears in a very striking + way in political aristocracies. Among the requisites of aristo- + cratic control secrecy has always had a place. It makes use of + the psychological fact that the unknown as such appears terrible, + powerful, and threatening. In the first place, it employs this fact + in seeking to conceal the numerical insignificance of the govern- + ing class. In Sparta the number of warriors was kept so, far as + + [...] + + On the other hand, the democratic principle is + bound up with the principle of publicity, and, to the same end, the + tendency toward general and fundamental laws. The latter relate + to an unlimited number of subjects, and are thus in their nature + public. Conversely, the employment of secrecy within the aristo- + cratic regime is only the extreme exaggeration of that social + exclusion and exemption for the sake of which aristocracies are + wont to oppose general, fundamentally sanctioned laws. + In case the notion of the aristocratic passes over from the + +Freedom, obedience and centralization: + + To this result not merely the correlation of demand + from freedom and for union contributes, as we have observed it + in case of the severity of the ritual, and in the present instance it + binds together the extremes of the two tendencies. The excess of + freedom, which such societies possessed with reference to all + otherwise valid norms, had to be offset, for the sake of the + equilibrium of interests, by a similar excess olf submissiveness + and resigning of the individual will. More essential, however. + was probably the necessity of centralization, which is the con- + dition of existence for the secret society, and especially when, + like the criminal band, it lives off the surrounding society, + when it mingles with this society in many radiations and + actions, and when it is seriously threatened with treachery + and diversion of interests the moment the most invariable + attachment to one center ceases to prevail. It is conseqeuntly + typical that the secret society is exposed to peculiar dangers, + especially when, for any reasons whatever, it does not develop + a powerfully unifying authority. The Waldenses were in + nature not a secret society. They became a secret society in + the thirteenth century only, in consequence of the external pres- + sure, which made it necessary to keep themselves from view. It + became impossible, for that reason, to hold regular assemblages, + and this in turn caused loss of unity in doctrine. There arose a + number of branches, with isolated life and development, fre- + quently in a hostile attitude toward each other. They went into + decline because they lacked the necessary and reinforcing attri- + bute of the secret society, viz., constantly efficient centralization. + +Responsibility: + + Nevertheless, responsibility + is quite as immediately joined with the ego - philosophically, too, + the whole responsibility problem is merely a detail of the problem + of the ego - in the fact that removing the marks of identity of + the person has, for the naive understanding in question, the effect + of abolishing responsibility. Political finesse makes no less use of + this correlation. In the American House of Representatives the + real conclusions are reached in the standing,committees, and they + are almost always ratified by the House. The transactions of + these committies, however, are secret, and the most important + portion of legislative activity is thus concealed from public view. + This being the case, the political responsibility of the repre- + sentatives seems to be largely wiped out, since no one can be + made responsible for proceedings that cannot be observed. Since + the shares of the individual persons in the transactions remain + hidden, the acts of committees and of the House seem to be those + of a super-individual authority. The irresponsibility is here also + the consequence or the symbol of the same intensified sociological + de-individualization which goes with the secrecy of group-action. + In all directorates, faculties, committees, boards of trustees, etc., + whose transactions are secret, the same thing holds. The indi- + vidual disappears as a person in the anonymous member of the + ring, so to speak, and with him the responsibility, which has no + hold upon him. in his intangible special character. + Finally, this one-sided intensification of universal sociological + + -- 496-497 + + [...] + +Danger for the rest of society and the existing oficial and central power: + + Wherever there is an attempt to realize + strong centralization, especially of a political type, special organi- + zations of the elements are abhorred, purely as such, entirely apart + from their content and purposes. As mere unities, so to speak, + they engage in competition with the central principle. + + [...] + + Accordingly, the secret society seems to be dangerous simply + because it is secret. Since it cannot be surely known that any + special organization whatever may not some day turn its legally + accumulated powers to some undesired end, and since on that + account there is suspicion in principle on the part of central + powers toward organizations of subjects, it follows that, in the + case of organizations which are secret in principle, the suspicion + that their secrecy conceals dangers is all the more natural. + + [...] + + Thus the secret society, purely on the ground of its secrecy, appears + dangerously related to conspiracy against existing powers. + + [...] + + The secret association is in such bad repute as enemy of central powers that, + conversely, every politically disapproved association must be + accused of such hostility! + + -- 497-498 diff --git a/books/technology/cybersyn.md b/books/technology/cybersyn.md index 4d39522..a0093b5 100644 --- a/books/technology/cybersyn.md +++ b/books/technology/cybersyn.md @@ -899,3 +899,174 @@ the world such as the Middle East. -- 232-233 + +## Misc + + The strike also had the effect of radicalizing factions of the left, + some of which began preparing for armed conflict. Political scientist + Arturo Valenzuela notes: “ironically, it was the counter-mobilization + of the petite bourgeoisie responding to real, contrived, and imaginary + threats which finally engendered, in dialectical fashion, a significant + and autonomous mobilization of the working class.”18 Rather than + bringing an end to Chilean socialism, the strike pitted workers against + small-business owners and members of the industrial bourgeoisie and + created the class war that the right openly feared. + + [...] + + The solution he proposed was social and technical, as it configured + machines and human beings in a way that could help the government adapt + and survive. + + [...] + + Accusations come from Britain and the USA. Invitations [to build + comparable systems] come from Brazil and South Africa.” Considering the + repressive governments that were in power in Brazil and South Africa in + the early 1970s, it is easy to sympathize with Beer’s lament: “You can + see what a false position I am in.”46 Beer was understandably + frustrated with these international misinterpretations of his + cybernetic work. + + [...] + + This Government is shit, but it is my Government.’ ”51 + + [...] + + The big problem was “not technology, it was not the computer, it was + [the] people,” he concluded.70 Cybersyn, a sociotechnical system, + depended on more than its hardware and software components. For the + system to function, human beings also needed to be disciplined and + brought into line. In the case of Cybersyn, integrating human beings + into the system, and thus changing their behavior, proved just as + difficult as building the telex network or programming the software—or + perhaps even more difficult. While the Cybersyn team could exert some + degree of control over the computer resources, construction of the + operations room, or installation of a telex machine, they had very + little control over what was taking place within the factories, + including levels of management participation or whether Cybersyn would + be integrated into existing + + [...] + + Beer, however, recognized the real possibility of a military coup. In + his letter to the editor of Science for People, he considered whether + Cybersyn might be altered by an “evil dictator” and used against the + workers. Since Cybersyn team members were educating the Chilean people + about such risks, he argued, the people could later sabotage these + efforts. “Maybe even the dictator himself can be undermined; because + ‘information constitutes control’—and if the people understand that + they may defeat even the dictator’s guns,” Beer mused.79 I have found + no evidence that members of the Cybersyn team were educating Chilean + workers about the risks of using Cybersyn, although they might have + been. + + [...] + + after the Pinochet military coup, information in Chile did constitute + control but in a very different way than Beer imagined. The military + created the Department of National Intelligence (DINA), an organization + that used the information it gleaned from torture and surveillance to + detain and “disappear” those the military government viewed as + subversive + + [...] + + The cybernetic adventure is apparently coming to an end, or is it not?” + Kohn asked. “The original objective of this project was to present new + tools for management, but primarily to bring about a substantial change + in the traditional practice of management.” In contrast, Kohn found + that “management accepts your tools, but just them. . . . The final + objective, ‘the revolution in management’ is not accepted, not even + + [...] + + Decybernation,” a reference to the technological components of Cybersyn + that were being used independent of the cybernetic commitment to + changing government organization. Beer wrote, “If we want a new system + of government, we have to change the established order,” yet to change + the established order required changing the very organization of the + Chilean government. Beer reminded team members that they had created + Cybersyn to support such organizational changes. Reduced to its + component technologies, Cybersyn was “no longer a viable system but a + collection of parts.” These parts could be assimilated into the current + government system, but then “we do not get a new system of government, + but an old system of government with some new tools. . . . These tools + are not the tools we invented,” Beer wrote.81 + + [...] + + Decybernation” was influenced by the ideas of the Chilean biologists + Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. Understanding the import of + Beer’s insistence on organizational change requires a brief explanation + of how Maturana and Varela differentiated between organization and + structure. According to the biologists, the “structure of a system” + refers to its specific components and the relationships among these + components. The “organization of the system” refers to the + relationships that make the system what it is, regardless of its + specific component parts. The structure of the system can change + without changing the identity of the system, but if the organization of + the system changes, the system becomes something else. In their 1987 + book The Tree of Knowledge + + [...] + + On 5 May the violent actions of the ultraright paramilitary group + Fatherland and Liberty pushed the government to declare Santiago an + emergency zone. Placing the city under martial law, Allende accused the + opposition of “consciously and sinisterly creating the conditions to + drag the country toward civil war.”92 The escalating conflict between + the government and the opposition did not bode well for the future of + Chilean socialism. + + [...] + + Marx, capital was evil and the enemy. For us, capital remains evil, but + the enemy is STATUS QUO. . . . I consider that if Marx were alive + today, he would have found the new enemy that I recognize in my + title.”101 In “Status Quo” Beer used cybernetics to explore some of + Marx’s more famous ideas and to update them for the modern world, + taking into account new technological advances in communication and + computing. According to Beer, the class struggle described by Marx was + out of date and “represent[ed] the situation generated by the + industrial revolution itself, and [was] ‘100 years old.’ ”102 Beer felt + that capitalism had since created new forms of work and new + exploitative relations.103 + + [...] + + Bureaucracy always favors the status quo,” he argues, “because its own + viability is at stake as an integral system.” In order to survive, + bureaucracy must reproduce itself, Beer claimed. This process + constrains freedom in the short term and prevents change in the long + term.109 “This situation is a social evil,” Beer asserts. “It means + that bureaucracy is a growing parasite on the body politic, that + personal freedoms are usurped in the service demands the parasitic + monster makes, and above all that half the national effort is deflected + from worthwhile activities.” Beer concludes that since bureaucracy + locks us into the status quo, “dismantling the bureaucracy can only be + a revolutionary aim.”110 Beer had long railed against bureaucracy + + [...] + + Nevertheless, Beer’s cybernetic analysis failed to tell him how to + advise his Chilean friends and help them save Chile’s political + project. In fact, it led him to the opposite conclusion: that it was + impossible for a small socialist country to survive within a capitalist + world system. “If the final level + + [...] + + societary recursion is capitalistic, in what sense can a lower level of + recursion become socialist?” he asks. “It makes little difference if + capital in that socialist country is owned by capitalists whose subject + is state controls, or by the state itself in the name of the people, + since the power of capital to oppress is effectively wielded by the + metasystem.”112 Or, to put it another way, Beer did not see how the + Allende government could survive, given the magnitude of the economic + pressure that a superpower like the United States was putting on the + small country. But Beer continued to work for the Allende government + even after he reached this conclusion, because his personal and + professional investment in Chilean socialism outweighed the pessimistic + judgment of cybernetics.113 |