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| author | Silvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net> | 2018-08-07 10:05:58 -0300 |
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diff --git a/books/psicologia/eros-civilization.md b/books/psicologia/eros-civilization.md deleted file mode 100644 index fdd41ab..0000000 --- a/books/psicologia/eros-civilization.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1409 +0,0 @@ -[[!meta title="Eros and Civilization"]] - -* Author: Hebert Marcuse -* Some subjects covered (keywords): productivity, efficiency, labor, repression, domination, alienation, automation. - -## Snippets - -### From Pleasure Principle to Reality Principle - -The becoming of an organized ego: - - The vicissitudes of the instincts are the vicissitudes of the mental apparatus - in civilization. The animal drives become human instincts under the influence - of the external reality. Their original "location" in the organism and their - basic direction remain the same, but their objectives and their manifestations - are subject to change. All psychoanalytic concepts (sublimation , - identification, projection, repression, introjection) connote the mutability of - the instincts. But the reality which shapes the instincts as well as their - needs and satisfaction is a socio-historical world. The animal man becomes a - human being only through a fundamental transformation of his nature, affecting - not only the instinctual aims but also the instinctual "values" -- that is, the - principles that govern the attainment of the aims. The change in the governing - value system may be tentatively defined as follows: - - from: to: - immediate satisfaction delayed satisfaction - pleasure restraint of pleasure - joy (play) toil (work) - receptiveness productiveness - absence of repression security - - Freud described this change as the transformation of the pleasure principle - into the reality principle. The interpretation of the "mental apparatus" in - terms of these two principles is basic to Freud' s theory and remains so in - spite of all modifications of the dualistic conception. It corresponds largely - (but not entirely) to the distinction between unconscious and conscious - processes. The individual exists, as it were, in two different dimensions, - characterized by different mental processes and principles. - - The difference between these two dimensions is a genetic-historical as well as - a structural one: the unconscious, ruled by the pleasure principle, comprises - "the older, primary processes, the residues of a phase of development in which - they were the only kind of mental processes." They strive for nothing but for - "gaining pleasure; from any operation which might arouse unpleasantness (` - pain') mental activity draws back." 1 But the unrestrained pleasure principle - comes into conflict with the natural and human environment . The individual - comes to the traumatic realization that full and painless gratification of his - needs is impossible. And after this experience of disappointment, a new - principle of mental functioning gains ascendancy. The reality principle - supersedes the pleasure principle: man learns to give up momentary, uncertain, - and destructive pleasure for delayed, restrained, but "assured" pleasure. 2 - Because of this lasting gain through renunciation and restraint, according to - Freud, the reality principle "safeguards " rather than "dethrones," "modifies " - rather than denies, the pleasure principle. - -### Civilized Introjection: the self-repression - - The effective subjugation of the instincts to repressive controls is imposed - not by nature but by man. The primal father, as the archetype of domination, - initiates the chain reaction of enslavement, rebellion, and reinforced - domination which marks the history of civilization. But ever since the first , - prehistoric restoration of domination following the first rebellion, repression - from without has been supported by repression from within: the unfree - individual introjects his masters and their commands into his own mental - apparatus. The struggle against freedom reproduces itself in the psyche of man - , as the self- repression of the repressed individual, and his self-repression - in turn sustains his masters and their institutions. It is this mental dynamic - which Freud unfolds as the dynamic of civilization. - - [...] - - Scarcity ( Lebensnot, Ananke) teaches men that they cannot freely gratify their - instinctual impulses, that they cannot live under the pleasure principle. - Society's motive in enforcing the decisive modification of the instinctual - structure is thus "economic; since it has not means enough to support life for - its members without work on their part, it must see to it that the number of - these members is restricted and their energies directed away from sexual - activities on to their work." 4 - - [...] - - According to Freud's conception the equation of freedom and happiness tabooed - by the conscious is upheld by the unconscious. Its truth, although repelled by - consciousness, continues to haunt the mind; it preserves the memory of past - stages of individual development at which integral gratification is obtained. - And the past continues to claim the future: it generates the wish that the - paradise be re-created on the basis of the achievements of civilization. - -### Eros and Thanatos - -At first it sounds like The Force from Star Wars... - - The pleasure principle, then., is a tendency operating in the service of a - function whose business it is to free the mental apparatus entirely from - excitation or to keep the amount of excitation in it constant or to keep it as - low as possible. We cannot yet decide with certainty in favour of any of these - ways of putting it. 5 - - But more and more the inner logic of the conception asserts itself. Constant - freedom from excitation has been finally abandoned at the birth of life; the - instinctual tendency toward equilibrium thus is ultimately regression behind - life itself. The primary processes of the mental apparatus, in their striving - for integral gratification, seem to be fatally bound to the "most universal - endeavour of all living substance -- namely to return to the quiescence of the - inorganic world." 6 The instincts are drawn into the orbit of death. "If it is - true that life is governed by Fechner's principle of constant equilibrium, it - consists of a continuous descent toward death." 7 The Nirvana principle now - emerges as the "dominating tendency of mental life, and perhaps of nervous life - in general." And the pleasure principle appears in the light of the Nirvana - principle -- as an "expression" of the Nirvana principle: . . the effort to - reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal tension due to stimuli (the - "Nirvana Principle".. )... finds expression in the pleasure principle; and our - recognition of this fact is one of our strongest reasons for believing in the - existence of death instincts. 8 - - However, the primacy of the Nirvana principle, the terrifying convergence of - pleasure and death, is dissolved as soon as it is established. No matter how - universal the regressive inertia of organic life, the instincts strive to - attain their objective in fundamentally different modes. The difference is - tantamount to that of sustaining and destroying life. Out of the common nature - of instinctual life develop two antagonistic instincts. The life instincts - (Eros) gain ascendency over the death instincts. They continuously counteract - and delay the "descent toward death": "fresh tensions are introduced by the - claims of Eros, of the sexual instincts, as expressed in instinctual needs." 9 - They begin their life-reproducing function with the separation of the germ - cells from the organism and the coalescence of two such cell bodies, 10 - proceeding to the establishment and preservation of "ever greater unities" of - life. 11 - - They thus win, against death, the "potential immortality" of the living - substance. 12 The dynamic dualism of instinctual life seems assured. However, - Freud at once harks back to the original common nature of the instincts. The - life instincts "are conservative in the same sense as the other instincts in - that they bring back earlier states of the living substance" -- although they - are conservative "to a higher degree." 13 Sexuality would thus ultimately obey - the same principle as the death instinct. Later, Freud, in order to illustrate - the regressive character of sexuality, recalls Plato's "fantastic hypothesis" - that "living substance at the time of its coming to life was torn apart into - small particles, which have ever since endeavoured to reunite through the - sexual instincts." 14 Does Eros, in spite of all the evidence, in the last - analysis work in the service of the death instinct, and is life really only one - long "detour to death"? 15 But the evidence is strong enough, and the detour is - long enough to warrant the opposite assumption. Eros is defined as the great - unifying force that preserves all life. 16 The ultimate relation between Eros - and Thanatos remains obscure. - - If Eros and Thanatos thus emerge as the two basic instincts whose ubiquitous - presence and continuous fusion (and de-fusion) characterize the life process, - then this theory of instincts is far more than a reformulation of the preceding - Freudian concepts. - - [...] - - However, the discovery of the common "conservative nature" of the instincts - militates against the dualistic conception and keeps Freud's late - metapsychology in that state of suspense and depth which makes it one of the - great intellectual ventures in the science of man. The quest for the common - origin of the two basic instincts can no longer be silenced. Fenichel pointed - out 20 that Freud himself made a decisive step in this direction by assuming a - "displaceable energy, which is in itself neutral, but is able to join forces - either with an erotic or with a destructive impulse" -- with the life or the - death instinct. Never before has death been so consistently taken into the - essence of life; but never before also has death come so close to Eros. - Fenichel raises the decisive question whether the antithesis of Eros and death - instinct is not the "differentiation of an originally common root." He suggests - that the phenomena grouped together as the death instinct may be taken as - expression of a principle "valid for all instincts," a principle which, in the - course of development, "might have been modified.. by external influences ." - Moreover, if the "regression-compulsion " in all organic life is striving for - integral quiescence, if the Nirvana principle is the ground of the pleasure - principle, then the necessity of death appears in an entirely new light. The - death instinct is destructiveness not for its own sake, but for the relief of - tension. The descent toward death is an unconscious flight from pain and want. - It is an expression of the eternal struggle against suffering and repression. - And the death instinct itself seems to be affected by the historical changes - which affect this struggle. Further explanation of the historical character of - the instincts requires placing them in the new concept of the person which - corresponds to the last version of Freud's theory of instincts. - -### A person - -* The main "layers" of the mental structure are now designated as id, ego, and superego. -* The id is free from the forms. -* Ego: the "mediator" between the id and the external world. - -Superego: - - This development, by which originally conscious struggles with the demands of - reality (the parents and their successors in the formation of the superego) are - transformed into unconscious automatic reactions, is of the utmost importance - for the course of civilization. The reality principle asserts itself through a - shrinking of the conscious ego in a significant direction: the autonomous - development of the instincts is frozen, and their pattern is fixed at the - childhood level. Adherence to a status quo ante is implanted in the - instinctual structure. The individual becomes instinctually re-actionary -- in - the literal as well as the figurative sense. - -### Biological and historical processes - - (a) Surplus-repression: the restrictions necessitated by social domination. - This is distinguished from (basic) repression: the "modifications " of the - instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization. - - (b) Performance principle: the prevailing historical form of the reality principle. - - Behind the reality principle lies the fundamental fact of Ananke or scarcity ( - Lebensnot), which means that the struggle for existence takes place in a world - too poor for the satisfaction of human needs without constant restraint, - renunciation, delay. In other words, whatever satisfaction is possible - necessitates work, more or less painful