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diff --git a/books/psychology/psychology-of-intelligence.md b/books/psychology/psychology-of-intelligence.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be516af --- /dev/null +++ b/books/psychology/psychology-of-intelligence.md @@ -0,0 +1,332 @@ +[[!meta title="The Psychology of Intelligence"]] + +* Author: Jean Piaget. +* Publisher: Routledge Classics. +* Year: 1950. + +## References + +* [Piaget's theory of cognitive development - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piaget's_theory_of_cognitive_development). + +## Overview + +This overview is a mixed of both ideas from the book altogether with other +considerations I've got by reading other, related material: + +### Intelligence is reversible! + +As what's really wonderful about this reversibility is that it's built atop of +lower, fundamental levels of irreversible dynamical systems. + +That revesibility is the capacity to the adaptive system do turn away from +configurations that doesn't lead to a defined goal and replace by other +pathways, mixing introspection and empirism. + +Reading this book along with The Tree of Live from Maturana and Varella +and Morin's Method I get the feeling that intelligence in life arises from +the sensori-motor system and gets deeper in a process where the nervous +system inflates to give way to impulses/stimuli that originates from itself. + +Consequential to this reversibility is that intelligence might experimentation +freely without risking itself producing damages or permanent harm to itself, +which is different to say that somebody can't harm him/herself by the consequence +of his/her acts. + +Also, while what happens with intelligence looks entirely reversible, mind is +not composed of intelligence alone. Other instances exist that might put the +whole apparatus on restricted modes of operation, such when in a neurosis which +is a state of constant looping in a given theme. + +## Misc + +* Perception (imediate contact with the world) (127). + +* Habit: beyond short and rapidly automatised connections between per- + ceptions and responses (habit) (127). + +* How the whole body is seem according to his theory? There's a movement (sic) + where intelligence raises from the sensori-motor to the mind, but can we + consider the other way as well, about what's conceived by abstract thought + be then used as a source of sensori-motor intelligence? I guess so, but wonder + how that could be articulated in Piaget's theory. + +## Intelligence and equilibrium + + Then, if intelligence is thus conceived as the form of equilibrium towards + which all cognitive processes tend, there arises the problem of its relations + with perception (Chap. 3), and with habit (Chap. 4). + + -- Preface + + Every response, whether it be an act directed towards the outside world or an + act internalized as thought, takes the form of an adaptation or, better, of a + re-adaptation. The individual acts only if he experiences a need, i.e., if the + equilibrium between the environment and the organism is momentarily upset, and + action tends to re-establish the equilibrium, i.e., to re-adapt the organ- ism + (Claparède). A response is thus a particular case of inter- action between the + external world and the subject, but unlike physiological interactions, which + are of a material nature and involve an internal change in the bodies which are + present, the responses studied by psychology are of a functional nature and are + achieved at greater and greater distances in space (percep- tion, etc.) and in + time (memory, etc.) besides following more and more complex paths (reversals, + detours, etc.). Behaviour, thus conceived in terms of functional interaction, + presupposes two essential and closely interdependent aspects: an affective + aspect and a cognitive aspect. + + -- 5 + + Furthermore, intelligence itself does not consist of an isolated and sharply + differentiated class of cognitive processes. It is not, properly speaking, one + form of structuring among others; it is the form of equilibrium towards which + all the structures arising out of perception, habit and elementary + sensori-motor mechan- isms tend. It must be understood that if intelligence is + not a faculty this denial involves a radical functional continuity between the + higher forms of thought and the whole mass of lower types of cognitive and + motor adaptation; so intelligence can only be the form of equilibrium towards + which these tend. + + This does not mean, of course, that a judgment consists of a co- ordination of + perceptual structures, or that perceiving means unconscious inference (although + both these theories have been held), for functional continuity in no way + excludes diversity or even heterogeneity among structures. Every structure is + to be thought of as a particular form of equilibrium, more or less stable + within its restricted field and losing its stability on reach- ing the limits of + the field. But these structures, forming different levels, are to be regarded as + succeeding one another according to a law of development, such that each one + brings about a more inclusive and stable equilibrium for the processes that + emerge from the preceding level. Intelligence is thus only a generic term to + indicate the superior forms of organization or equilibrium of cognitive + structurings. + + -- 7 + + In general, we may thus conclude that there is an essential unity between the + sensori-motor processes that engender per- ceptual activity, the formation of + habits, and pre-verbal or pre- representative intelligence itself. The latter + does not therefore arise as a new power, superimposed all of a sudden on com- + pletely prepared previous mechanisms, but is only the expres- sion of these + same mechanisms when they go beyond present and immediate contact with the + world (perception), as well as beyond short and rapidly automatised connections + between per- ceptions and responses (habit), and operate at progressively + greater distances and by more complex routes, in the direction of mobility and + reversibility. Early intelligence, therefore, is simply the form of mobile + equilibrium towards which the mechanisms adapted to perception and habit tend; + but the latter attain this only by