aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/books/tecnopolitica/cathedral-bazaar.mdwn
blob: 5e36e99acd31c3fbd01141c0903e1375d47271c3 (plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
[[!meta title="The Cathedral & The Bazaar"]]
[[!tag jogo software foss economics]]

* Author: Eric S. Raymond

## Phenomenology

* Linus Law: "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow" (page 30);
  "debugging is parallelizable" (page 32).

* Delphi Effect: "the averaged opinion of a mass of equally expert (or equally
  ignorant) observers is quite a bit more reliable a predictor than the opinion
  of a single randomly chosen observer" (page 31).

* Brooks Law: "complexity and communication costs of a project rise with the
  square number of developers" (pages 32, 49).

## Freedom and hierarchy

* Kropotkin is cited at page 52: "principle of understanding" versus the
  "principle of command".

* Visão libertariana: "The Linux world behaves in many respects like a free
  market or an ecology, a collection of selfish agents attempting to maximize
  utility, which in the process produces a self-correcting spontaneous order
  more elaborate and efficient than any amount of central planning could have
  achieved." (page 52). Logo em seguida ele nega a existência de um autruísmo
  puro.

## Economics

A very liberal point of view:

* Homesteading the Noosphere: "customs that regulate the ownership and control
  of open-source software [...] imply an underlying theory of property rights
  homologous to the Lockean theory of land tenure" (65).

* Open Source as a gift economy like a reputation game (81 - 83):

    Most ways humans have of organizing are adaptations to scarcity
    and want. Each way carries with it different ways of gaining social status.

    The simples way is the _command hierarchy_ [where] scarce goods are allocated
    by onde central authority and backed up by force. Command hierarchies scale
    very poorly; they become increasingly inefficient as they get larger.

    [...]

    Our society is predominantly an exchange economy. This is a sofisticated
    adaptation to scarcity that, unlike the command model, scales quite well.
    Allocation of scarce goods is done in a decentralized way through trade
    and voluntary coopreation.

    [...]

    Gift cultures are adaptations not to scarcity but to abundance. They arise
    in populations that do not have significant material scarcity problems
    with survival goods.

    [...]

    Abundance makes command relationships difficult to sustain and exchange
    relationships an almost pointless game. In gift cultures, social status
    is determined not by what you control but by _what you give away_.

    -- 80-81

He also explains that the reputation game is not the only drive in the
bazaar-style ecosystem: satisfation, love, the "joy of craftsmanship" are also
motivations for software development (pages 82-83), which is compatible
with the gift economy model:

    How can one maximize quality if there is no metric for quality?
    If scarcity economics doesn't operate, what metrics are available
    besides peer evaluation?

    Other respondents related peer-esteem rewards and the joy of hacking
    to the levels above subsistence needs in Abraham Maslow's well-known
    'hierachy of values' model of human motivation.

    -- 82-83