From e08c9c24fe91fe4d19af60bf5bdf713c04e6785a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvio Rhatto Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 14:50:00 -0300 Subject: Adds books/counterrevolution --- books/sociology/counterrevolution.md | 844 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 844 insertions(+) create mode 100644 books/sociology/counterrevolution.md (limited to 'books') diff --git a/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md b/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2a259e --- /dev/null +++ b/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md @@ -0,0 +1,844 @@ +[[!meta title="The Counterrevolution"]] + +By Bernard E. Harcourt. + +## Genealogy + +* Mass-scale warfare + * MAD + * Massive retaliation + * Game theory + * Systems analisys + * Nuclear war + +* Counterinsurgency + * Modern warfare + * Unconventional, counter-guerrila + * Special Ops + * Surgical operations + +* Mao's “Eight Points of Attention” plus two principles: + 1. Talk to people politely. + 2. Observe fair dealing in all business transactions. + 3. Return everything borrowed from the people. + 4. Pay for anything damaged. + 5. Do not beat or scold the people. + 6. Do not damage crops. + 7. Do not molest women. + 8. Do not ill-treat prisoners-of-war. 6 + + Two other principles were central to Mao’s revolutionary doctrine: first, the + importance of having a unified political and military power structure that + consolidated, in the same hands, political and military considerations; and + second, the importance of psychological warfare. More specifically, as Paret + explained, “proper psychological measures could create and maintain ideological + cohesion among fighters and their civilian supporters.” 7 + +* Paret (1960) tasks of “counterguerrilla action”: + 1. The military defeat of the guerrilla forces. + 2. The separation of the guerrilla from the population. + 3. The reestablishment of governmental authority and the development of a viable social order. + +* Petraeus: 3 key pillars: + 1. "The first is that the most important struggle is over the population." + 2. "Allegiance of the masses can only be secured + by separating the small revolutionary minority from the passive majority, and by + isolating, containing, and ultimately eliminating the active minority. In his + accompanying guidelines," + 3. "Success turns on collecting information on + everyone in the population. Total information is essential to properly distinguish + friend from foe and then extract the revolutionary minority. It is intelligence— + total information awareness—that renders the counterinsurgency possible." + +## Excerpts + +### Torture + + In Modern Warfare, Trinquier quietly but resolutely condoned torture. The + interrogations and related tasks were considered police work, as opposed to + military operations, but they had the exact same mission: the complete + destruction of the insurgent group. Discussing the typical interrogation of a + detainee, captured and suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization, + Trinquier wrote: “No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner + gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not, + specialists must force his secret from him. Then, as a soldier, he must face the + suffering, and perhaps the death, he has heretofore managed to avoid.” Trinquier + described specialists forcing secrets out of suspects using scientific methods that + did not injure the “integrity of individuals,” but it was clear what those + “scientific” methods entailed. 4 As the war correspondent Bernard Fall suggests, + the political situation in Algeria offered Trinquier the opportunity to develop “a + Cartesian rationale” to justify the use of torture in modern warfare. 5 + Similarly minded commanders championed the use of torture, indefinite + detention, and summary executions. They made no bones about it. + + [...] + + In his autobiographical account published in 2001, Services Spéciaux. Algérie + 1955–1957, General Paul Aussaresses admits to the brutal methods that were the + cornerstone of his military strategy. 6 He makes clear that his approach to + counterinsurgency rested on a three-pronged strategy, which included first, + intelligence work; second, torture; and third, summary executions. The + intelligence function was primordial because the insurgents’ strategy in Algeria + was to infiltrate and integrate the population, to blend in perfectly, and then + gradually to involve the population in the struggle. To combat this insurgent + strategy required intelligence—the only way to sort the dangerous + revolutionaries from the passive masses—and then, violent repression. “The first + step was to dispatch the clean-up teams, of which I was a part,” Aussaresses + writes. “Rebel leaders had to be identified, neutralized, and eliminated discreetly. + By seeking information on FLN leaders I would automatically be able to capture + the rebels and make them talk.” 7 + The rebels were made to talk by means of torture. Aussaresses firmly + believed that torture was the best way to extract information. It also served to + terrorize the radical minority and, in the process, to reduce it. The practice of + torture was “widely used in Algeria,” Aussaresses acknowledges. Not on every + prisoner, though; many spoke freely. “It was only when a prisoner refused to talk + or denied the obvious that torture was used.” 8 + Aussaresses claims he was introduced to torture in Algeria by the policemen + there, who used it regularly. But it quickly became routine to him. “Without any + hesitation,” he writes, “the policemen showed me the technique used for + ‘extreme’ interrogations: first, a beating, which in most cases was enough; then + other means, such as electric shocks, known as the famous ‘gégène’; and finally + water.” Aussaresses explains: “Torture by electric shock was made possible by + generators used to power field radio transmitters, which were extremely + common in Algeria. Electrodes were attached to the prisoner’s ears or testicles, + then electric charges of varying intensity were turned