From b6c0ffcaf707ee1968a7f29021d20357692a84d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvio Rhatto Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2018 10:05:58 -0300 Subject: Reorganization --- books/psicologia/psychology-of-intelligence.md | 332 ------------------------- 1 file changed, 332 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 books/psicologia/psychology-of-intelligence.md (limited to 'books/psicologia/psychology-of-intelligence.md') diff --git a/books/psicologia/psychology-of-intelligence.md b/books/psicologia/psychology-of-intelligence.md deleted file mode 100644 index be516af..0000000 --- a/books/psicologia/psychology-of-intelligence.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,332 +0,0 @@ -[[!meta title="The Psychology of Intelligence"]] - -* Author: Jean Piaget. -* Publisher: Routledge Classics. -* Year: 1950. - -## References - -* [Piaget's theory of cognitive development - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piaget's_theory_of_cognitive_development). - -## Overview - -This overview is a mixed of both ideas from the book altogether with other -considerations I've got by reading other, related material: - -### Intelligence is reversible! - -As what's really wonderful about this reversibility is that it's built atop of -lower, fundamental levels of irreversible dynamical systems. - -That revesibility is the capacity to the adaptive system do turn away from -configurations that doesn't lead to a defined goal and replace by other -pathways, mixing introspection and empirism. - -Reading this book along with The Tree of Live from Maturana and Varella -and Morin's Method I get the feeling that intelligence in life arises from -the sensori-motor system and gets deeper in a process where the nervous -system inflates to give way to impulses/stimuli that originates from itself. - -Consequential to this reversibility is that intelligence might experimentation -freely without risking itself producing damages or permanent harm to itself, -which is different to say that somebody can't harm him/herself by the consequence -of his/her acts. - -Also, while what happens with intelligence looks entirely reversible, mind is -not composed of intelligence alone. Other instances exist that might put the -whole apparatus on restricted modes of operation, such when in a neurosis which -is a state of constant looping in a given theme. - -## Misc - -* Perception (imediate contact with the world) (127). - -* Habit: beyond short and rapidly automatised connections between per- - ceptions and responses (habit) (127). - -* How the whole body is seem according to his theory? There's a movement (sic) - where intelligence raises from the sensori-motor to the mind, but can we - consider the other way as well, about what's conceived by abstract thought - be then used as a source of sensori-motor intelligence? I guess so, but wonder - how that could be articulated in Piaget's theory. - -## Intelligence and equilibrium - - Then, if intelligence is thus conceived as the form of equilibrium towards - which all cognitive processes tend, there arises the problem of its relations - with perception (Chap. 3), and with habit (Chap. 4). - - -- Preface - - Every response, whether it be an act directed towards the outside world or an - act internalized as thought, takes the form of an adaptation or, better, of a - re-adaptation. The individual acts only if he experiences a need, i.e., if the - equilibrium between the environment and the organism is momentarily upset, and - action tends to re-establish the equilibrium, i.e., to re-adapt the organ- ism - (Claparède). A response is thus a particular case of inter- action between the - external world and the subject, but unlike physiological interactions, which - are of a material nature and involve an internal change in the bodies which are - present, the responses studied by psychology are of a functional nature and are - achieved at greater and greater distances in space (percep- tion, etc.) and in - time (memory, etc.) besides following more and more complex paths (reversals, - detours, etc.). Behaviour, thus conceived in terms of functional interaction, - presupposes two essential and closely interdependent aspects: an affective - aspect and a cognitive aspect. - - -- 5 - - Furthermore, intelligence itself does not consist of an isolated and sharply - differentiated class of cognitive processes. It is not, properly speaking, one - form of structuring among others; it is the form of equilibrium towards which - all the structures arising out of perception, habit and elementary - sensori-motor mechan- isms tend. It must be understood that if intelligence is - not a faculty this denial involves a radical functional continuity between the - higher forms of thought and the whole mass of lower types of cognitive and - motor adaptation; so intelligence can only be the form of equilibrium towards - which these tend. - - This does not mean, of course, that a judgment consists of a co- ordination of - perceptual structures, or that perceiving means unconscious inference (although - both these theories have been held), for functional continuity in no way - excludes diversity or even heterogeneity among structures. Every structure is - to be thought of as a particular form of equilibrium, more or less stable - within its restricted field and losing its stability on reach- ing the limits of - the field. But these structures, forming different levels, are to be regarded as - succeeding one another according to a law of development, such that each one - brings about a more inclusive and stable equilibrium for the processes that - emerge from the preceding level. Intelligence is thus only a generic term to - indicate the superior forms of organization or equilibrium of cognitive - structurings. - - -- 7 - - In general, we may thus conclude that there is an essential unity between the - sensori-motor processes that engender per- ceptual activity, the formation of - habits, and pre-verbal or pre- representative intelligence itself. The latter - does not therefore arise as a new power, superimposed all of a sudden on com- - pletely prepared previous mechanisms, but is only the expres- sion of these - same mechanisms when they go beyond present and immediate contact with the - world (perception), as well as beyond short and rapidly automatised connections - between per- ceptions and responses (habit), and operate at