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authorSilvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net>2014-09-19 11:02:01 -0300
committerSilvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net>2014-09-19 11:02:01 -0300
commit85b5dcae9579a5c3ed5973bd95ea1ba5c107d921 (patch)
treee2128236907386d4a6ed067d739d72fbe0881c36
parentb48f88c247f0851fef3d779a431ecf935b2c86ca (diff)
downloadvbox-85b5dcae9579a5c3ed5973bd95ea1ba5c107d921.tar.gz
vbox-85b5dcae9579a5c3ed5973bd95ea1ba5c107d921.tar.bz2
Xinput and clipboard isolation
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-Scripts: vbox
-=============
+VirtualBox Wrapper
+==================
-This is the vbox repository.
+Wrapper to provide easy to use GUI isolation.
+
+Xinput and clipboard isolation
+------------------------------
+
+VirtualBox offers some protections agains inherent insecurities on X server
+architecture[1] but not as tough as [Qubes](https://qubes-os.org) or maybe
+how [Subgraph](https://subgraph.com/sgos/index.en.html) is planning.
+
+It's still possible to sandbox applications using VirtualBox and have some level
+of protection while having a slightly simple setup if you can't migrate to Qubes:
+
+ 1. Clipboard sharing: you can entirelly disable this feature or have just
+ the hability to copy content from the VM to the host X session.
+
+ 2. Xinput isolation: by my early testings, VirtualBox provides xinput isolation
+ as the guest can just capture events when the guest window is focused. But this
+ needs further research.
+
+References:
+
+* [1](http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com.br/2011/04/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html).