aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/books/sociedade/one-dimensional-man.md
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'books/sociedade/one-dimensional-man.md')
-rw-r--r--books/sociedade/one-dimensional-man.md1969
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1969 deletions
diff --git a/books/sociedade/one-dimensional-man.md b/books/sociedade/one-dimensional-man.md
deleted file mode 100644
index af5a90a..0000000
--- a/books/sociedade/one-dimensional-man.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1969 +0,0 @@
-[[!meta title="One-Dimensional Man"]]
-
-* Author: Hebert Marcuse
-* Terms: institutionalized, adjusted sublimation
-
-## Snippets
-
-### Intro
-
- From the beginning, any critical theory of society is thus confronted with the
- problem of historical objectivity, a problem which arises at the two points
- where the analysis implies value judgments:
-
- 1. the judgment that human life is worth living, or rather can be and ought to
- be made worth living. This judgment underlies all intellectual effort; it is
- the a priori of social theory, and its rejection (which is perfectly logical)
- rejects theory itself;
-
- 2. the judgment that, in a given society, specific possibilities exist for the
- amelioration of human life and specific ways and means of realizing these
- possibilities. Critical analysis has to demonstrate the objective validity of
- these judgments, and the demonstration has to proceed on empirical grounds. The
- established society has available an ascertainable quantity and quality of
- intellectual and material resources. How can these resources be used for the
- optimal development and satisfaction of individual needs and faculties with a
- minimum of toil and misery? Social theory is historical theory, and history is
- the realm of chance in the realm of necessity. Therefore, among the various
- possible and actual modes of organizing and utilizing the available resources,
- which ones offer the greatest chance of an optimal development?
-
- [...]
-
- The “possibilities” must be within the reach of the respective society; they
- must be definable goals of practice. By the same token, the abstraction from
- the established institutions must be expressive of an actual tendency—that is,
- their transformation must be the real need of the underlying population. Social
- theory is concerned with the historical alternatives which haunt the
- established society as subversive tendencies and forces. The values attached to
- the alternatives do become facts when they are translated into reality by
- historical practice. The theoretical concepts terminate with social change.
-
- But here, advanced industrial society confronts the critique with a situation
- which seems to deprive it of its very basis. Technical progress, extended to a
- whole system of domination and coordination, creates forms of life (and of
- power) which appear to reconcile the forces opposing the system and to defeat
- or refute all protest in the name of the historical prospects of freedom from
- toil and domination. Contemporary society seems to be capable of containing
- social change—qualitative change which would establish essentially different
- institutions, a new direction of the productive process, new modes of human
- existence.
-
- [...]
-
- As a technological universe, advanced industrial society is a political
- universe, the latest stage in the realization of a specific historical
- project—namely, the experience, transformation, and organization of nature as
- the mere stuff of domination.
-
- As the project unfolds, it shapes the entire universe of discourse and action,
- intellectual and material culture. In the medium of technology, culture,
- politics, and the economy merge into an omnipresent system which swallows up or
- repulses all alternatives. The productivity and growth potential of this system
- stabilize the society and contain technical progress within the framework of
- domination. Technological rationality has become political rationality.
-
-### Freedom in negative terms
-
- Contemporary industrial civilization demonstrates that it has reached the stage
- at which “the free society” can no longer be adequately defined in the
- traditional terms of economic, political, and intellectual liberties, not
- because these liberties have become insignificant, but because they are too
- significant to be confined within the traditional forms. New modes of
- realization are needed, corresponding to the new capabilities of society.
-
- Such new modes can be indicated only in negative terms because they would
- amount to the negation of the prevailing modes. Thus economic freedom would
- mean freedom from the economy—from being controlled by economic forces and
- relationships; freedom from the daily struggle for existence, from earning a
- living. Political freedom would mean liberation of the individuals from
- politics over which they have no effective control. Similarly, intellectual
- freedom would mean the restoration of individual thought now absorbed by mass
- communication and indoctrination, abolition of “public opinion” together with
- its makers. The unrealistic sound of these propositions is indicative, not of
- their utopian character, but of the strength of the forces which prevent their
- realization. The most effective and enduring form of warfare against liberation
- is the implanting of material and intellectual needs that perpetuate obsolete
- forms of the struggle for existence.
-
- The intensity, the satisfaction and even the character of human needs, beyond
- the biological level, have always been preconditioned. Whether or not the
- possibility of doing or leaving, enjoying or destroying, possessing or
- rejecting something is seized as a need depends on whether or not it can be
- seen as desirable and necessary for the prevailing societal institutions and
- interests. In this sense, human needs are historical needs and, to the extent
- to which the society demands the repressive development of the individual, his
- needs themselves and their claim for satisfaction are subject to overriding
- critical standards.
-
-### The irrationality of the rational
-
- We are again confronted with one of the most vexing aspects of advanced
- industrial civilization: the rational character of its irrationality. Its
- productivity and efficiency, its capacity to increase and spread comforts, to
- turn waste into need, and destruction into construction, the extent to which
- this civilization transforms the object world into an extension of man’s mind
- and body makes the very notion of alienation questionable.
-
- [...]
-
- But in the contemporary period, the technological controls appear to be the
- very embodiment of Reason for the benefit of all social groups and interests—to
- such an extent that all contradiction seems irrational and all counteraction
- impossible.
-
- No wonder then that, in the most advanced areas of this civilization, the
- social controls have been introjected to the point where even individual
- protest is affected at its roots. The intellectual and emotional refusal “to go
- along” appears neurotic and impotent.
-
- [...]
-
- But the term “introjection” perhaps no longer describes the way in which the
- individual by himself reproduces and perpetuates the external controls
- exercised by his society. Introjection suggests a variety of relatively
- spontaneous processes by which a Self (Ego) transposes the “outer” into the
- “inner.” Thus introjection implies the existence of an inner dimension
- distinguished from and even antagonistic to the external exigencies—an
- individual consciousness and an individual unconscious apart from public
- opinion and behavior.3 The idea of “inner freedom” here has its reality: it
- designates the private space in which man may become and remain “himself.”
-
- Today this private space has been invaded and whittled down by technological
- reality. Mass production and mass distribution claim the entire individual, and
- industrial psychology has long since ceased to be confined to the factory. The
- manifold processes of introjection seem to be ossified in almost mechanical
- reactions. The result is, not adjustment but mimesis: an immediate
- identification of the individual with his society and, through it, with the
- society as a whole.
-
-### One-dimensionality
-
- Thus emerges a pattern of one-dimensional thought and behavior in which ideas,
- aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established
- universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of
- this universe. They are redefined by the rationality of the given system and of
- its quantitative extension.
-
- The trend may be related to a development in scientific method: operationalism
- in the physical, behaviorism in the social sciences. The common feature is a
- total empiricism in the treatment of concepts; their meaning is restricted to
- the representation of particular operations and behavior. The operational point
- of view is well illustrated by P. W. Bridgman’s analysis of the concept of
- length:5
-
- We evidently know what we mean by length if we can tell what the length of any
- and every object is, and for the physicist nothing more is required. To find
- the length of an object, we have to perform certain physical operations. The
- concept of length is therefore fixed when the operations by which length is
- measured are fixed: that is, the concept of length involves as much and nothing
- more than the set of operations by which length is determined. In general, we
- mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is
- synonymous with the corresponding set of operations.
-
- Bridgman has seen the wide implications of this mode of thought for the society
- at large:6
-
- To adopt the operational point of view involves much more than a mere
- restriction of the sense in which we understand ‘concept,’ but means a
- far-reaching change in all our habits of thought, in that we shall no longer
- permit ourselves to use as tools in our thinking concepts of which we cannot
- give an adequate account in terms of operations.
-
- Bridgman’s prediction has come true. The new mode of thought is today the
- predominant tendency in philosophy, psychology, sociology, and other fields.
- Many of the most seriously troublesome concepts are being “eliminated” by
- showing that no adequate account of them in terms of operations or behavior can
- be given.
-
- [...]
-
- Outside the academic establishment, the “far-reaching change in all our habits
- of thought” is more serious. It serves to coordinate ideas and goals with those
- exacted by the prevailing system, to enclose them in the system, and to repel
- those which are irreconcilable with the system. The reign of such a
- one-dimensional reality does not mean that materialism rules, and that the
- spiritual, metaphysical, and bohemian occupations are petering out. On the
- contrary, there is a great deal of “Worship together this week,” “Why not try
- God,” Zen, existentialism, and beat ways of life, etc. But such modes of
- protest and transcendence are no longer contradictory to the status quo and no
- longer negative. They are rather the ceremonial part of practical behaviorism,
- its harmless negation, and are quickly digested by the status quo as part of
- its healthy diet.
-
- [...]
-
- Such limitation of thought is certainly not new. Ascending modern rationalism,
- in its speculative as well as empirical form, shows a striking contrast between
- extreme critical radicalism in scientific and philosophic method on the one
- hand, and an uncritical quietism in the attitude toward established and
- functioning social institutions. Thus Descartes’ ego cogitans was to leave the
- “great public bodies” untouched, and Hobbes held that “the present ought always
- to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best.” Kant agreed with Locke in
- justifying revolution if and when it has succeeded in organizing the whole and
- in preventing subversion.
-
-### Progress, abolition of labor, totalitarianism
-
- The society bars a whole type of oppositional operations and behavior;
- consequently, the concepts pertaining to them are rendered illusory or
- meaningless. Historical transcendence appears as metaphysical transcendence,
- not acceptable to science and scientific thought. The operational and
- behavioral point of view, practiced as a “habit of thought” at large, becomes
- the view of the established universe of discourse and action, needs and
- aspirations.
-
- “Progress” is not a neutral term; it moves toward specific ends, and these ends
- are defined by the possibilities of ameliorating the human condition. Advanced
- industrial society is approaching the stage where continued progress would
- demand the radical subversion of the prevailing direction and organization of
- progress. This stage would be reached when material production (including the
- necessary services) becomes automated to the extent that all vital needs can be
- satisfied while necessary labor time is reduced to marginal time. From this
- point on, technical progress would transcend the realm of necessity, where it
- served as the instrument of domination and exploitation which thereby limited
- its rationality; technology would become subject to the free play of faculties
- in the struggle for the pacification of nature and of society.
-
- Such a state is envisioned in Marx’s notion of the “abolition of labor.” The
- term “pacification of existence” seems better suited to designate the
- historical alternative of a world which—through an international conflict which
- transforms and suspends the contradictions within the established
- societies—advances on the brink of a global war. “Pacification of existence”
- means the development of man’s struggle with man and with nature, under
- conditions where the competing needs, desires, and aspirations are no longer
- organized by vested interests in domination and scarcity—an organization which
- perpetuates the destructive forms of this struggle.
-
- Today’s fight against this historical alternative finds a firm mass basis in
- the underlying population, and finds its ideology in the rigid orientation of
- thought and behavior to the given universe of facts. Validated by the
- accomplishments of science and technology, justified by its growing
- productivity, the status quo defies all transcendence. Faced with the
- possibility of pacification on the grounds of its technical and intellectual
- achievements, the mature industrial society closes itself against this
- alternative. Operationalism, in theory and practice, becomes the theory and
- practice of containment. Underneath its obvious dynamics, this society is a
- thoroughly static system of life: self-propelling in its oppressive
- productivity and in its beneficial coordination. Containment of technical
- progress goes hand in hand with its growth in the established direction. In
- spite of the political fetters imposed by the status quo, the more technology
- appears capable of creating the conditions for pacification, the more are the
- minds and bodies of man organized against this alternative.
-
- The most advanced areas of industrial society exhibit throughout these two
- features: a trend toward consummation of technological rationality, and
- intensive efforts to contain this trend within the established institutions.