arrangements and undertakings for the - procurement of the means for satisfying needs. For the duration of work, which - occupies practically the entire existence of the mature individual, pleasure is - "suspended" and pain prevails. - - However, this argument, which looms large in Freud' s metapsychology, is - fallacious in so far as it applies to the brute fact of scarcity what actually - is the consequence of a specific organization of scarcity, and of a specific - existential attitude enforced by this organization. - The prevalent scarcity has, throughout civilization (although in very different - modes), been organized in such a way that it has not been distributed - collectively in accordance with individual needs, nor has the procurement of - goods for the satisfaction of needs been organized with the objective of best - satisfying the developing needs of the individuals. - Instead, the distribution of scarcity as well as the effort of overcoming it, - the mode of work, have been imposed upon individuals -- first by mere - violence, subsequently by a more rational utilization of power. - Domination differs from rational exercise of authority. The latter, which is - inherent in any societal division of labor, is derived from knowledge and - confined to the administration of functions and arrangements necessary for the - advancement of the whole. In contrast, domination is exercised by a particular - group or individual in order to sustain and enhance itself in a privileged - position. - - [...] - - Moreover, while any form of the reality principle demands a considerable degree - and scope of repressive control over the instincts, the specific historical - institutions of the reality principle and the specific interests of domination - introduce additional controls over and above those indispensable for civilized - human association. These additional controls arising from the specific - institutions of domination are what we denote as surplus-repression. - -### Primeval revolutions and counter-revolutions: the return of the repressed - - The role of the women gains increasing importance . "A good part of the power - which had become vacant through the father' s death passed to the women; the - time of the matriarchate followed." 11 It seems essential for Freud' s - hypothesis that in the sequence of the development toward civilization the - matriarchal period is preceded by primal patriarchal despotism: the low degree - of repressive domination, the extent of erotic freedom, which are traditionally - associated with matriarchy appear, in Freud's hypothesis, as consequences of - the overthrow of patriarchal despotism rather than as primary "natural" - conditions. In the development of civilization, freedom becomes possible only - as liberation. Liberty follows domination -- and leads to the reaffirmation of - domination. Matriarchy is replaced by a patriarchal counter-revolution, and the - latter is stabilized by the institutionalization of religion. - - Male gods at first appear as sons by the side of the great mother-deities, but - gradually they assume the features of the father; polytheism cedes to - monotheism, and then returns the "one and only father deity whose power is - unlimited." 13 Sublime and sublimated, original domination becomes eternal, - cosmic, and good, and in this form guards the process of civilization. The - "historical rights" of the primal father are restored. - - [...] - - Must not their sense of guilt include guilt about the betrayal and denial of - their deed? Are they not guilty of restoring the repressive father, guilty of - self-imposed perpetuation of domination? The question suggests itself if - Freud's phylogenetic hypothesis is confronted with his notion of the - instinctual dynamic. As the reality principle takes root, even in its most - primitive and most brutally enforced form, the pleasure principle becomes - something frightful and terrifying; the impulses for free gratification meet - with anxiety, and this anxiety calls for protection against them. The - individuals have to defend themselves against the specter of their integral - liberation from want and pain, against integral gratification. And the latter - is represented by the woman who, as mother, has once, for the first and last - time, provided such gratification. These are the instinctual factors which - reproduce the rhythm of liberation and domination. - - [...] - - If we follow this train of thought beyond Freud, and connect it with the - twofold origin of the sense of guilt, the life and death of Christ would appear - as a struggle against the father -- and as a triumph over the father. 21 The - message of the Son was the message of liberation: the overthrow of the Law - (which is domination) by Agape (which is Eros). This would fit in with the - heretical image of Jesus as the Redeemer in the flesh, the Messiah who came to - save man here on earth. Then the subsequent transubstantiation of the Messiah, - the deification of the Son beside the Father, would be a betrayal of his - message by his own disciples -- the denial of the liberation in the flesh, the - revenge on the redeemer. Christianity would then have surrendered the gospel of - Agape-Eros again to the Law; the father-rule would be restored and - strengthened. In Freudian terms, the primal crime could have been expiated, - according to the message of the Son, in an order of peace and love on earth. It - was not; it was rather superseded by another crime -- that against the Son. - With his transubstantiation, his gospel too was transubstantiated; his - deification removed his message from this world. Suffering and repression were - perpetuated. - - [...] - - We have seen that Freud's theory is focused on the recurrent cycle - "domination-rebellion-domination." But the second domination is not simply a - repetition of the first one; the cyclical movement is progress in domination. - From the primal father via the brother clan to the system of institutional - authority characteristic of mature civilization, domination becomes - increasingly impersonal, objective, universal, and also increasingly rational, - effective, productive. At the end, under the rule of the fully developed - performance principle, subordination appears as implemented through the social - division of labor itself (although physical and personal force remains an - indispensable instrumentality). - - [...] - - The development of a hierarchical system of social labor not only rationalizes - domination but also "contains" the rebellion against domination. At the - individual level, the primal revolt is contained within the framework of the - normal Oedipus conflict. At the societal level, recurrent rebellions and - revolutions have been followed by counterrevolutions and restorations. From the - slave revolts in the ancient world to the socialist revolution, the struggle of - the oppressed has ended in establishing a new, "better" system of domination; - progress has taken place through an improving chain of control. Each revolution - has been the conscious effort to replace one ruling group by another; but each - revolution has also released forces that have "overshot the goal," that have - striven for the abolition of domination and exploitation. The ease with which - they have been defeated demands explanations. The ease with which they have - been defeated demands explanations. Neither the prevailing constellation of - power, nor immaturity of the productive forces, nor absence of class - consciousness provides an adequate answer. In every revolution, there seems to - have been a historical moment when the struggle against domination might have - been victorious -- but the moment passed. An element of self-defeat seems to - be involved in this dynamic (regardless of the validity of such reasons as the - prematurity and inequality of forces ). In this sense, every revolution has - also been a betrayed revolution. - -### Technics - - Technics provide the very basis for progress; technological rationality sets - the mental and behaviorist pattern for productive performance, and "power over - nature" has become practically identical with civilization. Is the - destructiveness sublimated in these activities sufficiently subdued and - diverted to assure the work of Eros? It seems that socially useful - destructiveness is less sublimated than socially useful libido. To be sure, the - diversion of destructiveness from the ego to the external world secured the - growth of civilization. However, extroverted destruction remains destruction: - its objects are in most cases actually and violently assailed, deprived of - their form, and reconstructed only after partial destruction; units are - forcibly divided, and the component parts forcibly rearranged. Nature is - literally "violated." Only in certain categories of sublimated aggressiveness - (as in surgical practice) does such violation directly strengthen the life of - its object. Destructiveness, in extent and intent, seems to be more directly - satisfied in civilization than the libido. - - [...] - - Then, through constructive technological destruction, through the constructive - violation of nature, the instincts would still operate toward the annihilation - of life. The radical hypothesis of Beyond the Pleasure Principle would stand: - the instincts of self-preservation, self-assertion, and mastery, in so far as - they have absorbed this destructiveness, would have the function of assuring - the organism' s "own path to death." - - [...] - - The growing mastery of nature then would, with the growing productivity of - labor, develop and fulfill the human needs only as a by-product: increasing - cultural wealth and knowledge would provide the material for progressive - destruction and the need for increasing instinctual repression. - - [...] - - However, the very progress of civilization tends to make this rationality a - spurious one. The existing liberties and the existing gratifications are tied - to the requirements of domination; they themselves become instruments of - repression. The excuse of scarcity, which has justified institutionalized - repression since its inception, weakens as man 's knowledge and control over - nature enhances the means for fulfilling human needs with a minimum of toil. - The still prevailing impoverishment of vast areas of the world is no longer due - chiefly to the poverty of human and natural resources but to the manner in - which they are distributed and utilized. - - This difference may be irrelevant to politics and to politicians but it is of - decisive importance to a theory of civilization which derives the need for - repression from the "natural" and perpetual disproportion between human desires - and the environment in which they must be satisfied. If such a "natural" - condition, and not certain political and social institutions, provides the - rationale for repression, then it has become irrational. The culture of - industrial civilization has turned the human organism into an ever more - sensitive, differentiated, exchangeable instrument, and has created a social - wealth sufficiently great to transform this instrument into an end in itself. - The available resources make for a qualitative change in the human needs. - Rationalization and mechanization of labor tend to reduce the quantum of - instinctual energy channeled into toil (alienated labor), thus freeing energy - for the attainment of objectives set by the free play of individual faculties. - - Technology operates against the repressive utilization of energy in so far as - it minimizes the time necessary for the production of the necessities of life, - thus saving time for the development of needs beyond the realm of necessity - and of necessary waste. - - But the closer the real possibility of liberating the individual from the - constraints once justified by scarcity and immaturity, the greater the need for - maintaining and streamlining these constraints lest the established order of - domination dissolve. Civilization has to defend itself against the specter of a - world which could be free. If society cannot use its growing productivity for - reducing repression (because such usage would upset the hierarchy of the status - quo), productivity must be turned against the individuals; it becomes itself - an instrument of universal control. Totalitarianism spreads over late - industrial civilization wherever the interests of domination prevail upon - productivity, arresting and diverting its potentialities. The people have to be - kept in a state of permanent mobilization, internal and external. The - rationality of domination has progressed to the point where it threatens to - invalidate its foundations; therefore it must be reaffirmed more effectively - than ever before. This time there shall be no killing of the father, not even a - "symbolic" killing -- because he may not find a successor. - - [...] - - Note: 20 In his paper on "The Delay of the Machine Age," Hanns