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Diffstat (limited to 'mod/openid_api/vendors/php-openid/Auth/OpenID/TrustRoot.php')
| -rw-r--r-- | mod/openid_api/vendors/php-openid/Auth/OpenID/TrustRoot.php | 461 |
1 files changed, 461 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/mod/openid_api/vendors/php-openid/Auth/OpenID/TrustRoot.php b/mod/openid_api/vendors/php-openid/Auth/OpenID/TrustRoot.php new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0f53958ed --- /dev/null +++ b/mod/openid_api/vendors/php-openid/Auth/OpenID/TrustRoot.php @@ -0,0 +1,461 @@ +<?php +/** + * Functions for dealing with OpenID trust roots + * + * PHP versions 4 and 5 + * + * LICENSE: See the COPYING file included in this distribution. + * + * @package OpenID + * @author JanRain, Inc. <openid@janrain.com> + * @copyright 2005-2008 Janrain, Inc. + * @license http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 Apache + */ + +require_once 'Auth/OpenID/Discover.php'; + +/** + * A regular expression that matches a domain ending in a top-level domains. + * Used in checking trust roots for sanity. + * + * @access private + */ +define('Auth_OpenID___TLDs', + '/\.(ac|ad|ae|aero|af|ag|ai|al|am|an|ao|aq|ar|arpa|as|asia' . + '|at|au|aw|ax|az|ba|bb|bd|be|bf|bg|bh|bi|biz|bj|bm|bn|bo|br' . + '|bs|bt|bv|bw|by|bz|ca|cat|cc|cd|cf|cg|ch|ci|ck|cl|cm|cn|co' . + '|com|coop|cr|cu|cv|cx|cy|cz|de|dj|dk|dm|do|dz|ec|edu|ee|eg' . + '|er|es|et|eu|fi|fj|fk|fm|fo|fr|ga|gb|gd|ge|gf|gg|gh|gi|gl' . + '|gm|gn|gov|gp|gq|gr|gs|gt|gu|gw|gy|hk|hm|hn|hr|ht|hu|id|ie' . + '|il|im|in|info|int|io|iq|ir|is|it|je|jm|jo|jobs|jp|ke|kg|kh' . + '|ki|km|kn|kp|kr|kw|ky|kz|la|lb|lc|li|lk|lr|ls|lt|lu|lv|ly' . + '|ma|mc|md|me|mg|mh|mil|mk|ml|mm|mn|mo|mobi|mp|mq|mr|ms|mt' . + '|mu|museum|mv|mw|mx|my|mz|na|name|nc|ne|net|nf|ng|ni|nl|no' . + '|np|nr|nu|nz|om|org|pa|pe|pf|pg|ph|pk|pl|pm|pn|pr|pro|ps|pt' . + '|pw|py|qa|re|ro|rs|ru|rw|sa|sb|sc|sd|se|sg|sh|si|sj|sk|sl' . + '|sm|sn|so|sr|st|su|sv|sy|sz|tc|td|tel|tf|tg|th|tj|tk|tl|tm' . + '|tn|to|tp|tr|travel|tt|tv|tw|tz|ua|ug|uk|us|uy|uz|va|vc|ve' . + '|vg|vi|vn|vu|wf|ws|xn--0zwm56d|xn--11b5bs3a9aj6g' . + '|xn--80akhbyknj4f|xn--9t4b11yi5a|xn--deba0ad|xn--g6w251d' . + '|xn--hgbk6aj7f53bba|xn--hlcj6aya9esc7a|xn--jxalpdlp' . + '|xn--kgbechtv|xn--zckzah|ye|yt|yu|za|zm|zw)\.?$/'); + +define('Auth_OpenID___HostSegmentRe', + "/^(?:[-a-zA-Z0-9!$&'\\(\\)\\*+,;=._~]|%[a-zA-Z0-9]{2})*$/"); + +/** + * A wrapper for trust-root related functions + */ +class Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot { + /* + * Return a discovery URL for this realm. + * + * Return null if the realm could not be parsed or was not valid. + * + * @param return_to The relying party return URL of the OpenID + * authentication request + * + * @return The URL upon which relying party discovery should be + * run in order to verify the return_to URL + */ + static function buildDiscoveryURL($realm) + { + $parsed = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($realm); + + if ($parsed === false) { + return false; + } + + if ($parsed['wildcard']) { + // Use "www." in place of the star + if ($parsed['host'][0] != '.') { + return false; + } + + $www_domain = 'www' . $parsed['host']; + + return sprintf('%s://%s%s', $parsed['scheme'], + $www_domain, $parsed['path']); + } else { + return $parsed['unparsed']; + } + } + + /** + * Parse a URL into its trust_root parts. + * + * @static + * + * @access private + * + * @param string $trust_root The url to parse + * + * @return mixed $parsed Either an associative array of trust root + * parts or false if parsing failed. + */ + static function _parse($trust_root) + { + $trust_root = Auth_OpenID_urinorm($trust_root); + if ($trust_root === null) { + return false; + } + + if (preg_match("/:\/\/[^:]+(:\d+){2,}(\/|$)/", $trust_root)) { + return false; + } + + $parts = @parse_url($trust_root); + if ($parts === false) { + return false; + } + + $required_parts = array('scheme', 'host'); + $forbidden_parts = array('user', 'pass', 'fragment'); + $keys = array_keys($parts); + if (array_intersect($keys, $required_parts) != $required_parts) { + return false; + } + + if (array_intersect($keys, $forbidden_parts) != array()) { + return false; + } + + if (!preg_match(Auth_OpenID___HostSegmentRe, $parts['host'])) { + return false; + } + + $scheme = strtolower($parts['scheme']); + $allowed_schemes = array('http', 'https'); + if (!in_array($scheme, $allowed_schemes)) { + return false; + } + $parts['scheme'] = $scheme; + + $host = strtolower($parts['host']); + $hostparts = explode('*', $host); + switch (count($hostparts)) { + case 1: + $parts['wildcard'] = false; + break; + case 2: + if ($hostparts[0] || + ($hostparts[1] && substr($hostparts[1], 0, 1) != '.')) { + return false; + } + $host = $hostparts[1]; + $parts['wildcard'] = true; + break; + default: + return false; + } + if (strpos($host, ':') !