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author | Silvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net> | 2014-09-19 11:02:01 -0300 |
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committer | Silvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net> | 2014-09-19 11:02:01 -0300 |
commit | 85b5dcae9579a5c3ed5973bd95ea1ba5c107d921 (patch) | |
tree | e2128236907386d4a6ed067d739d72fbe0881c36 | |
parent | b48f88c247f0851fef3d779a431ecf935b2c86ca (diff) | |
download | vbox-85b5dcae9579a5c3ed5973bd95ea1ba5c107d921.tar.gz vbox-85b5dcae9579a5c3ed5973bd95ea1ba5c107d921.tar.bz2 |
Xinput and clipboard isolation
-rw-r--r-- | README.md | 27 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 3 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,25 @@ -Scripts: vbox -============= +VirtualBox Wrapper +================== -This is the vbox repository. +Wrapper to provide easy to use GUI isolation. + +Xinput and clipboard isolation +------------------------------ + +VirtualBox offers some protections agains inherent insecurities on X server +architecture[1] but not as tough as [Qubes](https://qubes-os.org) or maybe +how [Subgraph](https://subgraph.com/sgos/index.en.html) is planning. + +It's still possible to sandbox applications using VirtualBox and have some level +of protection while having a slightly simple setup if you can't migrate to Qubes: + + 1. Clipboard sharing: you can entirelly disable this feature or have just + the hability to copy content from the VM to the host X session. + + 2. Xinput isolation: by my early testings, VirtualBox provides xinput isolation + as the guest can just capture events when the guest window is focused. But this + needs further research. + +References: + +* [1](http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com.br/2011/04/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html). |