- Here is the internal contradiction of this civilization: the irrational element
- in its rationality. It is the token of its achievements. The industrial society
- which makes technology and science its own is organized for the
- ever-more-effective domination of man and nature, for the ever-more-effective
- utilization of its resources. It becomes irrational when the success of these
- efforts opens new dimensions of human realization. Organization for peace is
- different from organization for war; the institutions which served the struggle
- for existence cannot serve the pacification of existence. Life as an end is
- qualitatively different from life as a means.
-
- [...]
-
- Qualitative change also involves a change in the technical basis on which this
- society rests—one which sustains the economic and political institutions
- through which the “second nature” of man as an aggressive object of
- administration is stabilized.
-
- [...]
-
- To be sure, labor must precede the reduction of labor, and industrialization
- must precede the development of human needs and satisfactions. But as all
- freedom depends on the conquest of alien necessity, the realization of freedom
- depends on the techniques of this conquest. The highest productivity of labor
- can be used for the perpetuation of labor, and the most efficient
- industrialization can serve the restriction and manipulation of needs.
-
- When this point is reached, domination—in the guise of affluence and
- liberty—extends to all spheres of private and public existence, integrates all
- authentic opposition, absorbs all alternatives. Technological rationality
- reveals its political character as it becomes the great vehicle of better
- domination, creating a truly totalitarian universe in which society and nature,
- mind and body are kept in a state of permanent mobilization for the defense of
- this universe.
-
-### Revolution
-
- The classical Marxian theory envisages the transition from capitalism to
- socialism as a political revolution: the proletariat destroys the political
- apparatus of capitalism but retains the technological apparatus, subjecting it
- to socialization. There is continuity in the revolution: technological
- rationality, freed from irrational restrictions and destructions, sustains and
- consummates itself in the new society. It is interesting to read a Soviet
- Marxist statement on this continuity, which is of such vital importance for the
- notion of socialism as the determinate negation of capitalism
-
- [...]
-
- To be sure, Marx held that organization and direction of the productive
- apparatus by the “immediate producers” would introduce a qualitative change in
- the technical continuity: namely, production toward the satisfaction of freely
- developing individual needs. However, to the degree to which the established
- technical apparatus engulfs the public and private existence in all spheres of
- society—that is, becomes the medium of control and cohesion in a political
- universe which incorporates the laboring classes—to that degree would the
- qualitative change involve a change in the technological structure itself. And
- such change would presuppose that the laboring classes are alienated from this
- universe in their very existence, that their consciousness is that of the total
- impossibility to continue to exist in this universe, so that the need for
- qualitative change is a matter of life and death. Thus, the negation exists
- prior to the change itself, the notion that the liberating historical forces
- develop within the established society is a cornerstone of Marxian theory.2
-
-### Hell
-
- Those whose life is the hell of the Affluent Society are kept in line by a
- brutality which revives medieval and early modern practices. For the other,
- less underprivileged people, society takes care of the need for liberation by
- satisfying the needs which make servitude palatable and perhaps even
- unnoticeable, and it accomplishes this fact in the process of production
- itself.
-
-### Automation
-
- (1) Mechanization is increasingly reducing the quantity and intensity of physical
- energy expended in labor. This evolution is of great bearing on the Marxian
- concept of the worker (proletarian). To Marx, the proletarian is primarily the
- manual laborer who expends and exhausts his physical energy in the work
- process, even if he works with machines. The purchase and use of this physical
- energy, under subhuman conditions, for the private appropriation of
- surplus-value entailed the revolting inhuman aspects of exploitation; the
- Marxian notion denounces the physical pain and misery of labor. This is the
- material, tangible element in wage slavery and alienation—the physiological and
- biological dimension of classical capitalism.
-
- “Pendant les siècles passés, une cause importante d’aliénation résidait dans le
- fait que l’être humain prêtait son individualité biologique à l’organisation
- technique: il était porteur d’outils; les ensembles techniques ne pouvaient se
- constituer qu’en incorporant l’homme comme porteur d’outils. Le caractère
- déformant de la profession était à la fois psychique et somatique.”3
-
- 3. “During the past centuries, one important reason for alienation was that the
- human being lent his biological individuality to the technical apparatus: he
- was the bearer of tools; technical units could not be established without
- incorporating man as bearer of tools into them. The nature of this occupation
- was such that it was both psychologically and physiologically deforming in its
- effect.” Gilbert Simondon, Du Mode d’existence des objets techniques (Paris:
- Aubier, 1958), p. 103, note.
-
- Now the ever-more-complete mechanization of labor in advanced capitalism, while
- sustaining exploitation, modifies the attitude and the status of the exploited.
- Within the technological ensemble, mechanized work in which automatic and
- semi-automatic reactions fill the larger part (if not the whole) of labor time
- remains, as a life-long occupation, exhausting, stupefying, inhuman
- slavery—even more exhausting because of increased speed-up, control of the
- machine operators (rather than of the product), and isolation of the workers
- from each other.4 To be sure, this form of drudgery is expressive of arrested,
- partial automation, of the coexistence of automated, semi-automated, and
- non-automated sections within the same plant, but even under these conditions,
- “for muscular fatigue technology has substituted tension and/or mental
- effort.”5 For the more advanced automated plants, the transformation of
- physical energy into technical and mental skills is emphasized:
-
- “… skills of the head rather than of the hand, of the logician rather than the
- craftsman; of nerve rather than muscle; of the pilot rather than the manual
- worker; of the maintenance man rather than the operator.”6
-
- This kind of masterly enslavement is not essentially different from that of the
- typist, the bank teller, the high-pressure salesman or saleswoman, and the
- television announcer. Standardization and the routine assimilate productive and
- non-productive jobs. The proletarian of the previous stages of capitalism was
- indeed the beast of burden, by the labor of his body procuring the necessities
- and luxuries of life while living in filth and poverty. Thus he was the living
- denial of his society.7 In contrast, the organized worker in the advanced areas
- of the technological society lives this denial less conspicuously and, like the
- other human objects of the social division of labor, he is being incorporated
- into the technological community of the administered population. Moreover, in
- the most successful areas of automation, some sort of technological community
- seems to integrate the human atoms at work. The machine seems to instill some
- drugging rhythm in the operators:
-
- “It is generally agreed that interdependent motions performed by a group of
- persons which follow a rhythmic pattern yield satisfaction—quite apart from
- what is being accomplished by the motions”;8 and the sociologist-observer
- believes this to be a reason for the gradual development of a “general climate”
- more “favorable both to production and to certain important kinds of human
- satisfaction.” He speaks of the “growth of a strong in-group feeling in each
- crew” and quotes one worker as stating: “All in all we are in the swing of
- things …”9
-
- The phrase admirably expresses the change in mechanized enslavement:
- things swing rather than oppress, and they swing the human instrument—not only
- its body but also its mind and even its soul. A remark by Sartre elucidates the
- depth of the process:
-
- “Aux premiers temps des machines semi-automatiques, des enquêtes ont montré que
- les ouvrières spécialisées se laissaient aller, en travaillant, à une rêverie
- d’ordre sexuel, elles se rappellaient la chambre, le lit, la nuit, tout ce qui
- ne concerne que la personne dans la solitude du couple fermé sur soi. Mais
- c’est la machine en elle qui rêvait de caresses.…”10 The machine process in the
- technological universe breaks the innermost privacy of freedom and joins
- sexuality and labor in one unconscious, rhythmic automatism—a process which
- parallels the assimilation of jobs.10
-
- 10. “Shortly after semi-automatic machines were introduced, investigations
- showed that female skilled workers would allow themselves to lapse while
- working into a sexual kind of daydream; they would recall the bedroom, the bed,
- the night and all that concerns only the person within the solitude of the
- couple alone with itself. But it was the machine in her which was dreaming of
- caresses …” Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique de la raison dialectique, tome I (Paris:
- Gallimard, 1960), p. 290.
-
- The machine process in the technological universe breaks the innermost privacy
- of freedom and joins sexuality and labor in one unconscious, rhythmic
- automatism—a process which parallels the assimilation of jobs.
-
- [...]
-
- (2) The assimilating trend shows forth in the occupational stratification. In
- the key industrial establishments, the “blue-collar” work force declines in
- relation to the “white-collar” element; the number of non-production workers
- increases.11 This quantitative change refers back to a change in the character
- of the basic instruments of production.12 At the advanced stage of
- mechanization, as part of the technological reality, the machine is not
-
- “une unité absolue, mais seulement une réalité technique individualisée,
- ouverte selon deux voies: celle de la relation aux éléments, et celle des
- relations interindividuelles dans l’ensemble technique.”13
-
- 13. “an absolute unity, but only an individualized technical reality open in
- two directions, that of the relation to the elements and that of the relation
- among the individuals in the technical whole.” Gilbert Simondon, loc. cit., p.
- 146.
-
- [...]
-
- To the extent to which the machine becomes itself a system of mechanical tools
- and relations and thus extends far beyond the individual work process, it
- asserts its larger dominion by reducing the “professional autonomy” of the
- laborer and integrating him with other professions which suffer and direct the
- technical ensemble. To be sure, the former “professional” autonomy of the
- laborer was rather his professional enslavement. But this specific mode of
- enslavement was at the same time the source of his specific, professional power
- of negation—the power to stop a process which threatened him with annihilation
- as a human being. Now the laborer is losing the professional autonomy which
- made him a member of a class set off from the other occupational groups because
- it embodied the refutation of the established society.
-
- The technological change which tends to do away with the machine as individual
- instrument of production, as “absolute unit,” seems to cancel the Marxian
- notion of the “organic composition of capital” and with it the theory of the
- creation of surplus value. According to Marx, the machine never creates value
- but merely transfers its own value to the product, while surplus value remains
- the result of the exploitation of living labor. The machine is embodiment of
- human labor power, and through it, past labor (dead labor) preserves itself and
- determines living labor. Now automation seems to alter qualitatively the
- relation between dead and living labor; it tends toward the point where
- productivity is determined “by the machines, and not by the individual
- output.”14 Moreover, the very measurement of individual output becomes
- impossible:
-
- “Automation in its largest sense means, in effect, the end of measurement of
- work.… With automation, you can’t measure output of a single man; you now have
- to measure simply equipment utilization. If that is generalized as a kind of
- concept … there is no longer, for example, any reason at all to pay a man by
- the piece or pay him by the hour,” that is to say, there is no more reason to
- keep up the “dual pay system” of salaries and wages.”15
-
- Daniel Bell, the author of this report, goes further; he links this
- technological change to the historical system of industrialization itself: the
- meaning of industrialization did not arise with the introduction of factories,
- it “arose out of the measurement of work. It’s when work can be measured, when
- you can hitch a man to the job, when you can put a harness on him, and measure
- his output in terms of a single piece and pay him by the piece or by the hour,
- that you have got modern industrialization.”16
-
-### Servitude
-
- (4) The new technological work-world thus enforces a weakening of the negative
- position of the working class: the latter no longer appears to be the living
- contradiction to the established society. This trend is strengthened by the
- effect of the technological organization of production on the other side of the
- fence: on management and direction. Domination is transfigured into
- administration.21 The capitalist bosses and owners are losing their identity as
- responsible agents; they are assuming the function of bureaucrats in a
- corporate machine. Within the vast hierarchy of executive and managerial boards
- extending far beyond the individual establishment into the scientific
- laboratory and research institute, the national government and national
- purpose, the tangible source of exploitation disappears behind the façade of
- objective rationality. Hatred and frustration are deprived of their specific
- target, and the technological veil conceals the reproduction of inequality and
- enslavement.22 With technical progress as its instrument, unfreedom—in the
- sense of man’s subjection to his productive apparatus—is perpetuated and
- intensified in the form of many liberties and comforts. The novel feature is
- the overwhelming rationality in this irrational enterprise, and the depth of
- the preconditioning which shapes the instinctual drives and aspirations of the
- individuals and obscures the difference between false and true consciousness.