on. This was apparently a + well-known procedure and I assumed that the policemen at Philippeville [in + Algeria] had not invented it.” 9 (Similar methods had, in fact, been used earlier in + Indochina.) + + Aussaresses could not have been more clear: + + The methods I used were always the same: beatings, electric shocks, and, in particular, water + torture, which was the most dangerous technique for the prisoner. It never lasted for more than one + hour and the suspects would speak in the hope of saving their own lives. They would therefore + either talk quickly or never. + + The French historian Benjamin Stora confirms the generalized use of torture. + He reports that in the Battle of Algiers, under the commanding officer, General + Jacques Massu, the paratroopers conducted massive arrests and “practiced + torture” using “electrodes […] dunking in bathtubs, beatings.” General Massu + himself would later acknowledge the use of torture. In a rebuttal he wrote in + 1971 to the film The Battle of Algiers, Massu described torture as “a cruel + necessity.” 10 According to Aussaresses, torture was condoned at the highest + levels of the French government. “Regarding the use of torture,” Aussaresses + + [...] + + For Aussaresses, as for Roger Trinquier, torture and disappearances were + simply an inevitable byproduct of an insurgency—inevitable on both sides of the + struggle. Because terrorism was inscribed in revolutionary strategy, it had to be + used in its repression as well. In a fascinating televised debate in 1970 with the + FLN leader and producer of The Battle of Algiers, Saadi Yacef, Trinquier + confidently asserted that torture was simply a necessary and inevitable part of + modern warfare. Torture will take place. Insurgents know it. In fact, they + anticipate it. The passage is striking: + + I have to tell you. Whether you’re for or against torture, it makes no difference. Torture is a + weapon that will be used in every insurgent war. One has to know that… One has to know that in + an insurgency, you are going to be tortured. + And you have to mount a subversive organization in light of that and in function of torture. It is + not a question of being for or against torture. You have to know that all arrested prisoners in an + insurgency will speak—unless they commit suicide. Their confession will always be obtained. So a + subversive organization must be mounted in function of that, so that a prisoner who speaks does + not give away the whole organization.16 + + “Torture?” asks the lieutenant aide de camp in Henri Alleg’s 1958 exposé + The Question. “You don’t make war with choirboys.” 18 Alleg, a French + journalist and director of the Alger républicain newspaper, was himself detained + and tortured by French paratroopers in Algiers. His book describes the + experience in detail, and in his account, torture was the inevitable product of + colonization and the anticolonial struggle. As Jean-Paul Sartre writes in his + + [...] + + In an arresting part of The Battle of Algiers it becomes clear that many of the + French officers who tortured suspected FLN members had themselves, as + members of the French Resistance, been victims of torture at the hands of the + Gestapo. It is a shocking moment. We know, of course, that abuse often begets + abuse; but nevertheless, one would have hoped that a victim of torture would + recoil from administering it to others. Instead, as Trinquier suggests, torture + became normalized in Algeria. This is, as Sartre describes it, the “terrible truth”: + “If fifteen years are enough to transform victims into executioners, then this + behavior is not more than a matter of opportunity and occasion. Anybody, at any + time, may equally find himself victim or executioner.” 20 + +### Misc + + The central tenet of counterinsurgency theory is that populations—originally + colonial populations, but now all populations, including our own—are made up + of a small active minority of insurgents, a small group of those opposed to the + insurgency, and a large passive majority that can be swayed one way or the other. + The principal objective of counterinsurgency is to gain the allegiance of that + passive majority. And its defining feature is that counterinsurgency is not just a + military strategy, but more importantly a political technique. Warfare, it turns + out, is political. + + On the basis of these tenets, counterinsurgency theorists developed and + refined over several decades three core strategies. First, obtain total information: + every communication, all personal data, all metadata of everyone in the + population must be collected and analyzed. Not just the active minority, but + everyone in the population. Total information awareness is necessary to + distinguish between friend and foe, and then to cull the dangerous minority from + the docile majority. Second, eradicate the active minority: once the dangerous + minority has been identified, it must be separated from the general population + + [...] + + and eliminated by any means possible—it must be isolated, contained, and + ultimately eradicated. Third, gain the allegiance of the general population: + everything must be done to win the hearts and minds of the passive majority. It is + their allegiance and loyalty, and passivity in the end, that matter most. + Counterinsurgency warfare has become our new governing paradigm in the + + [...] + + imagination. It drives our foreign affairs and now our domestic policy as well. + But it was not always that way. For most of the twentieth century, we + governed ourselves differently in the United States: our political imagination + was dominated by the massive battlefields of the Marne, of Verdun, by the + Blitzkrieg and the fire-bombing of Dresden—and by the use of the atomic bomb. + + [...] + + warfare. + Yet the transition from large-scale battlefield warfare to anticolonial struggles + and the Cold War in the 1950s, and to the war against terrorism since 9/11, has + brought about a historic transformation in our political imagination and in the + way that we govern ourselves. In contrast to the earlier sweeping