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diff --git a/books/technology/cathedral-bazaar.md b/books/technology/cathedral-bazaar.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9416d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/technology/cathedral-bazaar.md @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +[[!meta title="The Cathedral & The Bazaar"]] +[[!tag jogo software foss economics]] + +* [The Cathedral and the Bazaar](http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/) +* Author: Eric S. Raymond +* ISBN: 978-0-596-00108-7 +* Publisher: O'Reilly + +## Review + +While Raymond has innumerous insights on the dynamic of the free software +communities, he got political economy wrong, including, but not only by: + +* Choosing to focus on Lockean philosophical considerations. +* Putting altruism as a mode of appearance for an egotistical reward strategy. + +Reading this book years after the "Open Source Revolution" has begun, the whole +"Open Source X Free Software" debate looks even more important than what sometimes +were put as a metaphysical, esoteric dispute. Going beyond the requirement that +a software work is made available giving the "four freedoms", this debate puts +basic questions about the underlying production process all how societies chose +to divide labour and share wealth. + +More than ever before this debate has huge importance and implications, given +our current state of affairs where economic models such as "freemium", +"opencore" and [siren servers](/books/sociedade/who-owns-the-future) are +privatizing and concentrating the notion of property, i.e, transforming even +personal property in a "service": you don't own your gadget or content like +music you purchase, because of DRM, EULAS and the inability to repair your +stuff, see the iRepair movement. + +Raymond assumes that "the verdict of history seems to be free-market capitalism +is the globally optimal way to cooperate for economic efficiency" which, besides +being an "end of history"-type fallacy -- as we didn't tried yet many, many +possible economical systems, but only very few --, has wrong assumptions about +what is "optimal", "cooperation" and "efficient": just look about resource +depletion, absurd wealth concentration by the extremely rich and lack of +basic dignity for most of human population, not to mention animal/nature rights. + +Capitalism is based in the need that something is scarce, if not naturally then +let make it artificial scarce. So there's no way a capitalist business will +sustain itself by giving everything free as in software -- as it's anyway out +of question that it will give anything free as in beer. + +So while the bulk of Raymond ideas are revolutionary in the sense that capitalism +needs to constantly revolutionize itself, fade away in diminishing returns or +go to war mode -- when accumulated production is fanatically destroyed, it does +not offers insights for the main issue of how to replace capitalism which by +the previous definition is inequality-producing machine. + +Embracing open source as a capitalism moto sounds like being a hacker until +page two, which is a prevailing ideology of the Silicon Valley elite, which +sounds much more a meritocracy than hacker culture. We should question things +instead of taking assumptions for granted. + +That's curious, because Raymond cites Buckminster's Fuller "ephemeralization" +concept in the opening words of his "The Magic Cauldron" essay, which could +be explored to a new dimension if economics and politics are understood also +as technological apparatus we use to live better. An ephemeralization, as +Raymond explains, is "technology becoming both more effective and less +expensive as the physical resources invested in early designs are replaced +by more and more information content" (page 115). + +So it's clear when Raymond makes assumptions he is actually making a choice on +capitalist markets and conservative politics (I don't like to use the term +libertarian: it causes confusions as it means different things on different +cultures). + +If we change the assumptions, we can build different, new economies and +politics with other different emergent properties, like those based on values +of emancipation and solidarity. There are other Magic Cauldrons for the Free +Software spell. + +## Ideas while reading the book + +* Hypothesis: sustainability of "Open Source" economic model in Brazil was mostly embraced + by the government, by an army of free lancers and by a small number of business; while + open source is widely used in the country, it's mostly on the free rider mode: everyone + using an open stack but develops unpublished code (either closed source os lazilly left + out of public sight) or "poor gifts" in the expression of Raymond himself. + +## Phenomenology + +* Linus Law: "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow" (page 30); + "debugging is parallelizable" (page 32). + +* Delphi Effect: "the averaged opinion of a mass of equally expert (or equally + ignorant) observers is quite a bit more reliable a predictor than the opinion + of a single randomly chosen observer" (page 31). + +* Brooks Law: "complexity and communication costs of a project rise with the + square number of developers" (pages 32, 49). + +## Freedom and hierarchy + +* Kropotkin is cited at page 52: "principle of understanding" versus the + "principle of command". + +* Conservative vision: "The Linux world behaves in many respects like a free + market or an ecology, a collection of selfish agents attempting to maximize + utility, which in the process produces a self-correcting spontaneous order + more elaborate and efficient than any amount of central planning could have + achieved." (page 52). Right afterwards he negates the existence of true + altruism. + +## Economics + +A very liberal point of view: + +* Homesteading the Noosphere: "customs that regulate the ownership and control + of open-source software [...] imply an underlying theory of property rights + homologous to the Lockean theory of land tenure" (65). + +* Open Source as a gift economy like a reputation game (81 - 83): + + Most ways humans have of organizing are adaptations to scarcity + and want. Each way carries with it different ways of gaining social status. + + The simples way is the _command hierarchy_ [where] scarce goods are allocated + by onde central authority and backed up by force. Command hierarchies scale + very poorly; they become increasingly inefficient as they get larger. + + [...] + + Our society is predominantly an exchange economy. This is a sofisticated + adaptation to scarcity that, unlike the command model, scales quite well. + Allocation of scarce goods is done in a decentralized way through trade + and voluntary coopreation. + + [...] + + Gift cultures are adaptations not to scarcity but to abundance. They arise + in populations that do not have significant material scarcity problems + with survival goods. + + [...] + + Abundance makes command relationships difficult to sustain and exchange + relationships an almost pointless game. In gift cultures, social status + is determined not by what you control but by _what you give away_. + + -- 80-81 + +He also explains that the reputation game is not the only drive in the +bazaar-style ecosystem: satisfaction, love, the "joy of craftsmanship" are also +motivations for software development (pages 82-83), which is compatible +with the gift economy model: + + How can one maximize quality if there is no metric for quality? + If scarcity economics doesn't operate, what metrics are available + besides peer evaluation? + + Other respondents related peer-esteem rewards and the joy of hacking + to the levels above subsistence needs in Abraham Maslow's well-known + 'hierachy of values' model of human motivation. + + -- 82-83 + +Cites both Ayn Rand and Nietzsche at page 88 when talking about "selfless" +motives, besides their "whatever other failings", saying that both +are "desconstructing" 'altruism' into unacknowledged kinds of self-interest. + +## The value of humility + + Furthermore, past bugs are not automatically held against a developer; the fact + that a bug has been fixed is generally considered more importante than the fact + that one used to be there. As one respontend observed, one can gain status by + fixing 'Emacs bugs', but not by fixing 'Richard Stallman's bugs' -- and it + would be considered extremely bad form to criticie Stallman for _old_ Emacs + bugs that have since been fixed. + + This makes an interesting contrast with many parts of academia, in which + trashing putatively defective work by others is an important mode of gaining + reputation. In the hacker culture, such behavior is rather heavily tabooed -- + so heavily, in fact, that the absence of such behavior did no present itself to + me as a datum until that one respondent with an unusual perdpective pointed it + out nearly a full year after this essay was first published! + + The taboo against attacks on competence (not shared with academia) is even more + revealing than the (shared) taboo on posturing, because we can relate it to a + difference between academia and hackerdom in their communications and support + structures. + + The hacker culture's medium of gifting is intangible, its communications + channels are poor at expressing emotional nuance, and face-to-face contact + among its members is the exception rather than the rule. This gives it a lower + tolerance of noise than most other gift cultures, and goes a long way to + explain both the taboo against posturing and the taboo against attacks on + competence. Any significant incidence of flames over hackers' competence would + intolerably disrupt the culture's reputation scoreboard. + + -- 90-91 + +What about Linus behavior, then? + + The same vulnerability to noise explains the model of public humility required + of the hacker community's tribal elders. They must be seen to be free of boast + and posturing so the taboo against dangerous noise will hold. + + Talking softly is also functional if one aspires to be a maintainer of a + successful project; one must convince the community that one has good + judgement, because most of the maintainer's job is going to be judging other + people's code. Who would be inclined to contribute work to someone who clearly + can't judge the quality of their own code, or whose behavior suggests they will + attempt to unfairly hog the reputation return from the project? Potential + contributors want project leaders with enough humility and class to be able to + to say, when objectively appropriate, ``Yes, that does work better than my + version, I'll use it''—and to give credit where credit is due. + + -- 91 + +## References + +* [Homesteading the Noosphere](http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/). diff --git a/books/technology/cybersyn.md b/books/technology/cybersyn.