- For in reality, neither the utilization of administrative rather than physical
- controls (hunger, personal dependence, force), nor the change in the character
- of heavy work, nor the assimilation of occupational classes, nor the
- equalization in the sphere of consumption compensate for the fact that the
- decisions over life and death, over personal and national security are made at
- places over which the individuals have no control. The slaves of developed
- industrial civilization are sublimated slaves, but they are slaves, for slavery
- is determined
-
- “pas par l’obéissance, ni par la rudesse des labeurs, mais par le statu
- d’instrument et la réduction de l’homme à l’état de chose.”23
-
- 23. “neither by obedience nor by hardness of labor but by the status of being a
- mere instrument, and the reduction of man to the state of a thing.” François
- Perroux, La Coexistence pacifique, (Paris, Presses Universitaires, 1958), vol.
- III, p. 600.
-
- This is the pure form of servitude: to exist as an instrument, as a thing. And
- this mode of existence is not abrogated if the thing is animated and chooses
- its material and intellectual food, if it does not feel its being-a-thing, if
- it is a pretty, clean, mobile thing. Conversely, as reification tends to become
- totalitarian by virtue of its technological form, the organizers and
- administrators themselves become increasingly dependent on the machinery which
- they organize and administer. And this mutual dependence is no longer the
- dialectical relationship between Master and Servant, which has been broken in
- the struggle for mutual recognition, but rather a vicious circle which encloses
- both the Master and the Servant. Do the technicians rule, or is their rule that
- of the others, who rely on the technicians as their planners and executors?
-
- [...]
-
- A vicious circle seems indeed the proper image of a society which is
- self-expanding and self-perpetuating in its own preestablished direction—driven
- by the growing needs which it generates and, at the same time, contains.
-
-### Culture
-
- The greatness of a free literature and art, the ideals of humanism, the sorrows
- and joys of the individual, the fulfillment of the personality are important
- items in the competitive struggle between East and West. They speak heavily
- against the present forms of communism, and they are daily administered and
- sold. The fact that they contradict the society which sells them does not
- count. Just as people know or feel that advertisements and political platforms
- must not be necessarily true or right, and yet hear and read them and even let
- themselves be guided by them, so they accept the traditional values and make
- them part of their mental equipment. If mass communications blend together
- harmoniously, and often unnoticeably, art, politics, religion, and philosophy
- with commercials, they bring these realms of culture to their common
- denominator—the commodity form. The music of the soul is also the music of
- salesmanship. Exchange value, not truth value counts. On it centers the
- rationality of the status quo, and all alien rationality is bent to it.
-
- As the great words of freedom and fulfillment are pronounced by campaigning
- leaders and politicians, on the screens and radios and stages, they turn into
- meaningless sounds which obtain meaning only in the context of propaganda,
- business, discipline, and relaxation. This assimilation of the ideal with
- reality testifies to the extent to which the ideal has been surpassed. It is
- brought down from the sublimated realm of the soul or the spirit or the inner
- man, and translated into operational terms and problems. Here are the
- progressive elements of mass culture. The perversion is indicative of the fact
- that advanced industrial society is confronted with the possibility of a
- materialization of ideals. The capabilities of this society are progressively
- reducing the sublimated realm in which the condition of man was represented,
- idealized, and indicted. Higher culture becomes part of the material culture.
- In this transformation, it loses the greater part of its truth.
-
- [...]
-
- Domination has its own aesthetics, and democratic domination has its democratic
- aesthetics. It is good that almost everyone can now have the fine arts at his
- fingertips, by just turning a knob on his set, or by just stepping into his
- drugstore. In this diffusion, however, they become cogs in a culture-machine
- which remakes their content.
-
- [...]
-
- Obviously, the physical transformation of the world entails the mental
- transformation of its symbols, images, and ideas. Obviously, when cities and
- highways and National Parks replace the villages, valleys, and forests; when
- motorboats race over the lakes and planes cut through the skies—then these
- areas lose their character as a qualitatively different reality, as areas of
- contradiction.
-
- And since contradiction is the work of the Logos—rational confrontation of
- “that which is not” with “that which is”—it must have a medium of
- communication. The struggle for this medium, or rather the struggle against its
- absorption into the predominant one-dimensionality, shows forth in the
- avant-garde efforts to create an estrangement which would make the artistic
- truth again communicable.
-
- Bertolt Brecht has sketched the theoretical foundations for these efforts. The
- total character of the established society confronts the playwright with the
- question of whether it is still possible to “represent the contemporary world
- in the theater”—that is, represent it in such a manner that the spectator
- recognizes the truth which the play is to convey. Brecht answers that the
- contemporary world can be thus represented only if it is represented as subject
- to change3—as the state of negativity which is to be negated. This is doctrine
- which has to be learned, comprehended, and acted upon; but the theater is and
- ought to be entertainment, pleasure. However, entertainment and learning are
- not opposites; entertainment may be the most effective mode of learning. To
- teach what the contemporary world really is behind the ideological and material
- veil, and how it can be changed, the theater must break the spectator’s
- identification with the events on the stage.
- Not empathy and feeling, but distance and reflection are required. The
- “estrangement-effect” (Verfremdungseffekt) is to produce this dissociation in
- which the world can be recognized as what it is. “The things of everyday life
- are lifted out of the realm of the self-evident.…”4 “That which is ‘natural’
- must assume the features of the extraordinary. Only in this manner can the laws
- of cause and effect reveal themselves.”5
-
- [...]
-
- The efforts to recapture the Great Refusal in the language of literature suffer
- the fate of being absorbed by what they refute. As modern classics, the
- avant-garde and the beatniks share in the function of entertaining without
- endangering the good conscience of the men of good will. This absorption is
- justified by technical progress; the refusal is refuted by the alleviation of
- misery in the advanced industrial society. The liquidation of high culture is a
- byproduct of the conquest of nature, and of the progressing conquest of
- scarcity.
-
- Invalidating the cherished images of transcendence by incorporating them into
- its omnipresent daily reality, this society testifies to the extent to which
- insoluble conflicts are becoming manageable—to which tragedy and romance,
- archetypal dreams and anxieties are being made susceptible to technical
- solution and dissolution. The psychiatrist takes care of the Don Juans, Romeos,
- Hamlets, Fausts, as he takes care of Oedipus—he cures them. The rulers of the
- world are losing their metaphysical features. Their appearance on television,
- at press conferences, in parliament, and at public hearings is hardly suitable
- for drama beyond that of the advertisement,14 while the consequences of their
- actions surpass the scope of the drama.
-
-### Adjusted desublimation
-
- In contrast to the pleasures of adjusted desublimation, sublimation preserves
- the consciousness of the renunciations which the repressive society inflicts
- upon the individual, and thereby preserves the need for liberation. To be sure,
- all sublimation is enforced by the power of society, but the unhappy
- consciousness of this power already breaks through alienation. To be sure, all
- sublimation accepts the social barrier to instinctual gratification, but it
- also transgresses this barrier.
-
- The Superego, in censoring the unconscious and in implanting conscience, also
- censors the censor because the developed conscience registers the forbidden
- evil act not only in the individual but also in his society. Conversely, loss
- of conscience due to the satisfactory liberties granted by an unfree society
- makes for a happy consciousness which facilitates acceptance of the misdeeds of
- this society. It is the token of declining autonomy and comprehension.
- Sublimation demands a high degree of autonomy and comprehension; it is
- mediation between the conscious and the unconscious, between the primary and
- secondary processes, between the intellect and instinct, renunciation and
- rebellion. In its most accomplished modes, such as in the artistic oeuvre,
- sublimation becomes the cognitive power which defeats suppression while bowing
- to it.
-
- In the light of the cognitive function of this mode of sublimation, the
- desublimation rampant in advanced industrial society reveals its truly
- conformist function. This liberation of sexuality (and of aggressiveness) frees
- the instinctual drives from much of the unhappiness and discontent that
- elucidate the repressive power of the established universe of satisfaction. To
- be sure, there is pervasive unhappiness, and the happy consciousness is shaky
- enough—a thin surface over fear, frustration, and disgust. This unhappiness
- lends itself easily to political mobilization; without room for conscious
- development, it may become the instinctual reservoir for a new fascist way of
- life and death. But there are many ways in which the unhappiness beneath the
- happy consciousness may be turned into a source of strength and cohesion for
- the social order. The conflicts of the unhappy individual now seem far more
- amenable to cure than those which made for Freud’s “discontent in
- civilization,” and they seem more adequately defined in terms of the “neurotic
- personality of our time” than in terms of the eternal struggle between Eros and
- Thanatos.
-
- [...]
-
- In accordance with the terminology used in the later works of Freud: sexuality
- as “specialized” partial drive; Eros as that of the entire organism.
-
-### Crust
-
- In this general necessity, guilt has no place. One man can give the signal that
- liquidates hundreds and thousands of people, then declare himself free from all
- pangs of conscience, and live happily ever after. The antifascist powers who
- beat fascism on the battlefields reap the benefits of the Nazi scientists,
- generals, and engineers; they have the historical advantage of the late-comer.
- What begins as the horror of the concentration camps turns into the practice of
- training people for abnormal conditions—a subterranean human existence and the
- daily intake of radioactive nourishment. A Christian minister declares that it
- does not contradict Christian principles to prevent with all available means
- your neighbor from entering your bomb shelter. Another Christian minister
- contradicts his colleague and says it does. Who is right? Again, the neutrality
- of technological rationality shows forth over and above politics, and again it
- shows forth as spurious, for in both cases, it serves the politics of
- domination.
-
- [...]
-
- It seems that even the most hideous transgressions can be repressed in such a
- manner that, for all practical purposes, they have ceased to be a danger for
- society. Or, if their eruption leads to functional disturbances in the
- individual (as in the case of one Hiroshima pilot), it does not disturb the
- functioning of society. A mental hospital manages the disturbance.
-
-### Game
-
- The Happy Consciousness has no limits—it arranges games with death and
- disfiguration in which fun, team work, and strategic importance mix in
- rewarding social harmony. The Rand Corporation, which unites scholarship,
- research, the military, the climate, and the good life, reports such games in a
- style of absolving cuteness, in its “RANDom News,” volume 9, number 1, under
- the heading BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY. The rockets are rattling, the H-bomb is
- waiting, and the space-flights are flying, and the problem is “how to guard the
- nation and the free world.” In all this, the military planners are worried, for
- “the cost of taking chances, of experimenting and making a mistake, may be
- fearfully high.” But here RAND comes in; RAND relieves, and “devices like
- RAND’S SAFE come into the picture.” The picture into which they come is
- unclassified. It is a picture in which “the world becomes a map, missiles
- merely symbols [long live the soothing power of symbolism!], and wars just
- [just] plans and calculations written down on paper …” In this picture, RAND
- has transfigured the world into an interesting technological game, and one can
- relax—the “military planners can gain valuable ‘synthetic’ experience without
- risk.”
-
- PLAYING THE GAME
-
- To understand the game one should participate, for understanding is “in the
- experience.”
-
- Because SAFE players have come from almost every department at RAND as well as
- the Air Force, we might find a physicist, an engineer, and an economist on the
- Blue team. The Red team will represent a similar cross-section.
-
- The first day is taken up by a joint briefing on what the game is all about and
- a study of the rules. When the teams are finally seated around the maps in
- their respective rooms the game begins. Each team receives its policy statement
- from the Game Director. These statements, usually prepared by a member of the
- Control Group, give an estimate of the world situation at the time of playing,
- some information on the policy of the opposing team, the objectives to be met
- by the team, and the team’s budget. (The policies are changed for each game to
- explore a wide range of strategic possibilities.)