leaving their respective fields of + application. Moreover, intelligence, from this first sensori-motor stage + onwards, has already succeeded in constructing, in the special case of space, + the equilibrated structure that we call the group of displacements—in an + entirely empirical or practical form, it is true, and of course remaining on + the very restricted plane of immediate space. But it goes without saying that + this organiza- tion, circumscribed as it is by the limitations of action, still + does not constitute a form of thought. On the contrary, the whole development + of thought, from the advent of language to the end of childhood, is necessary + in order that the completed sensori- motor structures, which may even be + co-ordinated in the form of empirical groups, may be extended into genuine + operations, which will constitute or reconstruct these groupings and groups at + the level of symbolic behaviour and reflective reasoning. + + -- 127-128 + +## Logic and psychology + + An axiomatics is an exclusively hypothetico-deductive sci- + ence, i.e., it reduces to a minimum appeals to experience (it even + aims to eliminate them entirely) in order freely to reconstruct its + object by means of undemonstrable propositions (axioms), + which are to be combined as rigorously as possible and in every + possible way. In this way geometry has made great progress, + seeking to liberate itself from all intuition and constructing the + most diverse spaces simply by defining the primary elements to + be admitted by hypothesis and the operations to which they are + subject. The axiomatic method is thus the mathematical method + par excellence and it has had numerous applications, not only in + pure mathematics, but in various fields of applied mathematics + (from theoretical physics to mathematical economics). The use- + fulness of an axiomatics, in fact, goes beyond that of demonstra- + tion (although in this field it constitutes the only rigorous + method); in the face of complex realities, resisting exhaustive + analysis, it permits us to construct simplified models of reality + and thus provides the study of the latter with irreplaceable dis- + secting instruments. To sum up, an axiomatics constitutes a “pat- + tern” for reality, as F. Gonseth has clearly shown, and, since all + abstraction leads to a schematization, the axiomatic method in + the long run extends the scope of intelligence itself. + + But precisely because of its “schematic” character, an axiomat- + ics cannot claim to be the basis of, and still less to replace, its + corresponding experimental science, i.e. the science relating to + that sector of reality for which the axiomatics forms the pattern. + Thus, axiomatic geometry is incapable of teaching us what the + space of the real world is like (and “pure economics” in no way + exhausts the complexity of concrete economic facts). No axi- + omatics could replace the inductive science which corresponds + to it, for the essential reason that its own purity is merely a limit + which is never completely attained. As Gonseth also says, there + always remains an intuitive residue in the most purified pattern + (just as there is already an element of schematization in all intu- + ition). This reason alone is enough to show why an axiomatics + will never be the basis of an experimental science and why there + is an experimental science corresponding to every axiomatics + (and, no doubt, vice versa). + + -- page 30 + + It is true that in addition to the individual consistency of + actions there enter into thought interactions of a collective order + and consequently “norms” imposed by this collaboration. But + co-operation is only a system of actions, or of operations, car- + ried out in concert, and we may repeat the preceding argument + for collective symbolic behaviour, which likewise remains at a + level containing real structures, unlike axiomatizations of a + formal nature. + + For psychology, therefore, there remains unaltered the prob- + lem of understanding the mechanism with which intelligence + comes to construct coherent structures capable of operational + combination; and it is no use invoking “principles” which this + intelligence is supposed to apply spontaneously, since logical + principles concern the theoretical pattern formulated after + thought has been constructed and not this living process of con- + struction itself. Brunschvicg has made the profound observation + that intelligence wins battles or indulges, like poetry, in a con- + tinuous work of creation, while logico-mathematical deduction + is comparable only to treatises on strategy and to manuals of + “poetic art”, which codify the past victories of action or mind + but do not ensure their future conquests. 1 + + -- page 34 + +## Habit and sensori-motor intelligence + +Circular reaction: + + Let us imagine an infant in a cradle with a raised cover from which + hang a whole series of rattles and a loose string. The child grasps + this and so shakes the whole arrangement without expecting to do + so or understanding any of the detailed spatial or causal rela- + tions. Surprised by the result, he reaches for the string and + carries out the whole sequence several times over. J. M. Baldwin + called this active reproduction of a result at first obtained by + chance a “circular reaction”. The circular reaction is thus a typ- + ical example of reproductive assimilation. The first movement + executed and followed by its result constitutes a complete action, + which creates a new need once the objects to which it relates + have returned to their initial stage; these are then assimilated to + the previous action (thereby promoted to the status of a schema) + which stimulates its reproduction, and so on. Now this mechan- + ism is identical with that which is already present at the source + of elementary habits except that, in their case, the circular reac- + tion affects the body itself (so we will give the name “primary + circular reaction” to that of the early level, such as the schema of + thumb-sucking), whereas thenceforward, thanks to prehension, + it is applied to external objects (we will call this behaviour affect- + ing objects the “secondary circular reaction,” although we must + remember that these are not yet by any means