From b6c0ffcaf707ee1968a7f29021d20357692a84d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvio Rhatto Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2018 10:05:58 -0300 Subject: Reorganization --- books/historia/ibm-holocaust.md | 1896 --------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1896 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 books/historia/ibm-holocaust.md (limited to 'books/historia/ibm-holocaust.md') diff --git a/books/historia/ibm-holocaust.md b/books/historia/ibm-holocaust.md deleted file mode 100644 index d210856..0000000 --- a/books/historia/ibm-holocaust.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1896 +0,0 @@ -[[!meta title="IBM and the Holocaust"]] - -"See everything with Hollerith punchcards": - -[[!img dehomag.png link="no"]] - -## About - -* [IBM and the Holocaust](http://www.ibmandtheholocaust.com/). -* Author: [Edwin Black](http://edwinblack.com/). - -It's worth read on it's entirety. - -## Impressum - -Impressions not to be held in punch cards. - -So we have this huge corporation, an empire built around monopolist practices -and information technology. It's pure capitalistic in the sense that it's not -bound any specific foreign government political affiliations providing that -it buys that information machinery. - -Watson's micromanagment style of "the most infinitesimal details" (page 241) -is symmetric with IBM's own technologies of control. Shape and being shapen -by a technology, as a mutual reflection with infinesimal consequences -as multiple mirror-images. - -Was Watson before NCR -- and hence before IBM -- a mere seller? An the experience -with Patterson's salles manual what changed everything in Watson's mind? - - Patterson had created a sales manual designed to rigidly standardize all - pitches and practices, and even mold the thought processes of selling. No - deviation was allowed. - - -- 39 - -Watson sounds like the Steve Jobs equivalent at that era of -techno-totalitarianism. - -Similarly to that inclination to control and domination, a government like nazi -Germany was an _automatic_ customer/partner that exponentiated all -potentialities for _efficiency_ -- in the limited, rationalized as an -unidimensional sense of efficiency. Note that I'm not using _natural_ to -denote, as nature is just the automatic qualities of something. - -Total control freaks meet at the dawn of large-scale information technology -- -as we cannot say that informational practices did not exist before. - -A technology that was designed to operate no matter whats the nature of the -"business". Be it commodities, manufacturing, people or war-making management. -War-time or logistic-time. Does not matter. - -The joint venture of IBM and the Nazis created International Business-As-Usual -with Machines of hateful domination. - -Even with the noise in the relation as when Watson broke with Hitler, some -"unstoppable force" of automation was there to stay and groe -- in the sense -that it was already being summoned and the force to stop it would be -tremendous. - -The unusual of war was converted to the usual of business. No matter is war is -being waged, the corporate-form now was immune to it using a complex set-up os -nominated trustees, plausible deniability and levels of indirection. It can -"dissolve" itself in parts split inside beligerant nations and regroup after -the war -- keeping activities mostly unaffected and the profit guaranteed. -That is a even higher level of transnationality. It survives beyond localized -humours of mankind. - -THINK must be put in perspective. Not only in the ink in the printed punch card. -Not only as a corporation as a Think Tank and efectivelly an acting tank. - -A technology based on the operation of counting and sorting limits thinking to -only those two operations. In fact counting enables arithmetic and sorting -stablish the decision-making needed by proper computing, putting the whole -thought inside a box. Further restriction of thought is installed by allowing -it just for the purpose of profit: how to better exploit resources? By selling -that junk massivelly, this type of machinic "phylum" spread like cancer and -gangraned many brains. Copy is memory; punch card destruction is amnesia. -War is peace. Freedom is slavery. The Big Brother, or Big Blue, was an -information/disinformation machine. - -Punch cards: holes punched in holes distributed in a plane-section. How that -confines or enables thought? - -The nazi war machine was also an information machine, with an important -vulnerability of being too dependent in foreign technology. Hollerith himself -was a German descendent. Was that machinery only possible with this combination -of "traits" (page 31)? Germanic war-and-blood ideology with american capitalist -pragmatism? - -Nazism was not only land and blood, but had also a strict and extreme dose of -ratiolaism. Not only megalomania, but also extreme obsession. - -Impressum ironically punched on a ThinkPad. - -## An image comparison - -At [IBM Schoolhouse and Engineering Laboratory Building](https://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/history/year_1933.html) -entrance one could read the "Five Steps to Knowledge" [carved _at the -footsteps_](http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/think_culture/transform/) -(THINK / OBSERVE / DISCUSS / LISTEN / READ): - -![5 steps](https://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/history/images/5steps_to_knowledge.jpg) - -![THINK](http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/images/icp/Y812281R29443C55/us__en_us__ibm100__cult_think__five_steps__620x350.jpg) - -While, at Auschwitz, it was written "Work sets you free" in the entrance gate, above people's head: - -![Auschwitz Gate](auschwitz.jpg) - -One-dimensional Rationalization as a monotonic misconception of the thought process used for mass extermination. -Slave work, death by starvation which would set extermination camp inmates free from work and from data processing. - -A strange opposition of what is written in the ground -- for the head look something from above and at the same time -leaving the head low while the THINK-good stays above -- and what's written above to be seeing from below, diminished. - -That Auschwitz photo also has an iconic "HALT" sign at the entry blockade, which is evocative about the -last destination of an information processing in the extermination complex. - -## Workflow - -The International Holocaust Machines operated through the following stages: - -* Census/identification: initial data aquisition on population, assets and commodities, even livestock. -* Confiscation: seized goods, assets, etc. -* Ghettoization and Deportation, through: - * Sorting punch-card data to pinpoint residency location of undesirables to - subsequenttly kidnap them. - * Efficient management of railway using Holleriths to dispatch undesirables. -* Concentration and Extermination, by using punch-card technology to manage how each person would - die and where it will take place, as well as management of slave work. -* Internal management of the punch card business, which would include inventory - tracking and spoil recovering after the war. - -Besides the well known relation between death and money-making during wars, -that was a Death Factory: if life could be stated as a long "detour to death", a -Death Factory is exactly it's opposite: and acceleration instead of a delay, -the acumen of the industrial process at the massive scale. - -## Ideas - -Somebody ought to sort out the data -- not using punch cards! -- presenting in -the book: production inputs, outputs and what's known about profits, royalties -and tax avoidance; how money was transfered and invested. Or maybe somebody -already did that? Lot's interesting stuff might be discovered by doing a -quantitative analysis. - -It also might be important to search through patent offices for Hollerith -applications. - -And creation of organograms and relational charts/maps. - -## Questions - -How Holleriths were made? Which were manual and with were automaded procedures? -Was an assembly lines and time-controlled manufacturing processes involved? -Does Holleriths were involved in management of it's own production? - -## Excerpts - -### Hollerith - -Machine characteristics: - -* Closed, pattented design. -* Commercialized only through leasing. -* Compatible cards between Hollerith machines, "no other machine that might ever be produced" (how?). - -Hollerith characteristics: - - Just nineteen years old, Hollerith moved to Washington, D.C., to join - the Census bureau. Over dinner one night at the posh Potomac Boat Club, - Director of Vital Statistics, John Billings, quipped to Hollerith, "There ought - to be a machine for doing the purely mechanical work of tabulating popula- - tion and similar statistics." Inventive Hollerith began to think about a solu- - tion. French looms, simple music boxes, and player pianos used punched - holes on rolls or cards to automate rote activity. About a year later, Hollerith - was struck with his idea. He saw a train conductor punch tickets in a special - pattern to record physical characteristics such as height, hair color, size of - nose, and clothing—a sort of "punched photograph." Other conductors - could read the code and then catch anyone re-using the ticket of the original - passenger. 5 - - Hollerith's idea was a card with standardized holes, each representing a - different trait: gender, nationality, occupation, and so forth. The card would - then be fed into a "reader." By virtue of easily adjustable spring mechanisms - and brief electrical brush contacts sensing for the holes, the cards could be - "read" as they raced through a mechanical feeder. The processed cards could - then be sorted into stacks based on a specified series of punched holes. 6 - - Millions of cards could be sorted and resorted. Any desired trait - could be isolated—general or specific—by simply sorting and resorting for - data-specific holes. The machines could render the portrait of an entire - population—or could pick out any group within that population. Indeed, one - man could be identified from among millions if enough holes could be - punched into a card and sorted enough times. Every punch card would - become an informational storehouse limited only by the number of holes. It - was nothing less than a nineteenth-century bar code for human beings. 7 - - -- 31 - - Since the Census Bureau only needed most of the tabulators once every - decade, and because the defensive inventor always suspected some electri- - cian or mechanic would steal his design, Hollerith decided that the systems - would be leased by the government, not purchased. This important decision - to lease machines, not sell them, would dominate all major IBM business - transactions for the next century. Washington paid Hollerith about $750,000 - to rent his machines for the project. Now the inventor's challenge was to find - - -- 32 - - Italy, England, France, Austria, and Germany all submitted orders. Hollerith's - new technology was vi r t ual l y unrivaled. His machines made advanced census - taking possible everywhere in the world. He and he alone would control the - technology because the punchers, sorters, and tabulators were all designed - to be compatible with each other—and with no other machine that might - ever be produced. 12 - - [...] - - Other than his inventions, Hollerith was said to cherish three things: his - German heritage, his privacy, and his cat Bismarck. His link to everything - German was obvious to all around him. - - [...] - - For privacy, Hollerith built a tall fence around his home to keep out - neighbors and their pets. When too many cats scaled the top to jump into the - yard, the ever-inventive Hollerith strung electrical wire along the fence, con- - nected it to a battery, and then perched at his window puffing on a cigar. - When a neighbor cat would appear threatening Bismarck's privacy, Hollerith - would depress a switch, sending an electrical jolt into the animal. 