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d39522 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/technology/cybersyn.md @@ -0,0 +1,901 @@ +[[!meta title="Cybernetic Revolutionaries"]] + +* [Cybernetic Revolutionaries | Technology and Politics in Allende's Chile](http://www.cyberneticrevolutionaries.com/). +* [Cybernetic Revolutionaries | The MIT Press](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/cybernetic-revolutionaries). +* Further references [here](https://links.fluxo.info/tags/cybersyn). + +## General + +* Diagram of The Class War as a homeostatic system, 200. + +## Control and descentralization + + Beer’s writings on management cybernetics differed from the contemporaneous + work taking place in the U.S. military and think tanks such as RAND that led to the de- + velopment of computer systems for top- down command and control. From the 1950s + onward, Beer had drawn from his understanding of the human nervous system to + propose a form of management that allowed businesses to adapt quickly to a changing + environment. A major theme in Beer’s writings was finding a balance between central- + ized and decentralized control, and in particular how to ensure the stability of the + entire firm without sacrificing the autonomy of its component parts. + + Similarly, the Popular Unity government confronted the challenge of how to imple- + ment substantial social, political, and economic changes without sacrificing Chile’s + preexisting constitutional framework of democracy. A distinguishing feature of Chile’s + socialist process was the determination to expand the reach of the state without sac- + rificing the nation’s existing civil liberties and democratic institutions. Both Beer and + Popular Unity were thus deeply interested in ways of maintaining organizational + stability in the context of change and finding a balance between autonomy and + cohesion. + + -- 16 + +## Adaptive Control + + The idea of control is commonly associated with domination. Beer offered a different + definition: he defined control as self- regulation, or the ability of a system to adapt to + internal and external changes and survive. This alternative approach to control re- + sulted in multiple misunderstandings of Beer’s work, and he was repeatedly criticized + for using computers to create top- down control systems that his detractors equated + with authoritarianism and the loss of individual freedom. Such criticisms extended to + the design of Project Cybersyn, but, as this book illustrates, they were to some extent + ill- informed. To fully grasp how Beer approached the control problem requires a brief + introduction to his cybernetic vocabulary. + + Beer was primarily concerned with the study of “exceedingly complex systems,” + or “systems so involved that they are indescribable in detail.” 52 He contrasted exceed- + ingly complex systems with simple but dynamic systems such as a window catch, + which has few components and interconnections, and complex systems, which have a + greater number of components and connections but can be described in considerable + detail + + [...] + + In Beer’s opinion, traditional science did a good job of handling simple and complex + systems but fell short in its ability to describe, let alone regulate, exceedingly complex + systems. Cybernetics, Beer argued, could provide tools for understanding and control- + ling these exceedingly complex systems and help these systems adapt to problems + yet unknown. The trick was to “black- box” parts of the system without losing the key + characteristics of the original. 53 + + The idea of the black box originated in electrical engineering and referred to a sealed + box whose contents are hidden but that can receive an electrical input and whose + output the engineer can observe. By varying the input and observing the output, the + engineer can discern something about the contents of the box without ever seeing its + inner workings. Black- boxing parts of an exceedingly complex system preserved the + behavior of the original but did not require the observer to create an exact representa- + tion of how the system worked. Beer believed that it is possible to regulate exceedingly + complex systems without fully understanding their inner workings, asserting, “It is not + necessary to enter the black box to understand the nature of the function it performs” + or to grasp the range of the subsystem’s behaviors. 54 In other words, it is more impor- + tant to grasp what things do than to understand fully how they work. To regulate the + behavior of such a system requires a regulator that has as much flexibility as the system + it wishes to control and that can respond to and regulate all behaviors of subsystems + that have been black- boxed. + + [...] + + Controlling an exceedingly complex system with high variety therefore requires a + regulator that can react to and govern every one of these potential states, or, to put + it another way, respond to the variety of the system. “Often one hears the optimistic + demand: ‘give me a simple control system; one that cannot go wrong,’ ” Beer writes. + “The trouble with such ‘simple’ controls is that they have insufficient variety to cope + with the variety in the environment. . . . Only variety in the control mechanism can + deal successfully with variety in the system controlled.” 56 This last observation—that + only variety can control variety—is the essence of Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety and + a fundamental principle in Beer’s cybernetic work. 57 + + The Law of Requisite Variety makes intuitive sense: it is impossible to truly control + another unless you can respond to all attempts at subversion. This makes it extremely + difficult, if not impossible, to control an exceedingly complex system if control is de- + fined as domination. History is filled with instances of human beings’ trying to exert + control over nature, biology, and other human beings—efforts that have failed because + of their limited variety. Many of the most powerful medicines cannot adapt to all per- + mutations of a disease. Recent work in the sociology of science has positioned Beer’s + idea of control in contrast to the modernist ethos of many science and engineering + endeavors, which have sought to govern ecosystems, bodily functions, and natural + topographies. Despite the many successes associated with such projects, these efforts + at control still have unexpected, and sometimes undesirable, results. 58 + + Beer challenged the common definition of control as domination, which he viewed + as authoritarian and oppressive and therefore undesirable. It was also “naïve, primi- + tive and ridden with an almost retributive idea of causality.” What people viewed as + control, Beer continued, was nothing more than “a crude process of coercion,” an + observation that emphasized the individual agency of the entity being controlled. 59 + Instead of using science to dominate the outside world, scientists should focus on + identifying the equilibrium conditions among subsystems and developing regulators + to help the overall system reach its natural state of stability. Beer emphasized creating + lateral communication channels among the different subsystems so that the changes in + one subsystem could be absorbed by changes in the others. 60 This approach, he argued, + took advantage of the flexibility of each subsystem. Instead of creating a regulator to fix + the behavior of each subsystem, he found ways to couple subsystems together so that + they could respond to each other and adapt. Such adaptive couplings helped maintain + the stability of the overall system. + + Beer called the natural state of system stability homeostasis . 61 The term refers to the + ability of a system to withstand disturbances in its external environment through its + own dynamic self- regulation, such as that achieved by coupling subsystems to one + another. Beer argued that reaching homeostasis is crucial to the survival of any system, + whether it is mechanical, biological, or social. Control through homeostasis rather + than through domination gives the system greater flexibility and facilitated adaptation, + Beer argued. He therefore proposed an alternative idea of control, which he defined + as “a homeostatic machine for regulating itself.” 62 In a 1969 speech before the United + Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization, Beer stated that the “sensible + course for the manager is not to try to change the system’s internal behavior . . . but to + change its structure —so that its natural systemic behavior becomes different. All of this + says that management is not so much part of the system managed as it is the system’s + own designer.” 