Improve docs, adds TODO page and more references

1 files changed, 24 insertions, 16 deletions

diff --git a/index.md b/index.md
index 59837fe..6540e1a 100644
--- a/index.md
+++ b/index.md
@@ -5,14 +5,17 @@ attached bootloader in order to make more difficult to tamper the initialization
 process. Bootless is a bootloader installed in a removable media and used to
 initialize computers.
 
-It offers partial protection against the so-called [evil maid
-attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack).
+It offers partial protection against the so-called [evil maid attacks][], which
+basically consists in compromising the boot procedure on unnattended machines.
 
-- [Repository](https://git.fluxo.info/bootless).
-- [Tutorial](tutorial).
-- [References](references).
-- License: [GPLv3+](LICENSE).
-- Contact: rhatto at riseup.net.
+* [Repository](https://git.fluxo.info/bootless).
+* [Tutorial](tutorial).
+* [References](references).
+* [TODO](todo).
+* License: [GPLv3+](LICENSE).
+* Contact: rhatto at riseup.net.
+
+[evil maid attacks]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack
 
 ## Design
 
@@ -27,9 +30,10 @@ images.
 
 ## Dependencies
 
-- [GNU Grub](https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/).
-- Reference implementation is targeted to Debian like operating systems.
-- Optionally use git and [git-annex](http://git-annex.branchable.com/) to manage your repository and images.
+* [GNU Grub](https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/).
+* Reference implementation is targeted to Debian like operating systems.
+* Optionally use git and [git-annex](http://git-annex.branchable.com/) to
+  manage your repository and images.
 
 ## Installation
 
@@ -70,8 +74,8 @@ Check device/image signatures:
 
 ## Customization
 
-- Place your custom images into `custom` folder.
-- Edit `custom/custom.cfg` to suit your needs.
+* Place your custom images into `custom` folder.
+* Edit `custom/custom.cfg` to suit your needs.
 
 ## Threat Model
 
@@ -83,7 +87,9 @@ Check device/image signatures:
 
 2. Infection is still possible in plenty of unencrypted/unauthenticated
    software residing in the machine, such as BIOS, network firmware and
-   potential backdoors such as Intel's AMT/ME.
+   potential backdoors such as Intel's AMT/ME. Nowadays seems like there
+   are plenty of places were malicious code can be placed, not to say
+   about the many ways miniaturized hardware can be implanted.
 
 3. The USB stick itself is not a static device: it's has a built-in controller
    that could be exploited to present to your computer a compromised kernel or
@@ -96,8 +102,8 @@ Again:
   to be significantly smaller to do their jobs and optionally also load
   an operating system (in case it's intended not to be noticed).
 
-* Spyware could still be installed in the firware or in specialized harware,
-  which are plentyful in current computers.
+* Spyware could still be installed in the firmware or in specialized hardware,
+  which are plentiful in current computers.
 
 ### Additional mitigations
 
@@ -125,7 +131,9 @@ Again:
    or switching the "rfkill" button in laptops), preventing any bootloader exploit
    that to broadcast keystrokes.
 
-6. Implement "Physically Unclonable Functions" at your device:
+6. Implement [Physically Unclonable Functions][] (PUF) at your device:
     * [Thwarting Evil Maid Attacks](https://media.ccc.de/v/30C3_-_5600_-_en_-_saal_1_-_201312301245_-_thwarting_evil_maid_attacks_-_eric_michaud_-_ryan_lackey#t=2616) (30C3).
     * [Don't Want Your Laptop Tampered With? Just Add Glitter Nail Polish](https://www.wired.com/2013/12/better-data-security-nail-polish/).
     * [Home-made tamper-evident security seals for kids and adults alike](http://blog.ssokolow.com/archives/2017/04/08/home-made-tamper-evident-security-seals-for-kids-and-adults-alike/).
+
+[Physically Unclonable Functions]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_unclonable_function