military + paradigm, we now engage in surgical microstrategies of counterinsurgency + abroad and at home. This style of warfare—the very opposite of large-scale + battlefield wars like World War I or II—involves total surveillance, surgical + operations, targeted strikes to eliminate small enclaves, psychological tactics, + and political techniques to gain the trust of the people. The primary target is no + longer a regular army, so much as it is the entire population. It involves a new + + [...] + + The result is radical. We are now witnessing the triumph of a counterinsurgency + model of government on American soil in the absence of an insurgency, or + uprising, or revolution. The perfected logic of counterinsurgency now applies + regardless of whether there is a domestic insurrection. We now face a + counterinsurgency without insurgency. A counterrevolution without revolution. + The pure form of counterrevolution, without a revolution, as a simple modality + of governing at home—what could be called “The Counterrevolution.” + Counterinsurgency practices were already being deployed domestically in the + + [...] + + new internal enemies. It is vital that we come to grips with this new mode of + governing and recognize its unique dangers, that we see the increasingly + widespread domestication of counterinsurgency strategies and the new + technologies of digital surveillance, drones, and hypermilitarized police for what + they are: a counterrevolution without a revolution. We are facing something + radical, new, and dangerous. It has been long in the making, historically. It is + time to identify and expose it. + + + [...] + + so on. I argued that we have become an “expository society” where we + increasingly exhibit ourselves online, and in the process, freely give away our + most personal and private data. No longer an Orwellian or a panoptic society + characterized by a powerful central government forcibly surveilling its citizens + from on high, ours is fueled by our own pleasures, proclivities, joys, and + narcissism. And even when we try to resist these temptations, we have + practically no choice but to use the Internet and shed our digital traces. + I had not fully grasped, though, the relation of our new expository society to + + [...] + + strikes, indefinite detention, or our new hypermilitarized police force at home. + But as the fog lifts from 9/11, the full picture becomes clear. The expository + society is merely the first prong of The Counterrevolution. And only by tying + together our digital exposure with our new mode of counterinsurgency + governance can we begin to grasp the whole architecture of our contemporary + political condition. And only by grasping the full implications of this new mode + of governing—The Counterrevolution—will we be able to effectively resist it + and overcome. + + [...] + + approach targeting small revolutionary insurgencies and what were mostly + Communist uprisings. Variously called “unconventional,” “antiguerrilla” or + “counterguerrilla,” “irregular,” “sublimited,” “counterrevolutionary,” or simply + “modern” warfare, this burgeoning domain of military strategy flourished during + France’s wars in Indochina and Algeria, Britain’s wars in Malaya and Palestine, + and America’s war in Vietnam. It too was nourished by the RAND Corporation, + which was one of the first to see the potential of what the French commander + Roger Trinquier called “modern warfare” or the “French view of + counterinsurgency.” It offered, in the words of one of its leading students, the + historian Peter Paret, a vital counterweight “at the opposite end of the spectrum + from rockets and the hydrogen bomb.” 2 + Like nuclear-weapon strategy, the counterinsurgency model grew out of a + + + [...] + + from rockets and the hydrogen bomb.” 2 + Like nuclear-weapon strategy, the counterinsurgency model grew out of a + combination of strategic game theory and systems theorizing; but unlike nuclear + strategy, which was primarily a response to the Soviet Union, it developed more + in response to another formidable game theorist, Mao Zedong. The formative + moment for counterinsurgency theory was not the nuclear confrontation that + characterized the Cuban Missile Crisis, but the earlier Chinese Civil War that led + to Mao’s victory in 1949—essentially, when Mao turned guerrilla tactics into a + revolutionary war that overthrew a political regime. The central methods and + practices of counterinsurgency warfare were honed in response to Mao’s + strategies and the ensuing anticolonial struggles in Southeast Asia, the Middle + East, and North Africa that imitated Mao’s approach. 3 Those struggles for + independence were the breeding soil for the development and perfection of + unconventional warfare. + By the turn of the twentieth century, when President George W. Bush would + + [...] + + T HE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL CAN BE TRACED BACK through several different + genealogies. One leads to British colonial rule in India and Southeast Asia, to the + insurgencies there, and to the eventual British redeployment and modernization + of counterinsurgency strategies in Northern Ireland and Britain at the height of + the Irish Republican Army’s independence struggles. This first genealogy draws + heavily on the writings of the British counterinsurgency theorist Sir Robert + Thompson, the chief architect of Great Britain’s antiguerrilla strategies in + Malaya from 1948 to 1959. Another genealogy traces back to the American + colonial experience in the Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth century. + Others lead back to Trotsky and Lenin in Russia, to Lawrence of Arabia during + the Arab Revolt, or even to the Spanish uprising against Napoleon—all + mentioned, at least briefly, in General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency field + manual. Alternative genealogies reach back to the political theories of + Montesquieu or John Stuart Mill, while some go even further to antiquity and to + the works of Polybius, Herodotus, and Tacitus. 