From 96545ce0b97219a55ca41f05886eb9d5c6b330ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvio Rhatto Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 09:34:43 -0300 Subject: Books: One-dimensional man: chapter eight --- books/sociedade/one-dimensional-man.md | 320 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 320 insertions(+) (limited to 'books/sociedade') diff --git a/books/sociedade/one-dimensional-man.md b/books/sociedade/one-dimensional-man.md index 969c259..2e2574b 100644 --- a/books/sociedade/one-dimensional-man.md +++ b/books/sociedade/one-dimensional-man.md @@ -1317,3 +1317,323 @@ circle of the mutilated universe of ordinary discourse, it is at best entirely inconsequential. And, at worst, it is an escape into the non-controversial, the unreal, into that which is only academically controversial. + +### Universal Ghosts + + Contemporary analytic philosophy is out to exorcize such “myths” or + metaphysical “ghosts” as Mind, Consciousness, Will, Soul, Self, by dissolving + the intent of these concepts into statements on particular identifiable + operations, performances, powers, dispositions, propensities, skills, etc. The + result shows, in a strange way, the impotence of the destruction—the ghost + continues to haunt. While every interpretation or translation may describe + adequately a particular mental process, an act of imagining what I mean when I + say “I,” or what the priest means when he says that Mary is a “good girl,” not + a single one of these reformulations, nor their sum-total, seems to capture or + even circumscribe the full meaning of such terms as Mind, Will, Self, Good. + These universals continue to persist in common as well as “poetic” usage, and + either usage distinguishes them from the various modes of behavior or + disposition that, according to the analytic philosopher, fulfill their meaning. + + [...] + + However, this dissolution itself must be questioned—not only on behalf of the + philosopher, but on behalf of the ordinary people in whose life and discourse + such dissolution takes place. It is not their own doing and their own saying; + it happens to them and it violates them as they are compelled, by the + “circumstances,” to identify their mind with the mental processes, their self + with the roles and functions which they have to perform in their society. + If philosophy does not comprehend these processes of translation and + identification as societal processes—i.e., as a mutilation of the mind (and the + body) inflicted upon the individuals by their society—philosophy struggles only + with the ghost of the substance which it wishes to de-mystify. The mystifying + character adheres, not to the concepts of “mind,” “self,” “consciousness,” etc. + but rather to their behavioral translation. The translation is deceptive + precisely because it translates the concept faithfully into modes of actual + behavior, propensities, and dispositions and, in so doing, it takes the + mutilated and organized appearances (themselves real enough!) for the reality. + + [...] + + Moreover, the normal restriction of experience produces a pervasive tension, + even conflict, between “the mind” and the mental processes, between + “consciousness” and conscious acts. If I speak of the mind of a person, I do + not merely refer to his mental processes as they are revealed in his + expression, speech, behavior, etc., nor merely of his dispositions or faculties + as experienced or inferred from experience. I also mean that which he does not + express, for which he shows no disposition, but which is present nevertheless, + and which determines, to a considerable extent, his behavior, his + understanding, the formation and range of his concepts. + + Thus “negatively present” are the specific “environmental” forces which + precondition his mind for the spontaneous repulsion of certain data, + conditions, relations. They are present as repelled material. Their absence is + a reality—a positive factor that explains his actual mental processes, the + meaning of his words and behavior. Meaning for whom? Not only for the + professional philosopher, whose task it is to rectify the wrong that pervades + the universe of ordinary discourse, but also for those who suffer this wrong + although they may not be aware of it—for Joe Doe and Richard Roe. Contemporary + linguistic analysis shirks this task by interpreting concepts in terms of an + impoverished and preconditioned mind. What is at stake is the unabridged and + unexpurgated intent of certain key concepts, their function in the unrepressed + understanding of reality—in non-conformist, critical thought. + + Are the remarks just submitted on the reality content of such universals as + “mind” and “consciousness” applicable to other concepts, such as the abstract + yet substantive universals, Beauty, Justice, Happiness, with their contraries? + It seems that the persistence of these untranslatable universals as nodal + points of thought reflects the unhappy consciousness of a divided world in + which “that which is” falls short of, and even denies, “that which can be.” The + irreducible difference between the universal and its particulars seems to be + rooted in the primary experience of the inconquerable difference between + potentiality and actuality—between two dimensions of the one experienced world. + The universal comprehends in one idea the possibilities which are realized, and + at the same time arrested, in reality. + + [...] + + This description is of precisely that metaphysical character which positivistic + analysis wishes to eliminate by translation, but the translation eliminates + that which was to be defined. + + [...] + + The protest against the vague, obscure, metaphysical character of such + universals, the insistence on familiar concreteness and protective security of + common and scientific sense still reveal something of that primordial anxiety + which guided the recorded origins of philosophic thought in its evolution from + religion to mythology, and from mythology to logic; defense and security still + are large items in the intellectual as well as national budget. The unpurged + experience seems to be more familiar with the abstract and universal than is + the analytic philosophy; it seems to be embedded in a metaphysical world. + + Universals are primary elements of experience—universals not as philosophic + concepts but as the very qualities of the world with which one is daily + confronted. + + [...] + + The substantive character of “qualities” points to the experiential origin of + substantive universals, to