From 996f868f9a58f71f4a6f154812cec1b6529c8dd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvio Rhatto Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2019 22:53:02 -0300 Subject: Updates sociology --- books/sociology/counterrevolution.md | 175 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 174 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'books/sociology/counterrevolution.md') diff --git a/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md b/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md index 4a29d63..0c0bf1b 100644 --- a/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md +++ b/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md @@ -323,7 +323,6 @@ By Bernard E. Harcourt. [...] - warfare theory. 3 A founding principle of revolutionary insurgency—what Paret referred to as “the principal lesson” that Mao taught—was that “an inferior force could outpoint a modern army so long as it succeeded in gaining at least the tacit @@ -1575,3 +1574,177 @@ The unprecedented, self-fulfilling profecy: We are headed not, as Kant would have it, toward perpetual peace, but instead, sounding the refrain of Nietzsche’s eternal return, toward an endless state of counterinsurgency warfare. + +### Not exactly a state of exception, but of legality + + MANY COMMENTATORS ARGUE THAT WE NOW LIVE, IN THE United States and in the + West more broadly, in a “state of exception” characterized by suspended legality. + In this view, our political leaders have placed a temporary hold on the rule of + law, with the tacit understanding that they will resume their adherence to liberal + legal values when the political situation stabilizes. Some commentators go + further, arguing that we have now entered a “permanent state of exception.” + + This view, however, misperceives one particular tactic of counterinsurgency + —namely, the state of emergency—for the broader rationality of our new + political regime. It fails to capture the larger ambition of our new mode of + governing. The fact is, our government does everything possible to legalize its + counterinsurgency measures and to place them solidly within the rule of law— + through endless consultations with government lawyers, hypertechnical legal + arguments, and lengthy legal memos. The idea is not to put law on hold, not + even temporarily. It is not to create an exception, literally or figuratively. On the + contrary, the central animating idea is to turn the counterinsurgency model into a + fully legal strategy. So, the governing paradigm is not one of exceptionality, but + of counterinsurgency and legality. + + [...] + + The logic today is based on a model of + counterinsurgency warfare with, at its heart, the resolution of that central tension + between brutality and legality. The counterrevolutionary model has resolved the + inherited tension and legalized the brutality. + + [...] + + Agamben’s idea of a permanent state of exception pushes this + further, but simultaneously undermines the defining element of the exception, + since it becomes the rule. For the most part, though, the state of exception is + presented as aberrational but temporary. + + [...] + + The problem with the state-of-exception view is that it mistakes tactics for + the overarching logic of our new paradigm of governing and, in the process, fails + to see the broader framework of The Counterrevolution. The state-of-exception + framework rests on an illusory dichotomy between rule and exception, a myth + that idealizes and reifies the rule of law. The point is, the use of torture at CIA + black sites and the bulk collection of American telephony metadata were not + exceptions to the rule of law, but were rendered fully legalized and regulated + practices—firmly embedded in a web of legal memos, preauthorized formalities, + and judicial or quasi-judicial oversight. In this sense, hardly anything that + occurred was outside or exceptional to the law, or could not be brought back in. + + The Counterrevolution, unlike the state of exception, does not function on a + binary logic of rule and exception, but on a fully coherent systematic logic of + counterinsurgency that is pervasive, expansive, and permanent. It does not have + limits or boundaries. It does not exist in a space outside the rule of law. It is all + encompassing, systematic, and legalized. + + Of course, the rhetoric of “exception” is extremely useful to The + Counterrevolution. “States of emergency” are often deployed to seize control + over a crisis and to accelerate the three prongs of counterinsurgency. + + [...] + + The ultimate exercise of power, Foucault argued, is precisely to transform + ambiguities about illegalisms into conduct that is “illegal.” + + [...] + + During the ancien régime, Foucault argues, the popular and the privileged + classes worked together to evade royal regulations, fees, and impositions. + Illegalisms were widespread throughout the eighteenth century and well + distributed across the different strata of society + + [...] + + As wealth became increasingly mobile after the French Revolution, new + forms of wealth accumulation—of moveable goods, stocks, and supplies as + opposed to landed wealth—exposed massive amounts of chattel property to the + workers who came in direct contact with this new commercial wealth. The + accumulation of wealth began to make popular illegalisms less useful—even + dangerous—to the interests of the privileged. The commercial class seized the + mechanisms of criminal justice to put an end to these popular illegalisms + [...] The privileged seized the administrative and + police apparatus of the late eighteenth century to crack down on popular + illegalisms. + + [...] + + They effectively turned popular illegalisms into + illegalities, and, in the process, created the notion of the criminal as social + enemy—Foucault even talks here of creating an “internal enemy.” + + [...] + + In The Counterrevolution—by contrast to the bourgeois revolutions of the + early nineteenth century—the process is turned on its head. Illegalisms and + illegalities are inverted. Rather than the privileged turning popular illegalisms + into illegalities, the guardians are turning their own illegalisms into legalities. + [...] The strategy here is to paper one’s way into the legal realm through elaborate + memorandums and advice letters that justify the use of enhanced interrogation or the + assassination of American citizens abroad. + + [...] + + On the one hand, there is a strict division of responsibilities: the intelligence + agencies and the military determine all the facts outside the scope of the legal + memorandum. [...] Everything is compartmentalized. + + [...] + + On the other hand, the memo authorizes: it allows the political authority to + function within the bounds of the law. It sanitizes the political decision. It cleans + the hands of the military and political leaders. It produces legalities. + +A circular, feedback loop: + + None of this violates the rule of law or transgresses the boundaries of legal + liberalism. Instead, the change was rendered “legal.” If this feels circular, it is + because it is: there is a constant feedback effect in play here. The + counterinsurgency practices were rendered legal, and simultaneously justice was + made to conform to the counterinsurgency paradigm. The result of the feedback + loop was constantly new and evolving meanings of due process. And however + rogue they may feel, they had gone through the correct procedural steps of due + process to render them fully lawful and fully compliant with the rule of law. + + [...] + + “Abnormal,” in 1975, Foucault explored how the clash between the juridical + power to punish and the psychiatric thirst for knowledge produced new medical + diagnoses that then did work. + + [...] + + In his 1978 lecture on the invention of the notion of dangerousness in French + psychiatry, Foucault showed how the idea of future dangerousness emerged from + the gaps and tensions in nineteenth-century law. 37 + + [...] + + There are surely gaps here too in The Counterrevolution—tensions between + rule-boundedness on the one hand and a violent warfare model on the other. + Those tensions give momentum to the pendulum swings of brutality that are then + resolved by bureaucratic legal memos. + +### System analysis and Operations Research + + The RAND Corporation played a seminal role in the development of + counterinsurgency practices in the United States and championed for decades— + and still does—a systems-analytic approach that has come to dominate military + strategy. Under its influence, The Counterrevolution has evolved into a logical + and coherent system that regulates and adjusts itself, a fully reasoned and + comprehensive approach. + + [...] + + Systems analysis was often confused with OR, but it was distinct in several + regards. OR tended to have more elaborate mathematical models and solved + lower-level problems; in systems analysis, by contrast, the pure mathematical + computation was generally applied only to subparts of the overall problem. + Moreover, SA took on larger strategic questions that implicated choices between + major policy options. In this sense, SA was, from its inception, in the words of + one study, “less quantitative in method and more oriented toward the analysis of + broad strategic and policy questions, […] particularly […] seeking to clarify + choice under conditions of great uncertainty.” 5 + + [...] + + As this definition made clear, there were two meanings of the term system in + systems analysis: first, there was the idea that the world is made up of systems, + with internal objectives, that need to be analyzed separately from each other in + order to maximize their efficiency. Along this first meaning, the analysis would + focus on a particular figurative or metaphorical system—such as a weapons + system, a social system, or, in the case of early counterinsurgency, a colonial + system. Second, there was the notion of systematicity that involved a particular + type of method—one that began by collecting a set of promising alternatives, + constructing a model, and using a defined criterion. -- cgit v1.2.3