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diff --git a/books/history/ibm-holocaust.md b/books/history/ibm-holocaust.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11ff478 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/history/ibm-holocaust.md @@ -0,0 +1,1898 @@ +[[!meta title="IBM and the Holocaust"]] + +"See everything with Hollerith punchcards": + +[[!img dehomag.png link="no"]] + +## About + +* [IBM and the Holocaust](http://www.ibmandtheholocaust.com/). +* Author: [Edwin Black](http://edwinblack.com/). + +It's worth read on it's entirety. + +## Impressum + +Impressions not to be held in punch cards. + +So we have this huge corporation, an empire built around monopolist practices +and information technology. It's pure capitalistic in the sense that it's not +bound any specific foreign government political affiliations providing that +it buys that information machinery. + +Watson's micromanagment style of "the most infinitesimal details" (page 241) +is symmetric with IBM's own technologies of control. Shape and being shapen +by a technology, as a mutual reflection with infinesimal consequences +as multiple mirror-images. + +Was Watson before NCR -- and hence before IBM -- a mere seller? An the experience +with Patterson's salles manual what changed everything in Watson's mind? + + Patterson had created a sales manual designed to rigidly standardize all + pitches and practices, and even mold the thought processes of selling. No + deviation was allowed. + + -- 39 + +Watson sounds like the Steve Jobs equivalent at that era of +techno-totalitarianism. + +Similarly to that inclination to control and domination, a government like nazi +Germany was an _automatic_ customer/partner that exponentiated all +potentialities for _efficiency_ -- in the limited, rationalized as an +unidimensional sense of efficiency. Note that I'm not using _natural_ to +denote, as nature is just the automatic qualities of something. + +Total control freaks meet at the dawn of large-scale information technology -- +as we cannot say that informational practices did not exist before. + +A technology that was designed to operate no matter whats the nature of the +"business". Be it commodities, manufacturing, people or war-making management. +War-time or logistic-time. Does not matter. + +The joint venture of IBM and the Nazis created International Business-As-Usual +with Machines of hateful domination. + +Even with the noise in the relation as when Watson broke with Hitler, some +"unstoppable force" of automation was there to stay and groe -- in the sense +that it was already being summoned and the force to stop it would be +tremendous. + +The unusual of war was converted to the usual of business. No matter is war is +being waged, the corporate-form now was immune to it using a complex set-up os +nominated trustees, plausible deniability and levels of indirection. It can +"dissolve" itself in parts split inside beligerant nations and regroup after +the war -- keeping activities mostly unaffected and the profit guaranteed. +That is a even higher level of transnationality. It survives beyond localized +humours of mankind. + +THINK must be put in perspective. Not only in the ink in the printed punch card. +Not only as a corporation as a Think Tank and efectivelly an acting tank. + +A technology based on the operation of counting and sorting limits thinking to +only those two operations. In fact counting enables arithmetic and sorting +stablish the decision-making needed by proper computing, putting the whole +thought inside a box. Further restriction of thought is installed by allowing +it just for the purpose of profit: how to better exploit resources? By selling +that junk massivelly, this type of machinic "phylum" spread like cancer and +gangraned many brains. Copy is memory; punch card destruction is amnesia. +War is peace. Freedom is slavery. The Big Brother, or Big Blue, was an +information/disinformation machine. + +Punch cards: holes punched in holes distributed in a plane-section. How that +confines or enables thought? + +The nazi war machine was also an information machine, with an important +vulnerability of being too dependent in foreign technology. Hollerith himself +was a German descendent. Was that machinery only possible with this combination +of "traits" (page 31)? Germanic war-and-blood ideology with american capitalist +pragmatism? + +Nazism was not only land and blood, but had also a strict and extreme dose of +ratiolaism. Not only megalomania, but also extreme obsession. + +Impressum ironically punched on a ThinkPad. + +## An image comparison + +At [IBM Schoolhouse and Engineering Laboratory Building](https://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/history/year_1933.html) +entrance one could read the "Five Steps to Knowledge" [carved _at the +footsteps_](http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/think_culture/transform/) +(THINK / OBSERVE / DISCUSS / LISTEN / READ): + +![5 steps](https://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/history/images/5steps_to_knowledge.jpg) + +![THINK](http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/images/icp/Y812281R29443C55/us__en_us__ibm100__cult_think__five_steps__620x350.jpg) + +While, at Auschwitz, it was written "Work sets you free" in the entrance gate, above people's head: + +![Auschwitz Gate](auschwitz.jpg) + +One-dimensional Rationalization as a monotonic misconception of the thought process used for mass extermination. +Slave work, death by starvation which would set extermination camp inmates free from work and from data processing. + +A strange opposition of what is written in the ground -- for the head look something from above and at the same time +leaving the head low while the THINK-good stays above -- and what's written above to be seeing from below, diminished. + +That Auschwitz photo also has an iconic "HALT" sign at the entry blockade, which