1 + But the most direct antecedent of counterinsurgency warfare as embraced by + the United States after 9/11 was the French military response in the late 1950s + and 1960s to the anticolonial wars in Indochina and Algeria. This genealogy + passes through three important figures—the historian Peter Paret and the French + commanders David Galula and Roger Trinquier—and, through them, it traces + back to Mao Zedong. It is Mao’s idea of the political nature of + counterinsurgency that would prove so influential in the United States. Mao + politicized warfare in a manner that would come back to haunt us today. The + French connection also laid the seeds of a tension between brutality and legality + that would plague counterinsurgency practices to the present—at least, until the + United States discovered, or rediscovered, a way to resolve the tension by + legalizing the brutality. + + + [...] + + warfare theory. 3 + A founding principle of revolutionary insurgency—what Paret referred to as + “the principal lesson” that Mao taught—was that “an inferior force could + outpoint a modern army so long as it succeeded in gaining at least the tacit + support of the population in the contested area.” 4 The core idea was that the + military battle was less decisive than the political struggle over the loyalty and + allegiance of the masses: the war is fought over the population or, in Mao’s + words, “The army cannot exist without the people.” 5 + As a result of this interdependence, the insurgents had to treat the general + population well to gain its support. On this basis Mao formulated early on, in + 1928, his “Eight Points of Attention” for army personnel: + + 1. Talk to people politely. + 2. Observe fair dealing in all business transactions. + 3. Return everything borrowed from the people. + 4. Pay for anything damaged. + 5. Do not beat or scold the people. + 6. Do not damage crops. + 7. Do not molest women. + 8. Do not ill-treat prisoners-of-war. 6 + + Two other principles were central to Mao’s revolutionary doctrine: first, the + importance of having a unified political and military power structure that + consolidated, in the same hands, political and military considerations; and + second, the importance of psychological warfare. More specifically, as Paret + explained, “proper psychological measures could create and maintain ideological + cohesion among fighters and their civilian supporters.” 7 + Revolutionary warfare, in Paret’s view, boiled down to a simple equation: + + [...] + + the population.” 10 + Of course, neither Paret nor other strategists were so naïve as to think that + Mao invented guerrilla warfare. Paret spent much of his research tracing the + antecedents and earlier experiments with insurgent and counterinsurgency + warfare. “Civilians taking up arms and fighting as irregulars are as old as war,” + Paret emphasized. Caesar had to deal with them in Gaul and Germania, the + British in the American colonies or in South Africa with the Boers, Napoleon in + Spain, and on and on. In fact, as Paret stressed, the very term “guerrilla” + originated in the Spanish peasant resistance to Napoleon after the Spanish + monarchy had fallen between 1808 and 1813. Paret developed case studies of the + + [...] + + But for purposes of describing the “guerre révolutionnaire” of the 1960s, the + most pertinent and timely objects of study were Mao Zedong and the Chinese + revolution. And on the basis of that particular conception of revolutionary war, + Paret set forth a model of counterrevolutionary warfare. Drawing principally on + French military practitioners and theorists, Paret delineated a three-pronged + strategy focused on a mixture of intelligence gathering, psychological warfare on + both the population and the subversives, and severe treatment of the rebels. In + Guerrillas in the 1960’s, Paret reduced the tasks of “counterguerrilla action” to + the following: + 1. The military defeat of the guerrilla forces. + 2. The separation of the guerrilla from the population. + 3. The reestablishment of governmental authority and the development of a + viable social order. 12 + + [...] + + interact.” 13 + So the central task, according to Paret, was to attack the rebel’s popular + support so that he would “lose his hold over the people, and be isolated from + them.” There were different ways to accomplish this, from widely publicized + military defeats and sophisticated psychological warfare to the resettlement of + populations—in addition to other more coercive measures. But one rose above + the others for Paret: to encourage the people to form progovernment militias and + fight against the guerrillas. This approach had the most potential, Paret observes: + “Once a substantial number of members of a community commit violence on + + + [...] + + In sum, the French model of + counterrevolutionary warfare, in Paret’s view, had to be understood as the + inverse of revolutionary warfare. + + + [...] + + The main sources for Paret’s synthesis were the writings and practices of French + commanders on the ground, especially Roger Trinquier and David Galula, + though there were others as well. 15 Trinquier, one of the first French + commanders to theorize modern warfare based on his firsthand experience, had a + + + [...] + + persisting in repeating its efforts.” Trinquier argues that this new form of modern + warfare called for “an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, + psychological, military,” grounded on “Countrywide Intelligence.” As Trinquier + emphasizes, “since modern warfare asserts its presence on the totality of the + population, we have to be everywhere informed.” Informed, in order to know and + target the population and wipe out the insurgency. 