63 In other words, cybernetic management as described by Beer looked + for ways to redesign the structure of a company or state enterprise so that it would + naturally tend toward stability and the desired behavior. + + In addition, cybernetic management sought to create a balance between horizontal + and vertical forms of communication and control. Because changes in one subsystem + could be absorbed and adapted to by changes in others (via lateral communication), + each subsystem retained the ability to change its behavior, within certain limits, with- + out threatening the overall stability of the system and could do so without direction + from the vertical chain of command. To look at it another way, cybernetic manage- + ment approached the control problem in a way that preserved a degree of freedom and + autonomy for the parts without sacrificing the stability of the whole. + The first edition of Beer’s 1959 book Cybernetics and Management did not make many + + -- 26-29 + +## The Liberty Machine + + The Liberty Machine modeled a sociotechnical system that functioned as a dis- + seminated network, not a hierarchy; it treated information, not authority, as the basis + for action, and operated in close to real time to facilitate instant decision making and + eschew bureaucratic protocols. Beer contended that this design promoted action over + bureaucratic practice and prevented top- down tyranny by creating a distributed net- + work of shared information. The Liberty Machine distributed decision making across + different government offices, but it also required all subordinate offices to limit their + actions so as not to threaten the survival of the overall organization, in this case, a gov- + ernment. The Liberty Machine thus achieved the balance between centralized control + and individual freedom that had characterized Beer’s earlier work. + + [...] + + Beer posited that such a Liberty Machine could create a government where “com- + petent information is free to act,” meaning that once government officials become + aware of a problem, they could address it quickly; expert knowledge, not bureaucratic + politics, would guide policy. However, Beer did not critically explore what constitutes + “competent information” or how cybernetics might resolve disagreements within the + scientific community or within other communities of expertise. Moreover, it is not + clear how he separated bureaucracy from a system of checks and balances that might + slow action but prevent abuse. + + -- 33 + +## Viable System Model + + The Viable System Model offered a management structure for the regulation of ex- + ceedingly complex systems. It was based on Beer’s understanding of how the human + nervous system functioned, and it applied these insights more generally to the behav- + ior of organizations such as a company, government, or factory. 81 + + [...] + + Beer maintained that the abstraction of the structure could be applied in numerous + contexts, including the firm, the body, and the state. In keeping with Beer’s emphasis + on performance rather than representation, it was not a model that accurately repre- + sented what these systems were; rather, it was a model that described how these sys- + tems behaved. The Viable System Model functioned recursively: the parts of a viable + system were also viable, and their behavior could be described using the Viable System + Model. Beer explains: “The whole is always encapsulated in each part. . . . This is a les- + son learned from biology where we find the genetic blue- print of the whole organism + in every cell.” 83 Thus, Beer maintained that the state, the company, the worker, and the + cell all exhibit the same series of structural relationships. + + The Viable System Model devised ways to promote vertical and lateral communica- + tion. It offered a balance between centralized and decentralized control that prevented + both the tyranny of authoritarianism and the chaos of total freedom. Beer considered + viable systems to be largely self- organizing. Therefore, the model sought to maximize + the autonomy of its component parts so that they could organize themselves as they + saw fit. At the same time, it retained channels for vertical control to maintain the stabil- + ity of the whole system. These aspects of the Viable System Model shaped the design of + Project Cybersyn and provide another illustration of how Beer and Popular Unity were + exploring similar approaches to the problem of control. + + [...] + + The Viable System Model did not impose a hierarchical form of management in a + traditional sense. The dynamic communication between System One and System Two + enabled a form of adaptive man- + + [...] + + The Viable System Model draws a distinction between the bottom three levels of the + system, which govern daily operations, and the upper two levels of management, which + determine future development and the overall direction of the enterprise. Because the + lower three levels manage day- to- day activities and filter upward only the most impor- + tant information, the upper two levels are free to think about larger questions. In this + sense, Beer’s model tackled the idea of information overload long before the Internet + required us to wade into and make sense of an expanding sea of information. + + -- 35-38 + +## Management Cybernetics and Revolution + + The tension inherent in Beer’s model between individual autonomy and the welfare + of the collective organism mirrors the struggle between competing ideologies found in + Allende’s democratic socialism. Allende’s interpretation of Marx’s writings emphasized + the importance of respecting Chile’s existing democratic processes in bringing about + socialist reform, a possibility that Marx alluded to but never realized. 91 In contrast to + the centralized planning found in the Soviet Union, Allende’s articulation of socialism + stressed a commitment to decentralized governance with worker participation in man- + agement, reinforcing his professed belief in individual freedoms. Yet he also acknowl- + edged that in the face of political plurality the government would favor the “interest of + those who made their living by their own work” and that revolution should be brought + about from above with a “firm guiding hand.” 92 + + [...] + + In October 1970, nine months before Beer heard from Flores, the cybernetician de- + livered an address in London titled “This Runaway World—Can Man Gain Control?” + In this lecture Beer unknowingly foretold his coming involvement with the Allende + government. Commenting that government in its present form could not adequately + handle the complex challenges of modern society, Beer concluded: “What is needed is + structural change. Nothing else will do. . . . The more I reflect on these facts, the more + I perceive that the evolutionary approach to adaptation in social systems simply will + not work any more. . . . It has therefore become clear to me over the years that I am + advocating revolution.” 94 Beer added, “Do not let us have our revolution the hard way, + whereby all that mankind has successfully built may be destroyed. We do not need to + embark on the revolutionary process, with bombs and fire. But we must start with a + genuinely revolutionary intention: to devise wholly new methods for handling our + problems.” 95 Less than one year later, Beer would be in Chile helping a government + accomplish exactly this. + + -- 39-40 + +## Cyberfolk + + Thus Beer proposed building a new form of real- time communication, one that + would allow the people to communicate their feelings directly to the government. He + called this system Project Cyberfolk. In a handwritten report Beer describes how to + build a series of “algedonic meters” capable of measuring how happy Chileans were + with their government at any given time. 72 As noted in chapter 1, Beer used the word + algedonic to describe a signal of pleasure or pain. An algedonic meter would allow the + public to express its pleasure or pain, or its satisfaction or dissatisfaction with govern- + ment actions. + + -- 89 + +## Constructing the Liberty Machine + + As scientific director Beer created a work culture closer to the startup culture of the + 1990s than to the chain- of- command bureaucracy that flourished in the 1960s and + 1970s and was characteristic of Chilean government agencies. He viewed his position + as scientific director more as that of a “free agent” than a micromanager. After establish- + ing offices at the State Technology Institute (INTEC) and the Sheraton, he informed the + team that he would work at either location at his discretion and call on project team + members as required. Moreover, he refused to stick to a traditional nine- to- five work + schedule. Team members often found themselves working alongside the bearded cyber- + netician into the wee hours of the morning. This schedule enabled them to attend to + other projects at their regular jobs during the day and helped create an informal cama- + raderie among team members that bolstered their enthusiasm for the project. + + [...] + + In a memo to the Cybersyn team, Beer explains that he broke Cybersyn into clearly de- + fined subprojects that small teams could address intensively. This arrangement allowed + for a “meeting of the minds” within the smaller group, and because the small team + did not need approval from the larger group, it could progress quickly. At the same + time Beer insisted that each team keep the others informed of its progress. He arranged + large brainstorming sessions that brought together the members of different subteams. + In these sessions, he instructed, “sniping and bickering are OUT. Brain- storming is es- + sentially CREATIVE. . . . At least everyone gets to know everyone else, and how their + minds work. This activity is essentially FUN: fun generates friendship, and drags us all + out of our personal holes- in- the- ground.” Project leaders could then take ideas from + the brainstorming sessions and use them to improve their part of the project, thus in- + corporating the suggestions of others. Beer contrasted this “fun” style of management + with the more common practice of bringing all interested parties together to make + project decisions. That approach, he felt, eventually led to bickering, sniping, or sleep- + ing. It “masquerades as ‘democratic,’ [but] is very wasteful,” he observed. 