16 - Hollerith's first major overseas census was organized for the brutal - regime of Czar Nicholas II to launch the first-ever census of an estimated - 120 million Russians. Nicholas was anxious to import Hollerith technology. - - -- 34 - -### IBM merger - -The Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company, or CTR: - - The four lackluster firms Flint selected defied any apparent rationale - for merger. International Time Recording Company manufactured time - clocks to record worker hours. Computing Scale Company sold simple retail - scales with pricing charts attached as well as a line of meat and cheese slicers. - Bundy Manufacturing produced small key-actuated time clocks, but, more - importantly, it owned prime real estate in Endicott, New York. Of the four, - Hollerith's Tabulating Machine Company was simply the largest and most - dominant member of the group. 32 - - Moreover, Flint wanted CTR's helm to be captained by a businessman, not a - technocrat. For that, he chose one of America's up and coming business - scoundrels, Thomas J. Watson. - - -- 37 - -### Watson, "Paternalistic and authoritarian" - - Watson was a conqueror. From simple merchandise inauspiciously sold - to farmers and townsfolk in rural west-central New York, Watson would go - on to command a global company consumed not with mere customers, but - with territories, nations, and entire populations. He would identify corporate - enemies to overcome and strategies to deploy. Like any conqueror, he would - vanquish all in his way, and then demand the spoils. Salesmanship under - Watson would elevate from one man's personal elixir to a veritable cult of - commercial conquest. By virtue of his extraordinary skills, Watson would be - delivered from his humble beginnings as a late-nineteenth-century horse- - and-buggy back road peddler, to corporate scoundrel, to legendary tycoon, - to international statesman, and finally to regal American icon—all in less - than four decades. - - -- 38 - - Watson began the systematic annihilation of Hallwood, its sales, and its - customer base. Tactics included lurking near the Hallwood office to spy on its - salesmen and customers. Watson would report the prospective clients so - "intimidation squads" could pounce. The squads would threaten the prospect with - tall tales of patent infringement suits by NCR against Hallwood, falsely - claiming such suits would eventually include anyone who purchased Hallwood - machines. The frightened customer would then be offered an NCR machine at a - discount. 43 - - -- 40 - - Patterson planted him in New York City, handed him a million-dollar budget, - and asked him to create a fake business called Watson's Cash Register and - Second Hand Exchange. His mission was to join the community of second- - hand dealers, learn their business, set up shop nearby, dramatically undersell, - quietly steal their accounts, intimidate their customers, and otherwise disrupt - their viability. Watson's fake company never needed to make a profit—only - spend money to decimate unsuspecting dealers of used registers. Eventually, - they would either be driven out of business or sell out to Watson with a dra- - conian non-compete clause. Funneled money from NCR was used for opera- - tions since Watson had no capital of his own. 46 - - -- 41 - - NCR salesmen wore dark suits, the corporation innovated a One Hun- - dred Point Club for agents who met their quota, and The Cash stressed "clean - living" as a virtue for commercial success. One day during a pep rally to the - troops, Watson scrawled the word THINK on a piece of paper. Patterson saw - the note and ordered THINK signs distributed throughout the company. - Watson embraced many of Patterson's regimenting techniques as indispens- - able doctrine for good sales. What he learned at NCR would stay with him - forever. 53 - - [...] - - Patterson, Watson, and several dozen other Cash executives were indicted for - criminal conspiracy to restrain trade and construct a monopoly. - - [...] - - A year later, in 1913, all defendants were found guilty by an Ohio jury. - Damning evidence, supplied by Watson colleagues and even Watson's own - signed letters of instructions, were irrefutable. Most of the men, including - Watson, received a one-year jail sentence. Many of the convicted wept and - asked for leniency. But not Watson. He declared that he was proud of what - he had accomplished. 55 - - -- 42 - - Then came the floods. - - [...] - - The Cash pounced. NCR organized an immense emergency relief effort. - - [...] - - Patterson, Watson, and the other NCR men became national heroes over- - - [...] - - Petitions were sent to President Woodrow Wilson asking for a pardon. - Considering public sentiment, prosecutors offered consent decrees in lieu of - jail time. Most of the defendants eagerly signed. Watson, however, refused, - maintaining he saw nothing wrong in his conduct. Eventually, Watson's attorneys - successfully overturned the conviction on a technicality. The government - declined to re-prosecute. 58 But then the unpredictable and maniacal Patterson - rewarded Watson's - - -- 42-43 - - Patterson had demanded starched white shirts and dark suits at NCR. Watson - insisted CTR employees dress in an identical uniform. And Watson borrowed his - own NCR innovation, the term THINK, which at CTR was impressed onto as many - surfaces as could be found, from the wall above Watson's desk to the bottom of - company stationery. These Patterson cum Watson touches were easy to implement - since several key Watson aides were old cronies from the NCR scandal days. 66 - - -- 45 - -A "father image": - - Watson embodied more than the boss. He was the Leader. He even had a song. - Clad in their uniforms of dark blue suits and glistening white shirts, the - inspirited sales warriors of CTR would sing: - - Mister Watson is the man we're working for, - He's the Leader of the C-T-R, - He's the fairest, squarest man we know; - Sincere and true. - He has shown us how to play the game. - And how to make the dough. 70 - - -- 46 - - "IBM is more than a business—it is a great worldwide institution that is going - on forever." 74 More than ever. Watson f us e d himself into every facet of IBM's opera- - tions, injecting his style into every decision, and mesmerizing the psyche of - every employee. "IBM Spirit"—this was the term Watson ascribed to the all- - encompassing, almost tribal devotion to company that he demanded. - - [...] - - Children began their indoctrination early, becoming eligible at age three for - the kiddy rolls of the IBM Club, graduating to junior ranks at age eight. 76 - - [...] - - Watson's own son, Tom, who inherited his father's throne at IBM, - admitted, "The more I worked at IBM, the more I resented Dad for the cult- - like atmosphere that surrounded him." 78 - - [...] - - The ever- present equating of his name with the word THINK was more than an - Orwellian exercise, it was a true-life indoctrination. The Watson mystique was - never confined to the four walls of IBM. His aura was only magnified by - - -- 47 - - Fortune referred to Watson as "the Leader," with a capital "L." So completely - con- scious was Watson of his mythic quality that he eyed even the porters on - trains and waiters in restaurants as potential legend busters. He tossed them - big tips, often as much as $10, which was largesse for the day. - - [...] - - By giving liberally to charities and universities, by towering as a patron - of the arts, by arranging scores of organizational memberships, honorary de- - grees and awards, he further cultivated the man-myth for himself and IBM. 81 - Slogans were endlessly drilled into the extended IBM Family. We For- - give Thoughtful Mistakes. There Is No Such Thing As Standing Still. Pack Up - Your Troubles, Mr. Watson Is Here. 82 - And the songs. They began the very first day a man entered the IBM - culture. They never ended during one's entire tenure. More than 100 songs - were sung at various company functions. There were several for Watson, - including the "IBM Anthem" - - [...] - - Revival-style meetings enthralled the men of IBM. Swaying as they - chanted harmonies of adulation for the Leader, their palms brought together - in fervent applause in hero worship, fully accepting that their families and - destinies were intertwined with the family and destiny of the corporation, - legions of company men incessandy re-dedicated themselves to the "Ever - Onward" glory of IBM. All of it swirled around the irresistible magnetism, - t h e i nt oxi cat i n g command, the charismatic cultic control of one man, - Thomas J. Watson, the Leader. 84 - - -- 48-49 - -### IBM and the Third Reich - - The question confronting all businessmen in 1933 was whether trading - with Germany was worth either the economic risk or moral descent. This - question faced Watson at IBM as well. But IBM was in a unique commercial - position. While Watson and IBM were famous on the American business - scene, the company's overseas operations were fundamentally below the - public radar screen. IBM did not import German merchandise, it merely - exported American technology. The IBM name did not even appear on any - of thousands of index cards in the address files of leading New York boycott - organizations. Moreover, the power of punch cards as an automation tool - had not yet been commonly identified. So the risk that highly visible trading - might provoke economic retaliation seemed low, especially since Dehomag - did not even possess a name suggestive of IBM or Watson. 101 - On the other hand, the anticipated reward in Germany was great. - - Watson had learned early on that a government in reorganization, and - indeed a government tighdy monitoring its society, was good news for IBM. - During the Depression years, when the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration - created a massive bureaucracy to assist the public and control business, IBM - doubled its size. The National Recovery Act of 1933, for example, meant - "businesses all of a sudden had to supply the federal government with infor- - mation in huge and unprecedented amounts," recalled an IBM official. Extra - forms, export reports, more registrations, more statistics—IBM thrived on - red tape. 102 - - Nazi Germany offered Watson the opportunity to cater to government - control, supervision, surveillance, and regimentation on a plane never before - known in human history. The fact that Hitler planned to extend his Reich to - other nations only magnified the prospective profits. In business terms, that - was account growth. The technology was almost exclusively IBM's to purvey - because the firm controlled about 90 percent of the world market in punch - cards and sorters. - - -- 52 - -### Dehomag - - To be sure, Dehomag managers were as fervently devoted to the Nazi - movement as any of Hitler's scientific soldiers. IBM NY understood this from - the outset. Heidinger, a rabid Nazi, saw Dehomag's unique ability to imbue - the Reich with population information as a virtual calling from God. His - enraptured passion for Dehomag's sudden new role was typically expressed - while opening a new IBM facility in Berlin. "I feel it almost a sacred action," - declared Heidinger emotionally, "I pray the blessing of heaven may rest - upon this place." 118 - - That day, while standing next to the personal representative of Watson - and IBM, with numerous Nazi Party officials in attendance, Heidinger pub- - licly announced how in tune he and Dehomag were with the Nazi race scien- - tists who saw population statistics as the key to eradicating the unhealthy, - inferior segments of society. - - "The physician examines the human body and determines whether . . . - all organs are working to the benefit of the entire organism," asserted Hei- - dinger to a crowd of Nazi officials. "We [Dehomag] are very much like the - physician, in that we dissect, cell by cell, the German cultural body. We - report every individual characteristic . . . on a little card. These are not dead - cards, quite to the contrary, they prove later on that they come to life when - the cards are sorted at a rate of 25,000 per hour according to certain charac- - teristics. These characteristics are grouped like the organs of our cultural - body, and they will be calculated and determined with the help of our tabu- - lating machine. 