-
-### Guilt
-
- Obviously, in the realm of the Happy Consciousness, guilt feeling has no place,
- and the calculus takes care of conscience. When the whole is at stake, there is
- no crime except that of rejecting the whole, or not defending it. Crime, guilt,
- and guilt feeling become a private affair. Freud revealed in the psyche of the
- individual the crimes of mankind, in the individual case history the history of
- the whole. This fatal link is successfully suppressed. Those who identify
- themselves with the whole, who are installed as the leaders and defenders of
- the whole can make mistakes, but they cannot do wrong—they are not guilty. They
- may become guilty again when this identification no longer holds, when they are
- gone.
-
-### The Happy Conciousness
-
- The Happy Consciousness—the belief that the real is rational and that the
- system delivers the goods—reflects the new conformism which is a facet of
- technological rationality translated into social behavior.
-
-### Language, memory and history
-
- The unified, functional language is an irreconcilably anti-critical and
- anti-dialectical language. In it, operational and behavioral rationality
- absorbs the transcendent, negative, oppositional elements of Reason.
-
- I shall discuss17 these elements in terms of the tension between the “is” and
- the “ought,” between essence and appearance, potentiality and
- actuality—ingression of the negative in the positive determinations of logic.
- This sustained tension permeates the two-dimensional universe of discourse
- which is the universe of critical, abstract thought. The two dimensions are
- antagonistic to each other; the reality partakes of both of them, and the
- dialectical concepts develop the real contradictions. In its own development,
- dialectical thought came to comprehend the historical character of the
- contradictions and the process of their mediation as historical process. Thus
- the “other” dimension of thought appeared to be historical dimension—the
- potentiality as historical possibility, its realization as historical event.
-
- The suppresssion of this dimension in the societal universe of operational
- rationality is a suppression of history, and this is not an academic but a
- political affair. It is suppression of the society’s own past—and of its
- future, inasmuch as this future invokes the qualitative change, the negation of
- the present. A universe of discourse in which the categories of freedom
- have become interchangeable and even identical with their opposites is not only
- practicing Orwellian or Aesopian language but is repulsing and forgetting the
- historical reality—the horror of fascism; the idea of socialism; the
- preconditions of democracy; the content of freedom. If a bureaucratic
- dictatorship rules and defines communist society, if fascist regimes are
- functioning as partners of the Free World, if the welfare program of
- enlightened capitalism is successfully defeated by labeling it “socialism,” if
- the foundations of democracy are harmoniously abrogated in democracy, then the
- old historical concepts are invalidated by up-to-date operational
- redefinitions. The redefinitions are falsifications which, imposed by the
- powers that be and the powers of fact, serve to transform falsehood into truth.
-
- The functional language is a radically anti-historical language: operational
- rationality has little room and little use for historical reason.18 Is this
- fight against history part of the fight against a dimension of the mind in
- which centrifugal faculties and forces might develop—faculties and forces that
- might hinder the total coordination of the individual with the society?
- Remembrance of the past may give rise to dangerous insights, and the
- established society seems to be apprehensive of the subversive contents of
- memory. Remembrance is a mode of dissociation from the given facts, a mode of
- “mediation” which breaks, for short moments, the omnipresent power of the given
- facts. Memory recalls the terror and the hope that passed. Both come to life
- again, but whereas in reality, the former recurs in ever new forms, the latter
- remains hope. And in the personal events which reappear in the individual
- memory, the fears and aspirations of mankind assert themselves—the universal in
- the particular. It is history which memory preserves. It succumbs to the
- totalitarian power of the behavioral universe
-
- [...]
-
- The closed language does not demonstrate and explain—it communicates decision,
- dictum, command. Where it defines, the definition becomes “separation of good
- from evil”; it establishes unquestionable rights and wrongs, and one value as
- justification of another value. It moves in tautologies, but the tautologies
- are terribly effective “sentences.” They pass judgment in a “prejudged form”;
- they pronounce condemnation. For example, the “objective content,” that is, the
- definition of such terms as “deviationist,” “revisionist,” is that of the penal
- code, and this sort of validation promotes a consciousness for which the
- language of the powers that be is the language of truth.24
-
- [...]
-
- As the substance of the various regimes no longer appears in alternative modes
- of life, it comes to rest in alternative techniques of manipulation and
- control. Language not only reflects these controls but becomes itself an
- instrument of control even where it does not transmit orders but information;
- where it demands, not obedience but choice, not submission but freedom.
-
- [...]
-
- What is taking place is a sweeping redefinition of thought itself, of its
- function and content. The coordination of the individual with his society
- reaches into those layers of the mind where the very concepts are elaborated
- which are designed to comprehend the established reality. These concepts are
- taken from the intellectual tradition and translated into operational terms—a
- translation which has the effect of reducing the tension between thought and
- reality by weakening the negative power of thought.
-
-### Science and technology of domination
-
- The principles of modern science were a priori structured in such a way that
- they could serve as conceptual instruments for a universe of self-propelling,
- productive control; theoretical operationalism came to correspond to practical
- operationalism. The scientific method which led to the ever-more-effective
- domination of nature thus came to provide the pure concepts as well as the
- instrumentalities for the ever-more-effective domination of man by man through
- the domination of nature. Theoretical reason, remaining pure and neutral,
- entered into the service of practical reason. The merger proved beneficial to
- both. Today, domination perpetuates and extends itself not only through
- technology but as technology, and the latter provides the great legitimation of
- the expanding political power, which absorbs all spheres of culture.
-
- In this universe, technology also provides the great rationalization of the
- unfreedom of man and demonstrates the “technical” impossibility of being
- autonomous, of determining one’s own life. For this unfreedom appears neither
- as irrational nor as political, but rather as submission to the technical
- apparatus which enlarges the comforts of life and increases the productivity of
- labor. Technological rationality thus protects rather than cancels the
- legitimacy of domination, and the instrumentalist horizon of reason opens on a
- rationally totalitarian society:
-
- “One might call autocratic a philosophy of technics which takes the technical
- whole as a place where machines are used to obtain power. The machine is only a
- means; the end is the conquest of nature, the domestication of natural forces
- through a primary enslavement: The machine is a slave which serves to make
- other slaves. Such a domineering and enslaving drive may go together with the
- quest for human freedom. But it is difficult to liberate oneself by
- transferring slavery to other beings, men, animals, or machines; to rule over a
- population of machines subjecting the whole world means still to rule, and all
- rule implies acceptance of schemata of subjection.” Gilbert Simondon, Du Mode
- d’existence des objets techniques (Paris, Aubier, 1958), p. 127.
-
- [...]
-
- The incessant dynamic of technical progress has become permeated with political
- content, and the Logos of technics has been made into the Logos of continued
- servitude. The liberating force of technology—the instrumentalization of
- things—turns into a fetter of liberation; the instrumentalization of man.
-
- [...]
-
- No matter how one defines truth and objectivity, they remain related to the
- human agents of theory and practice, and to their ability to comprehend and
- change their world. This ability in turn depends on the extent to which matter
- (whatever it may be) is recognized and understood as that which it is itself in
- all particular forms. In these terms, contemporary science is of immensely
- greater objective validity than its predecessors. One might even add that, at
- present, the scientific method is the only method that can claim such validity;
- the interplay of hypotheses and observable facts validates the hypotheses and
- establishes the facts. The point which I am trying to make is that science, by
- virtue of its own method and concepts, has projected and promoted a universe in
- which the domination of nature has remained linked to the domination of man—a
- link which tends to be fatal to this universe as a whole. Nature,
- scientifically comprehended and mastered, reappears in the technical apparatus
- of production and destruction which sustains and improves the life of the
- individuals while subordinating them to the masters of the apparatus. Thus the
- rational hierarchy merges with the social one. If this is the case, then the
- change in the direction of progress, which might sever this fatal link, would
- also affect the very structure of science—the scientific project. Its
- hypotheses, without losing their rational character, would develop in an
- essentially different experimental context (that of a pacified world);
- consequently, science would arrive at essentially different concepts of nature
- and establish essentially different facts. The rational society subverts the
- idea of Reason.
-
- I have pointed out that the elements of this subversion, the notions of another
- rationality, were present in the history of thought from its beginning. The
- ancient idea of a state where Being attains fulfillment, where the tension
- between “is” and “ought” is resolved in the cycle of an eternal return,
- partakes of the metaphysics of domination. But it also pertains to the
- metaphysics of liberation—to the reconciliation of Logos and Eros. This idea
- envisages the coming-to-rest of the repressive productivity of Reason, the end
- of domination in gratification.
-
- [...]
-
- By way of summary, we may now try to identify more clearly the hidden subject
- of scientific rationality and the hidden ends in its pure form. The scientific
- concept of a universally controllable nature projected nature as endless
- matter-in-function, the mere stuff of theory and practice. In this form, the
- object-world entered the construction of a technological universe—a universe of
- mental and physical instrumentalities, means in themselves. Thus it is a truly
- “hypothetical” system, depending on a validating and verifying subject.
-
- The processes of validation and verification may be purely theoretical ones,
- but they never occur in a vacuum and they never terminate in a private,
- individual mind. The hypothetical system of forms and functions becomes
- dependent on another system—a pre-established universe of ends, in which and
- for which it develops. What appeared extraneous, foreign to the theoretical
- project, shows forth as part of its very structure (method and concepts); pure
- objectivity reveals itself as object for a subjectivity which provides the
- Telos, the ends. In the construction of the technological reality, there is no
- such thing as a purely rational scientific order; the process of technological
- rationality is a political process.
-
- Only in the medium of technology, man and nature become fungible objects of
- organization. The universal effectiveness and productivity of the apparatus
- under which they are subsumed veil the particular interests that organize the
- apparatus. In other words, technology has become the great vehicle of
- reification—reification in its most mature and effective form. The social
- position of the individual and his relation to others appear not only to be
- determined by objective qualities and laws, but these qualities and laws seem
- to lose their mysterious and uncontrollable character; they appear as
- calculable manifestations of (scientific) rationality. The world tends to
- become the stuff of total administration, which absorbs even the
- administrators. The web of domination has become the web of Reason itself, and
- this society is fatally entangled in it. And the transcending modes of thought
- seem to transcend Reason itself.
-
-### Positive and Negative Thinking
-
- In terms of the established universe, such contradicting modes of thought are
- negative thinking. “The power of the negative” is the principle which governs
- the development of concepts, and contradiction becomes the distinguishing
- quality of Reason (Hegel). This quality of thought was not confined to a
- certain type of rationalism; it was also a decisive element in the empiricist
- tradition. Empiricism is not necessarily positive; its attitude to the
- established reality depends on the particular dimension of experience which
- functions as the source of knowledge and as the basic frame of reference. For
- example, it seems that sensualism and materialism are per se negative toward a
- society in which vital instinctual and material needs are unfulfilled. In
- contrast, the empiricism of linguistic analysis moves within a framework which
- does not allow such contradiction—the self-imposed restriction to the prevalent
- behavioral universe makes for an intrinsically positive attitude. In spite of
- the rigidly neutral approach of the philosopher, the pre-bound analysis
- succumbs to the power of positive thinking.
-
- Before trying to show this intrinsically ideological character of linguistic
- analysis, I must attempt to justify my apparently arbitrary and derogatory play
- with the terms “positive” and “positivism” by a brief comment on their origin.