12 In addition, + he required all project leaders to write a progress report at the end of each month and + distribute it to the other team leaders. Beer viewed the brainstorming sessions and + the written project reports as serving a function similar to the signals passed between + the different organs of the body: they kept members of the team aware of activities + elsewhere. They also allowed the different subteams to adapt to progress or setbacks + elsewhere and helped Cybersyn maintain its viability as a coordinated project while it + advanced toward completion. + + -- 97-99 + +## The October Strike + + Flores proposed setting up a central command center in the presidential palace that + would bring together the president, the cabinet, the heads of the political parties in + the Popular Unity coalition, and representatives from the National Labor Federation— + approximately thirty- five people by Grandi’s estimation. Once these key people were + brought together in one place and apprised of the national situation, Flores reasoned, + they could then reach out to the networks of decision makers in their home institu- + tions and get things done. This human network would help the government make + decisions quickly and thus allow it to adapt to a rapidly changing situation. “Forget + technology,” Flores said—this network consisted of “normal people,” a point that is + well taken but also oversimplistic. 21 The solution he proposed was social and technical, + as it configured machines and human beings in a way that could help the government + adapt and survive. + + In addition to the central command hub in the presidential palace, Flores estab- + lished a number of specialized command centers dedicated to transportation, industry, + energy, banking, agriculture, health, and the supply of goods. Telex machines, many + of which were already in place for Project Cybersyn, connected these specialized com- + mand centers to the presidential palace. 22 Flores also created a secret telephone network + consisting of eighty- four numbers and linking some of the most important people in + the government, including members of the Popular Unity coalition and the National + Labor Federation. According to Grandi, this phone network remained active through- + out the remainder of Allende’s presidency. 23 + + Both the telex and the telephone network allowed the command centers to re- + ceive upward flows of current information from across the country and to disseminate + government orders back down, bypassing the bureaucracy. Flores assembled a team at + the presidential palace that would analyze the data sent over the network and compile + these data into reports. High- ranking members of government used these reports to + inform their decisions, which Flores’s team then communicated using the telex and + telephone networks. This arrangement gave the government the ability to make more + dynamic decisions. + + The Project Cybersyn telex room, housed in the State Development Corporation + (CORFO), served as the industrial command center during the strike. In addition to + transmitting the daily production data needed for the Cyberstride software, the CORFO + telex machines now carried urgent messages about factory production. “There were + enterprises that reported shortages of fuel,” Espejo recalled. Using the network, those + in the industrial command center could “distribute this message to the enterprises that + could help.” 24 The network also enabled the government to address distribution prob- + lems, such as locating trucks that were available to carry the raw materials and spare + parts needed to maintain production in Chilean factories, or determining which roads + remained clear of obstructionist strike activity. Espejo recalled, “The sector committees + were able to ask the enterprises to send raw materials, transport vehicles, or whatever + to another enterprise” that needed them. At the same time, enterprises could send re- + quests to the sector committees and have these requests addressed immediately. “It was + a very practical thing,” Espejo continued, referring in particular to the state- appointed + managers known as interventors. “You are the interventor of an enterprise, you are run- + ning out of fuel, you ask the corresponding sector committee. . . . Or [the interventors] + know that the raw materials they need are available in Valparaíso and that they need a + truck to go and get it. With bureaucratic procedures it would have been more difficult + to resolve these situations.” 25 + + [...] + + After the strike, Silva said, “two concepts stayed in our mind: that + information helps you make decisions and, above all, that it [the telex + machine] helps you keep a record of this information, which is different from + making a telephone call. [Having this record] lets you correct your mistakes + and see why things happened.” Silva added that the energy command center relied + primarily on the telex network because it gave up- to- + + [...] + + The telex network thus extended the reach of the social network that Flores had + assembled in the presidential command center and created a sociotechnical network + in the most literal sense. Moreover, the network connected the vertical command + of the government to the horizontal activities that were taking place on the shop + floor. To put it another way, the network offered a communications infrastructure + to link the revolution from above, led by Allende, to the revolution from below, led + by Chilean workers and members of grassroots organizations, and helped coordinate + the activities of both in a time of crisis. + + -- 148-150 + +## Automation, autonomy and worker participation + + Beer was spinning ideas in “One Year of (Relative) Solitude,” but he was aiming for + a new technological approach to the worker participation question that would create a + more democratic and less stratified workplace. And he concluded that giving workers + control of technology, both its use and its design, could constitute a new form of + worker empowerment. + + This assertion differed substantially from how other industrial studies of the day + approached the relationship of computer technology and labor in twentieth- century + production. Such studies, especially those inspired by Marxist analysis, often presented + computers and computer- controlled machinery as tools of capital that automated la- + bor, led to worker deskilling, and gave management greater control of the shop floor. + In Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974), Harry Braverman credits such machinery “as the + prime means whereby production may be controlled not by the direct producer but by the owner + and representatives of capital ” and cites computer technology as routinizing even highly + skilled professions such as engineering. 53 + + [...] + + In the 1950s Norbert Wiener, author of Cybernetics , believed computers would + usher in a second industrial revolution and lead to the creation of an + automatic factory. In The Human Use of Human Beings (1954), he worries that + auto- mated machinery “is the precise economic equivalent of slave labor. Any + labor which competes with slave labor must accept the economic conditions of + slave labor.” 56 + + -- 159-160 + + Two factors explain the difference between Beer and Braverman, who were writing + at about the same time. First, the computer system Beer designed did not automate + labor. Given the Popular Unity commitment to raising employment levels, automating + labor would not have made political sense. Second, Beer was writing and working in a + different political context than Braverman. The context of Chilean socialism inspired + Beer and gave him the freedom to envision new forms of worker participation that were + more substantial than what Braverman saw in the United States. It also allowed Beer + to see computer technology as something other than an abusive capitalist tool used by + management to control labor. Beer’s approach also reflected his position as a hired sci- + ence and technology consultant. His use of technology to address worker participation + differed from the contemporaneous efforts of the Allende government on this issue, + efforts that had focused on devising new governing committees within the industrial + sector and electing worker representatives. + + [...] + + Beer’s proposal bears a close resemblance to the work on participatory design that + emerged from the social democratic governments in Scandinavia in the 1970s. The + history of participatory design is often tied to Scandinavian trade union efforts to em- + power workers during that decade, and thus to create a more equitable power relation- + ship between labor and capital in Scandinavian factories. 58 These efforts were either + contemporaneous to Beer’s December report or began several years later, depending on + historical interpretation. Like the aforementioned automation studies, early participa- + tory design work viewed technologies such as computer systems as representing the + interests of management, not labor. However, participatory design used the primacy of + management as a starting point and then tried to change the dynamics of the labor- + capital relationship by changing the social practices surrounding the design and use + of technology. + + -- 161 + + Furthermore, appointing worker representatives to control the use of Cybersyn + would not guarantee that the system would be used in a way that represented the best + interests of the rank and file. Studies of worker participation have shown that worker + representatives often separate themselves from their co- workers on the shop floor and + form a new group of administrators. As Juan Espinosa and Andrew Zimbalist write in + their study of worker participation in Allende’s Chile, “It has been the historical experi- + ence, with a few exceptions, that those interpreting workers’ priorities and needs have + grown apart from the workers they are supposed to represent. . . . [They] become a new + class of privileged administrators.” 