From 85b5dcae9579a5c3ed5973bd95ea1ba5c107d921 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvio Rhatto Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 11:02:01 -0300 Subject: Xinput and clipboard isolation --- README.md | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index fa64c86..f022c50 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -1,4 +1,25 @@ -Scripts: vbox -============= +VirtualBox Wrapper +================== -This is the vbox repository. +Wrapper to provide easy to use GUI isolation. + +Xinput and clipboard isolation +------------------------------ + +VirtualBox offers some protections agains inherent insecurities on X server +architecture[1] but not as tough as [Qubes](https://qubes-os.org) or maybe +how [Subgraph](https://subgraph.com/sgos/index.en.html) is planning. + +It's still possible to sandbox applications using VirtualBox and have some level +of protection while having a slightly simple setup if you can't migrate to Qubes: + + 1. Clipboard sharing: you can entirelly disable this feature or have just + the hability to copy content from the VM to the host X session. + + 2. Xinput isolation: by my early testings, VirtualBox provides xinput isolation + as the guest can just capture events when the guest window is focused. But this + needs further research. + +References: + +* [1](http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com.br/2011/04/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html). -- cgit v1.2.3