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Diffstat (limited to 'models/Auth.old/OpenID/TrustRoot.php')
| -rw-r--r-- | models/Auth.old/OpenID/TrustRoot.php | 410 |
1 files changed, 410 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/models/Auth.old/OpenID/TrustRoot.php b/models/Auth.old/OpenID/TrustRoot.php new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2921bea94 --- /dev/null +++ b/models/Auth.old/OpenID/TrustRoot.php @@ -0,0 +1,410 @@ +<?php +/** + * Functions for dealing with OpenID trust roots + * + * PHP versions 4 and 5 + * + * LICENSE: See the COPYING file included in this distribution. + * + * @package OpenID + * @author JanRain, Inc. <openid@janrain.com> + * @copyright 2005 Janrain, Inc. + * @license http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/lesser.html LGPL + */ + +require_once 'Auth/OpenID/Discover.php'; + +/** + * A regular expression that matches a domain ending in a top-level domains. + * Used in checking trust roots for sanity. + * + * @access private + */ +define('Auth_OpenID___TLDs', + '/\.(com|edu|gov|int|mil|net|org|biz|info|name|museum|coop|aero|ac|' . + 'ad|ae|af|ag|ai|al|am|an|ao|aq|ar|as|at|au|aw|az|ba|bb|bd|be|bf|bg|' . + 'bh|bi|bj|bm|bn|bo|br|bs|bt|bv|bw|by|bz|ca|cc|cd|cf|cg|ch|ci|ck|cl|' . + 'cm|cn|co|cr|cu|cv|cx|cy|cz|de|dj|dk|dm|do|dz|ec|ee|eg|eh|er|es|et|eu|' . + 'fi|fj|fk|fm|fo|fr|ga|gd|ge|gf|gg|gh|gi|gl|gm|gn|gp|gq|gr|gs|gt|gu|' . + 'gw|gy|hk|hm|hn|hr|ht|hu|id|ie|il|im|in|io|iq|ir|is|it|je|jm|jo|jp|' . + 'ke|kg|kh|ki|km|kn|kp|kr|kw|ky|kz|la|lb|lc|li|lk|lr|ls|lt|lu|lv|ly|' . + 'ma|mc|md|mg|mh|mk|ml|mm|mn|mo|mp|mq|mr|ms|mt|mu|mv|mw|mx|my|mz|na|' . + 'nc|ne|nf|ng|ni|nl|no|np|nr|nu|nz|om|pa|pe|pf|pg|ph|pk|pl|pm|pn|pr|' . + 'ps|pt|pw|py|qa|re|ro|ru|rw|sa|sb|sc|sd|se|sg|sh|si|sj|sk|sl|sm|sn|' . + 'so|sr|st|sv|sy|sz|tc|td|tf|tg|th|tj|tk|tm|tn|to|tp|tr|tt|tv|tw|tz|' . + 'ua|ug|uk|um|us|uy|uz|va|vc|ve|vg|vi|vn|vu|wf|ws|ye|yt|yu|za|zm|zw)$/'); + +/** + * A wrapper for trust-root related functions + */ +class Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot { + /* + * Return a discovery URL for this realm. + * + * Return null if the realm could not be parsed or was not valid. + * + * @param return_to The relying party return URL of the OpenID + * authentication request + * + * @return The URL upon which relying party discovery should be + * run in order to verify the return_to URL + */ + function buildDiscoveryURL($realm) + { + $parsed = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($realm); + + if ($parsed === false) { + return false; + } + + if ($parsed['wildcard']) { + // Use "www." in place of the star + if ($parsed['host'][0] != '.') { + return false; + } + + $www_domain = 'www' . $parsed['host']; + + return sprintf('%s://%s%s', $parsed['scheme'], + $www_domain, $parsed['path']); + } else { + return $parsed['unparsed']; + } + } + + /** + * Parse a URL into its trust_root parts. + * + * @static + * + * @access private + * + * @param string $trust_root The url to parse + * + * @return mixed $parsed Either an associative array of trust root + * parts or false if parsing failed. + */ + function _parse($trust_root) + { + $parts = @parse_url($trust_root); + if ($parts === false) { + return false; + } + $required_parts = array('scheme', 'host'); + $forbidden_parts = array('user', 'pass', 'fragment'); + $keys = array_keys($parts); + if (array_intersect($keys, $required_parts) != $required_parts) { + return false; + } + + if (array_intersect($keys, $forbidden_parts) != array()) { + return false; + } + + // Return false if the original trust root value has more than + // one port specification. + if (preg_match("/:\/\/[^:]+(:\d+){2,}(\/|$)/", $trust_root)) { + return false; + } + + $scheme = strtolower($parts['scheme']); + $allowed_schemes = array('http', 'https'); + if (!in_array($scheme, $allowed_schemes)) { + return false; + } + $parts['scheme'] = $scheme; + + $host = strtolower($parts['host']); + $hostparts = explode('*', $host); + switch (count($hostparts)) { + case 1: + $parts['wildcard'] = false; + break; + case 2: + if ($hostparts[0] || + ($hostparts[1] && substr($hostparts[1], 0, 1) != '.')) { + return false; + } + $host = $hostparts[1]; + $parts['wildcard'] = true; + break; + default: + return false; + } + if (strpos($host, ':') !