Sachs made an - interesting attempt to demonstrate narcissism as a constitutive element of the - reality principle in Greek civilization. He discussed the problem of why the - Greeks did not develop a machine technology although they possessed the skill - and knowledge which would have enabled them to do so. He was not satisfied with - the usual explanations on economic and sociological grounds. Instead, he - proposed that the predominant narcissistic element in Greek culture prevented - technological progress: the libidinal cathexis of the body was so strong that - it militated against mechanization and automatization. Sachs' paper appeared in - the Psychoanalytic Quarterly, II (1933) , 42off. - -### Repression due to exogenous factors: the central argument - - Therefore, if the historical process tended to make obsolete the institutions - of the performance principle, it would also tend to make obsolete the - organization of the instincts -- that is to say, to release the instincts from - the constraints and diversions required by the performance principle. This - would imply the real possibility of a gradual elimination of - surplus-repression, whereby an expanding area of destructiveness could be - absorbed or neutralized by strengthened libido. Evidently, Freud' s theory - precludes the construction of any psychoanalytical utopia. If we accept his - theory and still maintain that there is historical substance in the idea of a - non-repressive civilization, then it must be derivable from Freud's instinct - theory itself. His concepts must be examined to discover whether or not they - contain elements that require reinterpretation. This approach would parallel - the one used in the preceding sociological discussion. - - [...] - - Freud maintains that an essential conflict between the two principles is - inevitable; however, in the elaboration of his theory, this inevitability seems - to be opened to question. The conflict, in the form it assumes in civilization, - is said to be caused and perpetuated by the prevalence of Ananke, Lebensnot, - the struggle for existence. (The later stage of the instinct theory, with the - concepts of Eros and death instinct, does not cancel this thesis: Lebensnot - now appears as the want and deficiency inherent in organic life itself.) The - struggle for existence necessitates the repressive modification of the - instincts chiefly because of the lack of sufficient means and resources for - integral, painless and toilless gratification of instinctual needs. If this is - true, the repressive organization of the instincts in the struggle for - existence would be due to exogenous factors -- exogenous in the sense that - they are not inherent in the "nature" of the instincts but emerge from the - specific historical conditions under which the instincts develop. - - [...] - - According to Freud, this distinction is meaningless, for the instincts - themselves are "historical"; 1 there is no instinctual structure "outside" the - historical structure. However, this does not dispense with the necessity of - making the distinction -- except that it must be made within the historical - structure itself. The latter appears as stratified on two levels: (a) the - phylogenetic-biological level, the development of the animal man in the - struggle with nature; and (b) the sociological level, the development of - civilized individuals and groups in the struggle among themselves and with - their environment . - - The two levels are in constant and inseparable interaction, but factors - generated at the second level are exogenous to the first and have therefore a - different weight and validity (although, in the course of the development, they - can "sink down" to the first level): they are more relative; they can change - faster and without endangering or reversing the development of the genus. This - difference in the origin of instinctual modification underlies the distinction - we have introduced between repression and surplus-repression; 2 the latter - originates and is sustained at the sociological level. - - [...] - - For his metapsychology, it is not decisive whether the inhibitions are imposed - by scarcity or by the hierarchical distribution of scarcity, by the struggle - for existence or by the interest in domination. And indeed the two factors -- - the phylogenetic-biological and the sociological -- have grown together in the - recorded history of civilization. But their union has long since become - "unnatural" -and so has the oppressive "modification" of the pleasure principle - by the reality principle. Freud' s consistent denial of the possibility of an - essential liberation of the former implies the assumption that scarcity is as - permanent as domination -- an assumption that seems to beg the question. By - virtue of this assumption, an extraneous fact obtains the theoretical dignity - of an inherent element of mental life, inherent even in the primary instincts. - In the light of the long-range trend of civilization, and in the light of - Freud' s own interpretation of the instinctual development, the assumption must - be questioned. The historical piossibility of a gradual decontrolling of the - instinctual development must be taken seriously, perhaps even the historical - necessity -- if civilization is to progress to a higher stage of freedom. - - [...] - - The diagram sketches a historical sequence from the beginning of organic life - (stages 2 and 3), through the formative stage of the two primary instincts (5), - to their "modified " development as human instincts in civilization (6-7). The - turning points are at stages 3 and 6. They are both caused by exogenous factors - by virtue of which the definite formation as well as the subsequent dynamic of - the instincts become "historically acquired." At stage 3, the exogenous factor - is the " unrelieved tension " created by the birth of organic life; the - "experience" that life is less "satisfactory," more painful, than the preceding - stage generates the death instinct as the drive for relieving this tension - through regression. The working of the death instinct thus appears as the - result of the trauma of primary frustration: want and pain, here caused by a - geological-biological event. - - The other turning point, however, is no longer a geological-biological one: it - occurs at the threshold of civilization. The exogenous factor here is Ananke, - the conscious struggle for existence. It enforces the repressive controls of - the sex instincts (first through the brute violence of the primal father, then - through institutionalization and internalization), as well as the - transformation of the death instinct into socially useful aggression and - morality. This organization of the instincts (actually a long process) creates - the civilized division of labor, progress, and law and order"; but it also - starts the chain of events that leads to the progressive weakening of Eros and - thereby to the growth of aggressiveness and guilt feeling. We have seen that - this development is not "inherent" in the struggle for existence but only in - its oppressive organization, and that at the present stage the possible - conquest of want makes this struggle ever more irrational. - - [...] - - In the biological-geological conditions which Freud assumed for the living - substance as such, no such change can be envisaged; the birth of life continues - to be a trauma, and thus the reign of the Nirvana principle seems to be - unshakable. However, the derivatives of the death instinct operate only in - fusion with the sex instincts; as long as life grows, the former remain - subordinate to the latter; the fate of the destrudo (the "energy" of the - destruction instincts) depends on that of the libido. Consequently, a - qualitative change in the development of sexuality must necessarily alter the - manifestations of the death instinct. - - Thus, the hypothesis of a non-repressive civilization must be theoretically - validated first by demonstrating the possibility of a nonrepressive development - of the libido under the conditions of mature civilization. The direction of - such a development is indicated by those mental forces which, according to - Freud, remain essentially free from the reality principle and carry over this - freedom into the world of mature consciousness. Their re-examination must be - the next step. - -### Detours to death: death instinct and negentropy - - Our re-examination must therefore begin with Freud's analysis of the death - instinct. We have seen that, in Freud's late theory of the instincts, the - "compulsion inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things - which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of - external disturbing forces" 4 is common to both primary instincts: Eros and - death instinct. Freud regards this retrogressive tendency as an expression of - the "inertia" in organic life, and ventures the following hypothetical - explanation: at the time when life originated in inanimate matter, a strong - "tension" developed which the young organism strove to relieve by returning to - the inanimate condition. 5 At the early stage of organic life, the road to the - previous state of inorganic existence was probably very short, and dying very - easy; but gradually "external influences " lengthened this road and compelled - the organism to take ever longer and more complicated "detours to death." - -[[!img detours-to-death.png link="no"]] - -### Phantasy - - Phantasy plays a most decisive function in the total mental structure: it links - the deepest layers of the unconscious with the highest products of - consciousness (art), the dream with the reality; it preserves the archetypes of - the genus, the perpetual but repressed ideas of the collective and individual - memory, the tabooed images of freedom. - - [...] - - The recognition of phantasy (imagination) as a thought process with its own - laws and truth values was not new in psychology and philosophy; Freud' s - original contribution lay in the attempt to show the genesis of this mode of - thought and its essential connection with the pleasure principle. The - establishment of the reality principle causes a division and mutilation of the - mind which fatefully determines its entire development. The mental process - formerly unified in the pleasure ego is now split: its main stream is channeled - into the domain of the reality principle and brought into line with its - requirements. Thus conditioned, this part of the mind obtains the monopoly of - interpreting, manipulating, and altering reality -- of governing remembrance - and oblivion, even of defining what reality is and how it should be used and - altered. The other part of the mental apparatus remains free from the control - of the reality principle -- at the price of becoming powerless, - inconsequential, unrealistic. - Whereas the ego was formerly guided and driven by the whole of its mental - energy, it is now to be guided only by that part of it which conforms to the - reality principle. This part and this part alone is to set the objectives, - norms, and values of the ego; as reason it becomes the sole repository of - judgment, truth, rationality; it decides what is useful and useless, good and - evil. 2 Phantasy as a separate mental process is born and at the same time - left behind by the organization of the pleasure ego into the reality ego. - Reason prevails: it becomes unpleasant but useful and correct; phantasy remains - pleasant but becomes useless, untrue -- a mere play, daydreaming. As such, it - continues to speak the language of the pleasure principle, of freedom from - repression, of uninhibited desire and gratification -- but reality proceeds - according to the laws of reason, no longer committed to the dream language. - - [...] - - The danger of abusing the discovery of the truth value of imagination for - retrogressive tendencies is exemplified by the work of Carl Jung. - -## Unsublimated pleasure - - Smell and taste give, as it were, unsublimated pleasure per se (and unrepressed - disgust). They relate (and separate) individuals immediately, without the - generalized and conventionalized forms of consciousness, morality, aesthetics. - Such immediacy is incompatible with the effectiveness of organized domination, - with a society which "tends to isolate people, to put distance between them, - and to prevent spontaneous relationships and thènatural' animal -like - expressions of such relations." - -### Art - - Still, within the limits of the aesthetic form, art expressed, although in an - ambivalent manner , the return of the repressed image of liberation; art was - opposition. At the present stage, in the period of total mobilization, even - this highly ambivalent opposition seems no longer viable. Art survives only - where it cancels itself , where it saves its substance by denying its - traditional form and thereby denying reconciliation: where it becomes - surrealistic and atonal. 