progressively - greater distances and by more complex routes, in the direction of mobility and - reversibility. Early intelligence, therefore, is simply the form of mobile - equilibrium towards which the mechanisms adapted to perception and habit tend; - but the latter attain this only by leaving their respective fields of - application. Moreover, intelligence, from this first sensori-motor stage - onwards, has already succeeded in constructing, in the special case of space, - the equilibrated structure that we call the group of displacements—in an - entirely empirical or practical form, it is true, and of course remaining on - the very restricted plane of immediate space. But it goes without saying that - this organiza- tion, circumscribed as it is by the limitations of action, still - does not constitute a form of thought. On the contrary, the whole development - of thought, from the advent of language to the end of childhood, is necessary - in order that the completed sensori- motor structures, which may even be - co-ordinated in the form of empirical groups, may be extended into genuine - operations, which will constitute or reconstruct these groupings and groups at - the level of symbolic behaviour and reflective reasoning. - - -- 127-128 - -## Logic and psychology - - An axiomatics is an exclusively hypothetico-deductive sci- - ence, i.e., it reduces to a minimum appeals to experience (it even - aims to eliminate them entirely) in order freely to reconstruct its - object by means of undemonstrable propositions (axioms), - which are to be combined as rigorously as possible and in every - possible way. In this way geometry has made great progress, - seeking to liberate itself from all intuition and constructing the - most diverse spaces simply by defining the primary elements to - be admitted by hypothesis and the operations to which they are - subject. The axiomatic method is thus the mathematical method - par excellence and it has had numerous applications, not only in - pure mathematics, but in various fields of applied mathematics - (from theoretical physics to mathematical economics). The use- - fulness of an axiomatics, in fact, goes beyond that of demonstra- - tion (although in this field it constitutes the only rigorous - method); in the face of complex realities, resisting exhaustive - analysis, it permits us to construct simplified models of reality - and thus provides the study of the latter with irreplaceable dis- - secting instruments. To sum up, an axiomatics constitutes a “pat- - tern” for reality, as F. Gonseth has clearly shown, and, since all - abstraction leads to a schematization, the axiomatic method in - the long run extends the scope of intelligence itself. - - But precisely because of its “schematic” character, an axiomat- - ics cannot claim to be the basis of, and still less to replace, its - corresponding experimental science, i.e. the science relating to - that sector of reality for which the axiomatics forms the pattern. - Thus, axiomatic geometry is incapable of teaching us what the - space of the real world is like (and “pure economics” in no way - exhausts the complexity of concrete economic facts). No axi- - omatics could replace the inductive science which corresponds - to it, for the essential reason that its own purity is merely a limit - which is never completely attained. As Gonseth also says, there - always remains an intuitive residue in the most purified pattern - (just as there is already an element of schematization in all intu- - ition). This reason alone is enough to show why an axiomatics - will never be the basis of an experimental science and why there - is an experimental science corresponding to every axiomatics - (and, no doubt, vice versa). - - -- page 30 - - It is true that in addition to the individual consistency of - actions there enter into thought interactions of a collective order - and consequently “norms” imposed by this collaboration. But - co-operation is only a system of actions, or of operations, car- - ried out in concert, and we may repeat the preceding argument - for collective symbolic behaviour, which likewise remains at a - level containing real structures, unlike axiomatizations of a - formal nature. - - For psychology, therefore, there remains unaltered the prob- - lem of understanding the mechanism with which intelligence - comes to construct coherent structures capable of operational - combination; and it is no use invoking “principles” which this - intelligence is supposed to apply spontaneously, since logical - principles concern the theoretical pattern formulated after - thought has been constructed and not this living process of con- - struction itself. Brunschvicg has made the profound observation - that intelligence wins battles or indulges, like poetry, in a con- - tinuous work of creation, while logico-mathematical deduction - is comparable only to treatises on strategy and to manuals of - “poetic art”, which codify the past victories of action or mind - but do not ensure their future conquests. 1 - - -- page 34 - -## Habit and sensori-motor intelligence - -Circular reaction: - - Let us imagine an infant in a cradle with a raised cover from which - hang a whole series of rattles and a loose string. The child grasps - this and so shakes the whole arrangement without expecting to do - so or understanding any of the detailed spatial or causal rela- - tions. Surprised by the result, he reaches for the string and - carries out the whole sequence several times over. J. M. Baldwin - called this active reproduction of a result at first obtained by - chance a “circular reaction”. The circular reaction is thus a typ- - ical example of reproductive assimilation. The first movement - executed and followed by its result constitutes a complete action, - which creates a new need once the objects to which it relates - have returned to their initial stage; these are then assimilated to - the previous action (thereby promoted to the status of a schema) - which stimulates its reproduction, and so on. Now this mechan- - ism is identical with that which is already present at the source - of elementary habits except that, in their case, the circular reac- - tion affects the body itself (so we will give the name “primary - circular reaction” to that of the early level, such as the schema of - thumb-sucking), whereas thenceforward, thanks to prehension, - it is applied to external objects (we will call this