the manner in which concepts originate in immediate + experience. + + [...] + + But precisely the relation of the word to a substantive universal (concept) + makes it impossible, according to Humboldt, to imagine the origin of language + as starting from the signification of objects by words and then proceeding to + their combination (Zusammenfügung): In reality, speech is not put together from + preceding words, but quite the reverse: words emerge from the whole of speech + (aus dem Ganzen der Rede).7 + + The “whole” that here comes to view must be cleared from all misunderstanding + in terms of an independent entity, of a “Gestalt,” and the like. The concept + somehow expresses the difference and tension between potentiality and + actuality—identity in this difference. It appears in the relation between the + qualities (white, hard; but also beautiful, free, just) and the corresponding + concepts (whiteness, hardness, beauty, freedom, justice). The abstract + character of the latter seems to designate the more concrete qualities as + part-realizations, aspects, manifestations of a more universal and more + “excellent” quality, which is experienced in the concrete.8 And by virtue of + this relation, the concrete quality seems to represent a negation as well as + realization of the universal. + + [...] + + These formulations do not alter the relation between the abstract concept and + its concrete realizations: the universal concept denotes that which the + particular entity is, and is not. The translation can eliminate the hidden + negation by reformulating the meaning in a non-contradictory proposition, but + the untranslated statement suggests a real want. There is more in the abstract + noun (beauty, freedom) than in the qualities (“beautiful,” “free”) attributed + to the particular person, thing or condition. The substantive universal intends + qualities which surpass all particular experience, but persist in the mind, not + as a figment of imagination nor as more logical possibilities but as the + “stuff” of which our world consists. + + [...] + + Now there is a large class of concepts—we dare say, the philosophically + relevant concepts—where the quantitative relation between the universal and the + particular assumes a qualitative aspect, where the abstract universal seems to + designate potentialities in a concrete, historical sense. However “man,” + “nature,” “justice,” “beauty” or “freedom” may be defined, they synthetize + experiential contents into ideas which transcend their particular realizations + as something that is to be surpassed, overcome. Thus the concept of beauty + comprehends all the beauty not yet realized; the concept of freedom all the + liberty not yet attained. + + Or, to take another example, the philosophic concept “man” aims at the fully + developed human faculties which are his distinguishing faculties, and which + appear as possibilities of the conditions in which men actually live. + + [...] + + Such universals thus appear as conceptual instruments for understanding the + particular conditions of things in the light of their potentialities. They are + historical and supra-historical; they conceptualize the stuff of which the + experienced world consists, and they conceptualize it with a view of its + possibilities, in the light of their actual limitation, suppression, and + denial. Neither the experience nor the judgment is private. The philosophic + concepts are formed and developed in the consciousness of a general condition + in a historical continuum; they are elaborated from an individual position + within a specific society. The stuff of thought is historical stuff—no matter + how abstract, general, or pure it may become in philosophic or scientific + theory. The abstract-universal and at the same time historical character of + these “eternal objects” of thought is recognized and clearly stated in + Whitehead’s Science and the Modern World:10 + + “Eternal objects are … in their nature, abstract. By ‘abstract’ I mean that + what an eternal object is in itself—that is to say, its essence—is + comprehensible without reference to some one particular experience. To be + abstract is to transcend the particular occasion of actual happening. But to + transcend an actual occasion does not mean being disconnected from it. On the + contrary, I hold that each eternal object has its own proper connection with + each such occasion, which I term its mode of ingression into that occasion.” + “Thus the metaphysical status of an eternal object is that of a possibility for + an actuality. Every actual occasion is defined as to its character by how these + possibilities are actualized for that occasion.” + + Elements of experience, projection and anticipation of real possibilities + enter into the conceptual syntheses—in respectable form as hypotheses, in + disreputable form as “metaphysics.” In various degrees, they are unrealistic + because they transgress beyond the established universe of behavior, and they + may even be undesirable in the interest of neatness and exactness. Certainly, + in philosophic analysis, + + “Little real advance … is to be hoped for in expanding our universe to + include so-called possible entities,”11 + + but it all depends on how Ockham’s Razor is applied, that is to say, which + possibilities are to be cut off. The possibility of an entirely different + societal organization of life has nothing in common with the “possibility” of a + man with a green hat appearing in all doorways tomorrow, but treating them with + the same logic may serve the defamation of undesirable possibilities. + Criticizing the introduction of possible entities, Quine writes that such an + “overpopulated universe is in many ways unlovely. It offends the aesthetic + sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes, but this is not the worst + of it. [Such a] slum of possibles is a breeding ground for disorderly + elements.”12 + + Contemporary philosophy has rarely attained a more authentic formulation of the + conflict between its intent and its function. The linguistic syndrome of + “loveliness,” “aesthetic sense,” and “desert landscape” evokes the liberating + air of Nietzsche’s thought, cutting into Law and Order, while the “breeding + ground for disorderly elements” belongs to the language spoken by the + authorities of Investigation and Information. What appears unlovely and + disorderly from the logical point of view, may well comprise the lovely + elements of a different order, and may thus be an essential part of the + material from which philosophic concepts