6 Otherwise, art shares the fate of all genuine human - communication : it dies off. - - [...] - - In a less sublimated form, the opposition of phantasy to the reality principle - is more at home in such sub-real and surreal processes as dreaming, - daydreaming, play, the "stream of consciousness." - - [...] - - The surrealists recognized the revolutionary implications of Freud' s - discoveries: "Imagination is perhaps about to reclaim its rights." - 13 But when they asked, "Cannot the dream also be applied to the solution of - the fundamental problems of life?" 14 they went beyond psychoanalysis in - demanding that the dream be made into reality without compromising its content. - Art allied itself with the revolution. Uncompromising adherence to the strict - truth value of imagination comprehends reality more fully. That the - propositions of the artistic imagination are untrue in terms of the actual - organization of the facts belongs to the essence of their truth: The truth that - some proposition respecting an actual occasion is untrue may express the vital - truth as to the aesthetic achievement. It expresses the "great refusal" which - is its primary characteristic. 15 This Great Refusal is the protest against - unnecessary repression, the struggle for the ultimate form of freedom -- "to - live without anxiety." 16 But this idea could be formulated without punishment - only in the language of art. In the more realistic context of political theory - and even philosophy, it was almost universally defamed as utopia. - -### Utopia - - The relegation of real possibilities to the no-man's land of utopia is itself - an essential element of the ideology of the performance principle. If the - construction of a nonrepressive instinctual development is oriented, not on the - subhistorical past, but on the historical present and mature civilization, the - very notion of utopia loses its meaning. The negation of the performance - principle emerges not against but with the progress of conscious rationality; - it presupposes the highest maturity of civilization. The very achievements of - the performance principle have intensified the discrepancy between the archaic - unconscious and conscious processes of man, on the one hand, and his actual - potentialities, on the other. The history of mankind seems to tend toward - another turning point in the vicissitudes of the instincts. And, just as at the - preceding turning points, the adaptation of the archaic mental structure to the - new environment would mean another "castrophe" -- an explosive change in the - environment itself. However, while the first turning point was, according to - the Freudian hypothesis, an event in geological history, and while the second - occurred at the beginning of civilization, the third turning point would be - located at the highest attained level of civilization. The actor in this event - would be no longer the historical animal man but the conscious, rational - subject that has mastered and appropriated the objective world as the arena of - his realization. The historical factor contained in Freud' s theory of - instincts has come to fruition in history when the basis of Ananke ( Lebensnot) - -- which, for Freud, provided the rationale for the repressive reality - principle -- is undermined by the progress of civilization. - - Still, there is some validity in the argument that, despite all progress, - scarcity and immaturity remain great enough to prevent the realization of the - principle "to each according to his needs." The material as well as mental - resources of civilization are still so limited that there must be a vastly - lower standard of living if social productivity were redirected toward the - universal gratification of individual needs: many would have to give up - manipulated comforts if all were to live a human life. Moreover, the prevailing - international structure of industrial civilization seems to condemn such an - idea to ridicule. This does not invalidate the theoretical insistence that the - performance principle has become obsolescent. The reconciliation between - pleasure and reality principle does not depend on the existence of abundance - for all. The only pertinent question is whether a state of civilization can be - reasonably envisaged in which human needs are fulfilled in such a manner and to - such an extent that surplus-repression can be eliminated. - - Such a hypothetical state could be reasonably assumed at two points, which lie - at the opposite poles of the vicissitudes of the instincts: one would be - located at the primitive beginnings of history, the other at its most mature - stage. The first would refer to a non-oppressive distribution of scarcity (as - may, for example, have existed in matriarchal phases of ancient society). The - second would pertain to a rational organization of fully developed industrial - society after the conquest of scarcity. The vicissitudes of the instincts would - of course be very different under these two conditions, but one decisive - feature must be common to both: the instinctual development would be - non-repressive in the sense that at least the surplus-repression necessitated - by the interests of domination would not be imposed upon the instincts. This - quality would reflect the prevalent satisfaction of the basic human needs (most - primitive at the first, vastly extended and refined at the second stage), - sexual as well as social: food, housing, clothing, leisure. This satisfaction - would be (and this is the important point) without toil -- that is, without the - rule of alienated labor over the human existence. Under primitive conditions, - alienation has not yet arisen because of the primitive character of the needs - themselves, the rudimentary (personal or sexual) character of the division of - labor, and the absence of an institutionalized hierarchical specialization of - functions. Under the "ideal" conditions of mature industrial civilization, - alienation would be completed by general automatization of labor, reduction of - labor time to a minimum , and exchangeability of functions. Since the length - of the working day is itself one of the principal repressive factors imposed - upon the pleasure principle by the reality principle, the reduction of the - working day to a point where the mere quantum of labor time no longer arrests - human development is the first prerequisite for freedom. Such reduction by - itself would almost certainly mean a considerable decrease in the standard of - living prevalent today in the most advanced industrial countries. But the - regression to a lower standard of living, which the collapse of the performance - principle would bring about, does not militate against progress in freedom. - - The argument that makes liberation conditional upon an ever higher standard of - living all too easily serves to justify the perpetuation of repression. The - definition of the standard of living in terms of automobiles , television sets, - airplanes, and tractors is that of the performance principle itself. Beyond the - rule of this principle, the level of living would be measured by other - criteria: the universal gratification of the basic human needs, and the freedom - from guilt and fear -- internalized as well as external, instinctual as well as - rrational." "La vraie civilization. . n' est pas dans le gaz, ni dans la - vapeur, ni dans les tables tournantes. Elle est dans la diminution des traces - du pêché originel" 17 -- this is the definition of progress beyond the rule of - the performance principle. - - Under optimum conditions, the prevalence, in mature civilization, of material - and intellectual wealth would be such as to allow painless gratification of - needs, while domination would no longer systematically forestall such - gratification. In this case, the quantum of instinctual energy still to be - diverted into necessary labor (in turn completely mechanized and rationalized) - would be so small that a large area of repressive constraints and - modifications, no longer sustained by external forces , would collapse. - -### The Aesthetic Dimension - - Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795), written largely - under the impact of the Critique of Judgment, aim at a remaking of civilization - by virtue of the liberating force of the aesthetic function: it is envisaged as - containing the possibility of a new reality principle. - - [...] - - Since it was civilization itself which "dealt modern man this wound," only a - new mode of civilization can heal it. The wound is caused by the antagonistic - relation between the two polar dimensions of the human existence. Schiller - describes this antagonism in a series of paired concepts: sensuousness and - reason, matter and form (spirit), nature and freedom, the particular and the - universal. - - Each of the two dimensions is governed by a basic impulse: the "sensuous - impulse " and the "form-impulse." 20 The former is essentially passive, - receptive, the latter active, mastering, domineering . Culture is built by the - combination and interaction of these two impulses. But in the established - civilization, their relation has been an antagonistic one: instead of - reconciling both impulses by making sensuousness rational and reason sensuous, - civilization has subjugated sensuousness to reason in such a manner that the - former, if it reasserts itself , does so in destructive and "savage" forms - while the tyranny of reason impoverishes and barbarizes sensuousness. The - conflict must be resolved if human potentialities are to realize themselves - freely. Since only the impulses have the lasting force that fundamentally - affects the human existence, such reconciliation between the two impulses must - be the work of a third impulse. Schiller defines this third mediating impulse - as the play impulse, its objective as beauty, and its goal as freedom. - - [...] - - The quest is for the solution of a "political" problem : the liberation of man - from inhuman existential conditions. Schiller states that, in order to solve - the political problem, "one must pass through the aesthetic, since it is beauty - that leads to freedom." The play impulse is the vehicle of this liberation. The - impulse does not aim at playing "with" something ; rather it is the play of - life itself, beyond want and external compulsion -- the manifestation of an - existence without fear and anxiety, and thus the manifestation of freedom - itself. - - Man is free only where he is free from constraint, external and internal, - physical and moral -- when he is constrained neither by law nor by need. 21 But - such constraint is the reality. Freedom is thus, in a strict sense, freedom - from the established reality: man is free when the "reality loses its - seriousness" and when its necessity "becomes light" ( leicht). 22 "The greatest - stupidity and the greatest intelligence have a certain affinity with each other - in that they both seek only the real"; however, such need for and attachment to - the real are "merely the results of want." - - In contrast, "indifference to reality" and interest in "show" (dis-play, - Schein) are the tokens of freedom from want and a "true enlargement of - humanity." 23 In a genuinely humane civilization, the human existence will be - play rather than toil, and man will live in display rather than need. - - These ideas represent one of the most advanced positions of thought. It must be - understood that the liberation from the reality which is here envisaged is not - transcendental, "inner," or merely intellectual freedom (as Schiller explicitly - emphasizes 24 ) but freedom in the reality. The reality that "loses its - seriousness" is the inhumane reality of want and need, and it loses its - seriousness when wants and needs can be satisfied without alienated labor. - Then, man is free to "play" with his faculties and potentialities and with - those of nature, and only by "playing" with them is he free. His world is then - display ( Schein), and its order is that of beauty. - - Because it is the realization of freedom, play is more than the constraining - physical and moral reality: ". . man is only serious with the agreeable, the - good, the perfect; but with beauty he plays." 25 Such formulations would be - irresponsible "aestheticism" if the realm of play were one of ornament, luxury, - holiday, in an otherwise repressive world. But here the aesthetic function is - conceived as a principle governing the entire human existence, and it can do so - only if it becomes "universal." - - [...] - - If we reassemble its main elements, we find: - - (1) The transformation of toil (labor) into play, and of repressive - productivity into "display" -- a transformation that must be preceded by the - conquest of want (scarcity) as the determining factor of civilization. 