17 + The other leading counterinsurgency theorist, also with deep firsthand + + + [...] + + time.’” 19 + From Mao, Galula drew the central lesson that societies were divided into + three groups and that the key to victory was to isolate and eradicate the active + minority in order to gain the allegiance of the masses. Galula emphasizes in + Counterinsurgency Warfare that the central strategy of counterinsurgency theory + “simply expresses the basic tenet of the exercise of political power”: + In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral + majority, and an active minority against the cause. + + [...] + + time.’” 19 + From Mao, Galula drew the central lesson that societies were divided into + three groups and that the key to victory was to isolate and eradicate the active + minority in order to gain the allegiance of the masses. Galula emphasizes in + Counterinsurgency Warfare that the central strategy of counterinsurgency theory + “simply expresses the basic tenet of the exercise of political power”: + In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral + majority, and an active minority against the cause. + + The technique of power consists in relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral + majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority.20 + The battle was over the general population, Galula emphasized in his + Counterinsurgency Warfare, and this tenet represented the key political + dimension of a new warfare strategy. + + [...] + + US general David Petraeus picked up right where David Galula and Peter Paret + left off. Widely recognized as the leading American thinker and practitioner of + counterinsurgency theory—eventually responsible for all coalition troops in Iraq + and the architect of the troop surge of 2007—General Petraeus would refine + + [...] + + On this political foundation, General Petraeus’s manual establishes three key + pillars—what might be called counterinsurgency’s core principles. + The first is that the most important struggle is over the population. In a short + set of guidelines that accompanies his field manual, General Petraeus + emphasizes: “The decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people are the center + + [...] + + The main battle, then, is over the populace. + The second principle is that the allegiance of the masses can only be secured + by separating the small revolutionary minority from the passive majority, and by + isolating, containing, and ultimately eliminating the active minority. In his + accompanying guidelines, General Petraeus emphasizes: “Seek out and eliminate + those who threaten the population. Don’t let them intimidate the innocent. Target + the whole network, not just individuals.” 25 + The third core principle is that success turns on collecting information on + everyone in the population. Total information is essential to properly distinguish + friend from foe and then extract the revolutionary minority. It is intelligence— + total information awareness—that renders the counterinsurgency possible. It is + + [...] + + paraphrasing the French commander, underscores the primacy of political factors + in counterinsurgency. “General Chang Ting-chen of Mao Zedong’s central + committee once stated that revolutionary war was 80 percent political action and + only 20 percent military,” the manual reads. Then it warns: “At the beginning of + a COIN operation, military actions may appear predominant as security forces + conduct operations to secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents; + however, political objectives must guide the military’s approach.” 27 + Chapter Two opens with an epigraph from David Galula’s book: “Essential + + [...] + + General David Petraeus learned, but more importantly popularized, Mao + Zedong’s central lesson: counterinsurgency warfare is political. It is a strategy + for winning over the people. It is a strategy for governing. And it is quite telling + that a work so indebted to Mao and midcentury French colonial thinkers would + become so influential post-9/11. Petraeus’s manual contained a roadmap for a + new paradigm of governing. As the fog lifts from 9/11, it is becoming + increasingly clear what lasting impact Mao had on our government of self and + others today. + + [...] + + D eveloped by military commanders and strategists over decades of anticolonial + wars, counterinsurgency warfare was refined, deployed, and tested in the years + following 9/11. Since then, the modern warfare paradigm has been distilled into + a concise three-pronged strategy: + 1. Bulk-collect all intelligence about everyone in the population—every + piece of data and metadata available. (total information awareness) + + [...] + + 2. Identify and eradicate the revolutionary minority. Total information about + everyone makes it possible to discriminate between friend and foe. Once + suspicion attaches, individuals must be treated severely to extract all + possible information, with enhanced interrogation techniques if + necessary; and if they are revealed to belong to the active minority, they + must be disposed of through detention, rendition, deportation, or drone + strike—in other words, targeted assassination. Unlike conventional + soldiers from the past, these insurgents are dangerous because of their + + [...] + + 3. Pacify the masses. The population must be distracted, entertained, + satisfied, occupied, and most importantly, neutralized, or deradicalized if + necessary, in order to ensure that the vast preponderance of ordinary + individuals remain just that—ordinary. This third prong reflects the + “population-centric” dimension of counterinsurgency theory. Remember, + in this new way of seeing, the population is the battlefield. Its hearts and + minds must be assured. In the digital age, this can be achieved, first, by + targeting enhanced content (such as sermons by moderate imams) to + deradicalize susceptible persons—in other words, by deploying new + digital techniques of psychological warfare and propaganda. Second, by + providing just the bare minimum in terms of welfare and humanitarian + assistance—like rebuilding schools, distributing some cash, and + bolstering certain government institutions. As General Petraeus’s field + +### Torture and surveilance + + T HE ATTACK ON THE W ORLD T RADE C ENTER SHOWED THE weakness of American + intelligence gathering. Top secret information obtained by one agency was + silo’ed from others, making it impossible to aggregate intelligence and obtain a + full picture of the security threats. The CIA knew that two of