conceived as + substances by the child). + + -- 110-112 + +Early intelligence: + + The routes between the subject and the object fol- + lowed by action, and also by sensori-motor reconstitutions and + anticipations, are no longer direct and simple pathways as at the + previous stages: rectilinear as in perception, or stereotyped and + uni-directional as in circular reactions. The routes begin to vary + and the utilisation of earlier schemata begins to extend further in + time. This is characteristic of the connection between means and + ends, which henceforth are differentiated, and this is why we + may begin to speak of true intelligence. But, apart from the + continuity that links it with earlier behaviour, we should note the + limitations of this early intelligence: there are no inventions or + discoveries of new means, but simply application of known + means to unforeseen circumstances. + + -- 114 + +Innovation: + + Two acquisitions characterise the next stage, both relating to + the utilisation of past experience. The assimilatory schemata so + far described are of course continually accommodated to + external data. But this accommodation is, so to speak, suffered + rather than sought; the subject acts according to his needs and + this action either harmonizes with reality or encounters resist- + ances which it tries to overcome. Innovations which arise for- + tuitously are either neglected or else assimilated to previous + schemata and reproduced by circular reaction. However, a time + comes when the innovation has an interest of its own, and this + certainly implies a sufficient stock of schemata for comparisons + to be possible and for the new fact to be sufficiently like the + known one to be interesting and sufficiently different to avoid + satiation. Circular reaction, then, will consist of a reproduction + of the new phenomenon, but with variations and active + experimentation that are intended precisely to extract from it its + new possibilities. + + -- 114 + +Topology: + + But there now arises a problem whose discussion leads to the study of space. + Perceptual constancy is the product of simple regulations and we saw (Chap. 3) + that the absence at all ages of absolute constancy and the existence of adult + “superconstancy” provide evidence for the regulative rather than operational + char- acter of the system. There is, therefore, all the more reason why it + should be true of the first two years. Does not the construction of space, on + the other hand, lead quite rapidly to a grouping structure and even a group + structure in accordance with + + Poincaré’s famous hypothesis concerning the psychologically primary influence of + the “group of displacements?” The genesis of space in sensori-motor + intelligence is com- pletely dominated by the progressive organisation of + responses, and this in effect leads to a “group” structure. But, contrary to + Poincaré’s belief in the a priori nature of the group of dis- placements, this + is developed gradually as the ultimate form of equilibrium reached by this + motor organisation. Successive co-ordinations (combinativity), reversals + (reversibility), detours (associativity) and conservations of position + (identity) gradually give rise to the group, which serves as a necessary + equilibrium for actions. + + At the first two stages (reflexes and elementary habits), we could not even speak + of a space common to the various per- ceptual modalities, since there are as + many spaces, all mutually heterogeneous, as there are qualitatively distinct + fields (mouth, visual, tactile, etc.). It is only in the course of the third + stage that the mutual assimilation of these various spaces becomes system- atic + owing to the co-ordination of vision with prehension. Now, step by step with + these co-ordinations, we see growing up elementary spatial systems which + already presage the form of composition characteristic of the group. Thus, in + the case of interrupted circular reaction, the subject returns to the starting- + point to begin again; when his eyes are following a moving object that is + travelling too fast for continuous vision (falling etc.), the subject + occasionally catches up with the object by dis- placements of his own body to + correct for those of the external moving object. + + But it is as well to realise that, if we take the point of view of the subject + and not merely that of a mathematical observer, the construction of a group + structure implies at least two conditions: the concept of an object and the + decentralisation of movements by correcting for, and even reversing, their + initial egocentricity. In fact, it is clear that the reversibility + characteristic of the group presupposes the concept of an object, and also vice + versa, since to retrieve an object is to make it possible for oneself to return + (by displacing either the object itself or one’s own body). The object is + simply the constant due to the reversible composition of the group. + Furthermore, as Poincaré himself has clearly shown, the idea of displacement as + such implies the possibility of differentiating between irreversible changes of + state and those changes of position that are characterized precisely by their + reversibility (or by their possible correction through movements of one’s own + body). It is obvious, therefore, that without con- servation of objects there + could not be any “group”, since then everything would appear as a “change of + state”. The object and the group of displacements are thus indissociable, the + one con- stituting the static aspect and the other the dynamic aspect of the + same reality. But this is not all: a world with no objects is a universe with + no systematic differentiation between subjective and external realities, a world + that is consequently “adualistic” (J. M. Baldwin). By this very fact, such a + universe would be centred on one’s own actions, the subject being all the more + dominated by this egocentric point of view because he remains + un-self-conscious. But the group implies just the opposite attitude: a complete + decentralisation, such that one’s own body is located as one element among + others in a system of displacements enabling one to distinguish between one’s + own movements and those of objects. + + -- 123-125 |