From f0a53b20df62489d149b76b3c9b7f49f6c3c68be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvio Rhatto Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 12:55:57 -0300 Subject: Adds books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state --- books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 193 insertions(+) create mode 100644 books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md (limited to 'books') diff --git a/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md b/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..20e09c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +[[!meta title="Stasis Before the State: Nine Theses on Agonistic Democracy"]] + +* Athor: Dimitris Vardoulakis +* References: + * https://www.worldcat.org/title/stasis-before-the-state-nine-theses-on-agonistic-democracy/oclc/1000452218 + * https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/2009359 + * https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1xhr6vd + * https://www.academia.edu/35908382/Vardoulakis_Stasis_Before_the_State_--_Introduction + * https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823277414/stasis-before-the-state/ + +## Excerpts + + This question would be trivial if sovereignty is under­ + stood simply as the sovereignty of specific states. The + question is pertinent when we consider the vio­lence + functioning as the structural princi­ple of sovereignty. + Sovereignty can only persist and the state that it sup­ + ports can only ever reproduce its structures—­political, + economic, ­legal, and so on—­through recourse to certain + forms of vio­lence. Such vio­lence is at its most effective + the less vis­i­ble and hence the less bloody it is. This in­ + sight has been developed brilliantly by thinkers such + as Gramsci, u + ­ nder the rubric of hegemony; Althusser, + through the concept of ideology; and Foucault, as the + notion of power. It is in this context that we should also + consider Carl Schmitt’s definition of the po­liti­cal as the + identification of the e ­ nemy. They all agree on the essen­ + tial or structural vio­lence defining sovereignty—­their + divergent accounts of that vio­lence notwithstanding. + The prob­lem of a space outside sovereignty is com­ + + [...] + + Posing the question of an outside to sovereignty + within the context of the mechanism of exclusion turns + the spotlight to what I call the ruse of sovereignty. This + essentially consists in the paradox that the assertion of + a space outside sovereignty is nothing other than the as­ + sertion of an excluded space and consequently signals + the mobilization of the logic of sovereignty. + + [...] + + To put this in the vocabulary used h + ­ ere, the at- + tempt to exclude exclusion is itself exclusory and thus + reproduces the logic of exclusion. + + [...] + + Turning to Solon’s first demo­cratic constitution, + I ­will suggest in this book that it is pos­si­ble by identify­ + ing the conflictual nature of democracy—or what the + ancient Greeks called stasis. Agonistic monism holds + that stasis is the definitional characteristic of democ­ + racy and of any other pos­si­ble constitutional form. Sta­ + sis or conflict as the basis of all po­liti­cal arrangements + then becomes another way of saying that democracy is + the form of e ­ very constitution. Hence, stasis comes be- + fore any conception of the state that relies on the ruse of + sovereignty. + + The obvious objection to this position would be about + the nature of this conflict. Hobbes makes the state of + nature — which he explic­itly identifies with democracy —­ + also the precondition of the commonwealth. Schmitt + defines the po­liti­cal as the identification of the enemy. + + [...] + + ent power. Is t ­ here a way out of this entangled knot? + Antonio Negri’s most significant contribution to po­ + liti­cal philosophy is, in my opinion, precisely at this + juncture. His intervention starts with his book on Spi­ + noza, The Savage Anomaly, in which he distinguishes + between potentia (constituent power) and potestas (con­ + stituted power). 20 It is most explic­itly treated in Insur- + gencies, which provides an account of the development + of constituent power in philosophical texts from early + modernity onward and examines the function of con­ + stituent power in significant historical events. 21 The + starting premise of this investigation is the rejection of + ent power. Is t ­ here a way out of this entangled knot? + Antonio Negri’s most significant contribution to po­ + liti­cal philosophy is, in my opinion, precisely at this + juncture. His intervention starts with his book on Spi­ + noza, The Savage Anomaly, in which he distinguishes + between potentia (constituent power) and potestas (con­ + stituted power). 