the 9/11 hijackers + were on American soil in San Diego, but didn’t share the information with the + FBI, who were actively trying to track them down. 1 September 11 was a + crippling intelligence failure, and in the immediacy of that failure many in + President George W. Bush’s administration felt the need to do something radical. + Greater sharing of intelligence, naturally. But much more as well. Two main + solutions were devised, or revived: total surveillance and tortured interrogations. + They represent the first prong of the counterinsurgency approach. + In effect, 9/11 set the stage both for total NSA surveillance and torture as + forms of total information awareness. The former functioned at the most virtual + or ethereal, or “digital” level, by creating the material for data-mining and + analysis. The latter operated at the most bodily or physical, or “analog” level, + obtaining information directly from suspects and detainees in Iraq, Pakistan, + Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But both satisfied the same goal: total information + awareness, the first tactic of counterinsurgency warfare. + +Census + + What is clear, though—as I document in Exposed—is that the myriad NSA, + FBI, CIA, and allied intelligence agencies produce total information, the first + and most important prong of the counterinsurgency paradigm. Most important, + because both of the other prongs depend on it. As the RAND Corporation notes + in its lengthy 519-page report on the current state of counterinsurgency theory + and practice, “Effective governance depends on knowing the population, + demographically and individually.” The RAND report reminds us that this + insight is not novel or new. The report then returns, pointedly for us, to Algeria + and the French commander, David Galula: “Galula, in Counterinsurgency + Warfare, argued that ‘control of the population begins with a thorough census. + Every inhabitant must be registered and given a foolproof identity card.’” 5 + + [...] + + Today, that identity card is an IP address, a mobile phone, a digital device, facial + recognition, and all our digital stamps. These new digital technologies have + made everyone virtually transparent. And with our new ethos of selfies, tweets, + Facebook, and Internet surfing, everyone is now exposed. + +Enhanced interrogation: + + Second, tortured interrogation. The dual personality of counterinsurgency + warfare is nowhere more evident than in the intensive use of torture for + information gathering by the United States immediately after 9/11. Fulfilling the + first task of counterinsurgency theory—total surveillance—this practice married + the most extreme form of brutality associated with modern warfare to the + formality of legal process and the rule of law. The combination of inhumanity + and legality was spectacular. + In the days following 9/11, many in the Bush administration felt there was + only one immediate way to address the information shortfall, namely, to engage + in “enhanced interrogation” of captured suspected terrorists—another + euphemism for torture. Of course, torture of captured suspects would not fix the + problem of silo’ed information, but they thought it would at least provide + immediate information of any pending attacks. One could say that the United + States turned to torture because many in the administration believed the country + did not have adequate intelligence capabilities, lacking the spy network or even + the language abilities to infiltrate and conduct regular espionage on + organizations like Al Qaeda. 6 + The tortured interrogations combined the extremes of brutality with the + +Getting information or "truth" was not the only, perhaps not the main point +of torture sessions, and maybe not as well the main point for mass surveillance: + + Even the more ordinary instances of “enhanced interrogation” were + harrowing—and so often administered, according to the Senate report, after the + interrogators believed there was no more information to be had, sometimes even + before the detainee had the opportunity to speak. + +Torture template: + + Ramzi bin al-Shibh was subjected to this type of treatment immediately upon + arrival in detention, even before being interrogated or given an opportunity to + cooperate—in what would become a “template” for other detainees. Bin al- + Shibh was subjected first to “sensory dislocation” including “shaving bin al- + Shibh’s head and face, exposing him to loud noise in a white room with white + lights, keeping him ‘unclothed and subjected to uncomfortably cool + temperatures,’ and shackling him ‘hand and foot with arms outstretched over his + head (with his feet firmly on the floor and not allowed to support his weight with + his arms).’” Following that, the interrogation would include “attention grasp, + walling, the facial hold, the facial slap… the abdominal slap, cramped + confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours, + and the waterboard, as appropriate to [bin al-Shibh’s] level of resistance.” 8 This + template would be used on others—and served as a warning to all. + The more extreme forms of torture were also accompanied by the promise of + +"Bigeard shrimp": + + The more extreme forms of torture were also accompanied by the promise of + life-long solitary confinement or, in the case of death, cremation. + Counterinsurgency torture in the past had often been linked to summary + disappearances and executions. Under the Bush administration, it was tied to + what one might call virtual disappearances. + During the Algerian war, as noted already, the widespread use of brutal + interrogation techniques meant that those who had been victimized—both the + guilty and innocent—became dangerous in the eyes of the French military + leadership. FLN members needed to be silenced, forever; but so did others who + might be radicalized by the waterboarding or gégène. In Algeria, a simple + solution was devised: the tortured would be thrown out from helicopters into the + Mediterranean. They became les crevettes de Bigeard, after the notorious French + general in Algeria, Marcel Bigeard: “Bigeard’s shrimp,” dumped into the sea, + their feet in poured concrete—a technique the French military had apparently + experimented with earlier in Indochina. + + [...] + + The CIA would devise a different solution in 2002: either torture the suspect + accidentally to death and then cremate his body to avoid detection, or torture the + suspect to the extreme and then ensure that he would never again talk to another + human being. Abu Zubaydah received the latter treatment. Zubaydah had first + been seized and interrogated at length by the FBI, had provided useful + information, and was placed in isolation for forty-seven days, the FBI believing + that he had no more valuable information. Then the CIA took over, believing he + might still be a source. 