are built. Neither the most refined + aesthetic sense nor the most exact philosophic concept is immune against + history. Disorderly elements enter into the purest objects of thought. They too + are detached from a societal ground, and the contents from which they abstract + guide the abstraction. + +### Historicism + + Thus the spectre of “historicism” is raised. If thought proceeds from + historical conditions which continue to operate in the abstraction, is there + any objective basis on which distinction can be made between the various + possibilities projected by thought—distinction between different and + conflicting ways of conceptual transcendence? Moreover, the question cannot be + discussed with reference to different philosophic projects only.13 To the + degree to which the philosophical project is ideological, it is part of a + historical project—that is, it pertains to a specific stage and level of the + societal development, and the critical philosophic concepts refer (no matter + how indirectly!) to alternative possibilities of this development. + + The quest for criteria for judging between different philosophic projects thus + leads to the quest for criteria for judging between different historical + projects and alternatives, between different actual and possible ways of + understanding and changing man and nature. I shall submit only a few + propositions which suggest that the internal historical character of the + philosophic concepts, far from precluding objective validity, defines the + ground for their objective validity. + + [...] + + The objects of thought and perception as they appear to the individuals prior + to all “subjective” interpretation have in common certain primary qualities, + pertaining to these two layers of reality: (1) to the physical (natural) + structure of matter, and (2) to the form which matter has acquired in the + collective historical practice that has made it (matter) into objects for a + subject. The two layers or aspects of objectivity (physical and historical) are + interrelated in such a way that they cannot be insulated from each other; the + historical aspect can never be eliminated so radically that only the “absolute” + physical layer remains. + + [...] + + I shall now propose some criteria for the truth value of different historical + projects. + + [...] + + (1) The transcendent project must be in accordance with the real possibilities + open at the attained level of the material and intellectual culture. + + (2) The transcendent project, in order to falsify the established totality, + must demonstrate its own higher rationality in the threefold sense that + + (a) it offers the prospect of preserving and improving the productive + achievements of civilization; + + (b) it defines the established totality in its very structure, basic + tendencies, and relations; + + (c) its realization offers a greater chance for the pacification of existence, + within the framework of institutions which offer a greater chance for the free + development of human needs and faculties. + +### Determinate choice + + If the historical continuum itself provides the objective ground for + determining the truth of different historical projects, does it also determine + their sequence and their limits? Historical truth is comparative; the + rationality of the possible depends on that of the actual, the truth of the + transcending project on that of the project in realization. Aristotelian + science was falsified on the basis of its achievements; if capitalism were + falsified by communism, it would be by virtue of its own achievements. + Continuity is preserved through rupture: quantitative development becomes + qualitative change if it attains the very structure of an established system; + the established rationality becomes irrational when, in the course of its + internal development, the potentialities of the system have outgrown its + institutions. Such internal refutation pertains to the historical character of + reality, and the same character confers upon the concepts which comprehend this + reality their critical intent. They recognize and anticipate the irrational in + the established reality—they project the historical negation. + + Is this negation a “determinate” one—that is, is the internal succession of a + historical project, once it has become a totality, necessarily pre-determined + by the structure of this totality? If so, then the term “project” would be + deceptive. That which is historical possibility would sooner or later be real; + and the definition of liberty as comprehended necessity would have a repressive + connotation which it does not have. All this may not matter much. What does + matter is that such historical determination would (in spite of all subtle + ethics and psychology) absolve the crimes against humanity which civilization + continues to commit and thus facilitate this continuation. + + I suggest the phrase “determinate choice” in order to emphasize the ingression + of liberty into historical necessity; the phrase does no more than condense the + proposition that men make their own history but make it under given conditions. + Determined are (1) the specific contradictions which develop within a + historical system as manifestations of the conflict between the potential and + the actual; (2) the material and intellectual resources available to the + respective system; (3) the extent of theoretical and practical freedom + compatible with the system. These conditions leave open alternative + possibilities of developing and utilizing the available resources, alternative + possibilities of “making a living,” of organizing man’s struggle with nature. + + [...] + + the truth of a historical project is not validated ex post through success, + that is to say, by the fact that it is accepted and realized by the society. + Galilean science was true while it was still condemned; Marxian theory was + already true at the time of the Communist Manifesto; fascism remains false even + if it is in ascent on an international scale (“true” and “false” always in the + sense of historical rationality as defined above). In the contemporary period, + all historical projects tend to be polarized on the two conflicting + totalities—capitalism and communism, and the outcome seems to depend on two + antagonistic series of factors: (1) the greater force of destruction; (2) the + greater productivity without destruction. In other words, the higher historical + truth would pertain to the system which offers the greater chance of + pacification. -- cgit v1.2.3