== false) { + return false; + } + + $parts['host'] = $host; + + if (isset($parts['path'])) { + $path = strtolower($parts['path']); + if (substr($path, 0, 1) != '/') { + return false; + } + } else { + $path = '/'; + } + + $parts['path'] = $path; + if (!isset($parts['port'])) { + $parts['port'] = false; + } + + + $parts['unparsed'] = $trust_root; + + return $parts; + } + + /** + * Is this trust root sane? + * + * A trust root is sane if it is syntactically valid and it has a + * reasonable domain name. Specifically, the domain name must be + * more than one level below a standard TLD or more than two + * levels below a two-letter tld. + * + * For example, '*.com' is not a sane trust root, but '*.foo.com' + * is. '*.co.uk' is not sane, but '*.bbc.co.uk' is. + * + * This check is not always correct, but it attempts to err on the + * side of marking sane trust roots insane instead of marking + * insane trust roots sane. For example, 'kink.fm' is marked as + * insane even though it "should" (for some meaning of should) be + * marked sane. + * + * This function should be used when creating OpenID servers to + * alert the users of the server when a consumer attempts to get + * the user to accept a suspicious trust root. + * + * @static + * @param string $trust_root The trust root to check + * @return bool $sanity Whether the trust root looks OK + */ + static function isSane($trust_root) + { + $parts = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($trust_root); + if ($parts === false) { + return false; + } + + // Localhost is a special case + if ($parts['host'] == 'localhost') { + return true; + } + + $host_parts = explode('.', $parts['host']); + if ($parts['wildcard']) { + // Remove the empty string from the beginning of the array + array_shift($host_parts); + } + + if ($host_parts && !$host_parts[count($host_parts) - 1]) { + array_pop($host_parts); + } + + if (!$host_parts) { + return false; + } + + // Don't allow adjacent dots + if (in_array('', $host_parts, true)) { + return false; + } + + // Get the top-level domain of the host. If it is not a valid TLD, + // it's not sane. + preg_match(Auth_OpenID___TLDs, $parts['host'], $matches); + if (!$matches) { + return false; + } + $tld = $matches[1]; + + if (count($host_parts) == 1) { + return false; + } + + if ($parts['wildcard']) { + // It's a 2-letter tld with a short second to last segment + // so there needs to be more than two segments specified + // (e.g. *.co.uk is insane) + $second_level = $host_parts[count($host_parts) - 2]; + if (strlen($tld) == 2 && strlen($second_level) <= 3) { + return count($host_parts) > 2; + } + } + + return true; + } + + /** + * Does this URL match the given trust root? + * + * Return whether the URL falls under the given trust root. This + * does not check whether the trust root is sane. If the URL or + * trust root do not parse, this function will return false. + * + * @param string $trust_root The trust root to match against + * + * @param string $url The URL to check + * + * @return bool $matches Whether the URL matches against the + * trust root + */ + static function match($trust_root, $url) + { + $trust_root_parsed = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($trust_root); + $url_parsed = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($url); + if (!$trust_root_parsed || !