From 2636d654748961337c102ab71eec61488926d220 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvio Rhatto Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2019 22:26:09 -0300 Subject: Updates books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state --- books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 98 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'books') diff --git a/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md b/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md index 20e09c2..a74958a 100644 --- a/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md +++ b/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md @@ -128,9 +128,7 @@ such, all po­liti­cal forms are effects of the demo­cratic. In other words, Negri’s obfuscation of the question of vio­ lence can never lead to agonistic monism. - - [...] - + Production of the real: Second, the state of emergency leading to justification @@ -152,8 +150,6 @@ Production of the real: with ­whether its justifications are believed by ­those it af­ fects. - [...] - Torture: Greek po­liti­cal philosophy. 4 Hannah Arendt also pays @@ -191,3 +187,100 @@ Torture: completely fabulatory. -- 32-33 + +Razão instrumental: + + Let us return to consider more carefully how sover­ + eign vio­lence always strives for justification. This means + that we can characterize the acts of sovereignty as con­ + forming to a rationalized instrumentalism. Sovereign + vio­lence is instrumental in the sense that it always aims + toward something—it is not vio­ + ­ + lence for vio­ + lence’s + sake. This means that the desired outcome of sover­ + eign vio­lence is calculated with the help of reason. The + extrapolation of vio­lence in instrumental terms is noth­ + ing new. For instance, Hannah Arendt pres­ents instru­ + mentalism as the defining feature of vio­lence. 7 Yet the + instrumentalism of sovereign vio­lence is not as self-­ + evident as it may at first appear. For instance, as Fran­ + çois Jullien shows, the conception of an instrumental + thinking as appropriate to the po­liti­cal arises in ancient + Greece, and it does not characterize the Chinese cul­ + ture, including even the ways in which warfare is con­ + ceived. 8 The impor­tant point, then, is to remember that + the instrumentality of reason in the ser­v ice of a justifi­ + cation of vio­lence is a characteristic of sovereignty as it + is developed in the Western po­liti­cal and philosophical + tradition. + The “invention” of the instrumentality of reason is + an impor­tant moment in the history of thought, and + its “inventors,” the ancient Greeks, amply recognized its + importance. In fact, their tragedies are concerned pre­ + cisely with the clash between the older forms of thinking + and new forms exemplified by instrumental reason. The + best example of this is perhaps the Oresteia. In the first + play of the trilogy, Agamemnon is murdered by his wife, + Clytemnestra. In the second play, Orestes, Agamem­ + non’s son, responds by killing his ­mother. In the third + play, the Eumenides, the court of Athens is called to de­ + cide w + ­ hether Orestes’s murder was justified. The alter­ + natives are that he is e ­ ither guilty of matricide pure and + simple or that his act was a po­liti­cal one aiming to ­free + Argos of a tyrant. Th + ­ ere is, then, a standstill or stasis—­ + and I draw again attention to this word, to which I w + ­ ill + return ­later—­between the two dif­fer­ent l ­ egal frame­ + works: one legality privileging kinship, the other privi­ + leging instrumental rationality whereby the murder of + Clytemnestra is justified by the end of saving the city + from a tyrant. The judges’ vote is a tie, at which point + the goddess Athena, who presides over the proceedings, + casts the vote to f ­ ree Orestes of the charge of matricide. + Calculative reason prevails as the mode of the po­liti­cal. + But at the same time, it should not be forgotten that the + vote was equally split. For the ancient Athenians, it is + impossible to reconcile the two dif­fer­ent legalities—­the + politics of kinship and the politics of instrumental + reason. Justice persists in this irreconcilability, despite + its tragic consequences. + + -- 33-35 + +Soberania como persuasão e interpretação: + + In other words, the absoluteness of + sovereignty has nothing to do with the power of sover­ + eignty as it is exercised through its institutions—­the + police, the army, the judiciary, and so on. Rather, the + absoluteness of sovereignty is an expression of the rhe­ + torical and logical mechanisms whereby sovereignty + uses the justification of vio­lence to dominate public de­ + bate and to persuade the citizens. The exercise of sover­ + eignty is the effect of an interpretative pro­cess. Differently + put, this entails that the justification of vio­lence is more + primary than the legitimate forms assumed by constituded power. + Without an effective justification, any government loses its + mandate to govern, even though its + decisions and po­liti­cal actions, its policies, and its legis­ + lative agenda may perfectly conform to the law of the + state. + + -- 52-53 + +Democracia: + + How can democracy as the other of sovereignty be + mobilized to respond to sovereignty’s justification of + vio­lence? This final question is, I believe, the most fun­ + damental po­liti­cal question. It essentially asks about + the relation of sovereignty and democracy. What is re­ + quired at this juncture in order to broach the relation + between democracy and sovereignty further is a better + determination of democracy. + + -- 53 -- cgit v1.2.3