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-[[!meta title="The Cathedral & The Bazaar"]]
-[[!tag jogo software foss economics]]
-
-* [The Cathedral and the Bazaar](http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/)
-* Author: Eric S. Raymond
-* ISBN: 978-0-596-00108-7
-* Publisher: O'Reilly
-
-## Phenomenology
-
-* Linus Law: "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow" (page 30);
-  "debugging is parallelizable" (page 32).
-
-* Delphi Effect: "the averaged opinion of a mass of equally expert (or equally
-  ignorant) observers is quite a bit more reliable a predictor than the opinion
-  of a single randomly chosen observer" (page 31).
-
-* Brooks Law: "complexity and communication costs of a project rise with the
-  square number of developers" (pages 32, 49).
-
-## Freedom and hierarchy
-
-* Kropotkin is cited at page 52: "principle of understanding" versus the
-  "principle of command".
-
-* Visão libertariana: "The Linux world behaves in many respects like a free
-  market or an ecology, a collection of selfish agents attempting to maximize
-  utility, which in the process produces a self-correcting spontaneous order
-  more elaborate and efficient than any amount of central planning could have
-  achieved." (page 52). Logo em seguida ele nega a existência de um autruísmo
-  puro.
-
-## Economics
-
-A very liberal point of view:
-
-* Homesteading the Noosphere: "customs that regulate the ownership and control
-  of open-source software [...] imply an underlying theory of property rights
-  homologous to the Lockean theory of land tenure" (65).
-
-* Open Source as a gift economy like a reputation game (81 - 83):
-
-    Most ways humans have of organizing are adaptations to scarcity
-    and want. Each way carries with it different ways of gaining social status.
-
-    The simples way is the _command hierarchy_ [where] scarce goods are allocated
-    by onde central authority and backed up by force. Command hierarchies scale
-    very poorly; they become increasingly inefficient as they get larger.
-
-    [...]
-
-    Our society is predominantly an exchange economy. This is a sofisticated
-    adaptation to scarcity that, unlike the command model, scales quite well.
-    Allocation of scarce goods is done in a decentralized way through trade
-    and voluntary coopreation.
-
-    [...]
-
-    Gift cultures are adaptations not to scarcity but to abundance. They arise
-    in populations that do not have significant material scarcity problems
-    with survival goods.
-
-    [...]
-
-    Abundance makes command relationships difficult to sustain and exchange
-    relationships an almost pointless game. In gift cultures, social status
-    is determined not by what you control but by _what you give away_.
-
-    -- 80-81
-
-He also explains that the reputation game is not the only drive in the
-bazaar-style ecosystem: satisfation, love, the "joy of craftsmanship" are also
-motivations for software development (pages 82-83), which is compatible
-with the gift economy model:
-
-    How can one maximize quality if there is no metric for quality?
-    If scarcity economics doesn't operate, what metrics are available
-    besides peer evaluation?
-
-    Other respondents related peer-esteem rewards and the joy of hacking
-    to the levels above subsistence needs in Abraham Maslow's well-known
-    'hierachy of values' model of human motivation.
-
-    -- 82-83
-
-Cites both Ayn Rand and Nietzsche at page 88 when talking about "selfless"
-motives, besides their "whatever other failings", saying that both
-are "desconstructing" 'altruism' into unacknowledged kinds of self-interest.
-
-## The value of humility
-
-    Furthermore, past bugs are not automatically held against a developer; the fact
-    that a bug has been fixed is generally considered more importante than the fact
-    that one used to be there. As one respontend observed, one can gain status by
-    fixing 'Emacs bugs', but not by fixing 'Richard Stallman's bugs' -- and it
-    would be considered extremely bad form to criticie Stallman for _old_ Emacs
-    bugs that have since been fixed.
-    
-    This makes an interesting contrast with many parts of academia, in which
-    trashing putatively defective work by others is an important mode of gaining
-    reputation. In the hacker culture, such behavior is rather heavily tabooed --
-    so heavily, in fact, that the absence of such behavior did no present itself to
-    me as a datum until that one respondent with an unusual perdpective pointed it
-    out nearly a full year after this essay was first published!
-
-    The taboo against attacks on competence (not shared with academia) is even more
-    revealing than the (shared) taboo on posturing, because we can relate it to a
-    difference between academia and hackerdom in their communications and support
-    structures.
-    
-    The hacker culture's medium of gifting is intangible, its communications
-    channels are poor at expressing emotional nuance, and face-to-face contact
-    among its members is the exception rather than the rule. This gives it a lower
-    tolerance of noise than most other gift cultures, and goes a long way to
-    explain both the taboo against posturing and the taboo against attacks on
-    competence. Any significant incidence of flames over hackers' competence would
-    intolerably disrupt the culture's reputation scoreboard.
-
-    -- 90-91
-
-What about Linus behavior, then?
-
-    The same vulnerability to noise explains the model of public humility required
-    of the hacker community's tribal elders. They must be seen to be free of boast
-    and posturing so the taboo against dangerous noise will hold.
-    
-    Talking softly is also functional if one aspires to be a maintainer of a
-    successful project; one must convince the community that one has good
-    judgement, because most of the maintainer's job is going to be judging other
-    people's code. Who would be inclined to contribute work to someone who clearly
-    can't judge the quality of their own code, or whose behavior suggests they will
-    attempt to unfairly hog the reputation return from the project? Potential
-    contributors want project leaders with enough humility and class to be able to
-    to say, when objectively appropriate, ``Yes, that does work better than my
-    version, I'll use it''—and to give credit where credit is due.
-
-    -- 91