10 The CIA turned to its more extreme forms of torture— + utilizing all ten of its most brutal techniques—but, as a CIA cable from the + interrogation team, dated July 15, 2002, records, they realized beforehand that it + would either have to cover up the torture if death ensued or ensure that + Zubaydah would never talk to another human being again in his lifetime. + According to the Senate report, “the cable stated that if Abu Zubaydah were to + die during the interrogation, he would be cremated. The interrogation team + closed the cable by stating: ‘regardless which [disposition] option we follow + however, and especially in light of the planned psychological pressure + techniques to be implemented, we need to get reasonable assurances that [Abu + Zubaydah] will remain in isolation and incommunicado for the remainder of his + life.’” 11 In response to this request for assurance, a cable from the CIA station + gave the interrogation team those assurances, noting that “it was correct in its + ‘understanding that the interrogation process takes precedence over preventative + medical procedures,’” and then adding in the cable: + +KUBARK + + routines were approved at the uppermost level of the US government, by the + president of the United States and his closest advisers. These practices were put + in place, designed carefully and legally—very legalistically, in fact—to be used + on suspected enemies. They were not an aberration. There are, to be sure, long + histories written of rogue intelligence services using unauthorized techniques; + there is a lengthy record, as well, of CIA ingenuity and creativity in this domain, + including, among other examples, the 1963 KUBARK Counterintelligence + Interrogation manual. 13 But after 9/11, the blueprint was drawn at the White + House and the Pentagon, and it became official US policy—deliberate, debated, + well-thought-out, and adopted as legal measures. + + + [...] + + The Janus face of torture was its formal legality amidst its shocking brutality. + Many of the country’s best lawyers and legal scholars, professors at top-ranked + law schools, top government attorneys, and later federal judges would pore over + statutes and case law to find legal maneuvers to permit torture. The felt need to + legitimate and legalize the brutality—and of course, to protect the officials and + operatives from later litigation—was remarkable. + The documents known collectively as the “torture memos” fell into two + categories: first, those legal memos regarding whether the Guantánamo detainees + were entitled to POW status under the Geneva Conventions (GPW), written + between September 25, 2001, and August 1, 2002; and second, starting in + August 2002, the legal memos regarding whether the “enhanced interrogation + techniques” envisaged by the CIA amounted to torture prohibited under + international law. + +How torture was defined to allow torture to happen: + + As Jay Bybee, then at the Office of Legal Counsel and now a + federal judge, wrote in his August 1, 2002, memo: + + We conclude that torture as defined in and proscribed by [18 US Code] Sections 2340-2340A, + covers only extreme acts. Severe pain is generally of the kind difficult for the victim to endure. + Where the pain is physical, it must be of an intensity akin to that which accompanies serious + physical injury such as death or organ failure. Severe mental pain requires suffering not just at the + moment of infliction but also requires lasting psychological harm, such as seen in mental disorders + like post-traumatic stress disorder. […] Because the acts inflicting torture are extreme, there is + significant range of acts that though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment + or punishment fail to rise to the level of torture.22 + + This definition of torture was so demanding that it excluded the brutal + practices that the United States was using. It set the federal legal standard, + essentially, at death or organ failure. + + [...] + + them 26 —and then, effectively, judicial opinions. The executive branch became a + minijudiciary, with no effective oversight or judicial review. And in the end, it + worked. The men who wrote these memos have never been prosecuted nor + seriously taken to task, as a legal matter, for their actions. The American people + allowed a quasi-judiciary to function autonomously, during and after. These self- + appointed judges wrote the legal briefs, rendered judgment, and wrote the + judicial opinions that legitimized these brutal counterinsurgency practices. In the + process, they rendered the counterinsurgency fully legal. They inscribed torture + within the fabric of law. + + One could go further. The torture memos accomplished a new resolution of + the tension between brutality and legality, one that we had not witnessed + previously in history. It was an audacious quasi-judicial legality that had rarely + been seen before. And by legalizing torture in that way, the Bush administration + provided a legal infrastructure for counterinsurgency-as-governance more + broadly. + + [...] + + And through this process of legalization, these broader torturous practices + spilled over into the second prong of counterinsurgency: the eradication of an + active minority. Torture began to function as a way to isolate, punish, and + eliminate those suspected of being insurgents. + +Bare existence, indefinite detention, incommunication: + + The indefinite detention and brutal ordinary measures served as a way to + eliminate these men—captured in the field or traded for reward monies, almost + like slaves from yonder. The incommunicado confinement itself satisfied the + second prong of counterinsurgency theory. 