From 09b233d952b30fe71dd910218e80711bdf560485 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jacob Appelbaum Date: Sat, 30 Apr 2011 01:35:06 -0700 Subject: Update README --- README | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'README') diff --git a/README b/README index e03b6a6..3d4d242 100644 --- a/README +++ b/README @@ -2,5 +2,23 @@ S.M.A.R.T. Monster Only Notices Surreptitious Tampering Events Retroactively -An anti-forensic reboot, disk access, and basic tamper detector +"An anti-forensic reboot, disk access, and basic tamper detector" +This set of scripts is written with the express purpose of detecting changes in +the bootable file system, with the unencrypted block device used for booting, +with S.M.A.R.T. data provided by your drives, and other interesting data +points. + +This software assumes that your /boot is unencrypted and that everything else +is encrypted with full disk encryption; it also assumes that your hard disk is +a spinning platter with S.M.A.R.T. support - this may also function with SSD +storage devices but is as of yet untested. + +We also assume that you layer your file system encryption with something like +eCryptFS for use after the full disk encryption has been unlocked. Anything +less will allow an attacker to simply log your main encryption key and leak it +through a covert channel, such as attempting to join a wireless network with +your key as the ESSID. Detection of such an event after the fact may be too +late. + +This is of course entirely imperfect and still worth exploring. -- cgit v1.2.3