diff options
| author | Silvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net> | 2016-07-03 11:00:56 -0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Silvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net> | 2016-07-03 11:00:56 -0300 |
| commit | ce9fe1ed9ba8b567fd5150f03a4b3bb8e7e1d9ca (patch) | |
| tree | d8f622d519af07ce2ff4c1861cd5c86e78d24bc1 | |
| parent | c483c5f404811e4e46531c2d8ff64e4aceacce62 (diff) | |
| download | bootless-ce9fe1ed9ba8b567fd5150f03a4b3bb8e7e1d9ca.tar.gz bootless-ce9fe1ed9ba8b567fd5150f03a4b3bb8e7e1d9ca.tar.bz2 | |
Format threat model
| -rw-r--r-- | index.mdwn | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
@@ -87,13 +87,13 @@ Check device/image signatures: Threat Model ------------ -Does bootless mitigate all types of Evil Maid attacks? No: +### Does bootless mitigate all types of Evil Maid attacks? No. -1. It just reduces it attack surface by placing the bootloader away from the physical machine and recommending you to use Full Disk Encryption (FDE) to store your operating system, swap and data. +1. It reduces the attack surface by placing the bootloader away from the physical machine and recommending you to use Full Disk Encryption (FDE) to store your operating system, swap and data. 2. Infection is still possible in plenty of unencrypted/unauthenticated software residing in the machine, such as BIOS, network firmware and potential backdoors such as Intel's AMT/ME. -Additional mitigations: +### Additional mitigations 3. For physical attempts to tamper with your bare metal, you might try to protect and monitor your perimeter. |