From 23ac9f57b9b4c761cb8edc5bfa0c0de77ec89326 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvio Rhatto Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2017 14:06:22 -0300 Subject: Change extension to .md --- books/tecnopolitica/cathedral-bazaar.mdwn | 137 ------------------------------ 1 file changed, 137 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 books/tecnopolitica/cathedral-bazaar.mdwn (limited to 'books/tecnopolitica/cathedral-bazaar.mdwn') diff --git a/books/tecnopolitica/cathedral-bazaar.mdwn b/books/tecnopolitica/cathedral-bazaar.mdwn deleted file mode 100644 index 4089a7e..0000000 --- a/books/tecnopolitica/cathedral-bazaar.mdwn +++ /dev/null @@ -1,137 +0,0 @@ -[[!meta title="The Cathedral & The Bazaar"]] -[[!tag jogo software foss economics]] - -* [The Cathedral and the Bazaar](http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/) -* Author: Eric S. Raymond -* ISBN: 978-0-596-00108-7 -* Publisher: O'Reilly - -## Phenomenology - -* Linus Law: "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow" (page 30); - "debugging is parallelizable" (page 32). - -* Delphi Effect: "the averaged opinion of a mass of equally expert (or equally - ignorant) observers is quite a bit more reliable a predictor than the opinion - of a single randomly chosen observer" (page 31). - -* Brooks Law: "complexity and communication costs of a project rise with the - square number of developers" (pages 32, 49). - -## Freedom and hierarchy - -* Kropotkin is cited at page 52: "principle of understanding" versus the - "principle of command". - -* Visão libertariana: "The Linux world behaves in many respects like a free - market or an ecology, a collection of selfish agents attempting to maximize - utility, which in the process produces a self-correcting spontaneous order - more elaborate and efficient than any amount of central planning could have - achieved." (page 52). Logo em seguida ele nega a existência de um autruísmo - puro. - -## Economics - -A very liberal point of view: - -* Homesteading the Noosphere: "customs that regulate the ownership and control - of open-source software [...] imply an underlying theory of property rights - homologous to the Lockean theory of land tenure" (65). - -* Open Source as a gift economy like a reputation game (81 - 83): - - Most ways humans have of organizing are adaptations to scarcity - and want. Each way carries with it different ways of gaining social status. - - The simples way is the _command hierarchy_ [where] scarce goods are allocated - by onde central authority and backed up by force. Command hierarchies scale - very poorly; they become increasingly inefficient as they get larger. - - [...] - - Our society is predominantly an exchange economy. This is a sofisticated - adaptation to scarcity that, unlike the command model, scales quite well. - Allocation of scarce goods is done in a decentralized way through trade - and voluntary coopreation. - - [...] - - Gift cultures are adaptations not to scarcity but to abundance. They arise - in populations that do not have significant material scarcity problems - with survival goods. - - [...] - - Abundance makes command relationships difficult to sustain and exchange - relationships an almost pointless game. In gift cultures, social status - is determined not by what you control but by _what you give away_. - - -- 80-81 - -He also explains that the reputation game is not the only drive in the -bazaar-style ecosystem: satisfation, love, the "joy of craftsmanship" are also -motivations for software development (pages 82-83), which is compatible -with the gift economy model: - - How can one maximize quality if there is no metric for quality? - If scarcity economics doesn't operate, what metrics are available - besides peer evaluation? - - Other respondents related peer-esteem rewards and the joy of hacking - to the levels above subsistence needs in Abraham Maslow's well-known - 'hierachy of values' model of human motivation. - - -- 82-83 - -Cites both Ayn Rand and Nietzsche at page 88 when talking about "selfless" -motives, besides their "whatever other failings", saying that both -are "desconstructing" 'altruism' into unacknowledged kinds of self-interest. - -## The value of humility - - Furthermore, past bugs are not automatically held against a developer; the fact - that a bug has been fixed is generally considered more importante than the fact - that one used to be there. As one respontend observed, one can gain status by - fixing 'Emacs bugs', but not by fixing 'Richard Stallman's bugs' -- and it - would be considered extremely bad form to criticie Stallman for _old_ Emacs - bugs that have since been fixed. - - This makes an interesting contrast with many parts of academia, in which - trashing putatively defective work by others is an important mode of gaining - reputation. In the hacker culture, such behavior is rather heavily tabooed -- - so heavily, in fact, that the absence of such behavior did no present itself to - me as a datum until that one respondent with an unusual perdpective pointed it - out nearly a full year after this essay was first published! - - The taboo against attacks on competence (not shared with academia) is even more - revealing than the (shared) taboo on posturing, because we can relate it to a - difference between academia and hackerdom in their communications and support - structures. - - The hacker culture's medium of gifting is intangible, its communications - channels are poor at expressing emotional nuance, and face-to-face contact - among its members is the exception rather than the rule. This gives it a lower - tolerance of noise than most other gift cultures, and goes a long way to - explain both the taboo against posturing and the taboo against attacks on - competence. Any significant incidence of flames over hackers' competence would - intolerably disrupt the culture's reputation scoreboard. - - -- 90-91 - -What about Linus behavior, then? - - The same vulnerability to noise explains the model of public humility required - of the hacker community's tribal elders. They must be seen to be free of boast - and posturing so the taboo against dangerous noise will hold. - - Talking softly is also functional if one aspires to be a maintainer of a - successful project; one must convince the community that one has good - judgement, because most of the maintainer's job is going to be judging other - people's code. Who would be inclined to contribute work to someone who clearly - can't judge the quality of their own code, or whose behavior suggests they will - attempt to unfairly hog the reputation return from the project? Potential - contributors want project leaders with enough humility and class to be able to - to say, when objectively appropriate, ``Yes, that does work better than my - version, I'll use it''—and to give credit where credit is due. - - -- 91 -- cgit v1.2.3