20 It is most explic­itly treated in Insur- + gencies, which provides an account of the development + of constituent power in philosophical texts from early + modernity onward and examines the function of con­ + stituent power in significant historical events. 21 The + starting premise of this investigation is the rejection of + and avoiding the ruse of sovereignty. 23 + The appeal to constituent power gives Negri the means + to provide an account of democracy as creative activity. + This has a wide spectrum of aspects and implications + that I can only gesture t ­ oward ­here. For instance, this + approach shows how democracy requires a convergence + of the ontological, the ethical, and the political—­which + is also a position central to my own proj­ect (see Thesis + 6). Consequently, democracy is not reducible to a con­ + stituted form, and thus Negri can provide a nonrepre­ + sen­ta­tional account of democracy. This is impor­tant + because it enables Marx’s own distaste for representative + democracy to resonate with con­temporary sociology + and po­liti­cal economy—­a proj­ect that starts with Negri’s + involvement in Italian workerism and culminates in his + collaborations with Michael Hardt. Besides the details, + which Negri has been developing for four de­cades, the + impor­tant point is that this description of democracy + and constituent power is consistently juxtaposed to the + po­liti­cal tradition that privileges constituted power and + sovereignty. 24 + + There is, however, a significant drawback in Negri’s + approach. It concerns the lack of a consistent account of + vio­lence in his work. + + [...] + + Without a + consideration of vio­lence, radical democracy ­w ill never + discover its agonistic aspect, namely, that conflict or + stasis is the precondition of the po­liti­cal and that, as + such, all po­liti­cal forms are effects of the demo­cratic. In + other words, Negri’s obfuscation of the question of vio­ + lence can never lead to agonistic monism. + + [...] + +Production of the real: + + Second, the state of emergency leading to justification + does not have to be “real”—it simply needs to be credi­ + ble. Truth or falsity are not properties of power—as Fou­ + cault very well recognized—­and the reason for this, I + would add, is that power’s justifications are rhetorical + strategies and hence unconcerned with validity. This is + the point where my account significantly diverges from + + [...] + + If we are to understand better sovereign vio­lence, we + need to investigate further the ways in which vio­lence is + justified. Sovereignty uses justification rhetorically. In­ + stead of being concerned with w + ­ hether the justifications + of actions are true or false, sovereignty is concerned + with ­whether its justifications are believed by ­those it af­ + fects. + + [...] + +Torture: + + Greek po­liti­cal philosophy. 4 Hannah Arendt also pays + par­tic­u­lar attention to this meta­phor. According to Ar­ + endt, Plato needs the meta­phor of the politician as a + craftsman in order to compensate for the lack of the no­ + tion of authority in Greek thought. ­These Platonic meta­ + phorics include the meta­phor of the statesman as a + physician who heals an ailing polis. 5 The meta­phor of + craftsmanship is used as a justification of po­liti­cal power. + craftsmanship is used as a justification of po­liti­cal power. + The meta­phor persists in modernity, and we can find + examples much closer to home. Mao Zedong justifies + the purges of the Cultural Revolution on the following + grounds: “Our object in exposing errors and criticizing + shortcomings is like that of curing a disease. The entire + purpose is to save the person.” 6 Whoever does not con­ + form to the Maoist ideal is “ill” and needs to be “cured.” + Similarly, George Papadopoulos, the col­o­nel who headed + the Greek junta from 1967 to 1974, repeatedly described + Greece as an ill patient requiring an operation. The dic­ + tatorial regime justified its vio­lence by drawing an anal­ + ogy of its exceptional powers to the powers of the head + surgeon in a hospital emergency room. Th + ­ ese operations + on “patients” took place not in hospitals but in dark po­ + lice cells or in vari­ous forms of prisons or concentration + camps. And the instruments of the “operations” ­were + not t ­ hose of the surgeon but rather of the torturer and + in many cases also of the executioner. The analogy be­ + tween the surgeon and the torturer is mobilized to pro­ + vide reasons for the exercise of vio­lence. An emergency + mobilizes rhetorical strategies that justify vio­lence, ir­ + respective of the fact that such a justification may be + completely fabulatory. + + -- 32-33 -- cgit v1.2.3