- Since its first usage, probably in the school of Saint-Simon, the term
- “positivism” has encompassed (1) the validation of cognitive thought by
- experience of facts; (2) the orientation of cognitive thought to the physical
- sciences as a model of certainty and exactness; (3) the belief that progress in
- knowledge depends on this orientation. Consequently, positivism is a struggle
- against all metaphysics, transcendentalisms, and idealisms as obscurantist and
- regressive modes of thought. To the degree to which the given reality is
- scientifically comprehended and transformed, to the degree to which society
- becomes industrial and technological, positivism finds in the society the
- medium for the realization (and validation) of its concepts—harmony between
- theory and practice, truth and facts. Philosophic thought turns into
- affirmative thought; the philosophic critique criticizes within the societal
- framework and stigmatizes non-positive notions as mere speculation, dreams or
- fantasies.1
-
- [...]
-
- The contemporary effort to reduce the scope and the truth of philosophy is
- tremendous, and the philosophers themselves proclaim the modesty and inefficacy
- of philosophy. It leaves the established reality untouched; it abhors
- transgression.
-
- Austin’s contemptuous treatment of the alternatives to the common usage of
- words, and his defamation of what we “think up in our armchairs of an
- afternoon”; Wittgenstein’s assurance that philosophy “leaves everything as it
- is”—such statements2 exhibit, to my mind, academic sado-masochism,
- self-humiliation, and self-denunciation of the intellectual whose labor does
- not issue in scientific, technical or like achievements. These affirmations of
- modesty and dependence seem to recapture Hume’s mood of righteous contentment
- with the limitations of reason which, once recognized and accepted, protect man
- from useless mental adventures but leave him perfectly capable of orienting
- himself in the given environment. However, when Hume debunked substances, he
- fought a powerful ideology, while his successors today provide an intellectual
- justification for that which society has long since accomplished—namely, the
- defamation of alternative modes of thought which contradict the established
- universe of discourse.
-
-### Language, philosophy and the restricted experience
-
- The almost masochistic reduction of speech to the humble and common is made
- into a program: “if the words ‘language,’ ‘experience,’ ‘world,’ have a use, it
- must be as humble a one as that of the words ‘table,’ ‘lamp,’ ‘door.’
-
- [...]
-
- The self-styled poverty of philosophy, committed with all its concepts to the
- given state of affairs, distrusts the possibilities of a new experience.
- Subjection to the rule of the established facts is total—only linguistic facts,
- to be sure, but the society speaks in its language, and we are told to obey.
- The prohibitions are severe and authoritarian: “Philosophy may in no way
- interfere with the actual use of language.”9 “And we may not advance any kind
- of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We
- must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its
- place.”10
-
- One might ask what remains of philosophy? What remains of thinking,
- intelligence, without anything hypothetical, without any explanation? However,
- what is at stake is not the definition or the dignity of philosophy. It is
- rather the chance of preserving and protecting the right, the need to think and
- speak in terms other than those of common usage—terms which are meaningful,
- rational, and valid precisely because they are other terms. What is involved is
- the spread of a new ideology which undertakes to describe what is happening
- (and meant) by eliminating the concepts capable of understanding what is
- happening (and meant).
-
- To begin with, an irreducible difference exists between the universe of
- everyday thinking and language on the one side, and that of philosophic
- thinking and language on the other. In normal circumstances, ordinary language
- is indeed behavioral—a practical instrument. When somebody actually says “My
- broom is in the corner,” he probably intends that somebody else who had
- actually asked about the broom is going to take it or leave it there, is going
- to be satisfied, or angry. In any case, the sentence has fulfilled its function
- by causing a behavioral reaction: “the effect devours the cause; the end
- absorbs the means.”11
-
- In contrast, if, in a philosophic text or discourse, the word “substance,”
- “idea,” “man,” “alienation” becomes the subject of a proposition, no such
- transformation of meaning into a behavioral reaction takes place or is intended
- to take place. The word remains, as it were, unfulfilled—except in thought,
- where it may give rise to other thoughts. And through a long series of
- mediations within a historical continuum, the proposition may help to form and
- guide a practice. But the proposition remains unfulfilled even then—only the
- hubris of absolute idealism asserts the thesis of a final identity between
- thought and its object. The words with which philosophy is concerned can
- therefore never have a use “as humble … as that of the words ‘table,’ ‘lamp,’
- ‘door.’ ”
-
- [...]
-
- Viewed from this position, the examples of linguistic analysis quoted above
- become questionable as valid objects of philosophic analysis. Can the most
- exact and clarifying description of tasting something that may or may not taste
- like pineapple ever contribute to philosophic cognition? [...] The object of
- analysis, withdrawn from the larger and denser context in which the speaker
- speaks and lives, is removed from the universal medium in which concepts are
- formed and become words. What is this universal, larger context in which people
- speak and act and which gives their speech its meaning—this context which does
- not appear in the positivist analysis, which is a priori shut off by the
- examples as well as by the analysis itself?
-
- This larger context of experience, this real empirical world, today is still
- that of the gas chambers and concentration camps, of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of
- American Cadillacs and German Mercedes, of the Pentagon and the Kremlin, of the
- nuclear cities and the Chinese communes, of Cuba, of brainwashing and
- massacres. But the real empirical world is also that in which all these things
- are taken for granted or forgotten or repressed or unknown, in which people are
- free. It is a world in which the broom in the corner or the taste of something
- like pineapple are quite important, in which the daily toil and the daily
- comforts are perhaps the only items that make up all experience. And this
- second, restricted empirical universe is part of the first; the powers that
- rule the first also shape the restricted experience.
-
- [...]
-
- Ordinary language in its “humble use” may indeed be of vital concern to
- critical philosophic thought, but in the medium of this thought words lose
- their plain humility and reveal that “hidden” something which is of no interest
- to Wittgenstein. [...] Such an analysis uncovers the history13 in everyday
- speech as a hidden dimension of meaning—the rule of society over its language.
-
- [...]
-
- Orienting itself on the reified universe of everyday discourse, and exposing
- and clarifying this discourse in terms of this reified universe, the analysis
- abstracts from the negative, from that which is alien and antagonistic and
- cannot be understood in terms of the established usage. By classifying and
- distinguishing meanings, and keeping them apart, it purges thought and speech
- of contradictions, illusions, and transgressions. But the transgressions are
- not those of “pure reason.” They are not metaphysical transgressions beyond the
- limits of possible knowledge, they rather open a realm of knowledge beyond
- common sense and formal logic.
-
- In barring access to this realm, positivist philosophy sets up a
- self-sufficient world of its own, closed and well protected against the
- ingression of disturbing external factors. In this respect, it makes little
- difference whether the validating context is that of mathematics, of logical
- propositions, or of custom and usage. In one way or another, all possibly
- meaningful predicates are prejudged. The prejudging judgment might be as broad
- as the spoken English language, or the dictionary, or some other code or
- convention. Once accepted, it constitutes an empirical a priori which cannot be
- transcended.
-
- [...]
-
- The therapeutic character of the philosophic analysis is strongly emphasized—to
- cure from illusions, deceptions, obscurities, unsolvable riddles, unanswerable
- questions, from ghosts and spectres. Who is the patient? Apparently a certain
- sort of intellectual, whose mind and language do not conform to the terms of
- ordinary discourse. There is indeed a goodly portion of psychoanalysis in this
- philosophy—analysis without Freud’s fundamental insight that the patient’s
- trouble is rooted in a general sickness which cannot be cured by analytic
- therapy. Or, in a sense, according to Freud, the patient’s disease is a protest
- reaction against the sick world in which he lives. But the physician must
- disregard the “moral” problem. He has to restore the patient’s health, to make
- him capable of functioning normally in his world.
-
- The philosopher is not a physician; his job is not to cure individuals but to
- comprehend the world in which they live—to understand it in terms of what it
- has done to man, and what it can do to man. For philosophy is (historically,
- and its history is still valid) the contrary of what Wittgenstein made it out
- to be when he proclaimed it as the renunciation of all theory, as the
- undertaking that “leaves everything as it is.”
-
- [...]
-
- The neo-positivist critique still directs its main effort against metaphysical
- notions, and it is motivated by a notion of exactness which is either that of
- formal logic or empirical description. Whether exactness is sought in the
- analytic purity of logic and mathematics, or in conformity with ordinary
- language—on both poles of contemporary philosophy is the same rejection or
- devaluation of those elements of thought and speech which transcend the
- accepted system of validation. This hostility is most sweeping where it takes
- the form of toleration—that is, where a certain truth value is granted to the
- transcendent concepts in a separate dimension of meaning and significance
- (poetic truth, metaphysical truth). For precisely the setting aside of a
- special reservation in which thought and language are permitted to be
- legitimately inexact, vague, and even contradictory is the most effective way
- of protecting the normal universe of discourse from being seriously disturbed
- by unfitting ideas. Whatever truth may be contained in literature is a “poetic”
- truth, whatever truth may be contained in critical idealism is a “metaphysical”
- truth—its validity, if any, commits neither ordinary discourse and behavior,
- nor the philosophy adjusted to them.
-
- This new form of the doctrine of the “double truth” sanctions a false
- consciousness by denying the relevance of the transcendent language to the
- universe of ordinary language, by proclaiming total non-interference. Whereas
- the truth value of the former consists precisely in its relevance to and
- interference with the latter.
-
-### Philosophy and science
-
- This intellectual dissolution and even subversion of the given facts is the
- historical task of philosophy and the philosophic dimension. Scientific method,
- too, goes beyond the facts and even against the facts of immediate experience.
- Scientific method develops in the tension between appearance and reality. The
- mediation between the subject and object of thought, however, is essentially
- different. In science, the medium is the observing, measuring, calculating,
- experimenting subject divested of all other qualities; the abstract subject
- projects and defines the abstract object.
-
- In contrast, the objects of philosophic thought are related to a consciousness
- for which the concrete qualities enter into the concepts and into their
- interrelation. The philosophic concepts retain and explicate the pre-scientific
- mediations (the work of everyday practice, of economic organization, of
- political action) which have made the object-world that which it actually is—a
- world in which all facts are events, occurrences in a historical continuum.
-
- The separation of science from philosophy is itself a historical event.
- Aristotelian physics was a part of philosophy and, as such, preparatory to the
- “first science”—ontology. The Aristotelian concept of matter is distinguished
- from the Galilean and post-Galilean not only in terms of different stages in
- the development of scientific method (and in the discovery of different
- ‘layers” of reality), but also, and perhaps primarily, in terms of different
- historical projects, of a different historical enterprise which established a
- different nature as well as society. Aristotelian physics becomes objectively
- wrong with the new experience and apprehension of nature, with the historical
- establishment of a new subject and object-world, and the falsification of
- Aristotelian physics then extends backward into the past and surpassed
- experience and apprehension.15
-
-### A funny paragraph
-
- The neglect or the clearing up of this specific philosophic dimension has led
- contemporary positivism to move in a synthetically impoverished world of
- academic concreteness, and to create more illusory problems than it has
- destroyed. Rarely has a philosophy exhibited a more tortuous esprit de sérieux
- than that displayed in such analyses as the interpretation of Three Blind Mice
- in a study of “Metaphysical and Ideographic Language,” with its discussion of
- an “artificially constructed Triple principle-Blindness-Mousery asymmetric
- sequence constructed according to the pure principles of ideography.”17
-
- Perhaps this example is unfair. [...] Examples are skillfully held in balance
- between seriousness and the joke
-
-[Three Blind Mice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Blind_Mice) is a crusty rhyme.
-
-### A suspect language
-
- Analytic philosophy often spreads the atmosphere of denunciation and
- investigation by committee. The intellectual is called on the carpet. What do
- you mean when you say …? Don’t you conceal something? You talk a language which
- is suspect. You don’t talk like the rest of us, like the man in the street, but
- rather like a foreigner who does not belong here. We have to cut you down to
- size, expose your tricks, purge you. We shall teach you to say what you have in
- mind, to “come clear,” to “put your cards on the table.” Of course, we do not
- impose on you and your freedom of thought and speech; you may think as you
- like. But once you speak, you have to communicate your thoughts to us—in our
- language or in yours. Certainly, you may speak your own language, but it must
- be translatable, and it will be translated. You may speak poetry—that is all
- right. We love poetry. But we want to understand your poetry, and we can do so
- only if we can interpret your symbols, metaphors, and images in terms of
- ordinary language.