is evocative about the +last destination of an information processing in the extermination complex. + +## Workflow + +The International Holocaust Machines operated through the following stages: + +* Census/identification: initial data aquisition on population, assets and commodities, even livestock. +* Confiscation: seized goods, assets, etc. +* Ghettoization and Deportation, through: + * Sorting punch-card data to pinpoint residency location of undesirables to + subsequenttly kidnap them. + * Efficient management of railway using Holleriths to dispatch undesirables. +* Concentration and Extermination, by using punch-card technology to manage how each person would + die and where it will take place, as well as management of slave work. +* Internal management of the punch card business, which would include inventory + tracking and spoil recovering after the war. + +Besides the well known relation between death and money-making during wars, +that was a Death Factory: if life could be stated as a long "detour to death", a +Death Factory is exactly it's opposite: and acceleration instead of a delay, +the acumen of the industrial process at the massive scale. + +## Ideas + +Somebody ought to sort out the data -- not using punch cards! -- presenting in +the book: production inputs, outputs and what's known about profits, royalties +and tax avoidance; how money was transfered and invested. Or maybe somebody +already did that? Lot's interesting stuff might be discovered by doing a +quantitative analysis. + +It also might be important to search through patent offices for Hollerith +applications. + +And creation of organograms and relational charts/maps. + +## Questions + +How Holleriths were made? Which were manual and with were automaded procedures? +Was an assembly lines and time-controlled manufacturing processes involved? +Does Holleriths were involved in management of it's own production? + +## Excerpts + +### Hollerith + +Machine characteristics: + +* Closed, pattented design. +* Commercialized only through leasing. +* Compatible cards between Hollerith machines, "no other machine that might ever be produced" (how?). + +Hollerith characteristics: + + Just nineteen years old, Hollerith moved to Washington, D.C., to join + the Census bureau. Over dinner one night at the posh Potomac Boat Club, + Director of Vital Statistics, John Billings, quipped to Hollerith, "There ought + to be a machine for doing the purely mechanical work of tabulating popula- + tion and similar statistics." Inventive Hollerith began to think about a solu- + tion. French looms, simple music boxes, and player pianos used punched + holes on rolls or cards to automate rote activity. About a year later, Hollerith + was struck with his idea. He saw a train conductor punch tickets in a special + pattern to record physical characteristics such as height, hair color, size of + nose, and clothing—a sort of "punched photograph." Other conductors + could read the code and then catch anyone re-using the ticket of the original + passenger. 5 + + Hollerith's idea was a card with standardized holes, each representing a + different trait: gender, nationality, occupation, and so forth. The card would + then be fed into a "reader." By virtue of easily adjustable spring mechanisms + and brief electrical brush contacts sensing for the holes, the cards could be + "read" as they raced through a mechanical feeder. The processed cards could + then be sorted into stacks based on a specified series of punched holes. 6 + + Millions of cards could be sorted and resorted. Any desired trait + could be isolated—general or specific—by simply sorting and resorting for + data-specific holes. The machines could render the portrait of an entire + population—or could pick out any group within that population. Indeed, one + man could be identified from among millions if enough holes could be + punched into a card and sorted enough times. Every punch card would + become an informational storehouse limited only by the number of holes. It + was nothing less than a nineteenth-century bar code for human beings. 7 + + -- 31 + + Since the Census Bureau only needed most of the tabulators once every + decade, and because the defensive inventor always suspected some electri- + cian or mechanic would steal his design, Hollerith decided that the systems + would be leased by the government, not purchased. This important decision + to lease machines, not sell them, would dominate all major IBM business + transactions for the next century. Washington paid Hollerith about $750,000 + to rent his machines for the project. Now the inventor's challenge was to find + + -- 32 + + Italy, England, France, Austria, and Germany all submitted orders. Hollerith's + new technology was vi r t ual l y unrivaled. His machines made advanced census + taking possible everywhere in the world. He and he alone would control the + technology because the punchers, sorters, and tabulators were all designed + to be compatible with each other—and with no other machine that might + ever be produced. 12 + + [...] + + Other than his inventions, Hollerith was said to cherish three things: his + German heritage, his privacy, and his cat Bismarck. His link to everything + German was obvious to all around him. + + [...] + + For privacy, Hollerith built a tall fence around his home to keep out + neighbors and their pets. When too many cats scaled the top to jump into the + yard, the ever-inventive Hollerith strung electrical wire along the fence, con- + nected it to a battery, and then perched at his window puffing on a cigar. + When a neighbor cat would appear threatening Bismarck's privacy, Hollerith + would depress a switch, sending an electrical jolt into the animal. 