From d06d921ab5b113e9acf26f6cb05ceda41449c290 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Silvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net>
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 09:19:01 -0300
Subject: Updates books

---
 books/sociedade/jogos-homens.mdwn         |  2 +-
 books/tecnopolitica/cathedral-bazaar.mdwn | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'books')

diff --git a/books/sociedade/jogos-homens.mdwn b/books/sociedade/jogos-homens.mdwn
index e0d0628..6166e6a 100644
--- a/books/sociedade/jogos-homens.mdwn
+++ b/books/sociedade/jogos-homens.mdwn
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-[[!meta tile="Os Jogos e os Homens"]]
+[[!meta title="Os Jogos e os Homens"]]
 
 A máscara e a vertigem
 
diff --git a/books/tecnopolitica/cathedral-bazaar.mdwn b/books/tecnopolitica/cathedral-bazaar.mdwn
index 89893d2..5e36e99 100644
--- a/books/tecnopolitica/cathedral-bazaar.mdwn
+++ b/books/tecnopolitica/cathedral-bazaar.mdwn
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 [[!meta title="The Cathedral & The Bazaar"]]
+[[!tag jogo software foss economics]]
 
 * Author: Eric S. Raymond
 
-## Main themes
+## Phenomenology
 
 * Linus Law: "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow" (page 30);
   "debugging is parallelizable" (page 32).
@@ -14,7 +15,7 @@
 * Brooks Law: "complexity and communication costs of a project rise with the
   square number of developers" (pages 32, 49).
 
-## Misc
+## Freedom and hierarchy
 
 * Kropotkin is cited at page 52: "principle of understanding" versus the
   "principle of command".
@@ -25,3 +26,56 @@
   more elaborate and efficient than any amount of central planning could have
   achieved." (page 52). Logo em seguida ele nega a existência de um autruísmo
   puro.
+
+## Economics
+
+A very liberal point of view:
+
+* Homesteading the Noosphere: "customs that regulate the ownership and control
+  of open-source software [...] imply an underlying theory of property rights
+  homologous to the Lockean theory of land tenure" (65).
+
+* Open Source as a gift economy like a reputation game (81 - 83):
+
+    Most ways humans have of organizing are adaptations to scarcity
+    and want. Each way carries with it different ways of gaining social status.
+
+    The simples way is the _command hierarchy_ [where] scarce goods are allocated
+    by onde central authority and backed up by force. Command hierarchies scale
+    very poorly; they become increasingly inefficient as they get larger.
+
+    [...]
+
+    Our society is predominantly an exchange economy. This is a sofisticated
+    adaptation to scarcity that, unlike the command model, scales quite well.
+    Allocation of scarce goods is done in a decentralized way through trade
+    and voluntary coopreation.
+
+    [...]
+
+    Gift cultures are adaptations not to scarcity but to abundance. They arise
+    in populations that do not have significant material scarcity problems
+    with survival goods.
+
+    [...]
+
+    Abundance makes command relationships difficult to sustain and exchange
+    relationships an almost pointless game. In gift cultures, social status
+    is determined not by what you control but by _what you give away_.
+
+    -- 80-81
+
+He also explains that the reputation game is not the only drive in the
+bazaar-style ecosystem: satisfation, love, the "joy of craftsmanship" are also
+motivations for software development (pages 82-83), which is compatible
+with the gift economy model:
+
+    How can one maximize quality if there is no metric for quality?
+    If scarcity economics doesn't operate, what metrics are available
+    besides peer evaluation?
+
+    Other respondents related peer-esteem rewards and the joy of hacking
+    to the levels above subsistence needs in Abraham Maslow's well-known
+    'hierachy of values' model of human motivation.
+
+    -- 82-83
-- 
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