43 - - (2) The self-sublimation of sensuousness (of the sensuous impulse) and the - de-sublimation of reason (of the form-impulse) in order to reconcile the two - basic antagonistic impulses. - - (3) The conquest of time in so far as time is destructive of lasting - gratification. - - These elements are practically identical with those of a reconciliation between - pleasure principle and reality principle. We recall the constitutive role - attributed to imagination (phantasy) in play and display: Imagination preserves - the objectives of those mental processes which have remained free from the - repressive reality principle; in their aesthetic function, they can be - incorporated into the conscious rationality of mature civilization. The play - impulse stands for the common denominator of the two opposed mental processes - and principles. - - [...] - - Non-repressive order is essentially an order of abundance: the necessary - constraint is brought about by "superfluity" rather than need. Only an order of - abundance is compatible with freedom. At this point, the idealistic and the - materialistic critiques of culture meet. Both agree that nonrepressive order - becomes possible only at the highest maturity of civilization, when all basic - needs can be satisfied with a minimum expenditure of physical and mental energy - in a minimum of time. - - [...] - - Possession and procurement of the necessities of life are the prerequisite, - rather than the content, of a free society. The realm of necessity, of labor, - is one of unfreedom because the human existence in this realm is determined by - objectives and functions that are not its own and that do not allow the free - play of human faculties and desires. - The optimum in this realm is therefore to be defined by standards of - rationality rather than freedom -- namely, to organize production and - distribution in such a manner that the least time is spent for making all - necessities available to all members of society. Necessary labor is a system of - essentially inhuman, mechanical, and routine activities; in such a system, - individuality cannot be a value and end in itself. Reasonably, the system of - societal labor would be organized rather with a view to saving time and space - for the development of individuality outside the inevitably repressive - work-world. Play and display, as principles of civilization, imply not the - transformation of labor but its complete subordination to the freely evolving - potentialities of man and nature. - -## Regression into progress - - The processes that create the ego and superego also shape and perpetuate - specific societal institutions and relations. Such psychoanalytical concepts as - sublimation, identification, and introjection have not only a psychical but - also a social content: they terminate in a system of institutions, laws, - agencies, things, and customs that confront the individual as objective - entities. Within this antagonistic system, the mental conflict between ego and - superego, between ego and id, is at one and the same time a conflict between - the individual and his society. - - [...] - - Therefore, the emergence of a non-repressive reality principle involving - instinctual liberation would regress behind the attained level of civilized - rationality. This regression would be psychical as well as social: it would - reactivate early stages of the libido which were surpassed in the development - of the reality ego, and it would dissolve the institutions of society in which - the reality ego exists. In terms of these institutions, instinctual liberation - is relapse into barbarism. However, occurring at the height of civilization, as - a consequence not of defeat but of victory in the struggle for existence, and - supported by a free society, such liberation might have very different results. - It would still be a reversal of the process of civilization, a subversion of - culture -- but after culture had done its work and created the mankind and the - world that could be free. - -### Work, toil and play - - Freud's suggestions in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego do more - than reformulate his thesis of Eros as the builder of culture; culture here - rather appears as the builder of Eros -- that is to say, as the "natural" - fulfillment of the innermost trend of Eros. Freud's psychology of civilization - was based on the inexorable conflict between Ananke and free instinctual - development. But if Ananke itself becomes the primary field of libidinal - development, the contradiction evaporates. Not only would the struggle for - existence not necessarily cancel the possibility of instinctual freedom (as we - suggested in Chapter 6); but it would even constitute a "prop" for instinctual - gratificaiton. The work relations which form the base of civilization, and thus - civilization itself, would be "propped" by non-desexualized instinctual energy. - The whole concept of sublimation is at stake . - - The problem of work, of socially useful activity, without (repressive) - sublimation can now be restated. It emerged as the problem of a change in the - character of work by virtue of which the latter would be assimilated to play -- - the free play of human faculties. What are the instinctual preconditions for - such a transformation? The most far -reaching attempt to answer this question - is made by Barbara Lantos in her article "Work and the Instincts." 26 She - defines work and play in terms of the instinctual stages involved in these - activities. Play is entirely subject to the pleasure principle: pleasure is in - the movement itself in so far as it activates erotogenic zones. "The - fundamental feature of play is, that it is gratifying in itself, without - serving any other purpose than that of instinctual gratification." - - [...] - - The genital organization of the sexual instincts has a parallel in the - work-organization of the ego-instincts. 27 - - Thus it is the purpose and not the content which marks an activity as play or - work. 28 A transformation in the instinctual structure (such as that from the - pregenital to the genital stage) would entail a change in the instinctual value - of the human activity regardless of its content. For example, if work were - accompanied by a reactivation of pregenital polymorphous eroticism, it would - tend to become gratifying in itself without losing its work content. Now it is - precisely such a reactivation of polymorphous eroticism which appeared as the - consequence of the conquest of scarcity and alienation. The altered societal - conditions would therefore create an instinctual basis for the transformation - of work into play. In Freud's terms , the less the efforts to obtain - satisfaction are impeded and directed by the interest in domination, the more - freely the libido could prop itself upon the satisfaction of the great vital - needs. - - [...] - - But while the psychoanalytical and anthropological concepts of such an order - have been oriented on the prehistorical and precivilized past, our discussion - of the concept is oriented on the future, on the conditions of fully mature - civilization. The transformation of sexuality into Eros, and its extension to - lasting libidinal work relations, here presuppose the rational reorganization - of a huge industrial apparatus, a highly specialized societal division of - labor, the use of fantastically destructive energies, and the co-operation of - vast masses. - - The idea of libidinal work relations in a developed industrial society finds - little support in the tradition of thought, and where such support is - forthcoming it seems of a dangerous nature. The transformation of labor into - pleasure is the central idea in Fourier's giant socialist utopia. - - [...] - - Fourier insists that this transformation requires a complete change in the - social institutions: distribution of the social product according to need, - assignment of functions according to individual faculties and inclinations, - constant mutation of functions, short work periods, and so on. But the - possibility of "attractive labor" ( travail attrayant) derives above all from - the release of libidinal forces . Fourier assumes the existence of an - attraction indnstrielle which makes for pleasurable co-operation. It is based - on the attraction passionnée in the nature of man , which persists despite the - opposition of reason, duty, prejudice. - - [...] - - Fourier comes closer than any other utopian socialist to elucidating the - dependence of freedom on non-repressive sublimation. However, in his detailed - blueprint for the realization of this idea, he hands it over to a giant - organization and administration and thus retains the repressive elements . The - working communities of the phalanstère anticipate "strength through joy" - rather than freedom, the beautification of mass culture rather than its - abolition. Work as free play cannot be subject to administration; only - alienated labor can be organized and administered by rational routine. It is - beyond this sphere, but on its basis, that non-repressive sublimation creates - its own cultural order. - - [...] - - The necessity to work is a neurotic symptom. It is a crutch. It is an attempt - to make oneself feel valuable even though there is no particular need for one' - s working. 37 - -### Superid - - It has been pointed out that the superego, as the mental representative of - morality, is not unambiguously the representative of the reality principle, - especially of the forbidding and punishing father. In many cases, the superego - seems to be in secret alliance with the id, defending the claims of the id - against the ego and the external world. Charles Odier therefore proposed that a - part of the superego is "in the last analysis the representative of a primitive - phase, during which morality had not yet freed itself from the pleasure - principle." [superid] - - [...] - - The psychical phenomenon which, in the individual, suggests such a pregenital - morality is an identification with the mother, expressing itself in a - castration-wish rather than castration-threat. It might be the survival of a - regressive tendency: remembrance of the primal Mother-Right, and at the same - time a "symbolic means against losing the then prevailing privileges of the - woman." According to Odier, the pregenital and prehistorical morality of the - superid is incompatible with the reality principle and therefore a neurotic - factor . - -### Time, memory and death - - The flux of time is society' s most natural ally in maintaining law and order, - conformity, and the institutions that relegate freedom to a perpetual utopia; - the flux of time helps men to forget what was and what can be: it makes them - oblivious to the better past and the better future. - - This ability to forget -- itself the result of a long and terrible education by - experience -- is an indispensable requirement of mental and physical hygiene - without which civilized life would be unbearable; but it is also the mental - faculty which sustains submissiveness and renunciation. To forget is also to - forgive what should not be forgiven if justice and freedom are to prevail. Such - forgiveness reproduces the conditions which reproduce injustice and - enslavement: to forget past suffering is to forgive the forces that caused it - --without defeating these forces . The wounds that heal in time are also the - wounds that contain the poison. Against this surrender to time, the restoration - of remembrance to its rights, as a vehicle of liberation, is one of the noblest - tasks of thought. - - [...] - - Nietzsche saw in the training of memory the beginning of civilized morality -- - especially the memory of obligations, contracts, dues. 10 This context reveals - the one-sidedness of memory-training in civilization: the faculty was chiefly - directed toward remembering duties rather than pleasures; memory was linked - with bad conscience, guilt, and sin. Unhappiness and the threat of punishment , - not happiness and the promise of freedom, linger in memory. - - [...] - - Still, this defeat of time is artistic and spurious; remembrance is no real - weapon unless it is translated into historical action. Then, the struggle - against time becomes a decisive moment in the struggle against domination: The - conscious wish to break the continuum of history belongs to the revolutionary - classes in the moment of action. This consciousness asserted itself during the - July Revolution. In the evening of the first day of the struggle, - simultaneously but independently at several places, shots were fired at the - time pieces on the towers of Paris. 