$url_parsed) { + return false; + } + + // Check hosts matching + if ($url_parsed['wildcard']) { + return false; + } + if ($trust_root_parsed['wildcard']) { + $host_tail = $trust_root_parsed['host']; + $host = $url_parsed['host']; + if ($host_tail && + substr($host, -(strlen($host_tail))) != $host_tail && + substr($host_tail, 1) != $host) { + return false; + } + } else { + if ($trust_root_parsed['host'] != $url_parsed['host']) { + return false; + } + } + + // Check path and query matching + $base_path = $trust_root_parsed['path']; + $path = $url_parsed['path']; + if (!isset($trust_root_parsed['query'])) { + if ($base_path != $path) { + if (substr($path, 0, strlen($base_path)) != $base_path) { + return false; + } + if (substr($base_path, strlen($base_path) - 1, 1) != '/' && + substr($path, strlen($base_path), 1) != '/') { + return false; + } + } + } else { + $base_query = $trust_root_parsed['query']; + $query = @$url_parsed['query']; + $qplus = substr($query, 0, strlen($base_query) + 1); + $bqplus = $base_query . '&'; + if ($base_path != $path || + ($base_query != $query && $qplus != $bqplus)) { + return false; + } + } + + // The port and scheme need to match exactly + return ($trust_root_parsed['scheme'] == $url_parsed['scheme'] && + $url_parsed['port'] === $trust_root_parsed['port']); + } +} + +/* + * If the endpoint is a relying party OpenID return_to endpoint, + * return the endpoint URL. Otherwise, return None. + * + * This function is intended to be used as a filter for the Yadis + * filtering interface. + * + * @see: C{L{openid.yadis.services}} + * @see: C{L{openid.yadis.filters}} + * + * @param endpoint: An XRDS BasicServiceEndpoint, as returned by + * performing Yadis dicovery. + * + * @returns: The endpoint URL or None if the endpoint is not a + * relying party endpoint. + */ +function filter_extractReturnURL($endpoint) +{ + if ($endpoint->matchTypes(array(Auth_OpenID_RP_RETURN_TO_URL_TYPE))) { + return $endpoint; + } else { + return null; + } +} + +function &Auth_OpenID_extractReturnURL(&$endpoint_list) +{ + $result = array(); + + foreach ($endpoint_list as $endpoint) { + if (filter_extractReturnURL($endpoint)) { + $result[] = $endpoint; + } + } + + return $result; +} + +/* + * Is the return_to URL under one of the supplied allowed return_to + * URLs? + */ +function Auth_OpenID_returnToMatches($allowed_return_to_urls, $return_to) +{ + foreach ($allowed_return_to_urls as $allowed_return_to) { + // A return_to pattern works the same as a realm, except that + // it's not allowed to use a wildcard. We'll model this by + // parsing it as a realm, and not trying to match it if it has + // a wildcard. + + $return_realm = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($allowed_return_to); + if (// Parses as a trust root + ($return_realm !== false) && + // Does not have a wildcard + (!$return_realm['wildcard']) && + // Matches the return_to that we passed in with it + (Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::match($allowed_return_to, $return_to))) { + return true; + } + } + + // No URL in the list matched + return false; +} + +/* + * Given a relying party discovery URL return a list of return_to + * URLs. + */ +function Auth_OpenID_getAllowedReturnURLs($relying_party_url, $fetcher, + $discover_function=null) +{ + if ($discover_function === null) { + $discover_function = array('Auth_Yadis_Yadis', 'discover'); + } + + $xrds_parse_cb = array('Auth_OpenID_ServiceEndpoint', 'consumerFromXRDS'); + + list($rp_url_after_redirects, $endpoints) = + Auth_Yadis_getServiceEndpoints($relying_party_url, $xrds_parse_cb, + $discover_function, $fetcher); + + if ($rp_url_after_redirects != $relying_party_url) { + // Verification caused a redirect + return false; + } + + call_user_func_array($discover_function, + array($relying_party_url, $fetcher)); + + $return_to_urls = array(); + $matching_endpoints = Auth_OpenID_extractReturnURL($endpoints); + + foreach ($matching_endpoints as $e) { + $return_to_urls[] = $e->server_url; + } + + return $return_to_urls; +} + +/* + * Verify that a return_to URL is valid for the given realm. + * + * This function builds a discovery URL, performs Yadis discovery on + * it, makes sure that the URL does not redirect, parses out the + * return_to URLs, and finally checks to see if the current return_to + * URL matches the return_to. + * + * @return true if the return_to URL is valid for the realm + */ +function Auth_OpenID_verifyReturnTo($realm_str, $return_to, $fetcher, + $_vrfy='Auth_OpenID_getAllowedReturnURLs') +{ + $disco_url = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::buildDiscoveryURL($realm_str); + + if ($disco_url === false) { + return false; + } + + $allowable_urls = call_user_func_array($_vrfy, + array($disco_url, $fetcher)); + + // The realm_str could not be parsed. + if ($allowable_urls === false) { + return false; + } + + if (Auth_OpenID_returnToMatches($allowable_urls, $return_to)) { + return true; + } else { + return false; + } +} + |