119 - - It was right about this time that Watson decided to engrave the five - steps leading up to the door of the IBM School in Endicott, New York, with - five of his favorite words. This school was the place where Watson would - train his valued disciples in the art of sales, engineering, and technical sup- - port. Those five uppermost steps, steps that each man ascended before enter- - ing the front door, were engraved with the following words: - - READ - LISTEN - DISCUSS - OBSERVE - - The fifth and uppermost step was chiseled with the heralded theme of - the company. It said THINK. 122 - The word THINK was everywhere. - - -- 56-57 - -### The Census - -The datacenter: - - IN MID - SEPTEMBER , 1933, 6,000 brown cardboard boxes began unceremo- niously - arriving at the cavernous Alexanderplatz census complex in Berlin. Each box - was stuffed with questionnaires manually filled out by pen and pencil, but soon - to be processed by an unprecedented automated praxis. As supervisors emptied - their precious cargo at the Prussian Statistical Office, each questionnaire—one - per household—was initialed by an intake clerk, stacked, and then transferred - downstairs. "Downstairs" led to Dehomag's massive 22,000-square-foot hall, just - one floor below, specifically rented for the project. 18 - - Messengers shuttling stacks of questionnaires from the Statistical Office to - Dehomag bounded down the right-hand side of an enclosed stairwell. As they - descended the short flight, the sound of clicking became louder and louder. At - the landing, they turned left and pushed through the doors. As the doors swung - open, they encountered an immense high-ceilinged, hangar-like facility - reverberating with the metallic music of Hollerith technology. Some 450 data - punchers deployed in narrow rows of punching stations labored behind tall - upright secretarial displays perfectly matched to the oversized - census questionnaires. 19 - - Turning left again, and then another right brought the messengers to a - long windowed wall lined with narrow tables. The forms were piled there. - From these first tables, the forms were methodically distributed to central- - ized desks scattered throughout the work areas. The census forms were then - loaded onto small trolleys and shutded again, this time to individual work - stations, each equipped with a device that resembled a disjointed typewriter - - actually an input engine. 20 - - A continuous "Speed Punching" operation ran two shifts, and three - when needed. Each shift spanned 7.5 hours with 60 minutes allotted for - "fresh air breaks" and a company-provided meal. Day and night, Dehomag - staffers entered the details on 41 million Prussians at a rate of 150 cards per - hour. Allowing for holidays and a statistical prediction of absenteeism, yet - ever obsessed with its four-month deadline, Dehomag decreed a quota of - 450,000 cards per day for its workforce. Free coffee was provided to keep - people awake. A gymnast was brought in to demonstrate graceful aerobics - and other techniques to relieve fatigue. Company officials bragged that the - 41 million processed cards, if stacked, would tower two and a half times - higher than the Zugspitze, Germany's 10,000-foot mountain peak. Dehomag - intended to reach the summit on time. 21 - - As company officials looked down upon a floor plan of the layout, the - linear rows and intersecting columns of work stations must have surely - resembled a grandiose punch card itself animated into a three-dimensional - bricks and mortar reality. Indeed, a company poster produced for the project - showed throngs of miniscule people scrambling over a punch card sketch. 22 - The surreal artwork was more than symbolic. - - -- 63-64 - -And the description follows which show how was explicity the wish to target Jews. - -Note for error-checking procedure and the "statistical prediction of -absenteeism" which imply on the [informate](/books/sociedade/age-of-the-smart-machine) -aspect of the procedure. - -### Discretion and secrecy - - Watson developed an extraordinary ability to write reserved and clev- - erly cautious letters. More commonly, he remained silent and let subordi- - nates and managers do the writing for him. But they too respected an IBM - code—unwritten, of course—to observe as much discretion as possible in - memos and correspondence. This was especially so in the case of corre- - sponding with or about Nazi Germany, the most controversial business part- - ner of the day. - - -- 68 - - Few understood the far-reaching ramifications of punch card technology and even - fewer had a foreground understanding that the com- pany Dehomag was in fact - essentially a wholly-owned subsidiary of Interna- tional Business Machines. - - Boycott and protest movements were ardently trying to crush Hitlerism by - stopping Germany's exports. Although a network of Jewish and non- sectarian - anti-Nazi leagues and bodies struggled to organize comprehensive lists of - companies doing business with Germany, from importers of German toys and shoes - to sellers of German porcelain and pharmaceuticals, yet IBM and Watson were not - identified. Neither the company nor its president even appeared in any of - thousands of hectic phone book entries or handwritten index card files of the - leading national and regional boycott bodies. Anti- Nazi agitators just didn't - understand the dynamics of corporate multi- nationalism. 64 - - Moreover, IBM was not importing German merchandise, it was export- - ing machinery. In fact, even exports dwindled as soon as the new plant in - Berlin was erected, leaving less of a paper trail. So a measure of invisibility - was assured in 1933. - - -- 75 - -### Fascism - - But to a certain extent all the worries about granting Hitler the techno- - logic tools he needed were all subordinated to one irrepressible, ideological - imperative. Hitler's plans for a new Fascist order with a "Greater Germany" - dominating all Europe were not unacceptable to Watson. In fact, Watson - admired the whole concept of Fascism. He hoped he could participate as the - American capitalistic counterpart of the great Fascist wave sweeping the Con- - tinent. Most of all, Fascism was good for business. - - THOMAS WATSOON and IBM had separately and jointly spent decades making - money any way they could. Rules were broken. Conspiracies were hatched. - Bloody wars became mere market opportunities. To a supranational, making - money is equal parts commercial Darwinism, corporate ecclesiastics, dynastic - chauvinism, and solipsistic greed. - - Watson was no Fascist. He was a pure capitalist. But the horseshoe of - political economics finds little distance between extremities. - - [...] - - After all, his followers wore uniforms, sang songs, and were expected to - display unquestioned loy- alty to the company he led. - - Fascism, the dictatorial state-controlled political system, was invented - by Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini. The term symbolically derived from the - Roman fasces, that is, the bundle of rods surrounding a ceremonial axe used - during Roman times. Indeed, Nazi symbols and ritual were in large part - adopted from Mussolini, including the palm-lifting Roman salute. Ironically, - Italian Fascism was non-racial and not anti-Semitic. National Socialism added - those defining elements. - - Mussolini fascinated Watson. Once, at a 1937 sales convention, Watson - spoke out in Il Duce's defense. "I want to pay tribute ... [to the] great leader, - Benito Mussolini," declared Watson. "I have followed the details of his work - very carefully since he assumed leadership [in 1922]. Evidence of his leader- - ship can be seen on all sides. . . . Mussolini is a pioneer . . . Italy is going to - benefit gready." 65 - - Watson explained his personal attraction to the dictator's style and even - observed similarities with his own corporate, capitalistic model. "One thing - which has greatly impressed me in connection with his leadership," con- - ceded Watson, "is the loyalty displayed by the people. To have the loyalty and - cooperation of everyone means progress—and ultimate success for a nation - or an individual business ... we should pay tribute to Mussolini for estab- - lishing this spirit of loyal support and cooperation." 66 - - For years, an autographed picture of Mussolini graced the grand piano - in Watson's living room. 67 - - In defense of Fascism, Watson made clear, "Different countries require - different forms of government and we should be careful not to let people in - other countries feel that we are trying to standardize principles of govern- - ment throughout the world." 68 - - -- 75-76 - -What an irony: Watson defending non-standardization of goverments around the world... - - His access to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and more importantly to - President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was unparalleled. While the Hoover Justice - Department was at the height of its anti-trust investigation of IBM in 1932, - Watson donated large sums to the Roosevelt campaign. Roosevelt's election - over Hoover was a landslide. Watson now had entree to the White House - itself. 71 - - -- 77 - -A statesman. - - So a happy medium was found between Watson's desire to maintain - deniability in IBM's lucrative relations with Germany and his personal desire - to hobnob with Third Reich VIPs. But, the demands of the growing business - in Germany would not be free of Watson's famous micro-management. Too - - -- 79 - -### Technology for the "Final Sollution" - - IBM did not invent Germany's anti-Semitism, but when it volunteered solutions, - the company virtually braided with Nazism. Like any technologic evolution, each - new solution powered a new level of sinister expectation and cruel capability. - - When Germany wanted to identify the Jews by name, IBM showed them how. When - Germany wanted to use that information to launch pro- grams of social expulsion - and expropriation, IBM provided the technologic wherewithal. When the trains - needed to run on time, from city to city or between concentration camps, IBM - offered that solution as well. Ultimately, there was no solution IBM would not - devise for a Reich willing to pay for services rendered. One solution led to - another. No solution was out of the question. - - As the clock ticked, as the punch cards clicked, as Jews in Germany saw - their existence vaporizing, others saw their corporate fortunes rise. Even as - German Jewry hid in their homes and wept in despair, even as the world - quietly trembled in fear, there was singing. Exhilarated, mesmerized, the - faithful would sing, and sing loudly to their Leaders—on both sides of the - Atlantic. - - Some uniforms were brown. Some were blue. - - -- 79-80 - -### Corporate schizophrenia - - To achieve his goals, each man had to cooperate in an international - campaign of corporate schizophrenia designed to achieve maximum deniability - for both Dehomag and IBM. The storyline depended upon the circumstance - and the listener. Dehomag could be portrayed as the American-controlled, al- - most wholly-owned subsidiary of IBM with token German shareholders and - on-site German managers. Or Dehomag could be a loyal German, staunchly - Aryan company baptized in the blood of Nazi ideology wielding the power - of its American investment for the greater glory of Hitler's Reich. - - -- 83 - -### The rhetoric - - "The physician examines the human body and determines whether ... - all organs are working to the benefit of the entire organism," asserted Hei- - dinger to a crowd of company employees and Nazi officials. "We [Dehomag] - are very much like the physician, in that we dissect, cell by cell, the German - cultural body. We report every individual characteristic ... on a little card. - These are not dead cards, quite to the contrary, they prove later on that they - come to life when the cards are sorted at a rate of 25,000 per hour according - to certain characteristics. These characteristics are grouped like the organs of - our cultural body, and they will be calculated and determined with the help - of our tabulating machine. 