11 - - It is the alliance between time and the order of repression that motivates the - efforts to halt the flux of time, and it is this alliance that makes time the - deadly enemy of Eros. - - [...] - - Every sound reason is on the side of law and order in their insistence that the - eternity of joy be reserved for the hereafter, and in their endeavor to - subordinate the struggle against death and disease to the never-ceasing - requirements of national and international security. - - The striving for the preservation of time in time, for the arrest of time, for - conquest of death, seems unreasonable by any standard, and outright impossible - under the hypothesis of the death instinct that we have accepted. Or does this - very hypothesis make it more reasonable? The death instinct operates under the - Nirvana principle: it tends toward that state of "constant gratification" where - no tension is felt -- a state without want. This trend of the instinct implies - that its destructive manifestations would be minimized as it approached such a - state. If the instinct's basic objective is not the termination of life but - of pain -- the absence of tension -- then paradoxically, in terms of the - instinct, the conflict between life and death is the more reduced, the closer - life approximates the state of gratification. Pleasure principle and Nirvana - principle then converge. - - [...] - - Death would cease to be an instinctual goal. It remains a fact, perhaps even an - ultimate necessity -- but a necessity against which the unrepressed energy of - mankind will protest, against which it will wage its greatest struggle. In - this struggle, reason and instinct could unite. Under conditions of a truly - human existence, the difference between succumbing to disease at the age of - ten, thirty, fifty, or seventy, and dying a "natural" death after a fulfilled - life, may well be a difference worth fighting for with all instinctual energy. - Not those who die, but those who die before they must and want to die, those - who die in agony and pain, are the great indictment against civilization. - - They also testify to the unredeemable guilt of mankind. Their death arouses the - painful awareness that it was unnecessary, that it could be otherwise. It takes - all the institutions and values of a repressive order to pacify the bad - conscience of this guilt. Once again, the deep connection between the death - instinct and the sense of guilt becomes apparent. The silent "professional - agreement" with the fact of death and disease is perhaps one of the most - widespread expressions of the death instinct -- or, rather, of its social - usefulness. In a repressive civilization, death itself becomes an instrument of - repression. Whether death is feared as constant threat, or glorified as supreme - sacrifice, or accepted as fate, the education for consent to death introduces - an element of surrender into life from the beginning -- surrender and - submission. - -### Psychoanalytic Therapy and Theory - - Fromm has devoted an admirable paper to "The Social Conditions of - Psychoanalytic Therapy," in which he shows that the psychoanalytic situation - (between analyst and patient) is a specific expression of liberalist toleration - and as such dependent on the existence of such toleration in the society. But - behind the tolerant attitude of the "neutral" analyst is concealed "respect for - the social taboos of the bourgeoisie." - 7 Fromm traces the effectiveness of these taboos at the very core of Freudian - theory, in Freud' s position toward sexual morality. With this attitude, Fromm - contrasts another conception of therapy, first perhaps formulated by Ferenczi, - according to which the analyst rejects patricentric-authoritarian taboos and - enters into a positive rather than neutral relation with the patient. The new - conception is characterized chiefly by an "unconditional affirmation of the - patient' s claim for happiness" and the "liberation of morality from its - tabooistic features ." 8 - - [...] - - in a repressive society, individual happiness and productive development are in - contradiction to society; if they are defined as values to be realized within - this society, they become themselves repressive. - - [...] - - while psychoanalytic theory recognizes that the sickness of the individual is - ultimately caused and sustained by the sickness of his civilization, - psychoanalytic therapy aims at curing the individual so that he can continue to - function as part of a sick civilization without surrendering to it altogether. - - [...] - - Theoretically, the difference between mental health and neurosis lies only in - the degree and effectiveness of resignation: mental health is successful, - efficient resignation -- normally so efficient that it shows forth as - moderately happy satisfaction. Normality is a precarious condition. "Neurosis - and psychosis are both of them an expression of the rebellion of the id against - the outer world, of its ` pain,' unwillingness to adapt itself to necessity -- - to ananke, or, if one prefers, of its incapacity to do so." 9 - - [...] - - In the long run, the question is only how much resignation the individual can - bear without breaking up. In this sense, therapy is a course in resignation: a - great deal will be gained if we succeed in "transforming your hysterical misery - into everyday unhappiness," which is the usual lot of mankind. 11 - - [...] - - The autonomous personality, in the sense of creative "uniqueness" and fullness - of its existence, has always been the privilege of a very few. At the present - stage, the personality tends toward a standardized reaction pattern established - by the hierarchy of power and functions and by its technical, intellectual, and - cultural apparatus. - - The analyst and his patient share this alienation, and since it does not - usually manifest itself in any neurotic symptom but rather as the hallmark of - "mental health," it does not appear in the revisionist consciousness. - - [...] - - Fromm writes: Genuine love is rooted in productiveness and may properly be - called, therefore, "productive love." Its essence is the same whether it is the - mother's love for the child, our love for man , or the erotic love between two - individuals. . certain basic elements may be said to be characteristic of all - forms of productive love. These are care, responsibility, respect, and - knowledge. 35 - - Compare with this ideological formulation Freud' s analysis of the instinctual - ground and underground of love, of the long and painful process in which - sexuality with all its polymorphous perversity is tamed and inhibited until it - ultimately becomes susceptible to fusion with tenderness and affection -- a - fusion which remains precarious and never quite overcomes its destructive - elements . - - [...] - - According to Freud, love, in our culture, can and must be practiced as - "aim-inhibited sexuality," with all the taboos and constraints placed upon it - by a monogamic-patriarchal society. Beyond its legitimate manifestations, love - is destruetive and by no means conducive to productiveness and constructive - work. Love, taken seriously, is outlawed: "There is no longer any place in - present-day civilized life for a simple natural love between two human beings," - 37 But to the revisionists, productiveness, love, happiness, and health merge - in grand hannony; civilization has not caused any conflicts between them which - the mature person could not solve without serious damage . - - [...] - - Freud had established a substantive link between human freedom and happiness on - the one hand and sexuality on the other: the latter provided the primary source - for the former and at the same time the ground for their necessary restriction - in civilization. The revisionist solution of the conflict through the - spiritualization of freedom and happiness demanded the weakening of this link . - - [...] - - Fromm 's ideological interpretation of the Oedipus complex implies acceptance - of the unhappiness of freedom, of its separation from satisfaction; Freud' s - theory implies that the Oedipus wish is the eternal infantile protest against - this separation -- protest not against freedom but against painful , repressive - freedom. Conversely, the Oedipus wish is the eternal infantile desire for the - archetype of freedom: freedom from want. And since the (unrepressed) sex - instinct is the biological carrier of this archetype of freedom, the Oedipus - wish is essentially "sexual craving." Its natural object is, not simply the - mother qua mother, but the mother qua woman -- female principle of - gratification. Here the Eros of receptivity, rest, painless and integral - satisfaction is nearest to the death instinct (return to the womb), the - pleasure principle nearest to the Nirvana principle. Eros here fights its first - battle against everything the reality principle stands for: against the father, - against domination, sublimation, resignation. Gradually then, freedom and - fulfillment are being associated with these paternal principles; freedom from - want is sacrificed to moral and spiritual independence. It is first the "sexual - craving" for the mother-woman that threatens the psychical basis of - civilization; it is the "sexual craving" that makes the Oedipus conflict the - prototype of the instinctual conflicts between the individual and his society. - If the Oedipus wish were in essence nothing more than the wish for protection - and security ("escape from freedom"), if the child desired only impermissible - security and not impermissible pleasure, then the Oedipus complex would indeed - present an essentially educational problem. As such, it can be treated without - exposing the instinctual danger zones of society. - -### Misc - - But, again, Freud shows that this repressive system does not really solve the - conflict. Civilization plunges into a destructive dialectic: the perpetual - restrictions on Eros ultimately weaken the life instincts and thus strengthen - and release the very forces against which they were "called up" -- those of - destruction. - - [...] - - For the vast majority of the population, the scope and mode of satisfaction are - determined by their own labor; but their labor is work for an apparatus which - they do not control, which operates as an independent power to which - individuals must submit if they want to live. And it becomes the more alien the - more specialized the division of labor becomes. Men do not live their own lives - but perform pre-established functions. While they work, they do not fulfill - their own needs and faculties but work in alienation. Work has now become - general, and so have the restrictions placed upon the libido: labor time, which - is the largest part of the individual' s life time, is painful time, for - alienated labor is absence of gratification, negation of the pleasure - principle. Libido is diverted for socially useful performances in which the - individual works for himself only in so far as he works for the apparatus, - engaged in activities that mostly do not coincide with his own faculties and - desires. - - [...] - - The work of repression pertains to the death instinct as well as the life - instinct. Normally, their fusion is a healthy one, but the sustained severity - of the superego constantly threatens this healthy balance. "The more a man - checks his aggressive tendencies toward others the more tyrannical, that is - aggressive, he becomes in his ego-ideal.. the more intense become the - aggressive tendencies of his ego-ideal against his ego." 57 Driven to the - extreme, in melancholia, "a pure culture of the death instinct" may hold sway - in the superego - - [...] - - It is in this context that Freud's metapsychology comes face to face with the - fatal dialectic of civilization: the very progress of civilization leads to the - release of increasingly destructive forces. In order to elucidate the - connection between Freud's individual psychology and the theory of - civilization, it will be necessary to resume the interpretation of the - instinctual dynamic at a different level -- namely, the phylogenetic one. - - [...] - - Note: 45 To be sure, every form of society, every civilization has to exact - labor time for the procurement of the necessities and luxuries of life. But not - every kind and mode of labor is essentially irreconcilable with the pleasure - principle. The human relations connected with work may "provide for a very - considerable discharge of libidinal component impulses, narcissistic, - aggressive, and even erotic." ( Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 34 note.) - The irreconcilable conflict is not between work (reality principle) and Eros - (pleasure principle), but between alienated labor (performance principle) and - Eros. The notion of non-alienated, libidinal work will be discussed below. - - [...] - - It is the end result of long historical processes which are congealed in the - network of human and institutional entities making up society, and these - processes define the personality and its relationships. Consequently, to - understand them for what they really are, psychology must unfreeze them by - tracing their hidden origins. In doing so, psychology discovers that the - determining childhood experiences are linked with the experiences of the - species -- that the individual lives the universal