diff options
authorSilvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net>2020-01-23 09:39:29 -0300
committerSilvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net>2020-01-23 09:39:29 -0300
commita7d637f23cb5eee84f0f959fc4e53effaf2694a0 (patch)
parent3ddc1eec03000ec56769bf351b5f0e6cad4b74e1 (diff)
Updates books/economics/game-theory-critical-introduction
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/books/economics/game-theory-critical-introduction.md b/books/economics/game-theory-critical-introduction.md
index a23ee05..a0fad61 100644
--- a/books/economics/game-theory-critical-introduction.md
+++ b/books/economics/game-theory-critical-introduction.md
@@ -568,3 +568,33 @@ is algorithmic"):
of Nash.
-- 58-60
+"Irrational" plays which might intend to send a message to other players:
+ Indeed why should one assume in this way that players cannot (or
+ should not) try to make statements about themselves through patterning
+ their ‘trembles? The question becomes particularly sharp once it is recalled
+ that, on the conventional account, players must expect that there is always
+ some chance of a tremble. Trembles in this sense are part of normal
+ behaviour, and the critics argue that agents may well attempt to use them
+ as a medium for signalling something to each other. Of course, players will
+ not do so if they believe that their chosen pattern is going to be ignored
+ by others. But that is the point: why assume that this is what they will
+ believe from the beginning, especially when agents can see that the
+ generally accepted use of trembles as signals might secure a better
+ outcome for both players [...]?
+ Note that this is not an argument against backward induction per se: it is an
+ argument against assuming CKR while working out beliefs via backward
+ induction (i.e. a criticism of Nash backward induction). When agents consider
+ patterning their ‘trembles’, they project forward about future behaviour given
+ that there are trembles now or in the past. What makes it ambiguous whether
+ they should do this, or stick to Nash backward induction instead, is that there
+ is no uniquely rational way of playing games like Figures 3.5 or 3.6 (unlike the
+ race to 20 game in which there is). In this light, the subgame perfect Nash
+ equilibrium offers one of many possible scenarios of how rational agents will
+ behave.
+ -- 93
+Why not expand this affirmation so _any_ move to signal some intention?