-
- The poet might answer that indeed he wants his poetry to be understandable and
- understood (that is why he writes it), but if what he says could be said in
- terms of ordinary language he would probably have done so in the first place.
- He might say: Understanding of my poetry presupposes the collapse and
- invalidation of precisely that universe of discourse and behavior into which
- you want to translate it. My language can be learned like any other language
- (in point of fact, it is also your own language), then it will appear that my
- symbols, metaphors, etc. are not symbols, metaphors, etc. but mean exactly what
- they say. Your tolerance is deceptive. In reserving for me a special niche of
- meaning and significance, you grant me exemption from sanity and reason, but in
- my view, the madhouse is somewhere else.
-
- [...]
-
- Under these circumstances, the spoken phrase is an expression of the individual
- who speaks it, and of those who make him speak as he does, and of whatever
- tension or contradiction may interrelate them. In speaking their own language,
- people also speak the language of their masters, benefactors, advertisers. Thus
- they do not only express themselves, their own knowledge, feelings, and
- aspirations, but also something other than themselves. Describing “by
- themselves” the political situation, either in their home town or in the
- international scene, they (and “they” includes us, the intellectuals who know
- it and criticize it) describe what “their” media of mass communication tell
- them—and this merges with what they really think and see and feel.
-
- [...]
-
- But this situation disqualifies ordinary language from fulfilling the
- validating function which it performs in analytic philosophy. “What people mean
- when they say …” is related to what they don’t say. Or, what they mean cannot
- be taken at face value—not because they lie, but because the universe of
- thought and practice in which they live is a universe of manipulated
- contradictions.
-
-### Metalanguage
-
- Here the problem of “metalanguage” arises; the terms which analyze the meaning
- of certain terms must be other than, or distinguishable from the latter. They
- must be more and other than mere synonyms which still belong to the same
- (immediate) universe of discourse. But if this metalanguage is really to break
- through the totalitarian scope of the established universe of discourse, in
- which the different dimensions of language are integrated and assimilated, it
- must be capable of denoting the societal processes which have determined and
- “closed” the established universe of discourse. Consequently, it cannot be a
- technical metalanguage, constructed mainly with a view of semantic or logical
- clarity. The desideratum is rather to make the established language itself
- speak what it conceals or excludes, for what is to be revealed and denounced is
- operative within the universe of ordinary discourse and action, and the
- prevailing language contains the metalanguage.
-
-### Ordinary universe of discourse
-
- The crimes against language, which appear in the style of the newspaper,
- pertain to its political style. Syntax, grammar, and vocabulary become moral
- and political acts. Or, the context may be an aesthetic and philosophic one:
- literary criticism, an address before a learned society, or the like.
-
- [...]
-
- For such an analysis, the meaning of a term or form demands its development in
- a multi-dimensional universe, where any expressed meaning partakes of several
- interrelated, overlapping, and antagonistic “systems.”
-
- [...]
-
- in reality, we understand each other only through whole areas of
- misunderstanding and contradiction. The real universe of ordinary language is
- that of the struggle for existence. It is indeed an ambiguous, vague, obscure
- universe, and is certainly in need of clarification. Moreover, such
- clarification may well fulfill a therapeutic function, and if philosophy would
- become therapeutic, it would really come into its own.
-
- Philosophy approaches this goal to the degree to which it frees thought from
- its enslavement by the established universe of discourse and behavior,
- elucidates the negativity of the Establishment (its positive aspects are
- abundantly publicized anyway) and projects its alternatives. To be sure,
- philosophy contradicts and projects in thought only. It is ideology, and this
- ideological character is the very fate of philosophy which no scientism and
- positivism can overcome. Still, its ideological effort may be truly
- therapeutic—to show reality as that which it really is, and to show that which
- this reality prevents from being.
-
- In the totalitarian era, the therapeutic task of philosophy would be a
- political task, since the established universe of ordinary language tends to
- coagulate into a totally manipulated and indoctrinated universe. Then politics
- would appear in philosophy, not as a special discipline or object of analysis,
- nor as a special political philosophy, but as the intent of its concepts to
- comprehend the unmutilated reality. If linguistic analysis does not contribute
- to such understanding; if, instead, it contributes to enclosing thought in the
- circle of the mutilated universe of ordinary discourse, it is at best entirely
- inconsequential. And, at worst, it is an escape into the non-controversial, the
- unreal, into that which is only academically controversial.
-
-### Universal Ghosts
-
- Contemporary analytic philosophy is out to exorcize such “myths” or
- metaphysical “ghosts” as Mind, Consciousness, Will, Soul, Self, by dissolving
- the intent of these concepts into statements on particular identifiable
- operations, performances, powers, dispositions, propensities, skills, etc. The
- result shows, in a strange way, the impotence of the destruction—the ghost
- continues to haunt. While every interpretation or translation may describe
- adequately a particular mental process, an act of imagining what I mean when I
- say “I,” or what the priest means when he says that Mary is a “good girl,” not
- a single one of these reformulations, nor their sum-total, seems to capture or
- even circumscribe the full meaning of such terms as Mind, Will, Self, Good.
- These universals continue to persist in common as well as “poetic” usage, and
- either usage distinguishes them from the various modes of behavior or
- disposition that, according to the analytic philosopher, fulfill their meaning.
-
- [...]
-
- However, this dissolution itself must be questioned—not only on behalf of the
- philosopher, but on behalf of the ordinary people in whose life and discourse
- such dissolution takes place. It is not their own doing and their own saying;
- it happens to them and it violates them as they are compelled, by the
- “circumstances,” to identify their mind with the mental processes, their self
- with the roles and functions which they have to perform in their society.
- If philosophy does not comprehend these processes of translation and
- identification as societal processes—i.e., as a mutilation of the mind (and the
- body) inflicted upon the individuals by their society—philosophy struggles only
- with the ghost of the substance which it wishes to de-mystify. The mystifying
- character adheres, not to the concepts of “mind,” “self,” “consciousness,” etc.
- but rather to their behavioral translation. The translation is deceptive
- precisely because it translates the concept faithfully into modes of actual
- behavior, propensities, and dispositions and, in so doing, it takes the
- mutilated and organized appearances (themselves real enough!) for the reality.
-
- [...]
-
- Moreover, the normal restriction of experience produces a pervasive tension,
- even conflict, between “the mind” and the mental processes, between
- “consciousness” and conscious acts. If I speak of the mind of a person, I do
- not merely refer to his mental processes as they are revealed in his
- expression, speech, behavior, etc., nor merely of his dispositions or faculties
- as experienced or inferred from experience. I also mean that which he does not
- express, for which he shows no disposition, but which is present nevertheless,
- and which determines, to a considerable extent, his behavior, his
- understanding, the formation and range of his concepts.
-
- Thus “negatively present” are the specific “environmental” forces which
- precondition his mind for the spontaneous repulsion of certain data,
- conditions, relations. They are present as repelled material. Their absence is
- a reality—a positive factor that explains his actual mental processes, the
- meaning of his words and behavior. Meaning for whom? Not only for the
- professional philosopher, whose task it is to rectify the wrong that pervades
- the universe of ordinary discourse, but also for those who suffer this wrong
- although they may not be aware of it—for Joe Doe and Richard Roe. Contemporary
- linguistic analysis shirks this task by interpreting concepts in terms of an
- impoverished and preconditioned mind. What is at stake is the unabridged and
- unexpurgated intent of certain key concepts, their function in the unrepressed
- understanding of reality—in non-conformist, critical thought.
-
- Are the remarks just submitted on the reality content of such universals as
- “mind” and “consciousness” applicable to other concepts, such as the abstract
- yet substantive universals, Beauty, Justice, Happiness, with their contraries?
- It seems that the persistence of these untranslatable universals as nodal
- points of thought reflects the unhappy consciousness of a divided world in
- which “that which is” falls short of, and even denies, “that which can be.” The
- irreducible difference between the universal and its particulars seems to be
- rooted in the primary experience of the inconquerable difference between
- potentiality and actuality—between two dimensions of the one experienced world.
- The universal comprehends in one idea the possibilities which are realized, and
- at the same time arrested, in reality.
-
- [...]
-
- This description is of precisely that metaphysical character which positivistic
- analysis wishes to eliminate by translation, but the translation eliminates
- that which was to be defined.
-
- [...]
-
- The protest against the vague, obscure, metaphysical character of such
- universals, the insistence on familiar concreteness and protective security of
- common and scientific sense still reveal something of that primordial anxiety
- which guided the recorded origins of philosophic thought in its evolution from
- religion to mythology, and from mythology to logic; defense and security still
- are large items in the intellectual as well as national budget. The unpurged
- experience seems to be more familiar with the abstract and universal than is
- the analytic philosophy; it seems to be embedded in a metaphysical world.
-
- Universals are primary elements of experience—universals not as philosophic
- concepts but as the very qualities of the world with which one is daily
- confronted.
-
- [...]
-
- The substantive character of “qualities” points to the experiential origin of
- substantive universals, to the manner in which concepts originate in immediate
- experience.
-
- [...]
-
- But precisely the relation of the word to a substantive universal (concept)
- makes it impossible, according to Humboldt, to imagine the origin of language
- as starting from the signification of objects by words and then proceeding to
- their combination (Zusammenfügung): In reality, speech is not put together from
- preceding words, but quite the reverse: words emerge from the whole of speech
- (aus dem Ganzen der Rede).7
-
- The “whole” that here comes to view must be cleared from all misunderstanding
- in terms of an independent entity, of a “Gestalt,” and the like. The concept
- somehow expresses the difference and tension between potentiality and
- actuality—identity in this difference. It appears in the relation between the
- qualities (white, hard; but also beautiful, free, just) and the corresponding
- concepts (whiteness, hardness, beauty, freedom, justice). The abstract
- character of the latter seems to designate the more concrete qualities as
- part-realizations, aspects, manifestations of a more universal and more
- “excellent” quality, which is experienced in the concrete.8 And by virtue of
- this relation, the concrete quality seems to represent a negation as well as
- realization of the universal.
-
- [...]
-
- These formulations do not alter the relation between the abstract concept and
- its concrete realizations: the universal concept denotes that which the
- particular entity is, and is not. The translation can eliminate the hidden
- negation by reformulating the meaning in a non-contradictory proposition, but
- the untranslated statement suggests a real want. There is more in the abstract
- noun (beauty, freedom) than in the qualities (“beautiful,” “free”) attributed
- to the particular person, thing or condition. The substantive universal intends
- qualities which surpass all particular experience, but persist in the mind, not
- as a figment of imagination nor as more logical possibilities but as the
- “stuff” of which our world consists.
-
- [...]
-
- Now there is a large class of concepts—we dare say, the philosophically
- relevant concepts—where the quantitative relation between the universal and the
- particular assumes a qualitative aspect, where the abstract universal seems to
- designate potentialities in a concrete, historical sense. However “man,”
- “nature,” “justice,” “beauty” or “freedom” may be defined, they synthetize
- experiential contents into ideas which transcend their particular realizations
- as something that is to be surpassed, overcome. Thus the concept of beauty
- comprehends all the beauty not yet realized; the concept of freedom all the
- liberty not yet attained.
-
- Or, to take another example, the philosophic concept “man” aims at the fully
- developed human faculties which are his distinguishing faculties, and which
- appear as possibilities of the conditions in which men actually live.
-
- [...]