63 Simply put, it would be impossible to give “the + workers” control of Cybersyn as Beer suggested, even if Chilean workers possessed the + skills to use the technology or build the factory models. + + Despite these oversights, Beer did realize that the October Strike was a transforma- + tive event for Chilean workers. Their self- organization and improvisation during the + strike played a central role in maintaining production, transportation, and distribu- + tion across the country. During the strike, workers organized to defend their factories + from paramilitary attacks, retooled their machines to perform new tasks, and set up + new community networks to distribute essential goods directly to the Chilean people. + Members of larger industrial belts collaborated with other groups of workers to seize + private- sector enterprises that had stopped production during the strike. Historian Pe- + ter Winn notes that during the strike workers came together regardless of politics, + industrial sector, factory, or status, thus “generating the dynamism, organization, and + will to stalemate the counterrevolutionary offensive and transform it into an opportu- + nity for revolutionary advance.” 64 In short, the strike transformed the mindset of the + Chilean working class and showed that workers could take control of their destiny and + accelerate the revolutionary process. + + -- 162-163 + +## Self-organization + + Despite these oversights, Beer did realize that the October Strike was a transforma- + tive event for Chilean workers. Their self- organization and improvisation during the + strike played a central role in maintaining production, transportation, and distribu- + tion across the country. During the strike, workers organized to defend their factories + from paramilitary attacks, retooled their machines to perform new tasks, and set up + new community networks to distribute essential goods directly to the Chilean people. + Members of larger industrial belts collaborated with other groups of workers to seize + private- sector enterprises that had stopped production during the strike. Historian Pe- + ter Winn notes that during the strike workers came together regardless of politics, + industrial sector, factory, or status, thus “generating the dynamism, organization, and + will to stalemate the counterrevolutionary offensive and transform it into an opportu- + nity for revolutionary advance.” 64 In short, the strike transformed the mindset of the + Chilean working class and showed that workers could take control of their destiny and + accelerate the revolutionary process. + + Although his information was limited, Beer was aware of workers’ activities during + the strike, and was excited by them. In fact, the ideas he presented in his December + report, “One Year of (Relative) Solitude,” were designed to support the “people’s auton- + omy.” Beer wrote, “The new task [outlined in the report] is to try and get all this, plus + the spontaneous things that I know are happening [such as the cordones industriales ] + together.” 65 From his perspective, it looked as if Chilean workers were self- organizing + to keep the larger revolutionary project viable. It is important to stress, especially given + the criticism he would receive in the months that followed, that Beer viewed his role as + using science and technology to help support these bottom- up initiatives. + + Although Beer’s take on participatory design was inspired by the events of the Oc- + tober Strike, it also came from his understandings of cybernetics. “The basic answer of + cybernetics to the question of how the system should be organized is that it ought to + organize itself,” Beer writes in the pages of Decision and Control . 66 In his writings Beer of- + ten cited nature as a complex system that remains viable through its self- organization. + He argued that such systems do not need to be designed because they already exist. To + modify the behavior of such a system, one need not control its every aspect but rather + change one subsystem so that the overall system naturally drifts toward the desired + goal. Perhaps the injection of worker action could drive Chile toward a new point of + homeostatic equilibrium, one that was congruent with the overall goal of socialist + transformation. + + -- 163-164 + +## Cybernetics + + Increasingly, Cybersyn was becoming a technological project divorced from its + cybernetic and political origins. The best- known component of the project, + the telex network, was not even associ- ated with the overall Cybersyn system, + let alone with Beer’s ideas about management cybernetics. + + In contrast, members of the core group had become serious students of cybernetics. + Several months earlier they had formed a small study group known as the Group of + 14 and tasked themselves with learning more about cybernetics and related scientific + work in psychology, biology, computer science, and information theory. They read the + work of Warren Weaver, Claude Shannon, Heinz von Foerster, and Herbert Simon and + invited Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela to speak to the + group (both accepted). Maturana was arguably the first substantial connection between + Chile and the international cybernetics community. In 1959, while a graduate student + at Harvard, he had coauthored an important paper, “What the Frog’s Eye Tells the + Frog’s Brain,” with Warren McCulloch, Jerome Lettvin, and Walter Pitts, all of whom + were important figures in the growing field of cybernetics. 76 + + -- 166 + +## Cybersyn Goes Public + + These initial press accounts illustrate a finding from science studies research, namely, + that for a technology to be successful it must be taken up by people other than the in- + ventors. What Bruno Latour, a sociologist of science, writes of scientific ideas also holds + true for technologies: “You need them , to make your [scientific] paper a decisive one.” 16 + However, this appropriation creates a dangerous situation. Engineers need others to + support their technologies so that the technology will be successful, but in the process + the engineers lose control of their invention. Latour warns, “The total movement . . . + of a statement, of an artefact, will depend to some extent on your action but to a much + greater extent on that of a crowd over which you have little control.” 17 As Latour ob- + serves, others may decide to accept the technology as it is, but they could also dismiss, + appropriate, or change the technology in fundamental ways. + + -- 177 + +## Simple technologies + + To these criticisms, Beer responded that the system used simple technologies such + as telex machines, drew from excellent programming talent in London and Santiago, + and relied on many “human interfaces,” meaning it was not automated. He also said + that he was tired of hearing the assertion that such a system could be built only in the + United States, and stressed that building the futuristic control room required only “the + managerial acceptance of the idea, plus the will to see it realized.” 18 But, he added, “I + finally found both the acceptance and the will—on the other side of the world.” 19 This + final comment was a not- so- subtle jab at his British compatriots, who over the years + had questioned the legitimacy and feasibility of his cybernetic ideas. + + -- 178 + +## Necessary instability; power and control + + The comments Espejo, Flores, and Schwember telexed to Beer show that they ob- + jected to other facets of the speech as drafted. They wrote that, while they agreed + that cybernetic thinking might help the government increase social stability, they + also wondered whether instability might be an important part of social progress. “His- + torical development is a succession of equilibriums and unequilibriums [ sic ],” Espejo + telexed. Disequilibrium “might be indispensable.” This is an interesting observation, + although it was not raised as an objection to Cybersyn in subsequent press accounts. + The Chileans also challenged Beer’s framing of the Chilean revolution as a control + problem. “The social phenomena goes [ sic ] further than the control problem,” Espejo + wrote; “there is for instance the problem of power.” If cybernetics looked only at con- + trol and ignored power relationships, “there is the danger that cybernetics might be + used for social repression,” Espejo continued, echoing the fears that had already ap- + peared in the press. Beer responded: “I cannot write the next book in this one lec- + ture.” 30 But perhaps Beer would have given greater thought to this issue had he known + that his critics would be most concerned with whether Cybersyn facilitated social + repression. + + [...] + + Beer writes that “the polarity between centralization and + decentralization—one masquerading as oppression and the other as freedom—is a + myth. Even if the homeostatic balance point turns out not to be always + computable, it surely exists. The poles are two absurdities for any viable + system, as our own bodies will tell us.” 31 The algedonic, or warning, signals + that Cybersyn sent to alert higher management constituted a threat to factory + freedom but it was a necessary one, for not alerting higher management might + pose a greater threat to system survival. “The body politic cannot sustain the + risk of autonomic inac- tion any more than we can as human beings,” Beer + observed. 