behaviour affect- - ing objects the “secondary circular reaction,” although we must - remember that these are not yet by any means conceived as - substances by the child). - - -- 110-112 - -Early intelligence: - - The routes between the subject and the object fol- - lowed by action, and also by sensori-motor reconstitutions and - anticipations, are no longer direct and simple pathways as at the - previous stages: rectilinear as in perception, or stereotyped and - uni-directional as in circular reactions. The routes begin to vary - and the utilisation of earlier schemata begins to extend further in - time. This is characteristic of the connection between means and - ends, which henceforth are differentiated, and this is why we - may begin to speak of true intelligence. But, apart from the - continuity that links it with earlier behaviour, we should note the - limitations of this early intelligence: there are no inventions or - discoveries of new means, but simply application of known - means to unforeseen circumstances. - - -- 114 - -Innovation: - - Two acquisitions characterise the next stage, both relating to - the utilisation of past experience. The assimilatory schemata so - far described are of course continually accommodated to - external data. But this accommodation is, so to speak, suffered - rather than sought; the subject acts according to his needs and - this action either harmonizes with reality or encounters resist- - ances which it tries to overcome. Innovations which arise for- - tuitously are either neglected or else assimilated to previous - schemata and reproduced by circular reaction. However, a time - comes when the innovation has an interest of its own, and this - certainly implies a sufficient stock of schemata for comparisons - to be possible and for the new fact to be sufficiently like the - known one to be interesting and sufficiently different to avoid - satiation. Circular reaction, then, will consist of a reproduction - of the new phenomenon, but with variations and active - experimentation that are intended precisely to extract from it its - new possibilities. - - -- 114 - -Topology: - - But there now arises a problem whose discussion leads to the study of space. - Perceptual constancy is the product of simple regulations and we saw (Chap. 3) - that the absence at all ages of absolute constancy and the existence of adult - “superconstancy” provide evidence for the regulative rather than operational - char- acter of the system. There is, therefore, all the more reason why it - should be true of the first two years. Does not the construction of space, on - the other hand, lead quite rapidly to a grouping structure and even a group - structure in accordance with - - Poincaré’s famous hypothesis concerning the psychologically primary influence of - the “group of displacements?” The genesis of space in sensori-motor - intelligence is com- pletely dominated by the progressive organisation of - responses, and this in effect leads to a “group” structure. But, contrary to - Poincaré’s belief in the a priori nature of the group of dis- placements, this - is developed gradually as the ultimate form of equilibrium reached by this - motor organisation. Successive co-ordinations (combinativity), reversals - (reversibility), detours (associativity) and conservations of position - (identity) gradually give rise to the group, which serves as a necessary - equilibrium for actions. - - At the first two stages (reflexes and elementary habits), we could not even speak - of a space common to the various per- ceptual modalities, since there are as - many spaces, all mutually heterogeneous, as there are qualitatively distinct - fields (mouth, visual, tactile, etc.). It is only in the course of the third - stage that the mutual assimilation of these various spaces becomes system- atic - owing to the co-ordination of vision with prehension. Now, step by step with - these co-ordinations, we see growing up elementary spatial systems which - already presage the form of composition characteristic of the group. Thus, in - the case of interrupted circular reaction, the subject returns to the starting- - point to begin again; when his eyes are following a moving object that is - travelling too fast for continuous vision (falling etc.), the subject - occasionally catches up with the object by dis- placements of his own body to - correct for those of the external moving object. - - But it is as well to realise that, if we take the point of view of the subject - and not merely that of a mathematical observer, the construction of a group - structure implies at least two conditions: the concept of an object and the - decentralisation of movements by correcting for, and even reversing, their - initial egocentricity. In fact, it is clear that the reversibility - characteristic of the group presupposes the concept of an object, and also vice - versa, since to retrieve an object is to make it possible for oneself to return - (by displacing either the object itself or one’s own body). The object is - simply the constant due to the reversible composition of the group. - Furthermore, as Poincaré himself has clearly shown, the idea of displacement as - such implies the possibility of differentiating between irreversible changes of - state and those changes of position that are characterized precisely by their - reversibility (or by their possible correction through movements of one’s own - body). It is obvious, therefore, that without con- servation of objects there - could not be any “group”, since then everything would appear as a “change of - state”. The object and the group of displacements are thus indissociable, the - one con- stituting the static aspect and the other the dynamic aspect of the - same reality. But this is not all: a world with no objects is a universe with - no systematic differentiation between subjective and external realities, a world - that is consequently “adualistic” (J. M. Baldwin). By this very fact, such a - universe would be centred on one’s own actions, the subject being all the more - dominated by this egocentric point of view because he remains - un-self-conscious. But the group implies just the opposite attitude: a complete - decentralisation, such that one’s own body is located as one element among - others in a system of displacements enabling one to distinguish between one’s - own movements and those of objects. - - -- 123-125 -- cgit v1.2.3