fate of mankind. The past - defines the present because mankind has not yet mastered its own history. - - [...] - - The basic work in civilization is non-libidinal, is labor; labor is - "unpleasantness," and such unpleasantness has to be enforced. - - [...] - - To be sure, there is a mode of work which offers a high degree of libidinal - satisfaction, which is pleasurable in its execution. And artistic work, where - it is genuine, seems to grow out of a non-repressive instinctual constellation - and to envisage non-repressive aims -- so much so that the term sublimation - seems to require considerable modification if applied to this kind of work. - - [...] - - The "automatization" of the superego 25 indicates the defense mechanisms by - which society meets the threat. The defense consists chiefly in a strengthening - of controls not so much over the instincts as over consciousness, which, if - left free, might recognize the work of repression in the bigger and better - satisfaction of needs. The manipulation of consciousness which has occurred - throughout the orbit of contemporary industrial civilization has been described - in the various interpretations of totalitarian and "popular cultures": - co-ordination of the private and public existence, of spontaneous and required - reactions. The promotion of thoughtless leisure activities, the triumph of - anti- intellectual ideologies, exemplify the trend. - - [...] - - But these personal father-images have gradually disappeared behind the - institutions. With the rationalization of the productive apparatus, with the - multiplication of functions, all domination assumes the form of administration. - At its peak, the concentration of economic power seems to turn into anonymity: - everyone, even at the very top, appears to be powerless before the movements - and laws of the apparatus itself. Control is normally administered by offices - in which the controlled are the employers and the employed. - - [...] - - Most of the clichés with which sociology describes the process of - dehumanization in presentday mass culture are correct; but they seem to be - slanted in the wrong direction. What is retrogressive is not mechanization and - standardization but their containment, not the universal co-ordination but its - concealment under spurious liberties, choices, and individualities. The high - standard of living in the domain of the great corporations is restrictive in a - concrete sociological sense: the goods and services that the individuals buy - control their needs and petrify their faculties. In exchange for the - commodities that enrich their life, the individuals sell not only their labor - but also their free time. The better living is offset by the all-pervasive - control over living. People dwell in apartment concentrations -- and have - private automobiles with which they can no longer escape into a different - world. They have huge refrigerators filled with frozen foods. They have dozens - of newspapers and magazines that espouse the same ideals. They have innumerable - choices, innumerable gadgets which are all of the same sort and keep them - occupied and divert their attention from the real issue -- which is the - awareness that they could both work less and determine their own needs and - satisfactions. - - The ideology of today lies in that production and consumption reproduce and - justify domination. But their ideological character does not change the fact - that their benefits are real. The repressiveness of the whole lies to a high - degree in its efficacy: it enhances the scope of material culture, facilitates - the procurement of the necessities of life, makes comfort and luxury cheaper, - draws ever-larger areas into the orbit of industry -- while at the same time - sustaining toil and destruction. The individual pays by sacrificing his time, - his consciousness, his dreams; civilization pays by sacrificing its own - promises of liberty, justice, and peace for all. - - The discrepancy between potential liberation and actual repression has come to - maturity: it permeates all spheres of life the world over. The rationality of - progress heightens the irrationality of its organization and direction. - Social cohesion and administrative power are sufficiently strong to protect the - whole from direct aggression, but not strong enough to eliminate the - accumulated aggressiveness. It turns against those who do not belong to the - whole, whose existence is its denial. This foe appears as the archenemy and - Antichrist himself : he is everywhere at all times ; he represents hidden and - sinister forces, and his omnipresence requires total mobilization. - - [...] - - Being is essentially the striving for pleasure. This striving becomes an "aim" - in the human existence: the erotic impulse to combine living substance into - ever larger and more durable units is the instinctual source of civilization. - The sex instincts are life instincts: the impulse to preserve and enrich life - by mastering nature in accordance with the developing vital needs is originally - an erotic impulse. - Ananke is experienced as the barrier against the satisfaction of the life - instincts, which seek pleasure, not security. And the "struggle for existence" - is originally a struggle for pleasure: culture begins with the collective - implementation of this aim. Later, however, the struggle for existence is - organized in the interest of domination: the erotic basis of culture is - transformed. When philosophy conceives the essence of being as Logos, it is - already the Logos of domination -- commanding, mastering, directing reason, to - which man and nature are to be subjected Freud' s interpretation of being in - terms of Eros recaptures the early stage of Plato's philosophy, which conceived - of culture not as the repressive sublimation but as the free - self-development of Eros. As early as Plato, this conception appears as an - archaic-mythical residue. Eros is being absorbed into Logos, and Logos is - reason which subdues the instincts. - The history of ontology reflects the reality principle which governs the world - ever more exclusively: The insights contained in the metaphysical notion of - Eros were driven underground. They survived, in eschatological distortion, in - many heretic movements, in the hedonistic philosophy. Their history has still - to be written -- as has the history of the transformation of Eros in Agape. 29 - Freud's own theory follows the general trend: in his work, the rationality of - the predominant reality principle supersedes the metaphysical speculations on - Eros. - - [...] - - As an isolated individual phenomenon , the reactivation of narcissistic libido - is not culture-building but neurotic: The difference between a neurosis and a - sublimation is evidently the social aspect of the phenomenon . A neurosis - isolates; a sublimation unites. diff --git a/books/psicologia/eros-civilization/detours-to-death.png b/books/psicologia/eros-civilization/detours-to-death.png Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 3012525..0000000 --- a/books/psicologia/eros-civilization/detours-to-death.png +++ /dev/null diff --git a/books/psicologia/psychology-of-intelligence.md b/books/psicologia/psychology-of-intelligence.md deleted file mode 100644 index be516af..0000000 --- a/books/psicologia/psychology-of-intelligence.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,332 +0,0 @@ -[[!meta title="The Psychology of Intelligence"]] - -* Author: Jean Piaget. -* Publisher: Routledge Classics. -* Year: 1950. - -## References - -* [Piaget's theory of cognitive development - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piaget's_theory_of_cognitive_development). - -## Overview - -This overview is a mixed of both ideas from the book altogether with other -considerations I've got by reading other, related material: - -### Intelligence is reversible! - -As what's really wonderful about this reversibility is that it's built atop of -lower, fundamental levels of irreversible dynamical systems. - -That revesibility is the capacity to the adaptive system do turn away from -configurations that doesn't lead to a defined goal and replace by other -pathways, mixing introspection and empirism. - -Reading this book along with The Tree of Live from Maturana and Varella -and Morin's Method I get the feeling that intelligence in life arises from -the sensori-motor system and gets deeper in a process where the nervous -system inflates to give way to impulses/stimuli that originates from itself. - -Consequential to this reversibility is that intelligence might experimentation -freely without risking itself producing damages or permanent harm to itself, -which is different to say that somebody can't harm him/herself by the consequence -of his/her acts. - -Also, while what happens with intelligence looks entirely reversible, mind is -not composed of intelligence alone. Other instances exist that might put the -whole apparatus on restricted modes of operation, such when in a neurosis which -is a state of constant looping in a given theme. - -## Misc - -* Perception (imediate contact with the world) (127). - -* Habit: beyond short and rapidly automatised connections between per- - ceptions and responses (habit) (127). - -* How the whole body is seem according to his theory? There's a movement (sic) - where intelligence raises from the sensori-motor to the mind, but can we - consider the other way as well, about what's conceived by abstract thought - be then used as a source of sensori-motor intelligence? I guess so, but wonder - how that could be articulated in Piaget's theory. - -## Intelligence and equilibrium - - Then, if intelligence is thus conceived as the form of equilibrium towards - which all cognitive processes tend, there arises the problem of its relations - with perception (Chap. 3), and with habit (Chap. 4). - - -- Preface - - Every response, whether it be an act directed towards the outside world or an - act internalized as thought, takes the form of an adaptation or, better, of a - re-adaptation. The individual acts only if he experiences a need, i.e., if the - equilibrium between the environment and the organism is momentarily upset, and - action tends to re-establish the equilibrium, i.e., to re-adapt the organ- ism - (Claparède). A response is thus a particular case of inter- action between the - external world and the subject, but unlike physiological interactions, which - are of a material nature and involve an internal change in the bodies which are - present, the responses studied by psychology are of a functional nature and are - achieved at greater and greater distances in space (percep- tion, etc.) and in - time (memory, etc.) besides following more and more complex paths (reversals, - detours, etc.). Behaviour, thus conceived in terms of functional interaction, - presupposes two essential and closely interdependent aspects: an affective - aspect and a cognitive aspect. - - -- 5 - - Furthermore, intelligence itself does not consist of an isolated and sharply - differentiated class of cognitive processes. It is not, properly speaking, one - form of structuring among others; it is the form of equilibrium towards which - all the structures arising out of perception, habit and elementary - sensori-motor mechan- isms tend. It must be understood that if intelligence is - not a faculty this denial involves a radical functional continuity between the - higher forms of thought and the whole mass of lower types of cognitive and - motor adaptation; so intelligence can only be the form of equilibrium towards - which these tend. - - This does not mean, of course, that a judgment consists of a co- ordination of - perceptual structures, or that perceiving means unconscious inference (although - both these theories have been held), for functional continuity in no way - excludes diversity or even heterogeneity among structures. Every structure is - to be thought of as a particular form of equilibrium, more or less stable - within its restricted field and losing its stability on reach- ing the limits of - the field. But these structures, forming different levels, are to be regarded as - succeeding one another according to a law of development, such that each one - brings about a more inclusive and stable equilibrium for the processes that - emerge from the preceding level. Intelligence is thus only a generic term to - indicate the superior forms of organization or equilibrium of cognitive - structurings. - - -- 7 - - In general, we may thus conclude that there is an essential unity between the - sensori-motor processes that engender per- ceptual activity, the formation of - habits, and pre-verbal or pre- representative intelligence itself. The latter - does not therefore arise as a new power, superimposed all of a sudden on com- - pletely prepared previous mechanisms, but is only the expres- sion of these - same mechanisms when they go beyond present and immediate contact with the - world (perception), as well as beyond short and rapidly automatised connections - between per- ceptions and responses (habit), and operate at progressively - greater distances and by more complex routes, in the direction of mobility and - reversibility. Early intelligence, therefore, is simply the form of mobile - equilibrium towards which the mechanisms adapted to perception and habit tend; - but the latter attain this only by leaving their respective fields of - application. Moreover, intelligence, from this first sensori-motor stage - onwards, has already succeeded in constructing, in the special case of space, - the equilibrated structure that we call the group of displacements—in an - entirely empirical or practical form, it is true, and of course remaining on - the very restricted plane of immediate space. But it goes without saying that - this organiza- tion, circumscribed as it is by the limitations of action, still - does not constitute a form of thought. On the contrary, the whole development - of thought, from the advent of language to the end of childhood, is necessary - in order that the completed sensori- motor structures, which may even be - co-ordinated in the form of empirical groups, may be extended into genuine - operations, which will constitute or reconstruct these groupings and groups at - the level of symbolic behaviour and reflective reasoning. - - -- 127-128 - -## Logic and psychology - - An axiomatics is an exclusively hypothetico-deductive sci- - ence, i.e., it reduces to a minimum appeals to experience (it even - aims to eliminate them entirely) in order freely to reconstruct its - object by means of undemonstrable propositions (axioms), - which are to be combined as rigorously as possible and in every - possible way. In this way geometry has made great progress, - seeking to liberate itself from all intuition and constructing the - most diverse spaces simply by defining the primary elements to - be admitted by hypothesis and the operations to which they are - subject. The axiomatic method is thus the mathematical method - par excellence and it has had numerous applications, not only in - pure mathematics, but in various fields of applied mathematics - (from theoretical physics to mathematical economics). The use- - fulness of an axiomatics, in fact, goes beyond that of demonstra- - tion (although in this field it constitutes the only rigorous - method); in the face of complex realities, resisting exhaustive - analysis, it permits us to construct simplified models of reality - and thus provides the study of the latter with irreplaceable dis- - secting instruments. To sum up, an axiomatics constitutes a “pat- - tern” for reality, as F. Gonseth has clearly shown, and, since all - abstraction leads to a schematization, the axiomatic method in - the long run extends the scope of intelligence itself. - - But precisely because of its “schematic” character, an axiomat- - ics cannot claim to be the basis of, and still less to replace, its - corresponding experimental science, i.e. the science relating to - that sector of reality for which the axiomatics forms the pattern. - Thus, axiomatic geometry is incapable of teaching us what the - space of the real world is like (and “pure economics” in no way - exhausts the complexity of concrete economic facts). No axi- - omatics could replace the inductive science which corresponds - to it, for the essential reason that its own purity is merely a limit - which is never completely attained. As Gonseth also says, there - always remains an intuitive residue in the most purified pattern - (just as there is already an element of schematization in all intu- - ition). This reason alone is enough to show why an axiomatics - will never be the basis of an experimental science and why there - is an experimental science corresponding to every axiomatics - (and, no doubt, vice versa). - - -- page 30 - - It is true that in addition to the individual consistency of - actions there enter into thought interactions of a collective order - and consequently “norms” imposed by this collaboration. But - co-operation is only a system of actions, or of operations, car- - ried out in concert, and we may repeat the preceding argument - for collective symbolic behaviour, which likewise remains at a - level containing real structures, unlike axiomatizations of a - formal nature. - - For psychology, therefore, there remains unaltered the prob- - lem of understanding the mechanism with which intelligence - comes to construct coherent structures capable of operational - combination; and it is no use invoking “principles” which this - intelligence is supposed to apply spontaneously, since logical - principles concern the theoretical pattern formulated after - thought has been constructed and not this living process of con- - struction itself. Brunschvicg has made the profound observation - that intelligence wins battles or indulges, like poetry, in a con- - tinuous work of creation, while logico-mathematical deduction - is comparable only to treatises on strategy and to manuals of - “poetic art”, which codify the past victories of action or mind - but do not ensure their future conquests. 1 - - -- page 34 - -## Habit and sensori-motor intelligence - -Circular reaction: - - Let us imagine an infant in a cradle with a raised cover from which - hang a whole series of rattles and a loose string. The child grasps - this and so shakes the whole arrangement without expecting to do - so or understanding any of the detailed spatial or causal rela- - tions. Surprised by the result, he reaches for the string and - carries out the whole sequence several times over. J. M. Baldwin - called this active reproduction of a result at first obtained by - chance a “circular reaction”. The circular reaction is thus a typ- - ical example of reproductive assimilation. The first movement - executed and followed by its result constitutes a complete action, - which creates a new need once the objects to which it relates - have returned to their initial stage; these are then assimilated to - the previous action (thereby promoted to the status of a schema) - which stimulates its reproduction, and so on. Now this mechan- - ism is identical with that which is already present at the source - of elementary habits except that, in their case, the circular reac- - tion affects the body itself (so we will give the name “primary - circular reaction” to that of the early level, such as the schema of - thumb-sucking), whereas thenceforward, thanks to prehension, - it is applied to external objects (we will call this behaviour affect- - ing objects the “secondary circular reaction,” although we must - remember that these are not yet by any means conceived as - substances by the child). - - -- 110-112 - -Early intelligence: - - The routes between the subject and the object fol- - lowed by action, and also by sensori-motor reconstitutions and - anticipations, are no longer direct and simple pathways as at the - previous stages: rectilinear as in perception, or stereotyped and - uni-directional as in circular reactions. The routes begin to vary - and the utilisation of earlier schemata begins to extend further in - time. This is characteristic of the connection between means and - ends, which henceforth are differentiated, and this is why we - may begin to speak of true intelligence. But, apart from the - continuity that links it with earlier behaviour, we should note the - limitations of this early intelligence: there are no inventions or - discoveries of new means, but simply application of known - means to unforeseen circumstances. - - -- 114 - -Innovation: - - Two acquisitions characterise the next stage, both relating to - the utilisation of past experience. The assimilatory schemata so - far described are of course continually accommodated to - external data. But this accommodation is, so to speak, suffered - rather than sought; the subject acts according to his needs and - this action either harmonizes with reality or encounters resist- - ances which it tries to overcome. Innovations which arise for- - tuitously are either neglected or else assimilated to previous - schemata and reproduced by circular reaction. However, a time - comes when the innovation has an interest of its own, and this - certainly implies a sufficient stock of schemata for comparisons - to be possible and for the new fact to be sufficiently like the - known one to be interesting and sufficiently different to avoid - satiation. Circular reaction, then, will consist of a reproduction - of the new phenomenon, but with variations and active - experimentation that are intended precisely to extract from it its - new possibilities. - - -- 114 - -Topology: - - But there now arises a problem whose discussion leads to the study of space. - Perceptual constancy is the product of simple regulations and we saw (Chap. 3) - that the absence at all ages of absolute constancy and the existence of adult - “superconstancy” provide evidence for the regulative rather than operational - char- acter of the system. There is, therefore, all the more reason why it - should be true of the first two years. Does not the construction of space, on - the other hand, lead quite rapidly to a grouping structure and even a group - structure in accordance with - - Poincaré’s famous hypothesis concerning the psychologically primary influence of - the “group of displacements?” The genesis of space in sensori-motor - intelligence is com- pletely dominated by the progressive organisation of - responses, and this in effect leads to a “group” structure. But, contrary to - Poincaré’s belief in the a priori nature of the group of dis- placements, this - is developed gradually as the ultimate form of equilibrium reached by this - motor organisation. Successive co-ordinations (combinativity), reversals - (reversibility), detours (associativity) and conservations of position - (identity) gradually give rise to the group, which serves as a necessary - equilibrium for actions. - - At the first two stages (reflexes and elementary habits), we could not even speak - of a space common to the various per- ceptual modalities, since there are as - many spaces, all mutually heterogeneous, as there are qualitatively distinct - fields (mouth, visual, tactile, etc.). It is only in the course of the third - stage that the mutual assimilation of these various spaces becomes system- atic - owing to the co-ordination of vision with prehension. Now, step by step with - these co-ordinations, we see growing up elementary spatial systems which - already presage the form of composition characteristic of the group. Thus, in - the case of interrupted circular reaction, the subject returns to the starting- - point to begin again; when his eyes are following a moving object that is - travelling too fast for continuous vision (falling etc.), the subject - occasionally catches up with the object by dis- placements of his own body to - correct for those of the external moving object. - - But it is as well to realise that, if we take the point of view of the subject - and not merely that of a mathematical observer, the construction of a group - structure implies at least two conditions: the concept of an object and the - decentralisation of movements by correcting for, and even reversing, their - initial egocentricity. In fact, it is clear that the reversibility - characteristic of the group presupposes the concept of an object, and also vice - versa, since to retrieve an object is to make it possible for oneself to return - (by displacing either the object itself or one’s own body). The object is - simply the constant due to the reversible composition of the group. - Furthermore, as Poincaré himself has clearly shown, the idea of displacement as - such implies the possibility of differentiating between irreversible changes of - state and those changes of position that are characterized precisely by their - reversibility (or by their possible correction through movements of one’s own - body). It is obvious, therefore, that without con- servation of objects there - could not be any “group”, since then everything would appear as a “change of - state”. The object and the group of displacements are thus indissociable, the - one con- stituting the static aspect and the other the dynamic aspect of the - same reality. But this is not all: a world with no objects is a universe with - no systematic differentiation between subjective and external realities, a world - that is consequently “adualistic” (J. M. Baldwin). By this very fact, such a - universe would be centred on one’s own actions, the subject being all the more - dominated by this egocentric point of view because he remains - un-self-conscious. But the group implies just the opposite attitude: a complete - decentralisation, such that one’s own body is located as one element among - others in a system of displacements enabling one to distinguish between one’s - own movements and those of objects. - - -- 123-125 |