27 - - "We are proud that we may assist in such a task, a task that provides our - nation's Physician [Adolf Hitler] with the material he needs for his examina- - tions. Our Physician can then determine whether the calculated values are in - harmony with the health of our people. It also means that if such is not the - case, our Physician can take corrective procedures to correct the sick circum- - stances. . . . Our characteristics are deeply rooted in our race. Therefore, we - must cherish them like a holy shrine, which we will—and must—keep pure. - We have the deepest trust in our Physician and will follow his instructions in - blind faith, because we know that he will lead our people to a great future. - - -- 88 - -### Automation and efficiency - - While Hitler's rhetoric was burning the parade grounds and airwaves, - while Storm Troopers were marching Jews through the streets in ritual - humiliations, while Reich legislative decrees and a miasma of regional and - private policies were ousting Jews from their professions and residences, - while noisy, outrageous acts of persecution were appalling the world, a qui- - eter process was also underway. Germany was automating. - Hollerith systems could do more than count. They could schedule, ana- - lyze, and compute. They could manage. - - -- 92 - - [...] - - Hitler's Germany began achieving undreamed of efficiencies. - - -- 94 - -### Now or then? - - People seated in a doctor's office or a welfare line never comprehended the - destiny of routine information about their personal traits and conditions. - Question 11 required a handwritten checkmark if the individual was a for- - eigner. Later, this information was punched into the correlating punch card in - columns 29-30 under nationality. 83 - - -- 101 - -### Information as money, on paper - -The discourse on purity was also present on technology itself, in the form -of punch cards produced according rigid specificiations using a paper devoid -of "impurities": - - WHEN HERMAN HOLLERITH designed his first punch card, he made it the - size of a dollar bill. 94 For IBM, information was money. The more Germany - calculated, tabulated, sorted, and analyzed, the greater the demand for - machines. Equally important, once a machine was leased, it required vast - quantities of punch cards. In many cases, a single tabulation required - thousands of cards. Each card was designed to be used only once, and in a - single operation. When Dehomag devised more in-depth data processing, the - improvements only bolstered card demand. How many punch cards were needed? - Millions - per week. 95 - - Punch cards sped through the huffing machines of the Third Reich like tiny - high-speed mechanized breaths rapidly inhaled and exhaled one time and one time - only. But Hollerith systems were delicate, precision-engineering instruments - that depended on a precision-engineered punch card manufac- tured to exacting - specifications under ideal conditions. Because electrical current in the - machines sensed the rectangular holes, even a microscopic imperfection would - make the card inoperable and could foul up the en- - - So IBM production specifications were rigorous. Coniferous chemical - pulp was milled, treated, and cured to create paper stock containing no - more than 5 percent ash, and devoid of ground wood, calk fibers, process- - ing chemicals, slime carbon, or other impurities that might conduct electric- - ity and "therefore cause incorrect machine sensing." Residues, even in trace - amounts, would accumulate on gears and other mechanisms, eventually - causing jams and system shutdowns. Electrical testing to isolate defective - sheets was mandatory. Paper, when cut, had to lie flat without curl or wrin- - kle, and feature a hard, smooth finish on either side that yielded a "good - snap or rattle." 96 - - -- 103 - -There seems to be an equivalent discourse on purity and eugenics during the -development of the transistor. Something to check out. - - Only IBM could make and sell the unique punch cards for its machines. - Indeed, punch cards were the precious currency of data processing. Depend- - ing upon the market, IBM derived as much as a third of its profit from card - sales. Overseas sales were even more of a profit center. Punch card profits - were enough to justify years of federal anti-trust litigation designed to break - the company's virtual monopoly on their sale and manufacture." - When Herman Hollerith invented his technology at the close of the - previous century, he understood the enduring commercial tactic of prolifer- - ating a single universal system of hardware and ensuring that he alone pro- - duced the sole compatible soft goods. Hollerith was right to size his card like - the dollar. IBM's punch card monopoly was nothing less than a license to - print money. - - -- 104 - - Never before had so many people been identified so precisely, so silently, so - quickly, and with such far-reaching consequences. The dawn of the Information - Age began at the sunset of human decency. - - -- 110 - -## 1933 census was just a rehearsal - - Top racial experts of the Interior Ministry flew in for the assignment. Working - with drafts shuttled between Hitler's abode and police headquarters, twin - decrees of disenfranchisement were finally patched together. The Law for the - Protec- tion of German Blood and a companion decree entitled the Reich - Citizenship Law deprived Jews of their German citizenship and now used the term - explicitly—Jew, not non-Aryan. Moreover, Jews were proscribed from marry- ing - or having sexual relations with any Aryan. - - [...] - - Laborious and protracted paper searches of individual genealogical - records were possible. But each case could take months of intensive research. - That wasn't fast enough for the Nazis. Hitler wanted the Jews identified en - masse. - - [...] - - Once drafted, the Nuremberg regulations would be completely - dependent upon Hollerith technology for the fast, wholesale tracing of Jew- - ish family trees that the Reich demanded. Hollerith systems offered the - Reich the speed and scope that only an automated system could to identify - not only half and quarter Jews, but even eighth and sixteenth Jews. 14 - - [...] - - Earlier in 1935, the Party's Race Political Office had estimated the total - number of "race Jews." Thanks to Dehomag's people-counting methods, the - Nazis believed that the 1933 census, which recorded a half million observant - Jews, was now obsolete. Moreover, Nazis were convinced that the often- - quoted total of some 600,000 Jews, which was closer to Germany's 1925 - census, was a mere irrelevance. In mid-June 1935, Dr. Leonardo Conti, a key - Interior Ministry raceologist, declared 600,000 represented just the "practic- - ing Jews." The true number of racial Jews in the Reich, he insisted, exceeded - 1.5 million. Conti, who would soon become the Ministry's State Secretary for - Health overseeing most race questions, was a key assistant to the officials - rishing to compose the Nuremberg Jewish laws for Hitler. 16 - - -- 114-115 - -"Final sollution": - - Gesturing fanatically, he [Hitler] concluded with this warning: The new law "is - an attempt at the legal regulation of a problem, which, if it fails, must be - turned over to the Nazi Party for final solution." 22 - - -- 116 - -### Mechanics - - Ironically, while all understood the evil anti-Jewish process underway, - virtually none comprehended the technology that was making it possible, - The mechanics were less than a mystery, they were transparent. - In 1935, while the world shook at a rearmed Germany speeding toward - - [...] - - NAZI GERMANY was IBM's second most important customer after the U.S. - - [...] - - Business was good. Hitler needed Holleriths. Rigid dictatorial control - over all aspects of commerce and social life mandated endless reporting and - oversight. - - [...] - - IBM was guided by one precept: know your customer, anticipate their needs. - - -- 117 - - [...] - - Dehomag could do the sorting in-house for a fee. The company bragged that - it possessed the ability to cross-reference account numbers on bank deposits - - -- 119 - - None of Germany's statistical programs came easy. All of them required - on-going technical innovation. Every project required specific customized - applications with Dehomag engineers carefully devising a column and corre- - sponding hole to carry the intended information. Dummy cards were first - carefully mocked-up in pen and pencil to make sure all categories and their - placement were acceptable to both Dehomag and the reporting agency. [...] - Dehomag was Germany's data maestro. - - -- 121 - - New devices never stopped appearing. [...] Many of these devices were of course - dual-purpose. They as routinely helped build Germany's general commercial, - social, and military infrastructure as they helped a heightening tower of Nazi - statistical offensives. In Germany, some of the devices, such as the IBM - Fingerprint Selecting Sorter, were only usable by Nazi security forces. 46 - - -- 123 - -### What the alliance meant - - Rottke openly conceded the contract between IBM and Heidinger had - "been made under an unlucky star, [and] appears to be the source of all - evil." But he nonetheless warned Watson again that if Heidinger's shares - were transferred to a foreign source Dehomag would probably not be per- - mitted "the use of the word Deutsche (German) as an enterprise recognized - in Germany as German." 126 That disaster had to be avoided at all costs. To - IBM's doctrinaire German managers, including Heidinger, Dehomag repre- - sented far more than just a profit-making enterprise. To them, Dehomag had - the technologic ability to keep Germany's war machine automated, facilitate - her highly efficient seizure of neighboring countries, and achieve the Reich's - swiftly moving racial agenda. If IBM's subsidiary were deemed non-Aryan, - the company would be barred from all the sensitive projects awaiting it. - Hitler's Germany—in spite of itself—would be deprived of the Holleriths it - so desperately required. - - From Watson's point of view, Germany was on the brink of unleash- - ing its total conquest of Europe. IBM subsidiaries could be coordinated by - - Dehomag into one efficient continental enterprise, moving parts, cards, and - machines as the Reich needed them. The new order that Hitler promised was - made to order for IBM. - - In July 1939, Watson arrived in Berlin to personally mediate with Hei- - dinger. A compromise would be necessary. The stakes were too high for the - Nazis. The stakes were too high for capitalism. But it was the Germans who - gave in, deferring on Heidinger's demands for a few months under term - Watson dictated. "Watson now controlled something the Third Reich needed - to launch the next decisive step in the solution of the Jewish question, not - just in Germany—but all of Europe. Until now, the fastest punchers, tabula- - tors, and sorters could organize only by numbers. The results could then be - sorted by sequentially numbered profession, geographic locale, or popula- - tion category. But now Watson had something new and powerful. 