5 But somehow it also reached further + than mere detention, approximating a form of disappearance or virtual death. + The conditions these men found themselves in were so extreme, it is almost as if + they were as good as dead. + Reading Slahi’s numbing descriptions, one cannot help but agree with the + philosopher Giorgio Agamben that these men at Guantánamo were, in his words, + no more than “bare life.” 6 Agamben’s concept of bare existence captures well + the dimensions of dehumanization and degradation that characterized their lives: + the camp inmates were reduced to nothing more than bare animal existence. + They were no longer human, but things that lived. The indefinite detention and + torture at Guantánamo achieved an utter denial of their humanity. + Every aspect of their treatment at black sites and detention facilities + +### Drone strikes + + This debate between more population-centric proponents and more enemy- + centric advocates of counterinsurgency should sound familiar. It replays the + controversy over the use of torture or other contested methods within the + counterinsurgency paradigm. It replicates the strategic debates between the + ruthless and the more decent. It rehearses the tensions between Roger Trinquier + and David Galula. + + Yet just as torture is central to certain versions of modern warfare, the drone + strike too is just as important to certain variations of the counterinsurgency + approach. Drone strikes, in effect, can serve practically all the functions of the + second prong of counterinsurgency warfare. Drone strikes eliminate the + identified active minority. They instill terror among everyone living near the + active minority, dissuading them and anyone else who might contemplate joining + the revolutionaries. They project power and infinite capability. They show who + has technological superiority. As one Air Force officer says, “The real advantage + of unmanned aerial systems is that they allow you to project power without + projecting vulnerability.” 18 By terrifying and projecting power, drones dissuade + the population from joining the insurgents. + + [...] + + Covered extensively by the news media, + drone attacks are popularly believed to have caused even more civilian casualties + than is actually the case. The persistence of these attacks on Pakistani territory + offends people’s deepest sensibilities, alienates them from their government, and + contributes to Pakistan’s instability.” 19 + In July 2016, the Obama administration released a report estimating the + + + [...] + + Those in the affected countries typically receive far higher casualty reports. + The Pakistan press, for instance, reported that there are about 50 civilians killed + for every militant assassinated, resulting in a hit rate of about 2 percent. As + Kilcullen and Exum argue, regardless of the exact number, “every one of these + dead noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, + and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as + drone strikes have increased.” 25 + To those living in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and + neighboring countries, the Predator drones are terrifying. But again—and this is + precisely the central tension at the heart of counterinsurgency theory—the terror + may be a productive tool for modern warfare. It may dissuade people from + joining the active minority. It may convince some insurgents to abandon their + efforts. Terror, as we have seen, is by no means antithetical to the + counterinsurgency paradigm. Some would argue it is a necessary means. + Drones are by no means a flawless weapons system even for their proponents. + + [...] + + Regarding the first question, a drone should be understood as a blended + weapons system, one that ultimately functions at several levels. It shares + characteristics of the German V-2 missile, to be sure, but also the French + guillotine and American lethal injection. It combines safety for the attacker, with + relatively precise but rapid death, and a certain anesthetizing effect—as well as, + of course, utter terror. For the country administering the drone attack, it is + perfectly secure. There is no risk of domestic casualties. In its rapid and + apparently surgical death, it can be portrayed, like the guillotine, as almost + humane. And drones have had a numbing effect on popular opinion precisely + because of their purported precision and hygiene—like lethal injection has done, + for the most part, in the death-penalty context. Plus, drones are practically + invisible and out of sight—again, for the country using them—though, again, + terrifying for the targeted communities. + + [...] + + Chamayou’s second question is, perhaps, the most important. This new + weapons system has changed the US government’s relationship to its own + citizens. There is no better evidence of this than the deliberate, targeted drone + killing of US and allied nation citizens abroad—as we will see. 32 + + [...] + + An analogy from the death penalty may be helpful. There too, the means + employed affect the ethical dimensions of the practice itself. The gas chamber + and the electric chair—both used in the United States even after the Holocaust— + became fraught with meaning. Their symbolism soured public opinion on the + death penalty. By contrast, the clinical or medical nature of lethal injection at + first reduced the political controversy surrounding executions. Only over time, + with botched lethal injections and questions surrounding the drug cocktails and + their true effects, have there been more questions raised. But it has taken time for + the negative publicity to catch up with lethal injection. Drones, at this point, + remain far less fraught than conventional targeted assassinations. -- cgit v1.2.3