From ce2698a88be769d39288ee76fe7adcda7d03c974 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvio Rhatto Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 16:03:06 -0300 Subject: Updates sociology --- books/sociology/counterrevolution.md | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 113 insertions(+) diff --git a/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md b/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md index 0c0bf1b..6bca18d 100644 --- a/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md +++ b/books/sociology/counterrevolution.md @@ -1748,3 +1748,116 @@ A circular, feedback loop: system. Second, there was the notion of systematicity that involved a particular type of method—one that began by collecting a set of promising alternatives, constructing a model, and using a defined criterion. + + [...] + + This method of systems analysis became influential in government and + eventually began to dominate governmental logics starting in 1961 when Robert + McNamara acceded to the Pentagon under President John F. Kennedy. + + [...] + + According to its proponents, systems analysis + would allow policy makers to put aside partisan politics, personal preferences, + and subjective values. It would pave the way to objectivity and truth. As RAND + expert and future secretary of defense James R. Schlesinger explained: + “[Systems analysis] eliminates the purely subjective approach on the part of + devotees of a program and forces them to change their lines of argument. They + must talk about reality rather than morality.” 13 With systems analysis, + Schlesinger argued, there was no longer any need for politics or value + judgments. The right answer would emerge from the machine-model that + independently evaluated cost and effectiveness. All that was needed was a + narrow and precise objective and good criteria. The model would then spit out + the most effective strategy. + + [...] + + Counterinsurgency theory blossomed at precisely the moment that systems + analysis was, with RAND’s backing, gaining influence in the Pentagon and at + the White House. The historian Peter Paret pinpoints this moment, in fact, to the + very first year of the Kennedy administration: “In 1961, the Cuban revolution + combined with the deteriorating Western position in Southeast Asia + + [...] + + It convened, as mentioned earlier, the seminal + counterinsurgency symposium in April 1962, where RAND analysts discovered + David Galula and commissioned him to write his memoirs. RAND would + publish his memoirs as a confidential classified report in 1963 under the title + + [...] + + Counterinsurgency theory blossomed at precisely the moment that systems + analysis was, with RAND’s backing, gaining influence in the Pentagon and at + the White House. The historian Peter Paret pinpoints this moment, in fact, to the + very first year of the Kennedy administration: “In 1961, the Cuban revolution + combined with the deteriorating Western position in Southeast Asia to shift + + [...] + + One recent episode regarding interrogation + methods is telling. It involved the evaluation of different tactics to obtain + information from informants, ranging from truth serums to sensory overload to + torture. These alternatives were apparently compared and evaluated using a SA + approach at a workshop convened by RAND, the CIA, and the American + Psychological Association (APA). Again, the details are difficult to ascertain + fully, but the approach seemed highly systems-analytic. + + [...] a series of workshops on “The Science of Deception” + + [...] + + More specifically, according to this source, the workshops probed and + compared different strategies to elicit information. The systems-analytic + approach is reflected by the set of questions that the participants addressed: How + important are differential power and status between witness and officer? What + pharmacological agents are known to affect apparent truth-telling behavior? + What are sensory overloads on the maintenance of deceptive behaviors? How + might we overload the system or overwhelm the senses and see how it affects + deceptive behaviors? These questions were approached from a range of + disciplines. The workshops were attended by “research psychologists, + psychiatrists, neurologists who study various aspects of deception and + representatives from the CIA, FBI and Department of Defense with interests in + intelligence operations. In addition, representatives from the White House Office + of Science and Technology Policy and the Science and Technology Directorate + of the Department of Homeland Security were present.” 31 + + [...] + + And in effect, from a counterinsurgency perspective, these various tactics— + truth serums, sensory overloads, torture—are simply promising alternatives that + need to be studied, modeled, and compared to determine which ones are superior + at achieving the objective of the security system. Nothing is off limits. + Everything is fungible. The only question is systematic effectiveness. This is the + systems-analytic approach: not piecemeal, but systematic. + Incidentally, a few years later, Gerwehr apparently went to Guantánamo, but + refused to participate in any interrogation because the CIA was not using video + cameras to record the interrogations. Following that, in the fall of 2006 and in + 2007, Gerwehr made several calls to human-rights advocacy groups and + reporters to discuss what he knew. A few months later, in 2008, Gerwehr died of + a motorcycle accident on Sunset Boulevard. 32 He was forty years old. + + [...] + + Sometimes, depending on the practitioner, the analysis favored torture or summary + execution; at other times, it leaned toward more “decent” tactics. But these + variations must now be understood as internal to the system. Under President + Bush’s administration, the emphasis was on torture, indefinite detention, and + illicit eavesdropping; under President Obama’s, it was on drone strikes and total + surveillance; in the first months of the Trump presidency, on special operations, + drones, the Muslim ban, and building the wall. What unites these different + strategies is counterinsurgency’s coherence as a system—a system in which + brutal violence is heart and center. That violence is not aberrational or rogue. It + is to be expected. It is internal to the system. Even torture and assassination are + merely variations of the counterinsurgency logic. + + Counterinsurgency abroad and at home has been legalized and systematized. It + has become our governing paradigm “in any situation,” and today “simply + expresses the basic tenet of the exercise of political power.” It has no sunset + provision. It is ruthless, game theoretic, systematic—and legal. And with all of + the possible tactics at the government’s disposal—from total surveillance to + indefinite detention and solitary confinement, to drones and robot-bombs, even + to states of exception and emergency powers—this new mode of governing has + never been more dangerous. + + In sum, The Counterrevolution is our new form of tyranny. -- cgit v1.2.3