-
- Such universals thus appear as conceptual instruments for understanding the
- particular conditions of things in the light of their potentialities. They are
- historical and supra-historical; they conceptualize the stuff of which the
- experienced world consists, and they conceptualize it with a view of its
- possibilities, in the light of their actual limitation, suppression, and
- denial. Neither the experience nor the judgment is private. The philosophic
- concepts are formed and developed in the consciousness of a general condition
- in a historical continuum; they are elaborated from an individual position
- within a specific society. The stuff of thought is historical stuff—no matter
- how abstract, general, or pure it may become in philosophic or scientific
- theory. The abstract-universal and at the same time historical character of
- these “eternal objects” of thought is recognized and clearly stated in
- Whitehead’s Science and the Modern World:10
-
- “Eternal objects are … in their nature, abstract. By ‘abstract’ I mean that
- what an eternal object is in itself—that is to say, its essence—is
- comprehensible without reference to some one particular experience. To be
- abstract is to transcend the particular occasion of actual happening. But to
- transcend an actual occasion does not mean being disconnected from it. On the
- contrary, I hold that each eternal object has its own proper connection with
- each such occasion, which I term its mode of ingression into that occasion.”
- “Thus the metaphysical status of an eternal object is that of a possibility for
- an actuality. Every actual occasion is defined as to its character by how these
- possibilities are actualized for that occasion.”
-
- Elements of experience, projection and anticipation of real possibilities
- enter into the conceptual syntheses—in respectable form as hypotheses, in
- disreputable form as “metaphysics.” In various degrees, they are unrealistic
- because they transgress beyond the established universe of behavior, and they
- may even be undesirable in the interest of neatness and exactness. Certainly,
- in philosophic analysis,
-
- “Little real advance … is to be hoped for in expanding our universe to
- include so-called possible entities,”11
-
- but it all depends on how Ockham’s Razor is applied, that is to say, which
- possibilities are to be cut off. The possibility of an entirely different
- societal organization of life has nothing in common with the “possibility” of a
- man with a green hat appearing in all doorways tomorrow, but treating them with
- the same logic may serve the defamation of undesirable possibilities.
- Criticizing the introduction of possible entities, Quine writes that such an
- “overpopulated universe is in many ways unlovely. It offends the aesthetic
- sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes, but this is not the worst
- of it. [Such a] slum of possibles is a breeding ground for disorderly
- elements.”12
-
- Contemporary philosophy has rarely attained a more authentic formulation of the
- conflict between its intent and its function. The linguistic syndrome of
- “loveliness,” “aesthetic sense,” and “desert landscape” evokes the liberating
- air of Nietzsche’s thought, cutting into Law and Order, while the “breeding
- ground for disorderly elements” belongs to the language spoken by the
- authorities of Investigation and Information. What appears unlovely and
- disorderly from the logical point of view, may well comprise the lovely
- elements of a different order, and may thus be an essential part of the
- material from which philosophic concepts are built. Neither the most refined
- aesthetic sense nor the most exact philosophic concept is immune against
- history. Disorderly elements enter into the purest objects of thought. They too
- are detached from a societal ground, and the contents from which they abstract
- guide the abstraction.
-
-### Historicism
-
- Thus the spectre of “historicism” is raised. If thought proceeds from
- historical conditions which continue to operate in the abstraction, is there
- any objective basis on which distinction can be made between the various
- possibilities projected by thought—distinction between different and
- conflicting ways of conceptual transcendence? Moreover, the question cannot be
- discussed with reference to different philosophic projects only.13 To the
- degree to which the philosophical project is ideological, it is part of a
- historical project—that is, it pertains to a specific stage and level of the
- societal development, and the critical philosophic concepts refer (no matter
- how indirectly!) to alternative possibilities of this development.
-
- The quest for criteria for judging between different philosophic projects thus
- leads to the quest for criteria for judging between different historical
- projects and alternatives, between different actual and possible ways of
- understanding and changing man and nature. I shall submit only a few
- propositions which suggest that the internal historical character of the
- philosophic concepts, far from precluding objective validity, defines the
- ground for their objective validity.
-
- [...]
-
- The objects of thought and perception as they appear to the individuals prior
- to all “subjective” interpretation have in common certain primary qualities,
- pertaining to these two layers of reality: (1) to the physical (natural)
- structure of matter, and (2) to the form which matter has acquired in the
- collective historical practice that has made it (matter) into objects for a
- subject. The two layers or aspects of objectivity (physical and historical) are
- interrelated in such a way that they cannot be insulated from each other; the
- historical aspect can never be eliminated so radically that only the “absolute”
- physical layer remains.
-
- [...]
-
- I shall now propose some criteria for the truth value of different historical
- projects.
-
- [...]
-
- (1) The transcendent project must be in accordance with the real possibilities
- open at the attained level of the material and intellectual culture.
-
- (2) The transcendent project, in order to falsify the established totality,
- must demonstrate its own higher rationality in the threefold sense that
-
- (a) it offers the prospect of preserving and improving the productive
- achievements of civilization;
-
- (b) it defines the established totality in its very structure, basic
- tendencies, and relations;
-
- (c) its realization offers a greater chance for the pacification of existence,
- within the framework of institutions which offer a greater chance for the free
- development of human needs and faculties.
-
-### Determinate choice
-
- If the historical continuum itself provides the objective ground for
- determining the truth of different historical projects, does it also determine
- their sequence and their limits? Historical truth is comparative; the
- rationality of the possible depends on that of the actual, the truth of the
- transcending project on that of the project in realization. Aristotelian
- science was falsified on the basis of its achievements; if capitalism were
- falsified by communism, it would be by virtue of its own achievements.
- Continuity is preserved through rupture: quantitative development becomes
- qualitative change if it attains the very structure of an established system;
- the established rationality becomes irrational when, in the course of its
- internal development, the potentialities of the system have outgrown its
- institutions. Such internal refutation pertains to the historical character of
- reality, and the same character confers upon the concepts which comprehend this
- reality their critical intent. They recognize and anticipate the irrational in
- the established reality—they project the historical negation.
-
- Is this negation a “determinate” one—that is, is the internal succession of a
- historical project, once it has become a totality, necessarily pre-determined
- by the structure of this totality? If so, then the term “project” would be
- deceptive. That which is historical possibility would sooner or later be real;
- and the definition of liberty as comprehended necessity would have a repressive
- connotation which it does not have. All this may not matter much. What does
- matter is that such historical determination would (in spite of all subtle
- ethics and psychology) absolve the crimes against humanity which civilization
- continues to commit and thus facilitate this continuation.
-
- I suggest the phrase “determinate choice” in order to emphasize the ingression
- of liberty into historical necessity; the phrase does no more than condense the
- proposition that men make their own history but make it under given conditions.
- Determined are (1) the specific contradictions which develop within a
- historical system as manifestations of the conflict between the potential and
- the actual; (2) the material and intellectual resources available to the
- respective system; (3) the extent of theoretical and practical freedom
- compatible with the system. These conditions leave open alternative
- possibilities of developing and utilizing the available resources, alternative
- possibilities of “making a living,” of organizing man’s struggle with nature.
-
- [...]
-
- the truth of a historical project is not validated ex post through success,
- that is to say, by the fact that it is accepted and realized by the society.
- Galilean science was true while it was still condemned; Marxian theory was
- already true at the time of the Communist Manifesto; fascism remains false even
- if it is in ascent on an international scale (“true” and “false” always in the
- sense of historical rationality as defined above). In the contemporary period,
- all historical projects tend to be polarized on the two conflicting
- totalities—capitalism and communism, and the outcome seems to depend on two
- antagonistic series of factors: (1) the greater force of destruction; (2) the
- greater productivity without destruction. In other words, the higher historical
- truth would pertain to the system which offers the greater chance of
- pacification.
-
-### Negative Thinking
-
- To the degree to which the established society is irrational, the analysis in
- terms of historical rationality introduces into the concept the negative
- element—critique, contradiction, and transcendence.
-
- This element cannot be assimilated with the positive. It changes the concept in
- its entirety, in its intent and validity. Thus, in the analysis of an economy,
- capitalist or not, which operates as an “independent” power over and above the
- individuals, the negative features (overproduction, unemployment, insecurity,
- waste, repression) are not comprehended as long as they appear merely as more
- or less inevitable by-products, as “the other side” of the story of growth and
- progress.
-
- True, a totalitarian administration may promote the efficient exploitation of
- resources; the nuclear-military establishment may provide millions of jobs
- through enormous purchasing power; toil and ulcers may be the by-product of the
- acquisition of wealth and responsibility; deadly blunders and crimes on the
- part of the leaders may be merely the way of life. One is willing to admit
- economic and political madness—and one buys it. But this sort of knowledge of
- “the other side” is part and parcel of the solidification of the state of
- affairs, of the grand unification of opposites which counteracts qualitative
- change, because it pertains to a thoroughly hopeless or thoroughly
- preconditioned existence that has made its home in a world where even the
- irrational is Reason.
-
- The tolerance of positive thinking is enforced tolerance—enforced not by any
- terroristic agency but by the overwhelming, anonymous power and efficiency of
- the technological society. As such it permeates the general consciousness—and
- the consciousness of the critic. The absorption of the negative by the positive
- is validated in the daily experience, which obfuscates the distinction between
- rational appearance and irrational reality.
-
- [examples follow]
-
- These examples may illustrate the happy marriage of the positive and the
- negative—the objective ambiguity which adheres to the data of experience. It is
- objective ambiguity because the shift in my sensations and reflections responds
- to the manner in which the experienced facts are actually interrelated. But
- this interrelation, if comprehended, shatters the harmonizing consciousness and
- its false realism. Critical thought strives to define the irrational character
- of the established rationality (which becomes increasingly obvious) and to
- define the tendencies which cause this rationality to generate its own
- transformation. “Its own” because, as historical totality, it has developed
- forces and capabilities which themselves become projects beyond the established
- totality. They are possibilities of the advancing technological rationality
- and, as such, they involve the whole of society. The technological
- transformation is at the same time political transformation, but the political
- change would turn into qualitative social change only to the degree to which it
- would alter the direction of technical progress—that is, develop a new
- technology. For the established technology has become an instrument of
- destructive politics.
-
- Such qualitative change would be transition to a higher stage of civilization
- if technics were designed and utilized for the pacification of the struggle for
- existence. In order to indicate the disturbing implications of this statement,
- I submit that such a new direction of technical progress would be the
- catastrophe of the established direction, not merely the quantitative evolution
- of the prevailing (scientific and technological) rationality but rather its
- catastrophic transformation, the emergence of a new idea of Reason, theoretical
- and practical.
-
- The new idea of Reason is expressed in Whitehead’s proposition: “The function
- of Reason is to promote the art of life.”1 In view of this end, Reason is the
- “direction of the attack on the environment” which derives from the “threefold
- urge: (1) to live, (2) to live well, (3) to live better.”2
-
-Then read the rest of the whole chapter 9. It's interesting enough that deserves
-to be quoted on its entirety. It talks about the completion of the
-Technological Project. Like this:
-
- Civilization produces the means for freeing Nature from its own brutality, its
- own insufficiency, its own blindness, by virtue of the cognitive and
- transforming power of Reason. And Reason can fulfill this function only as
- post-technological rationality, in which technics is itself the instrumentality
- of pacification, organon of the “art of life.” The function of Reason then
- converges with the function of Art.
-
- The Greek notion of the affinity between art and technics may serve as a
- preliminary illustration. The artist possesses the ideas which, as final
- causes, guide the construction of certain things—just as the engineer possesses
- the ideas which guide, as final causes, the construction of a machine. For
- example, the idea of an abode for human beings determines the architect’s
- construction of a house; the idea of wholesale nuclear explosion determines the
- construction of the apparatus which is to serve this purpose. Emphasis on the
- essential relation between art and technics points up the specific rationality
- of art.