32 In proposing the idea of effective freedom, Beer was arguing (1) + that freedom was something that could be calculated and (2) that freedom should + be quantitatively circumscribed to ensure the stability of the overall system. + For those who had followed Beer’s work over the years, effective freedom was a + new term to describe the balance of centralized and decentral- ized control + that Beer had advocated for more than a decade. It also reflected the same + principles as Allende’s democratic socialism, which increased state power but + preserved civil liberties. But for the uninitiated, the claim that a control + system that explicitly limited freedom actually preserved and promoted freedom + must have seemed like a political slogan straight out of 1984 . 33 + + -- 180-181 + + In fact, Hanlon was not alone in recognizing Cybersyn’s potential for + centralized control. On 1 March Beer telexed to Espejo, “Accusations come from + Britain and the USA. Invitations [to build comparable systems] come from Brazil + and South Africa.” Considering the repressive governments that were in power in + Brazil and South Africa in the early 1970s, it is easy to sympathize with + Beer’s lament: “You can see what a false position I am in.” 46 Beer was + understandably frustrated with these international misinterpretations of his + cybernetic work. + + However, it took little political imagination to see how putting Cybersyn in a differ- + ent social, political, and organizational context could make the system an instrument + of centralized control. Beer had tried to embed political values in Cybersyn’s design, + but he engineered them in the social and organizational aspects of the Cybersyn sys- + tem, in addition to the technology itself. As safeguards, these social and organizational + arrangements were not very strong. Archived telexes from the project team show that if + the Cyberstride software detected a production indicator outside the accepted range of + values, a member of the National Computer Corporation (ECOM) alerted the affected + enterprise, those in the central telex room in CORFO, and Espejo in the CORFO infor- + matics directorate—all at the same time. + + -- 183-184 + +## Feasibility + + Grosch’s letter to the editor underlines the assumption that industrialized nations, + such as the United States and the nations of Western Europe, pioneered modern com- + puter capabilities; nations of the developing world, such as Chile, did not. In his let- + ter Grosch wrote that Project Cybersyn could not be built in a “strange and primitive + hardware and software environment,” such as that found in Chile, and in such a short + time. + + -- 186-187 + + For the system to function, human beings also needed to be disciplined and brought + into line. In the case of Cybersyn, integrating human beings into the system, and thus + changing their behavior, proved just as difficult as building the telex network or pro- + gramming the software—or perhaps even more difficult. While the Cybersyn team could + exert some degree of control over the computer resources, construction of the operations + room, or installation of a telex machine, they had very little control over what was tak- + ing place within the factories, including levels of management participation or whether + Cybersyn would be integrated into existing management practices. Espejo and Benadof + lacked the authority to force the state- run factories to implement Cybersyn, and indus- + trial managers remained unconvinced that it warranted their total compliance. + + -- 190 + +## Conclusions + + This history is a case study for better understanding the multifaceted relationship + of technology and politics. In particular, I have used this history to address (1) how + governments have envisioned using computer and communications technologies to + bring about structural change in society; (2) the ways technologists have tried to em- + bed political values in the design of technical systems; (3) the challenges associated + with such efforts; and (4) how studying the relationship of technology and politics + can reveal the important but often hidden role of technology in history and enhance + our understanding of historical processes. Forty years later, this little- known story also + has much to say about the importance of transnational collaboration, technological + innovation, and the ways in which geopolitics influences technology. + + Computer and communications technologies have often been linked to processes + of political, economic, and social transformation. But claims that these technologies + can bring about structural change in society—like the frequent assertion that comput- + ers will bring democracy or greater social equality—are often made in the absence + of historical analysis. + + -- 212 + + Project Cybersyn is an example of the difficulty of creating a sociotechnical system + designed to change existing social relationships and power configurations and then + enforce the new patterns over time. Scientific techniques may conceal biases with a + veneer of neutrality and thus lead to undesirable results. For example, Allende charged + the Project Cybersyn team with building a system that supported worker participation. + Yet the scientific techniques Chilean engineers used to model the state- controlled fac- + tories resembled Taylorism, a rationalized approach to factory production that disem- + powered workers and gave management greater control over labor. Time analysis, for + example, emerged in the context of capitalist production, prioritizing efficiency and + productivity over other values, such as the quality of shop floor life. By using time- + analysis techniques, Cybersyn engineers could have inadvertently created production + relationships that were counter to the Popular Unity platform and then solidified them + in the form of a computer model. + + Sociotechnical relationships must also remain intact for the system to maintain the + desired configuration of power. Changing these technical, social, and organizational + relationships may also change the distribution of power within the system. As I have + shown, in some cases it is much easier to change a sociotechnical system than to hold it + static. The history of Project Cybersyn suggests that the interpretation of sociotechnical + relationships is especially malleable when a system is new, forms part of a controversial + political project, or requires existing social, technical, and organizational relationships + to change in substantial ways. + + This malleability makes it extremely difficult to marry a sociotechnical system to a + specific set of political values, especially if the goal is to create dramatic changes in the + status quo. In the case of Cybersyn, journalists, scientists, and government officials all + + [...] + + Once separated from the social and organizational relations that Beer imagined, + the technology of Project Cybersyn could support many different forms of + government, including totalitarianism. If Project Cybersyn had been implemented + as Beer imagined, it might have become a system that supported such values as + democracy, participation, and autonomy. But as its critics perceived, it would + have been easy to circumvent the technological and organizational safeguards + the team designed; therefore, it would have been easy for the system to support + a different set of political values, especially in different social, + organizational, and geographic settings. Value- centered design is a + complicated and challenging endeavor. Even if technolo- + + [...] + + Even if technologists attempt to build certain relationships into the design + of a technological system, which itself is a fraught and socially negotiated + process, they have no guarantee that others will adopt the system in the + desired way—or that they will adopt the system at all. + + -- 215-216 + + This history further reveals that different nations have very different experiences + with computer technology and that these experiences are connected to the political, + economic, and geographic contexts of these nations. Chilean democratic socialism + prompted the creation of a computer technology that furthered the specific aims of + the Chilean revolution and would not have made sense in the United States. The Chil- + ean context also differed from that of the Soviet Union in fundamental ways. Because + Chile was significantly smaller than the Soviet Union in its geography, population, and + industrial output, building a computer system to help regulate the Chilean economy + was a more manageable affair. In addition, the Soviet solution used computers for cen- + tralized top- down control and collected a wealth of data about industrial production + activities with the goal of improving state planning. In contrast, the Cybersyn team + used Beer’s view of management cybernetics to create a system that emphasized action + as well as planning; and the system sent limited quantities of information up the gov- + ernment hierarchy, and tried to maximize factory self- management without sacrificing + the health of the entire economy. As this contrast shows, technologies are the product + of the people involved in their creation and the political and economic moments in + which they are built. + + -- 218 + + This particular transnational collaboration sheds light on processes of technologi- + cal innovation in differently situated world contexts. Project Cybersyn, a case study + of technological innovation, was a cutting- edge system using technologies that were + far from the most technologically sophisticated. A network of telex machines trans- + formed a middle- of- the- road mainframe computer into a new form of economic com- + munication. Slide projectors presented new visual representations of economic data. + Hand- drawn graphs showing data collected on a daily basis gave the government a + macroscopic view of economic activity and identified the areas of the economy most + in need of attention. Project Cybersyn thus challenges the assumption that advanced + technologies need to be complex. Sophisticated systems can be built using simple tech- + nologies, provided that particular attention is paid to how humans interact and the + ways that technology can change the dynamics of these interactions. Project Cybersyn + may be a useful example for thinking about sustainable design or the creation of tech- + nologies for regions of the world with limited resources. 