127 - He had the alphabetizes. - - -- 172-173 - - In Copenhagen, at the ICC [International Chamber of Commerce] Congress, - Watson's pro-Axis proposal exceeded anything the State Department could have - expected. He champi- oned a resolution whereby private businessmen from the - three Axis and three Allied nations would actually supercede their governments - and negoti- ate a radical new international trade policy designed to satisfy - Axis demands for raw materials coveted from other nations. The businessmen - would then lobby their respective governments' official economic advisors to - adopt their appeasement proposals for the sake of averting war. Ironically, the - raw mate- rials were needed by Axis powers solely for the sake of waging war. - - On June 28, under Watson's leadership, the ICC passed a resolution again - calling for "a fair distribution of raw materials, food stuffs and other - products . . . [to] render unnecessary the movements of armies across fron- - tiers." To this end, the ICC asked "the governments of France, Germany, Italy, - Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States . . . each collaborate with - their own leading businessmen . , . with respect to national needs . . . [and - therefore] give all countries of the world a fair opportunity to share in the - resources of the world." 27 - - Even as Watson angled for Germany to be ceded more raw materials, - Germany was openly raping invaded territories. - - [...] - - No wonder the German delegate to the ICC enthusiastically lauded - Watson's proposal, which only sought to legitimize by private consultation - what the Third Reich was undertaking by force. In his final speech of the - Congress, Watson himself summed up the misery and devastation in the - world as a mere "difference of opinion." His solution of businessmen confer- - ring to divvy up other nations' resources to avoid further aggression was - offered with these words: "We regret that there are unsatisfactory economic - and political conditions in the world today, with a great difference of opinion - existing among many countries. But differences of opinion, freely discussed - and fairly disposed of, result in mutual benefit and increased happiness to all - concerned." 31 - - [...] - - One State Department assistant secretary could not help but comment on the - similarity of Watson's suggestion to the Axis' own warlike demands. "This is, - of course, a political question of major world importance," wrote the assistant - secretary, and one upon which we have been hearing much from Germany, Italy and - Japan. It occurs to me that it is most unfortunate that Mr. Thomas J. Watson, - as an American serving as the president of the International Chamber of - Commerce, should have sponsored a resolution of this character. It may well be - that his resolution will return to plague us at some future date." That comment - was written on October 5, 1939. 37 By then it was unnecessary to reply - - -- 181-184 - -### Biblical Census - - The Bible itself taught that unless specifically ordered by God, the census is - evil because through it the enemy will know your strength: - - I Chronicles 21: Satan rose up against Israel and incited David to take a cen- - sus of Israel. . . . This command was also evil in the sight of God. . . Then - David said to God, "I have sinned greatly by doing this. Now I beg you to take - away the guilt of your servant. I have done a very foolish thing." 78 On - October 28, 1939, for the Jewish people of Warsaw, everything - - -- 195 - -### The Ghetto, The Train and the Print Shop - - Now the Reich knew exactly how many Jews were under their jurisdic- - tion, how much nutrition to allocate—as low as 184 calories per person per - day. They could consolidate Jews from the mixed districts of Warsaw, and - bring in Jews from other nearby villages. The transports began arriving. - White armbands with Jewish stars were distributed. Everyone, young or old, - was required to wear one on the arm. Not the forearm, but the arm—visible, - above the elbow. The Warsaw-Malkinia railway line ran right through the pro- - posed ghetto. It was all according to Heydrich's September 21 Express Let- - ter. Soon the demarcated ghetto would be surrounded by barbed wire. - Eventually, a wall went up, sealing the residents of the ghetto from the outside - world. Soon thereafter, the railway station would become the most feared lo- - cation in the ghetto. 83 - - The Nazi quantification and regimentation of Jewish demographics in - Warsaw and indeed all of Poland was nothing less than spectacular—an al- - most unbelievable feat. Savage conditions, secrecy, and lack of knowledge by - the victims would forever obscure the details of exactly how the Nazis man- - aged to tabulate the cross-referenced information on 360,000 souls within - forty-eight hours. - - But this much is known: The Third Reich possessed only one method - of tabulating censuses: Dehomag's Hollerith system. Moreover, IBM was in - Poland, headquartered in Warsaw. In fact, the punch card print shop was just - yards from the Warsaw Ghetto at Rymarska Street 6. That's where they pro- - duced more than 20 million cards. - - -- 196 - - The strategic alliance with Hitler continued to pay off in the cities and - in the ghettos. But now IBM machines would demonstrate their special value - along the railways and in the concentration camps of Europe. Soon the Jews - would become Hollerith numbers. - - -- 203 - -### 'Blitzkrieg' efficiency - - HITLER'S ARMIES SWARMED OVER EUROPE THROUGHOUT the first months of 1940. The - forces of the Reich slaughtered all opposition with a military machine - unparalleled in human history. Blitzkrieg—lightning war—was more than a new - word. Its very utterance signified coordinated death under the murderous - onslaught of Hitler's massive air, sea, and 100,000-troop ground assaults. - - -- 204 - - IBM had almost single-handedly brought modern warfare into the - information age. Through its persistent, aggressive, unfaltering efforts, IBM - virtually put the "blitz" in the krieg for Nazi Germany. Simply put, IBM orga- - nized the organizers of Hitler's war. - - Keeping corporate distance in the face of the company's mounting - involvement was now more imperative than ever. Although deniability was - constructed with enough care to last for decades, the undeniable fact was - that either IBM NY or its European headquarters in Geneva or its individual - subsidiaries, depending upon the year and locale, maintained intimate - knowledge of each and every application wielded by Nazis. This knowledge - was inherendy revealed by an omnipresent paper trail: the cards themselves. - IBM—and only IBM—printed all the cards. Billions of them. - - -- 213 - -### Even more discretion - - Only with great caution could Watson now publicly defend the Hitler - agenda, even through euphemisms and code words. Most Americans would - not tolerate anyone who even appeared to be a Nazi sympathizer or collabo- - rator. So, as he had done since Kristallnacht in late 1938, Watson continued - to insert corporate distance between himself and all involvement in the - affairs of his subsidiaries in Nazi Europe—even as he micro-managed their - day-to-day operations. More than ever, he now channeled his communica- - tions to Nazi Europe through trusted intermediaries in Geneva and else- - where on the Continent. He controlled subsidiary operations through - attorneys and employees acting as nominee owners, following the pattern set - in Czechoslovakia and Poland. 7 - - [...] - - Peace was Watson's message. - - [...] - - Ironically, at that very moment, Watson and IBM were in fact Europe's most - successful organizers not of peace, but of the ravages of war. - - -- 206-207 - -### Customized, proprietaty tech from a monopoly - -How they knew how the card was user for, which would lead to ethical concerns --- but the part of IBM -- and strategic ones -- by the part of the German government: - - IBM printed billions of its electrically sensitive cards each year for its - European customers. But every order was different. Each set was meticu- - lously designed not only for the singular client, but for the client's specific - assignments. The design work was not a rote procedure, but an intense col- - laboration. It began with a protracted investigation of the precise data needs - of the project, as well as the people, items, or services being tabulated. This - required IBM subsidiary "field engineers" to undertake invasive studies of - the subject being measured, often on-site. Was it people? Was it cattle? Was it - airplane engines? Was it pension payments? Was it slave labor? Different data - gathering and card layouts were required for each type of application. 44 - - [...] - - Once printed, each set of custom-designed punch cards bore its own - distinctive look for its highly specialized purpose. Each set was printed with - its own job-specific layout, with columns arrayed in custom-tailored configu- - rations and then preprinted with unique column labels. Only IBM presses - manufactured these cards, column by column, with the preprinted field topic: - race, nationality, concentration camp, metal drums, combat wounds to leg, - train departure vs. train arrival, type of horse, bank account, wages owed, - property owed, physical racial features possessed—ad infinitum. 46 - - Cards printed for one task could never be used for another. Factory pay- - roll accounting cards, for example, could not be utilized by the SS in its on- - going program of checking family backgrounds for racial features. - - [...] - - An IBM punch card could only be used once. After a period of months, the - gargantuan stacks of processed cards were routinely destroyed. Billions more - were needed each year by the Greater Reich and its Axis allies, requiring a - sophisticated logisti- cal network of IBM authorized pulp mills, paper - suppliers, and stock trans- port. Sales revenue for the lucrative supply of - cards was continuously funneled to IBM via various modalities, including its - Geneva nexus. 50 Slave labor cards were particularly complex on-going projects. - The Reich was constandy changing map borders and Germanizing city and regional - names. Its labor needs became more and more demanding. This type of punch card - operation required numerous handwritten mock-ups and regular revisions. For - example, MB Projects 3090 and 3091 tracking slave labor involved several - mock-up cards, each clearly imprinted with Deho- mag's name along the edge. - Written in hand on a typical sample was the pro- ject assignment: "work - deployment of POWs and prisoners according to business branches." Toward the - left, a column was hand-labeled "number of employed during the month" next to - another column hand-marked "number of employed at month's end." The center and - right-hand column headings were each scribbled in: French, Belgium, British, - Yugoslavian, Polish. 51 Another card in the series was entitled "registration - of male and female - - [...] - - The delicate machines, easily nudged out of whack by their con- - stant syncopation, were serviced on-site, generally monthly, whether that site - was in the registration center at Mauthausen concentration camp, the SS - offices at Dachau, or the census bureau in any country. 54 - - -- 214-217 - -### Business plan and practice - - Few in the financial community were sur- prised. IBM profits had been in a - steep climb since the day Hitler came to power. 57 Clearly, the war was good to - IBM coffers. Indeed, in many ways the war seemed an ideal financial - opportunity to Watson. Like many, he fully expected Germany to trample over all - of Europe, creating a new economic order, one in which IBM would rule the data - domain. Like many, Watson expected that America would stay out of the war, and - when it was over, businessmen like him would pick up the post-war economic - pieces. In fact, Watson began planning for the post-war boom and a complete - - "Our program," asserted Watson, "is for national committees in the individual - countries to study their own problems from the standpoint of what they need - from other countries and what they have to furnish other countries." It was the - same Hitleresque message Wat- son had been preaching for years. Some countries, - both men believed, were simply entided to the natural resources of another. War - could be avoided by ceding these materials in advance. 