== false) { + return false; + } + + $parts['host'] = $host; + + if (isset($parts['path'])) { + $path = strtolower($parts['path']); + } else { + $path = '/'; + } + + $parts['path'] = $path; + if (!isset($parts['port'])) { + $parts['port'] = false; + } + + $parts['unparsed'] = $trust_root; + + return $parts; + } + + /** + * Is this trust root sane? + * + * A trust root is sane if it is syntactically valid and it has a + * reasonable domain name. Specifically, the domain name must be + * more than one level below a standard TLD or more than two + * levels below a two-letter tld. + * + * For example, '*.com' is not a sane trust root, but '*.foo.com' + * is. '*.co.uk' is not sane, but '*.bbc.co.uk' is. + * + * This check is not always correct, but it attempts to err on the + * side of marking sane trust roots insane instead of marking + * insane trust roots sane. For example, 'kink.fm' is marked as + * insane even though it "should" (for some meaning of should) be + * marked sane. + * + * This function should be used when creating OpenID servers to + * alert the users of the server when a consumer attempts to get + * the user to accept a suspicious trust root. + * + * @static + * @param string $trust_root The trust root to check + * @return bool $sanity Whether the trust root looks OK + */ + function isSane($trust_root) + { + $parts = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($trust_root); + if ($parts === false) { + return false; + } + + // Localhost is a special case + if ($parts['host'] == 'localhost') { + return true; + } + + // Get the top-level domain of the host. If it is not a valid TLD, + // it's not sane. + preg_match(Auth_OpenID___TLDs, $parts['host'], $matches); + if (!$matches) { + return false; + } + $tld = $matches[1]; + + // Require at least two levels of specificity for non-country + // tlds and three levels for country tlds. + $elements = explode('.', $parts['host']); + $n = count($elements); + if ($parts['wildcard']) { + $n -= 1; + } + if (strlen($tld) == 2) { + $n -= 1; + } + if ($n <= 1) { + return false; + } + return true; + } + + /** + * Does this URL match the given trust root? + * + * Return whether the URL falls under the given trust root. This + * does not check whether the trust root is sane. If the URL or + * trust root do not parse, this function will return false. + * + * @param string $trust_root The trust root to match against + * + * @param string $url The URL to check + * + * @return bool $matches Whether the URL matches against the + * trust root + */ + function match($trust_root, $url) + { + $trust_root_parsed = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($trust_root); + $url_parsed = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($url); + if (!$trust_root_parsed || !$url_parsed) { + return false; + } + + // Check hosts matching + if ($url_parsed['wildcard']) { + return false; + } + if ($trust_root_parsed['wildcard']) { + $host_tail = $trust_root_parsed['host']; + $host = $url_parsed['host']; + if ($host_tail && + substr($host, -(strlen($host_tail))) != $host_tail && + substr($host_tail, 1) != $host) { + return false; + } + } else { + if ($trust_root_parsed['host'] != $url_parsed['host']) { + return false; + } + } + + // Check path and query matching + $base_path = $trust_root_parsed['path']; + $path = $url_parsed['path']; + if (!isset($trust_root_parsed['query'])) { + if (substr($path, 0, strlen($base_path)) != $base_path) { + return false; + } + } else { + $base_query = $trust_root_parsed['query']; + $query = @$url_parsed['query']; + $qplus = substr($query, 0, strlen($base_query) + 1); + $bqplus = $base_query . '&'; + if ($base_path != $path || + ($base_query != $query && $qplus != $bqplus)) { + return false; + } + } + + // The port and scheme need to match exactly + return ($trust_root_parsed['scheme'] == $url_parsed['scheme'] && + $url_parsed['port'] === $trust_root_parsed['port']); + } +} + +/* + * If the endpoint is a relying party OpenID return_to endpoint, + * return the endpoint URL. Otherwise, return None. + * + * This function is intended to be used as a filter for the Yadis + * filtering interface. + * + * @see: C{L{openid.yadis.services}} + * @see: C{L{openid.yadis.filters}} + * + * @param endpoint: An XRDS BasicServiceEndpoint, as returned by + * performing Yadis dicovery. + * + * @returns: The endpoint URL or None if the endpoint is not a + * relying party endpoint. + */ +function filter_extractReturnURL(&$endpoint) +{ + if ($endpoint->matchTypes(array(Auth_OpenID_RP_RETURN_TO_URL_TYPE))) { + return $endpoint; + } else { + return null; + } +} + +function &Auth_OpenID_extractReturnURL(&$endpoint_list) +{ + $result = array(); + + foreach ($endpoint_list as $endpoint) { + if (filter_extractReturnURL($endpoint)) { + $result[] = $endpoint; + } + } + + return $result; +} + +/* + * Is the return_to URL under one of the supplied allowed return_to + * URLs? + */ +function Auth_OpenID_returnToMatches($allowed_return_to_urls, $return_to) +{ + foreach ($allowed_return_to_urls as $allowed_return_to) { + // A return_to pattern works the same as a realm, except that + // it's not allowed to use a wildcard. We'll model this by + // parsing it as a realm, and not trying to match it if it has + // a wildcard. + + $return_realm = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($allowed_return_to); + if (// Parses as a trust root + ($return_realm !== false) && + // Does not have a wildcard + (!$return_realm['wildcard']) && + // Matches the return_to that we passed in with it + (Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::match($allowed_return_to, $return_to))) { + return true; + } + } + + // No URL in the list matched + return false; +} + +/* + * Given a relying party discovery URL return a list of return_to + * URLs. + */ +function Auth_OpenID_getAllowedReturnURLs($relying_party_url, &$fetcher, + $discover_function=null) +{ + if ($discover_function === null) { + $discover_function = array('Auth_Yadis_Yadis', 'discover'); + } + + list($rp_url_after_redirects, $endpoints) = + Auth_OpenID_discoverWithYadis($relying_party_url, + $fetcher, + 'Auth_OpenID_extractReturnURL', + $discover_function); + + if ($rp_url_after_redirects != $relying_party_url) { + // Verification caused a redirect + return false; + } + + $return_to_urls = array(); + foreach ($endpoints as $e) { + $return_to_urls[] = $e->server_url; + } + + return $return_to_urls; +} + +/* + * Verify that a return_to URL is valid for the given realm. + * + * This function builds a discovery URL, performs Yadis discovery on + * it, makes sure that the URL does not redirect, parses out the + * return_to URLs, and finally checks to see if the current return_to + * URL matches the return_to. + * + * @return true if the return_to URL is valid for the realm + */ +function Auth_OpenID_verifyReturnTo($realm_str, $return_to, &$fetcher, + $_vrfy='Auth_OpenID_getAllowedReturnURLs') +{ + $disco_url = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::buildDiscoveryURL($realm_str); + + if ($disco_url === false) { + return false; + } + + $allowable_urls = call_user_func_array($_vrfy, + array($disco_url, &$fetcher)); + + // The realm_str could not be parsed. + if ($allowable_urls === false) { + return false; + } + + if (Auth_OpenID_returnToMatches($allowable_urls, $return_to)) { + return true; + } else { + return false; + } +} + +?>
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