3 + + This story of technological innovation also challenges the assumption that innova- + tion results from private- sector competition in an open marketplace. Disconnection + from the global marketplace, as occurred in Chile, can also lead to technological in- + novation and even make it a necessity. This history has shown that the state, as well + as the private sector, can support innovation. The history of technology also backs this + finding; for example, in the United States the state played a central role in funding + high- risk research in important areas such as computing and aviation. However, this + lesson is often forgotten. As we recover from the effects of a financial crisis, brought + on in large part by our extraordinary faith in the logic of the free market, it is a lesson + that is worth remembering. + + -- 219-220 + + Geopolitics also shapes our understandings of technological development and tech- + nological change. If historians, technologists, designers, educators, and policy makers + continue to give substantial and disproportionate attention to the technologies that + triumph, a disproportionate number of which were built in the industrial centers of the + world, they miss seeing the richness of the transnational cross- fertilization that occurs + outside the industrial centers and the complex ways that people, ideas, and artifacts + move and evolve in the course of their travels. Technological innovation is the result + of complex social, political, and economic relationships that span nations and cultures. + To understand the dynamics of technological development—and perhaps thereby do + a better job of encouraging it—we must broaden our view of where technological in- + novation occurs and give greater attention to the areas of the world marginalized by + these studies in the past. + + -- 221 + +## Epilogue + + While on Dawson Island, Flores and the other prisoners reflected on their experi- + ences during the previous three years and, as a group, tried to understand the com- + plexities of Chilean socialism and what had gone wrong. Flores offered the group a + cybernetic interpretation of events, which resonated with Allende’s former minister of + mining, Sergio Bitar. When Bitar published a detailed history of the Allende govern- + ment in 1986, he used cybernetics to explain in part what happened during Allende’s + presidency. Bitar writes, “In the present case [the Allende government], systemic variety + grew because of structural alterations and disturbance of the existing self- regulatory + mechanisms (principally those of the market). But the directing center (the govern- + ment) did not expand its variety controls with the necessary speed; nor could it replace + the existing self- regulatory mechanism with new ones.” Bitar concludes that “when + a complex system [the Chilean nation] is subject to transformation it is essential to + master systemic variety at every moment.” 17 This choice of language, seemingly out of + place in a study of political history, shows that Chile’s encounter with cybernetics not + only led to the creation of Project Cybersyn but also shaped how some members of the + Allende government made sense of the history they had lived. + + -- 229 + + But the more Flores read, the more he began to see the limitations of cybernetic + thinking. While Flores still felt that the Law of Requisite Variety and the Viable System + Model were useful concepts, he believed they were insufficient for the situations he had + encountered while in Allende’s cabinet. “My problem [in Allende’s cabinet] was not + variety; my problem was the configuration of reality, persuading other people,” Flores + said. 20 Understanding the configuration of reality became a driving intellectual pursuit + for Flores, and he found the work of the Chilean biologists Maturana and Varela espe- + cially useful toward this end. In addition to developing the theory of autopoiesis with + Varela, Maturana had conducted extensive work on optics. His 1959 work with Jerry + Lettvin, Warren McCulloch, and Walter Pitts analyzed the frog’s optical system and + concluded that what a frog sees is not reality per se but rather a construction assembled + by the frog’s visual system. What the frog sees is therefore a product of its biological + structure. This distinction formed the foundation for much of Maturana and Varela’s + later work in biology and cognition during the 1960s and 1970s, and later inspired the + two biologists to break with traditional claims of scientific objectivity and emphasize + the role of the observer. One of Maturana’s best- known claims—“Anything said is said + by an observer”—illustrates this point. 21 + + Flores’s dissatisfaction with cybernetics paralleled a similar dissatisfaction within + the cybernetics community. Heinz von Foerster, who had worked with Maturana, Va- + rela, and the Group of 14 in Chile, found it problematic that cybernetics claimed to + create objective representations of real- world phenomena that were independent of + an observer. 22 Von Foerster described this approach as “first- order cybernetics,” which + he defined as “the cybernetics of observed systems.” However, von Foerster was influ- + enced by Maturana’s work and, like Maturana, became convinced that the observer + plays a central role in the construction of cybernetic models. In the fall of 1973 von + Foerester taught a yearlong course at the University of Illinois on the “cybernetics of + cybernetics,” or what became known as second- order cybernetics, “the cybernetics of + observing systems.” 23 Although von Foerster was not the only person involved in the + development of second- order cybernetics, studies of this intellectual transition have + credited von Foerster for bridging the gap between first- order and second- order cyber- + netic thinking. 24 Not surprisingly, Flores also took to the idea of second- order cybernet- + ics, and in his later writing he would cite von Foerster’s edited volume Cybernetics of + Cybernetics . 25 + + [...] + + Flores credits Maturana for leading him to the work of Martin Heidegger. Like Ma- + turana, Heidegger rejected the existence of an objective external world and saw objects/ + texts as coexisting with their observers/interpreters. Heidegger’s idea of “thrownness” + also resonated with Flores—the idea that in everyday life we are thrown into the world + and forced to act without the benefit of reflection, rational planning, or objective as- + sessment. Looking back, Flores saw his time in the Allende cabinet as an example of + thrownness rather than rational decision making. “My job was so demanding that I did + not have the time to perfect [what I was doing]. I only had time to feel it. It was some- + thing I felt.” 29 In the context of emergency, he had no time to study the laws of control + laid down by cybernetics in order to determine how best to resolve government crises. + Flores often had to lead with his gut, and his previous experiences and the traditions of + Chilean society implicitly shaped his decisions. Flores also realized that “when you are + minister and you say something, no matter what you say, it has consequences.” 30 It was + therefore important to use words deliberately. Flores found that management through + variety control did not allow intuitive forms of decision making, nor did it account for + the previous experiences and cultural situation of decision makers or accommodate the + importance of communicating effectively and with intention. + + [...] + + Understanding Computers and Cognition begins by critiquing the rationalist assump- + tion that an objective, external world exists. The critique builds on the ideas of Hei- + degger, Searle, Maturana, J. L. Austin, and Hans- Georg Gadamer to show that knowledge + is the result of interpretation and depends on the past experiences of the interpreter + and his or her situatedness in tradition. Winograd and Flores then argue that because + computers lack such experiences and traditions, they cannot replace human beings as + knowledge makers. “The ideal of an objectively knowledgeable expert must be replaced + with a recognition of the importance of background,” Winograd and Flores write. “This + can lead to the design of tools that facilitate a dialog of evolving understanding among + a knowledgeable community.” 32 Building on this observation, the authors propose that + computers should not make decisions for us but rather should assist human actions, + especially human “communicative acts that create requests and commitments that + serve to link us to others.” 33 Moreover, computer designers should not focus on creating + an artifact but should view their labors as a form of “ontological design.” Computers + should reflect who we are and how we interact in the world, as well as shape what we + can do and who we will become. The American Society for Information Science named + + -- 230-231 + + To some he was brusque, intimidating, direct to the point of rudeness, and off- + putting. Yet his message and his success in both the academic and business + communities transformed him into a cult figure for others. + + [...] + + “A civil democracy with a market economy is the best political construction so + far because it allows people to be history makers,” the authors declare. 