58 No time was wasted in - making plans. - - -- 217-218 - -But domestic pressue got too high in the US: - - The long delayed moment had come. That day, June 6, Watson wrote a - reluctant letter to Adolf Hitler. This one would not be misaddressed or - undelivered. This one would be sent by registered mail and released to the - newspapers. Watson returned the medal Hitler had personally granted—and - he chose to return it publicly via the media. The letter declared: "the present - policies of your government are contrary to the causes for which I have been - - -- 222 - - Dehomag was to become completely Nazified. The hierarchy had plans - for Hollerith machines that stretched to virtually all the Reich's most urgent - needs, from the conflict in Europe to Hitler's war against European Jewry. - - -- 227 - -But Germany was too dependent on IBM automation technologies. In fact dependency -on information technology was so high that equipment production could not supply -the demand. The automation process might have been exponential, beyond the -capacity of the system itself. Information was faster than physical, industrial -production: - - But the strategic alliance with IBM was too entrenched to simply switch off. - Since the birth of the Third Reich, Germany had automated virtually its entire - economy, as well as most government operations and Nazi Party activities, using - a single technology: Hollerith. Elaborate data operations were in full swing - every- where in Germany and its conquered lands. The country suddenly discov- - ered its own vulnerable over-dependence on IBM machinery. - - [...] - - At the same time, Germany's war industry suffered from a chronic paper and pulp - shortage due to a lack of supply and the diversion of basic pulping ingredients - to war propellants. Only four specialized paper plants in Germany could even - produce Hollerith - - [...] - - Holleriths could not function without IBM's unique paper. Watson controlled the - paper. 17 Printing cards was a stop-start process that under optimal conditions - - [...] - - Holleriths could not function without cards. Watson controlled the cards. 18 - Precision maintenance was needed monthly on the sensitive gears, tum- - - [...] - - Even working at peak capacity in tandem with recently opened IBM factories in - Germany, Austria, Italy, and France, Nazi requests for sorters, tabulators, and - collators were back-ordered twenty-four months. Hollerith systems could not - function without machines or spare parts. Watson controlled the machines and - the spare parts. 19 - - Watson's monopoly could be replaced—but it would take years. Even - if the Reich confiscated every IBM printing plant in Nazi-dominated Europe, - and seized every machine, within months the cards and spare parts would - run out. The whole data system would quickly grind to a halt. As it stood in - summer 1941, the IBM enterprise in Nazi Germany was hardly a stand- - alone operation; it depended upon the global financial, technical, and ma- - terial support of IBM NY and i t s seventy worldwide subsidiaries. Watson - controlled all of it. - - Without punch card technology, Nazi Germany would be completely - incapable of even a fraction of the automation it had taken for granted, - Returning to manual methods was unthinkable. The Race and Settlement - - -- 228-230 - - If Watson allowed the Reich—in a fit of rage over the return of the medal—to - oust IBM technologic supremacy in Nazi Germany, and if he allowed Berlin to - embark upon its own ersatz punch card industry, Hitler's data automation - program might speed toward self-destruction. No one could predict how - drastically every Reich undertaking would be affected. But clearly, the blitz - IBM attached to the German krieg would eventually be sub- tracted if not - severely lessened. All Watson had to do was give up Dehomag as the Nazis - demanded. If IBM did not have a technologic stranglehold over Germany, the - Nazis would not be negotiating, they would simply seize what- ever they wanted. - For Watson, it was a choice. - - [...] - - But Watson would not detach Dehomag from the global IBM empire. - - -- 235 - - Albert empha- sized that in the very near future, "a minority of shares might - be even materi- ally of higher value than the present majority." He added that - the notion of stockholder "control" was actually becoming a passe notion in - Germany since the Reich now direcdy or indirectly controlled virtually all - business. "A majority of shares," he wrote Watson, "does not mean as much as - it used to . . . [since] a corporation, company, enterprise or plant - manufacturing in Germany is so firmly, thoroughly and definitely subjected to - the governmen- tal rules and regulations." 46 - - -- 237 - - For IBM, war would ironically be more advantageous than existing - peace. - - Under the current state of affairs, IBM's assets were blocked in Ger- - many until the conflict was over. Under an enemy custodian, those same - marks would still be blocked—again until any war was over. As it stood, Hei- - dinger was threatening daily to destroy Dehomag unless IBM sold or re- - duced its ownership; and he was demanding to cash out his stock. But if war - with the U.S. broke out, Heidinger and the other managers would be sum- - marily relieved of their management authority since technically they repre- - sented IBM NY. A government custodian chosen on the basis of keen - business skills—and Albert might have the connections to select a reliable - one—would be appointed to replace Heidinger and manage Dehomag. In - fact, the Nazi receiver would diligendy manage all of IBM's European sub- - sidiaries. The money would be waiting when the war was over. 56 - - Plausible deniability would be real. Questions—would not be asked by IBM NY. - Answers-would not be given by IBMers in Europe or Reich officials. 58 - - -- 240-241 - - [...] - - The company that lionized the word THINK now thought better of its - guiding mandate. - - -- 241-242 - - IBM should rely on its decided technologic edge, suggested Chauncey, - because of the profound difficulty in starting a punch card industry from - scratch, especially if New York could block French Bull competition. In spite - of the quality of its devices, French Bull was a very small company with very - few machines. Bull's one small factory could never supply the Reich's conti- - nental needs. Ramping up for volume production—even if based within a - Bull factory—would take months. Hitler didn't have months in his hour-to- - hour struggle to dominate Europe. In a section entided "Length of Time for - Competition to Come in Actuality," Chauncey argued, "Unless the authori- - ties, or the new company, operate in the meantime from the French Bull fac- - tory, it would appear that much time may elapse before such new company - [could] ... furnish machines in Germany." 103 - - -- 257 - - It seemed that in spite of its autarkic impulses and collective rage - against Watson, the cold fact remained: Nazi Germany needed punch cards. - It needed them not next month or even next week. It needed them every - hour of every day in every place. Only IBM could provide them. - "My inclination is to fight," Chauncey declared straight out. But the - battle would be difficult. He knew that IBM was fighting a two-front psycho- - economic war: Heidinger's demand to cash in his stock, and Nazi Party - demands to take over the subsidiary. Clearly, the two were organically linked, - - [...] - - As for IBM's fight with the Nazi Party, Chauncey reiterated his willing- - ness to "make any representations to the authorities that our managers need - not reveal any information of the activities of Dehomag's customers... . but I - cannot get the actual persons out in the open." 107 That chance would now - come. After weeks of remaining in the background, Dr. Edmund Veesen- - mayer would finally come forward. - - -- 258 - - IBM as a company would know the innermost details of Hitler's Holle- - rith operations, designing the programs, printing the cards, and servicing the - machines. But Watson and his New York directors could erect a wall of credi- - ble deniability at the doors of the executive suite. In theory, only those down - the hall in the New York headquarters who communicated direcdy with IBM - Geneva, such as IBM European General Manager Schotte, could provide a - link to the reality in Europe. But in fact, any such wall contained so many - cracks, gaps, and hatches as to render it imaginary. The free flow of informa- - tion, instructions, requests, and approvals by Watson remained detailed and - continuous for years to come—until well into 1944. - - [...] - - Using codes and oblique references, they nonetheless all spoke the - same language, even when the language was vague. - - [...] - - Millions of punch cards were routinely shipped from IBM in America - directly to Nazi-controlled sources in Poland, France, Bulgaria, and Belgium, - or routed circuitously through Sweden or colonies in Africa. When IBM's - American presses did not fill orders, subsidiaries themselves would ship - cards across frontiers from one IBM location to another. 125 - - -- 264-265 - -Such knowledge would in fact interest the allies. But curiously the State -Deparment acted as a "postman" during "DURING IBM'S day-to-day struggle to -stay in the Axis during wartime" (page 277): - - The Department's desire to secretly advance the commercial causes of - IBM persevered in spite of the nation's officially stated opposition to the - Hitler menace. For this reason, it was vital to Watson that nothing be done to - embarrass or even annoy the Department publicly. This caution was only - heightened by an on-going FBI investigation into IBM's operation as a - potential hotbed of Nazi sympathizers. Avoiding embarrassing moments was - difficult given the far-flung global empire of IBMers so deeply involved with - Fascist and Axis countries, and accustomed to speaking supportively of their - clients' military endeavors. - - -- 277 - -That was before the US entering the war. - -### The new board - - During all the genocide years, 1942-1945, the Dehomag that Watson - fought to protect did remain intact. Ultimately, it was governed by a special - Reich advisory committee representing the highest echelons of the Nazi hier- - archy. The Dehomag advisory committee replaced the traditional corporate - board of directors. As with any board, the committee's duty was to advise - - [...] - - Four men sat on the advisory board. One was a trustee. Second was - Passow, chief of the Maschinelles Berichtwesen. Third was Heidinger. Fourth - was Adolf Hitler's personal representative. 160 - - Hitler's representative on Dehomag's advisory committee was Dr. Edmund - Veesenmayer. 161 - - -- 271 - -### General Ruling 11 - - As America advanced toward the moment it would enter the war, the - Roosevelt Administration had recendy espoused General Ruling 11, an - emergency regulation forbidding any financial transactions with Nazi Ger- - many without a special Treasury Department license involving written justifi- - cations. Even certain corporate instructions of a financial nature were subject - to the rule. This was something completely new to contend with in IBM's - Nazi alliance. IBM would now be required to seek a complicated, bureau- - cratic approval for each financial instruction it ordered for its overseas sub- - sidiaries under Nazi control. General Ruling 11 would not affect subsidiaries - in neutral countries, such as Sweden or Switzerland. Even still, it would - severely hamper all communications with Dehomag itself, and open a gov- - ernment window into many of IBM's complex transactions. 