-
- [...]
-
- In the contemporary era, the conquest of scarcity is still confined to small
- areas of advanced industrial society. Their prosperity covers up the Inferno
- inside and outside their borders; it also spreads a repressive productivity and
- “false needs.” It is repressive precisely to the degree to which it promotes
- the satisfaction of needs which require continuing the rat race of catching up
- with one’s peers and with planned obsolescence, enjoying freedom from using the
- brain, working with and for the means of destruction. The obvious comforts
- generated by this sort of productivity, and even more, the support which it
- gives to a system of profitable domination, facilitate its importation in less
- advanced areas of the world where the introduction of such a system still means
- tremendous progress in technical and human terms.
-
- However, the close interrelation between technical and political-manipulative
- know-how, between profitable productivity and domination, lends to the conquest
- of scarcity the weapons for containing liberation. To a great extent, it is the
- sheer quantity of goods, services, work, and recreation in the overdeveloped
- countries which effectuates this containment. Consequently, qualitative change
- seems to presuppose a quantitative change in the advanced standard of living,
- namely, reduction of overdevelopment.
-
- The standard of living attained in the most advanced industrial areas is not a
- suitable model of development if the aim is pacification. In view of what this
- standard has made of Man and Nature, the question must again be asked whether
- it is worth the sacrifices and the victims made in its defense. The question
- has ceased to be irresponsible since the “affluent society” has become a
- society of permanent mobilization against the risk of annihilation, and since
- the sale of its goods has been accompanied by moronization, the perpetuation of
- toil, and the promotion of frustration.
-
- Under these circumstances, liberation from the affluent society does not mean
- return to healthy and robust poverty, moral cleanliness, and simplicity. On the
- contrary, the elimination of profitable waste would increase the social wealth
- available for distribution, and the end of permanent mobilization would reduce
- the social need for the denial of satisfactions that are the individual’s
- own—denials which now find their compensation in the cult of fitness, strength,
- and regularity.
-
- [...]
-
- The crime is that of a society in which the growing population aggravates the
- struggle for existence in the face of its possible alleviation. The drive for
- more “living space” operates not only in international aggressiveness but also
- within the nation. Here, expansion has, in all forms of teamwork, community
- life, and fun, invaded the inner space of privacy and practically eliminated
- the possibility of that isolation in which the individual, thrown back on
- himself alone, can think and question and find. This sort of privacy—the sole
- condition that, on the basis of satisfied vital needs, can give meaning to
- freedom and independence of thought—has long since become the most expensive
- commodity, available only to the very rich (who don’t use it). In this respect,
- too, “culture” reveals its feudal origins and limitations. It can become
- democratic only through the abolition of mass democracy, i.e., if society has
- succeeded in restoring the prerogatives of privacy by granting them to all and
- protecting them for each.
-
- [...]
-
- To take an (unfortunately fantastic) example: the mere absence of all
- advertising and of all indoctrinating media of information and entertainment
- would plunge the individual into a traumatic void where he would have the
- chance to wonder and to think, to know himself (or rather the negative of
- himself) and his society. Deprived of his false fathers, leaders, friends, and
- representatives, he would have to learn his ABC’s again. But the words and
- sentences which he would form might come out very differently, and so might his
- aspirations and fears.
-
- To be sure, such a situation would be an unbearable nightmare. While the people
- can support the continuous creation of nuclear weapons, radioactive fallout,
- and questionable foodstuffs, they cannot (for this very reason!) tolerate being
- deprived of the entertainment and education which make them capable of
- reproducing the arrangements for their defense and/or destruction. The
- non-functioning of television and the allied media might thus begin to achieve
- what the inherent contradictions of capitalism did not achieve—the
- disintegration of the system. The creation of repressive needs has long since
- become part of socially necessary labor—necessary in the sense that without it,
- the established mode of production could not be sustained. Neither problems of
- psychology nor of aesthetics are at stake, but the material base of domination.
-
-### Imagination
-
- In reducing and even canceling the romantic space of imagination, society has
- forced the imagination to prove itself on new grounds, on which the images are
- translated into historical capabilities and projects. The translation will be
- as bad and distorted as the society which undertakes it. Separated from the
- realm of material production and material needs, imagination was mere play,
- invalid in the realm of necessity, and committed only to a fantastic logic and
- a fantastic truth. When technical progress cancels this separation, it invests
- the images with its own logic and its own truth; it reduces the free faculty of
- the mind. But it also reduces the gap between imagination and Reason. The two
- antagonistic faculties become interdependent on common ground. In the light of
- the capabilities of advanced industrial civilization, is not all play of the
- imagination playing with technical possibilities, which can be tested as to
- their chances of realization? The romantic idea of a “science of the
- Imagination” seems to assume an ever-more-empirical aspect.
-
- [...]
-
- Imagination has not remained immune to the process of reification. We are
- possessed by our images, suffer our own images. Psychoanalysis knew it well,
- and knew the consequences. However, “to give to the imagination all the means
- of expression” would be regression. The mutilated individuals (mutilated also
- in their faculty of imagination) would organize and destroy even more than they
- are now permitted to do. Such release would be the unmitigated horror—not the
- catastrophe of culture, but the free sweep of its most repressive tendencies.
- Rational is the imagination which can become the a priori of the reconstruction
- and redirection of the productive apparatus toward a pacified existence, a life
- without fear. And this can never be the imagination of those who are possessed
- by the images of domination and death.
-
- To liberate the imagination so that it can be given all its means of expression
- presupposes the repression of much that is now free and that perpetuates a
- repressive society. And such reversal is not a matter of psychology or ethics
- but of politics, in the sense in which this term has here been used throughout:
- the practice in which the basic societal institutions are developed, defined,
- sustained, and changed. It is the practice of individuals, no matter how
- organized they may be. Thus the question once again must be faced: how can the
- administered individuals—who have made their mutilation into their own
- liberties and satisfactions, and thus reproduce it on an enlarged
- scale—liberate themselves from themselves as well as from their masters? How is
- it even thinkable that the vicious circle be broken?
-
-### Qualitative Change
-
- Qualitative change is conditional upon planning for the whole against these
- interests, and a free and rational society can emerge only on this basis.
-
- The institutions within which pacification can be envisaged thus defy the
- traditional classification into authoritarian and democratic, centralized and
- liberal administration. Today, the opposition to central planning in the name
- of a liberal democracy which is denied in reality serves as an ideological prop
- for repressive interests. The goal of authentic self-determination by the
- individuals depends on effective social control over the production and
- distribution of the necessities (in terms of the achieved level of culture,
- material and intellectual).
-
- Here, technological rationality, stripped of its exploitative features, is the
- sole standard and guide in planning and developing the available resources for
- all. Self-determination in the production and distribution of vital goods and
- services would be wasteful. The job is a technical one, and as a truly
- technical job, it makes for the reduction of physical and mental toil. In this
- realm, centralized control is rational if it establishes the preconditions for
- meaningful self-determination. The latter can then become effective in its own
- realm—in the decisions which involve the production and distribution of the
- economic surplus, and in the individual existence.
-
- In any case, the combination of centralized authority and direct democracy is
- subject to infinite variations, according to the degree of development.
- Self-determination will be real to the extent to which the masses have been
- dissolved into individuals liberated from all propaganda, indoctrination, and
- manipulation, capable of knowing and comprehending the facts and of evaluating
- the alternatives. In other words, society would be rational and free to the
- extent to which it is organized, sustained, and reproduced by an essentially
- new historical Subject.
-
- At the present stage of development of the advanced industrial societies, the
- material as well as the cultural system denies this exigency. The power and
- efficiency of this system, the thorough assimilation of mind with fact, of
- thought with required behavior, of aspirations with reality, militate against
- the emergence of a new Subject. They also militate against the notion that the
- replacement of the prevailing control over the productive process by “control
- from below” would mean the advent of qualitative change. This notion was valid,
- and still is valid, where the laborers were, and still are, the living denial
- and indictment of the established society. However, where these classes have
- become a prop of the established way of life, their ascent to control would
- prolong this way in a different setting. And yet, the facts are all there
- which validate the critical theory of this society and of its fatal
- development: the increasing irrationality of the whole; waste and restriction
- of productivity; the need for aggressive expansion; the constant threat of war;
- intensified exploitation; dehumanization. And they all point to the historical
- alternative: the planned utilization of resources for the satisfaction of vital
- needs with a minimum of toil, the transformation of leisure into free time, the
- pacification of the struggle for existence.
-
-### Terrorized beauty
-
- Beauty reveals its terror as highly classified nuclear plants and laboratories
- become “Industrial Parks” in pleasing surroundings; Civil Defense Headquarters
- display a “deluxe fallout-shelter” with wall-to-wall carpeting (“soft”), lounge
- chairs, television, and Scrabble, “designed as a combination family room during
- peacetime (sic!) and family fallout shelter should war break out.”1 If the
- horror of such realizations does not penetrate into consciousness, if it is
- readily taken for granted, it is because these achievements are (a) perfectly
- rational in terms of the existing order, (b) tokens of human ingenuity and
- power beyond the traditional limits of imagination.
-
-### What brings chance: practice
-
- Dialectical theory is not refuted, but it cannot offer the remedy. It cannot be
- positive. To be sure, the dialectical concept, in comprehending the given
- facts, transcends the given facts. This is the very token of its truth. It
- defines the historical possibilities, even necessities; but their realization
- can only be in the practice which responds to the theory, and, at present, the
- practice gives no such response.
-
- On theoretical as well as empirical grounds, the dialectical concept pronounces
- its own hopelessness. The human reality is its history and, in it,
- contradictions do not explode by themselves. The conflict between streamlined,
- rewarding domination on the one hand, and its achievements that make for
- self-determination and pacification on the other, may become blatant beyond any
- possible denial, but it may well continue to be a manageable and even
- productive conflict, for with the growth in the technological conquest of
- nature grows the conquest of man by man. And this conquest reduces the freedom
- which is a necessary a priori of liberation. This is freedom of thought in the
- only sense in which thought can be free in the administered world—as the
- consciousness of its repressive productivity, and as the absolute need for
- breaking out of this whole. But precisely this absolute need does not prevail
- where it could become the driving force of a historical practice, the effective
- cause of qualitative change. Without this material force, even the most acute
- consciousness remains powerless.
-
- No matter how obvious the irrational character of the whole may manifest itself
- and, with it, the necessity of change, insight into necessity has never
- sufficed for seizing the possible alternatives. Confronted with the omnipresent
- efficiency of the given system of life, its alternatives have always appeared
- utopian. And insight into necessity, the consciousness of the evil state, will
- not suffice even at the stage where the accomplishments of science and the
- level of productivity have eliminated the utopian features of the
- alternatives—where the established reality rather than its opposite is utopian.
-
- [...]
-
- The enchained possibilities of advanced industrial societies are: development
- of the productive forces on an enlarged scale, extension of the conquest of
- nature, growing satisfaction of needs for a growing number of people, creation
- of new needs and faculties. But these possibilities are gradually being
- realized through means and institutions which cancel their liberating
- potential, and this process affects not only the means but also the ends. The
- instruments of productivity and progress, organized into a totalitarian system,
- determine not only the actual but also the possible utilizations.
-
- [...]
-
- But the struggle for the solution has outgrown the traditional forms. The
- totalitarian tendencies of the one-dimensional society render the traditional
- ways and means of protest ineffective—perhaps even dangerous because they
- preserve the illusion of popular sovereignty. This illusion contains some
- truth: “the people,” previously the ferment of social change, have “moved up”
- to become the ferment of social cohesion. Here rather than in the
- redistribution of wealth and equalization of classes is the new stratification
- characteristic of advanced industrial society.