41 + Flores’s transformation from socialist minister was now complete: he had wholly + remade himself in the image of neoliberalism. + + Thus, by the end of the 1990s, Flores and Beer had switched places. Flores had + morphed into a wealthy international consultant driven by the conviction that orga- + nization, communication, and action all were central to making businesses successful. + Meanwhile, Beer had become increasingly interested in societal problems and chang- + ing the world for the better. His last book, Beyond Dispute (1994), proposed a new + method for problem solving based on the geometric configurations of the icosahedron, + a polygon with twenty equilateral triangle faces. He called this new method “synteg- + rity” and argued that it could serve as a new approach to conflict resolution in areas of + the world such as the Middle East. + + -- 232-233 diff --git a/books/technology/maciunas-learning-machines.md b/books/technology/maciunas-learning-machines.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3d6dd0c --- /dev/null +++ b/books/technology/maciunas-learning-machines.md @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +[[!meta title="Maciunas Learning Machines"]] + +[Maciunas’s Learning Machine](http://georgemaciunas.com/exhibitions/knowledge-as-art-chance-computability-and-improving-education-thomas-bayes-alan-turing-george-maciunas/george-maciunas/maciunas-learning-machine/). + +## Snippets + + The declared aim was “to learn as if mechanically and without having to think + too much.” 38 + + [...] + + The idea of the interactive user was born. George Maciunas is one of them. + + [...] + + This interest in graphic forms of communi- cation can in turn be traced back to + Maciunas’ profound aversion to books. Instead of spending hours of his time + reading, he preferred to learn by taking in as much informa- tion as possible + at a glance. This explains his fascination with diagrams, charts, maps, tables, + systems of coordinates, and graphs. The charting of history, moreover, was but + one facet of the visual information which was to preoccupy him throughout his + life, not just as an architect, but as a knowledge worker. + + [...] + + Thus the Atlas of Russian History ranks among those forms of knowledge-driven + visualization systems that can be grouped together under the term “operative + pictoriality.” 51 + + One key feature of “operative pictoriality” is the interaction on a map of the + visual and the discursive. The latter takes the form of keywords used to + chronicle historical events—trans- formative processes of which each map can + provide no more than a snapshot showing them at a certain point in time, or at + a particular stage in their unfolding. The Atlas of Russian His- tory is + remarkable for another quality as well, namely in the way it uses recurring + terminol- ogy. As a kind of hyperlink, this terminology facilitates navigation + through the Atlas, which after all works on the principle of anticipation. + + [...] + + The cartography ends more or less abruptly in the late nineteenth century. The + heroic phase of Soviet history that was to follow in the early twentieth + century was too complex to be contained, let alone mapped, in the traditional + atlas format. To a certain extent, therefore, Maciunas can be said to have + reached the limits of what the charting and mapping of his- tory could achieve. + The limit he had reached was systemic, of the kind Gregory Bateson examined in + his book Mind and Nature (1979): “All description, explanation, or representa- + tion is necessarily in some sense a mapping of derivatives from the phenomena + to be de- scribed onto some surface or matrix or system of coordinates. In the + case of an actual map, the receiving matrix is commonly a flat sheet of paper + of finite extent, and difficulties occur when that which is to be mapped is too + big or, for example, spherical. . . . Every receiving matrix,” Bateson + concluded, “will have its formal characteristics which will in principle be + distortive of the phenomena to be mapped onto it.” 59 + + [...] + + The distortion of phenomena in the Atlas of Russian History consisted in its + gross simplifica- tion of complex geohistorical processes as factographic + fallout. To be able to capture that “hot” phase in a chronology which, owing to + the large number of fast-moving events that have to be taken into account, has + the character of “differential elements”—to borrow Claude Lévi-Strauss’ + definition for the study of anthropology—Maciunas had no choice but to change + his mode of presentation. He therefore switched from two-dimensional mapping of + history to the historiogram, which could be expanded in three dimensions + without any major structural changes and thus lent itself more readily to the + ever greater factual density Maciunas now grappled with. + + [...] + + Usually, geographical maps are static representations. The snapshots of history + they pro- vide have no room for the dynamic dimension of historical processes. + The arrows Maciunas used in the Atlas of Russian History are an attempt to + restore a sense of dynamism. The vectors are necessary to the mental animation + of systems, and signify large-scale move- ments such as migrations or + invasions. Yet they can only ever mark out the general direc- tion, never the + exact route taken. It is the arrows, moreover, which lend the charts the dia- + grammatic character that appeals so strongly to non-cartographers such as + Maciunas. The rudimentary nature of the cartographic information provided on + the various sheets also belongs in this category. Because Maciunas dispenses + with a frame, a grid, and a specifica- tion of scale, the representational + space of his history charts tends to resemble pictures rather than maps. 61 + + [...] + + The history of the empire was to inform maps of the empire. The political + function of the atlas of history was thus very similar to that of history + painting. Its purpose was not so much to deliver comfort and relief—which was + what history paintings had to do—as to nurture historical awareness. Such + awareness as the basis for social development, however, was to be found only at + the top of the learning curve that was preceded and facilitated by the + positivistic acquisition of facts. To para- phrase Jürgen Habermas, social + evolution is driven by changes in the knowledge poten- tial. 69 The historical + sources show a milieu which believed in the reformation—meaning the + improvement—of the world by education. Maciunas’ maps are of a piece with this + en- lightenment ideology. As an imaginative matrix, they do not deliver an + abstract model of history, but rather generate their own history—one whose + narrative strategies elude any direct empirical verification. This metahistory + is ideologically motivated. As the factual density increases, so the process of + historical change picks up speed, culminating in the Russian Revolution. + Maciunas’ mapping project was focused on that one event, an event which + exemplifies most vividly the feasibility of history, which in turn allows for + the idea that society can indeed be modeled. diff --git a/books/technology/manifesto-contrassexual.md b/books/technology/manifesto-contrassexual.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d575a84 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/technology/manifesto-contrassexual.md @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +[[!meta title="Manifesto Contrassexual"]] + +Por Beatriz Preciado. + +## Trechos + +[[!img 2018-03-03-17:01:45_660x638.png link="no"]] +[[!img 2018-03-04-02:33:43_533x291.png link="no"]] +[[!img 2018-03-04-02:38:12_569x683.png link="no"]] +[[!img 2018-03-04-08:45:50_521x709.png link="no"]] +[[!img 2018-03-04-15:01:41_427x719.png link="no"]] +[[!img 2018-03-04-15:02:04_419x584.png link="no"]] +[[!img 2018-03-04-15:02:29_419x543.png link="no"]] +[[!img 2018-03-04-15:02:42_441x731.png link="no"]] +[[!img 2018-03-04-15:02:55_424x733.png link="no"]] +[[!img 2018-03-04-15:03:16_430x733.png link="no"]] +[[!img 2018-03-04-15:37:55_606x562.png link="no"]] diff --git a/books/technology/manifesto-contrassexual/2018-03-03-17:01:45_660x638.png b/books/technology/manifesto-contrassexual/2018-03-03-17:01:45_660x638.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4b8d58 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/technology/manifesto-contrassexual/2018-03-03-17:01:45_660x638.png diff --git a/books/technology/manifesto-contrassexual/2018-03-04-02:33:43_533x291.png b/books/technology/manifesto-contrassexual/2018-03-04-02:33:43_533x291.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f14e580 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/technology/manifesto-contrassexual/2018-03-04-02:33:43_533x291.png diff --git a/books/technology/manifesto-contrassexual/2018-03-04-02:38:12_569x683.png 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/dev/null +++ b/books/technology/spaceship-earth.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +[[!meta title="Manual da Espaçonave Terra"]] + +[Manual De Instruções Para Espaçonave Terra](https://archive.org/details/86522184RBuckminsterFullerManualDeInstrucoesParaANaveEspacialTerraViaOptima1998). + + Contudo, e de súbito, e sem que na sociedade ninguém se apercebesse, surgiu o + anti-corpo evolucionário contra a extinção na forma do computador e da sua + automatização globalmente orientada, que tornou o homem obsoleto como + especialista da produção e controle físicos -- mesmo em cima da hora. + + Como superespecialista, o computador pode perseverar dia e noite, separando o + preto do branco a velocidades sobrehumanas. O computador pode também operar em + graus de frio ou calor nos quais o homem pereceria. Como especialista, o homem + vai ser completamente afastado pelo computador. O homem vai ser obrigado a + reestabelecer, usar e disfrutar sua "globalidade" inata. O que se nos depara é + lidar com a totalidades da Nave Espacial Terra e do universo. A evolução parece + estar apostada em fazer o homem cumprir um destino muito mais elevado que ser + apenas uma simples máquina muscular e reflexa -- um autómato escravo -- a + automatização afasta os autómatos. + + -- 24 e 25 + + Todas as nossas camas de hotel em todo o mundo encontram-se desocupadas dois + terços do tempo. As nossas salas de estar encontram-se vazias sete oitavos do + tempo. + + --- 80 |