51 - How much time did IBM have? - - -- 288 - - Now it appeared that General Ruling 11 had been violated. - - -- 291 - - IBM would not place a stop on any of its Dehomag business, or any - subsidiary's interaction with it. IBM filed another request with the Treasury - Department, this time to send an instruction to all of its European sub- - sidiaries and agencies, as well, as its divisions in Japan. The instruction: "In - view of world conditions we cannot participate in the affairs of our compa- - nies in various countries as we did in normal times. Therefore you are - advised that you will have to make your own decisions and not call on us for - any advice or assistance until further notice." It was sent to the State Depart- - ment on October 10, 1941, with a request for comment. 77 - - -- 293 - - December, just days before Pearl Harbor, to circumvent Treasury license - requirements and issue financial instructions to Dehomag. Ultimately, after - the U.S. joined the war against Germany, Westerholt was appointed the cus- - todian of CEC. 39 The Nazis were able to do with CEC as they pleased so - long as IBM was paid. The looming competition with Bull never came - to fruition. It was more of a bargaining chip than a genuine threat. Unable to - replace IBM, the Third Reich pressured the company into relinquishing Wat- - son's troublesome micro-managing in favor of the faster and more coordi- - nated action the Reich required. - - -- 306 - -### Holland and France - - Germany wanted the Jews identified by bloodline not religion, pauper- - ized, and then deported to camps, just as they were elsewhere in conquered - Europe. The Jews of France stood vulnerable under the shadow of destruc- - tion. Hitler was ready. - - In France, the Holleriths were not. - - -- 307 - - In 1936, as Inspector of Population Registries, Lentz standardized local - population registers and their data collection methodology throughout the - Netherlands—an administrative feat that earned him a royal decoration. That - same year, he outlined his personal vision in Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, - the journal of the German Statistical Society: "Theoretically," predicted - Lentz, "the collection of data for each person can be so abundant and com- - plete, that we can finally speak of a paper human representing the natural - human." 46 - - [...] - - His motto was "to record is to serve." 47 - - -- 308-309 - - Ten days after the census ordered by decree V06/41 was fully com- - piled, punched, and sorted, Nazi authorities demanded all Jews wear the - Jewish star. Again a number of Dutch people reacted with outrage and - protest. British diplomats reported that in one town, when the burgomaster - ordered Jews to affix the star, many non-Jews wore one as well. 87 - But it was not the outward visage of six gold points worn on the chest - for all to see on the street, it was the 80 columns punched and sorted in a - Hollerith facility that marked the Jews of Holland for deportation to concen- - tration camps. The Germans understood this all too well. - - -- 316 - - Arthur Seyss-Inquart, German Kommissar for Holland: 'Thanks to decree - 6/41, all Dutch Jews are now in the bag." 88 - - FRANCE EXCELLED at many things. Punch card automation was not one of - them. Although IBM had been able to install several hundred Hollerith - devices, mainly for high-volume military, railway, and banking users, Reich - forces had in large part confiscated those machines - - -- 317 - - Oppressive Nazi rule could have dictated its iron will to all reluctant - French authorities, and conquered the demographic uncertainties of a - French Jewry in two zones if only the Holleriths could be deployed. That is - precisely what Holleriths brought to any problem—organization where there - was disorder and tabular certainty where there was confusion. The Nazis - could have punch-carded the Jews of France into the same genocidal sce- - nario in force elsewhere, including Holland. But in the aftermath of the MB's - technologic ravages, France's punch card infrastructure was simply incapable - of supporting the massive series of programs Berlin required. Even if the - machines could have been gathered, transferred, or built—CEC just didn't - have the punch cards. - - -- 319 - - Rene Carmille, comp- troller general of the French Army, had for years been an - ardent advocate of punch cards. More than that, he had machines in good working - order at his government's Demographic Service. Carmille came forward and - offered to end the census chaos. He promised that his tabulators could deliver - the Jews of France. 119 - - -- 324 - - Carmille had been working for months on a national Personal Identifi- - cation Number, a number that would not only be sequential, but descriptive. - The thirteen-digit PIN number would be a manual "bar code" of sorts - describing an individual's complete personal profile as well as professional - skills in great detail. For example, one number would be assigned for metal - workers, with a second modifying number for brass, and then a third modi- - fying number for curtain rods. Tabulators could then be set to whisk - through millions of cards until it located French metal workers, specializing - in brass with experience in curtain rods. Those metal workers could also be - pinpointed in any district. The system mimicked a concurrent Reich codifica- - tion system that assigned a descriptive bar code-like number to every prod- - uct and component in Germany. Carmille's number would ultimately evolve - into France's social security number. 123 - - -- 325 - - "We are no longer dealing with general censuses, but we are really following - individuals." Carmille made clear, "the new organization must now be envisioned - in such a way that the information be obtained continuously, which means that - the updating of information must be carefully regulated." 127 Carmille was now - France's great Hollerith hope. - - -- 328-329 - - Clearly, Carmille was running an active tabulator operation. Why wasn't - he producing the Jewish lists? - - [...] - - Just days after the French mobilized in Algeria the Nazis discovered - that Carmille was a secret agent for the French resistance. He had no inten- - tion of delivering the Jews. It was all a cover for French mobilization. - - [...] - - Carmille had deceived the Nazis. In fact, he had been working with - French counter-intelligence since 1911. During the worst days of Vichy, - Carmille was always considered one of the highest-placed operatives of the - French resistance, a member of the so-called "Marco Polo Network" of sabo- - teurs and spies. Carmille's operation had generated some 20,000 fake iden- - tity passes. And he had been laboring for months on a database of 800,000 - former soldiers in France who could be instandy mobilized into well- - planned units to fight for liberation. Under his plan, 300,000 men would be - ready to go. He had their names, addresses, their military specialties, and all - their occupational skills. He knew which ones were metal workers specializ- - ing in curtain rods, and which were combat-ready troops. 154 - As for column 11 asking for Jewish identity, the holes were never - punched—the answers were never tabulated. 155 More than 100,000 cards - of Jews sitting in his office—never handed over. 156 He foiled the entire - enterprise. - - -- 332-333 - - In early 1944, SS security officers ordered Carmille arrested. He was - apprehended in Lyon at noon on February 3, 1944. He was taken to the - Hotel Terminus where his interrogator was the infamous Butcher of Lyon, - Klaus Barbie. Barbie was despised as a master of torture who had sadistically - questioned many members of the resistance. Carmille went for two days - straight under Barbie's hand. He never cracked. 159 - - -- 334 - - It never stopped in Holland. The Population Registry continued to - spew out tabulations of names. The trains continued to roll. - Meanwhile, in France, the Germans also deported Jews to death camps - as often as possible. But in France, Nazi forces were compelled to continue - their random and haphazard round-ups. 168 - - Carmille was sent to Dachau, prisoner 76608, where he died of exhaus- - tion on January 25, 1945. He was posthumously honored as a patriot - although his role in dramatically reducing the number of Jewish deaths in - France was never really known and in some cases doubted. How many lives - he saved will never be tabulated. After the war, Lentz explained he was just a - public servant. He was tried, but only on unrelated charges, for which he was - sentenced to three years inprison. 169 - - Holland had Lentz. France had Carmille. Holland had a well-entrenched - Hollerith infrastructure. France's punch card infrastructure was in complete - disarray. - - -- 336 - -### American Property - - So even though corporate parents, such as IBM, were not - permitted to communicate with their own subsidiaries because they were in - Axis territory, these companies were deemed American property to be pro- - tected. In fact, since IBM only leased the machines, every Dehomag machine, - whether deployed at the Waffen-SS office in Dachau or an insurance office in - Rome, was considered American property to be protected. 10 - - -- 342 - -### War, Computing, Cryptography and Meteoroloy - - IBM and its technology were in fact involved in the Allies' most top- - secret operations. The Enigma code crackers at Bletchley Park in England - used Hollerith machines supplied by IBM's British licensee, the British Tabu- - lating Machine Company. Hut 7 at Bletchley Park was known as the Tabulating - Machine Section. As early as January 1941, the British Tabulating Machine - Company was supplying machines and punch cards not only to Bletchley - Park, but to British intelligence units in Singapore and Cairo as well. 40 - - Park, but to British intelligence units in Singapore and Cairo as well. 40 - By May 1942, IBM employees had joined America's own cryptographic - service. A key man was Steve Dunwell, who left Endicott's Commercial Re- - search Department to join other code breakers in Washington, D.C. The - group used a gamut of punch card machines made by IBM as well as Rem- - ington Rand to decipher intercepted Axis messages. Captured enemy code - books were keyed into punch cards using overlapping strings of fifty digits. - The punched cards were sorted. Each deciphered word was used to attack - another word until a message's context and meaning could laboriously be - established. At one point, Dunwell needed a special machine with electro- - mechanical relays that could calculate at high speed the collective probability - of words that might appear in a theoretical message bit. Dunwell sought per- - mission from Watson to ask that the device be assembled at IBM. Watson - granted it. - - It was an irony of the war that IBM equipment was used to encode and - decode for both sides of the conflict. 42 - - IBM was there even when the Allies landed at Normandy on June 6, - 1944. Hollerith machines were continuously used by the Weather Division of - the Army Air Forces to monitor and predict t h e tempestuous storms afflicting - the English Channel. When Al lied troops finally landed at Normandy, MRUs - went in soon after the beachhead was secured. 43 - War had always been good to IBM. In America, war income was with- - - -- 348 - - IBM machines were not just used to wage war. They were also used to - track people. Holleriths organized millions for the draft. Allied soldiers miss- - ing in action, as well as captured Axis prisoners, were cataloged by IBM sys- - tems. - - -- 349 - -### Untouchable and beyond reach of any nation - - IBM and Watson were untouchable. Carter learned the immutable truth in the very - words he had written months earlier: - - This [World War] is a conflict of warlike nationalistic states, each having cer- - tain interests. Yet we frequently find these interests clashing diametrically - with the opposing interests of international corporate structures, more huge - and powerful than nations. - - [...] - - IBM was in some ways bigger than the war. Both sides could not afford - to proceed without the company's all-important technology. Hitler needed - IBM. So did the Allies. - - -- 352 - -### One could never escape his code (p. 367), Hollerith erfasst: the Logistics of Genocide (p. 375) - - For the Allies, IBM assistance came at a crucial point. But for the Jews - of Europe it was too late. Hitler's Holleriths had been deployed against them - for almost a decade and were continuing without abatement. Millions of - Jews would now suffer the consequences of being identified and processed - by IBM technologies. - - After nearly a decade of incremental solutions the Third Reich was - ready to launch the last stage. In January 1942, a conference was held in - Wannsee outside Berlin. This conference, supported by Reich statisticians - and Hollerith experts, would outline the Final Solution of the Jewish prob- - lem in Europe. Once more, Holleriths would be used, but this time the Jews - would not be sent away from their offices or congregated into ghettos. Ger- - many was now ready for mass shooting pits, gas chambers, crematoria, and - an ambitious Hollerith-driven program known as "extermination by labor" - where Jews were systematically worked to death like spent matches. - For the Jews of Europe, it was their final encounter with German - automation. - - -- 354 - - The multitude of columns and codes punched into Hollerith and sorted - for instant results was an expensive, never-ending enterprise designed to - implement Hitler's evolving solutions to what was called the Jewish problem. - From Germany's first identifying census in 1933, to its sweeping occupa- - tional and social expulsions, to a net of ancestral tracings, to the Nuremberg - definitions of 1935, to the confiscations, and finally to the ghettoizations, it - was the codes that branded the individual and sealed his destiny. Each code - was a brick in an inescapable wall of data. Trapped by their code, Jews could - only helplessly wait to be sorted for Germany's next persecution. The system - Germany created in its own midst, it also exported by conquest or subver- - sion. As the war enveloped all Europe, Jews across the Continent found - themselves numbered and sorted to one degree or another. - - By early 1942, a change had occurred. Nazi Germany no longer killed - just Jewish people. It killed Jewish populations. This was the data-driven - denouement of Hitler's war against the Jews. - - Hollerith codes, compilations, and rapid sorts had enabled the Nazi - Reich to make an unprecedented leap from individual destruction to some- - thing on a much larger scale. - - -- 369 - - Der Fuhrer was now deter- mined to unleash a long contemplated campaign of - systematic, automated genocide, thus once and for all ridding the world of - Jews. 68 - - -- 370 - - By early 1944, Korherr was able to report to Eichmann a total of 5 million Jews - eliminated by "natural decrease, con- centration camp inmates, ghetto inmates, - and those who were [simply] put to death." 88 - - [...] - - More than a statistical bureau, by its very nature, the Hollerith complex at - Friedrichstrasse helped Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich, and Eichmann prioritize, - schedule, and manage the seemingly impossible logistics of genocide across - dozens of cities in more than twenty countries and territories. It was not just - people who were counted and marshaled for deportation. Boxcars, locomotives, - and intricate train timetables were sched- uled across battle-scarred - borders—all while a war was being fought on two fronts. The technology had - enabled Nazi Germany to orchestrate the death of millions without skipping a - note. - - Amidst the whirlwind of the Final Solution, the Third Reich's transition - from the blind persecution of a general population to the destruction of indi- - viduals had come full circle. In genocide, the Jews lost their identity. They - had been reduced to mere nameless data bits. Now each murdered Jew no - longer even represented an individual death. Now every corpse comprised a - mere component in a far larger statistical set adding up to total annihilation. - - -- 375 - -### Business Philosophy of "The Sollutions Company" (page 429) - - Perhaps IBM's business philosophy was best expressed by an executive - of Beige Watson in an August 1939 letter to senior officers of IBM NY. The - letter detailed the company's growing involvement in Japan's aircraft indus- - try. The IBM Brussels executive declared: "It is none of our business to - judge the reasons why an American corporation should or would help a for- - eign Government, and consequently Mr. Decker and myself have left these - considerations entirely out of our line of thought. ... we are, as IBM men, - interested in the technical side of the application of our machines." 102 - But as European territory was liberated in late 1944 and early 1945, - - -- 399 - - Fellinger even put IBM's interest before that of the Third Reich, con- - stantly badgering Berlin to pay more rent, and clear up its delinquencies. - He even demanded that the Wehrmacht pay for CEC machines the German - military seized from occupied France. It took months of burdensome legal - wrangling, but Fellinger successfully argued that the German military had no - right to remove CEC's machines without properly compensating IBM. His - argument hammered away at the theme that because the plundered machines - were leased items, they never belonged to the French government, but to IBM. - As such, the transferred devices were not subject to traditional rules of "war - booty." Only after reams of Fellinger's dense briefs, supported by attestations - by CEC Managing Director Roger Virgile, did the MB finally consent to nearly - a million Reichsmarks in back rent for machines transported out of France. 19 - - -- 407 - - Eventually, after ceaseless efforts, IBM NY regained control of its Ger- - man subsidiary. The name had been changed, the money regained, the - machines recovered, the record clear. For IBM the war was over. - - But for the descendants of 6 million Jews and millions of other Euro- - peans, the war would never be over. It would haunt them and people of con- - science forever. After decades of documentation by the best minds, the most - studied among them would confess that they never really understood the - Holocaust process. Why did it happen? How could it happen? How were they - selected? How did the Nazis get the names? They always had the names. - - What seemingly magical scheduling process could have allowed mil- - lions of Nazi victims to step onto train platforms in Germany or nineteen - other Nazi-occupied countries, travel for two and three days by rail, and then - step onto a ramp at Auschwitz or Treblinka—and within an hour be marched - into gas chambers. Hour a f t e r hour. Day a f t er day. Timetable after timetable. - - Like clockwork, and always with blitzkrieg efficiency. - The survivors would never know. The liberators who fought would - never know. The politicians who made speeches would never know. The - prosecutors who prosecuted would never know. The debaters who debated - would never know. - - The question was barely even raised. - - -- 429-430 - - "IBM does not have much information about this period" - - -- 433 - - IBM stuck to its story that the "Information Company" had no information about - the documents in its own archives, and had transferred some documents to - esteemed institutions for study. - - -- 452 - -## Index - -* Contract irregularities and American taxpayers subsidizing Hollerith, 34. -* Statistics, "race statistics", intellectual shock troops, 53-55. -* Tax avoidance, 65-66. -* Plan for a tower centralizing all the information, 97-98. -* Organized sterilization, 99. -* Slogan: "Hollerith illuminates your company, provides surveillance and helps organize", 110. -* Powers Machine Company, specialized, old and still functioning, like a niche technology, 108. -* Punch card and equipment production in numbers, 123-124. -* Accounting manipulation, 126-130. -* Meeting with Mussolini, 137. -* Meeting with Hitler, '"Heil!" 108 Watson lifted his right arm halfway up before he caught himself', 138. -* Watson wearing a medal with swastikas, 140. -* Office of Automated Reporting (Maschinelles Berichtwesen) and an "universal punch code system", 158-159. -* Animal censuses, 211. -* Monopoly and anti-trust ligitations, proprietary technology, 36, 213-214; monopoly and Soviet government, 243. -* FBI investigation on germans at the IBM, 219-220. -* Examples use for punch cards in nazi-Germany, 215-216, 373; at page 230 it's mentioned the "Race and Setdement Office", "a marriage-assistance bureau for SS officers" "who fulfilled the `[racial]` requirements for marriage", a pre-tinder automated dating agency that could not run correctly due to difficult access to Hollerith machines. -* Bizarre "alien" corporation management by a trustee in war-declared situations (Alien Property Custodian) with plausible deniability, destruction of evidence and layers of indirection, 238-241. -* IBM and State Department, 242. -* Watson was a micromanager, micromanagement (many places in the book). -* Money/revenue flow, 252. -* Patent war, 258 and other pages. -* Nazi-Germany and other US companies, 259. -* Irish Republican Army, 260. -* Ustashi croatian militia, 260. -* International Telephone Company reorganization in Spain; company re-organization under fascist-regimes, 262. -* Competitors: Bull in France, Powers in the US, Kamatec in Holland, 263. -* Veesenmayer: "technical scheduler of actual genocide", 268. -* Network of Hollerith systems installed at railroad junctions; relation between punch cards and trains, 270. -* Tulard file, a form system from 1941, 322. -* Notice from the Jewish Underground, 331. -* Holland and France in numbers: death-ratios (Jews counted / murdered) of 73% versus 25%, 336. -* Control in Business Machines, corporation as an "international monster" (which sounds like a "transleviathan"), 339. -* Argument that Hollerith patents should belong to the US Government "in the first place", 340. -* Watson motive to be "in the international peace movement", 340. -* IBM guns, grenades and masks, 346. -* Final Solution, 370. -* Daily death-rate at Auschwitz getting higher and outpassing Hollerith capacity, giving place to improvised number schemes; decrease of order, 357-358. -* Mengele and his own distinct numbers tatooed on inmates, 357. -* Protocol for mass Jewish extermination, 370. -* Switzerland: "switchboard for Nazi-era commercial intrigue"; banks as annomization proxies, 395. -* Document fabrication "to demonstrate compliance when the opposite was true" and client "blacklisting", 397. -* Watson's letter to all subsidiaries on enemy territory stating that now they were on their own, which in practice was only partially true 293, 398. -* The role of a neutral country to put a subsidiary as a proxy - or a "nexus" (page 399) - between a corporation and it's branches on enemy territories; in the case of IBM it was on Geneva, Switzerland, "a clearing office between the local organizations (...) and the New York Headquarters", 395-399. -* Validity of "punch card signature", 407. -* IBM Soldiers, 409. -* Reparation avoidance after the war, 422. -* Simultaneus translation technology during the Nuremberg Trials, by IBM and free-of-charge, 425. -* Hollerith usage by Allies, 426. -* IBM exemption, 426. -* Another Census, 428. -* Book "The History of Computing in Europe", 429. -* Manual punch card sorting by concentration camp inmates, 432. -* The Hollerith Bunker, 432. -* Caloric intake rationing, 196, 443. -* Defensive Documentation, 446. -* IBM Klub and House of Data, 449. -* Investigation that required "Holocaust knowledge with an emphasis on Hitler-era finance, added to information-technology expertise, sifted through the dogged techniques of an investigative reporter", 454. -* Local and central processing facilities -- like Berlin and Oranienburg, 455. -- cgit v1.2.3