16 + Hollerith's first major overseas census was organized for the brutal + regime of Czar Nicholas II to launch the first-ever census of an estimated + 120 million Russians. Nicholas was anxious to import Hollerith technology. + + -- 34 + +### IBM merger + +The Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company, or CTR: + + The four lackluster firms Flint selected defied any apparent rationale + for merger. International Time Recording Company manufactured time + clocks to record worker hours. Computing Scale Company sold simple retail + scales with pricing charts attached as well as a line of meat and cheese slicers. + Bundy Manufacturing produced small key-actuated time clocks, but, more + importantly, it owned prime real estate in Endicott, New York. Of the four, + Hollerith's Tabulating Machine Company was simply the largest and most + dominant member of the group. 32 + + Moreover, Flint wanted CTR's helm to be captained by a businessman, not a + technocrat. For that, he chose one of America's up and coming business + scoundrels, Thomas J. Watson. + + -- 37 + +### Watson, "Paternalistic and authoritarian" + + Watson was a conqueror. From simple merchandise inauspiciously sold + to farmers and townsfolk in rural west-central New York, Watson would go + on to command a global company consumed not with mere customers, but + with territories, nations, and entire populations. He would identify corporate + enemies to overcome and strategies to deploy. Like any conqueror, he would + vanquish all in his way, and then demand the spoils. Salesmanship under + Watson would elevate from one man's personal elixir to a veritable cult of + commercial conquest. By virtue of his extraordinary skills, Watson would be + delivered from his humble beginnings as a late-nineteenth-century horse- + and-buggy back road peddler, to corporate scoundrel, to legendary tycoon, + to international statesman, and finally to regal American icon—all in less + than four decades. + + -- 38 + + Watson began the systematic annihilation of Hallwood, its sales, and its + customer base. Tactics included lurking near the Hallwood office to spy on its + salesmen and customers. Watson would report the prospective clients so + "intimidation squads" could pounce. The squads would threaten the prospect with + tall tales of patent infringement suits by NCR against Hallwood, falsely + claiming such suits would eventually include anyone who purchased Hallwood + machines. The frightened customer would then be offered an NCR machine at a + discount. 43 + + -- 40 + + Patterson planted him in New York City, handed him a million-dollar budget, + and asked him to create a fake business called Watson's Cash Register and + Second Hand Exchange. His mission was to join the community of second- + hand dealers, learn their business, set up shop nearby, dramatically undersell, + quietly steal their accounts, intimidate their customers, and otherwise disrupt + their viability. Watson's fake company never needed to make a profit—only + spend money to decimate unsuspecting dealers of used registers. Eventually, + they would either be driven out of business or sell out to Watson with a dra- + conian non-compete clause. Funneled money from NCR was used for opera- + tions since Watson had no capital of his own. 46 + + -- 41 + + NCR salesmen wore dark suits, the corporation innovated a One Hun- + dred Point Club for agents who met their quota, and The Cash stressed "clean + living" as a virtue for commercial success. One day during a pep rally to the + troops, Watson scrawled the word THINK on a piece of paper. Patterson saw + the note and ordered THINK signs distributed throughout the company. + Watson embraced many of Patterson's regimenting techniques as indispens- + able doctrine for good sales. What he learned at NCR would stay with him + forever. 53 + + [...] + + Patterson, Watson, and several dozen other Cash executives were indicted for + criminal conspiracy to restrain trade and construct a monopoly. + + [...] + + A year later, in 1913, all defendants were found guilty by an Ohio jury. + Damning evidence, supplied by Watson colleagues and even Watson's own + signed letters of instructions, were irrefutable. Most of the men, including + Watson, received a one-year jail sentence. Many of the convicted wept and + asked for leniency. But not Watson. He declared that he was proud of what + he had accomplished. 55 + + -- 42 + + Then came the floods. + + [...] + + The Cash pounced. NCR organized an immense emergency relief effort. + + [...] + + Patterson, Watson, and the other NCR men became national heroes over- + + [...] + + Petitions were sent to President Woodrow Wilson asking for a pardon. + Considering public sentiment, prosecutors offered consent decrees in lieu of + jail time. Most of the defendants eagerly signed. Watson, however, refused, + maintaining he saw nothing wrong in his conduct. Eventually, Watson's attorneys + successfully overturned the conviction on a technicality. The government + declined to re-prosecute. 58 But then the unpredictable and maniacal Patterson + rewarded Watson's + + -- 42-43 + + Patterson had demanded starched white shirts and dark suits at NCR. Watson + insisted CTR employees dress in an identical uniform. And Watson borrowed his + own NCR innovation, the term THINK, which at CTR was impressed onto as many + surfaces as could be found, from the wall above Watson's desk to the bottom of + company stationery. These Patterson cum Watson touches were easy to implement + since several key Watson aides were old cronies from the NCR scandal days. 66 + + -- 45 + +A "father image": + + Watson embodied more than the boss. He was the Leader. He even had a song. + Clad in their uniforms of dark blue suits and glistening white shirts, the + inspirited sales warriors of CTR would sing: + + Mister Watson is the man we're working for, + He's the Leader of the C-T-R, + He's the fairest, squarest man we know; + Sincere and true. + He has shown us how to play the game. + And how to make the dough. 70 + + -- 46 + + "IBM is more than a business—it is a great worldwide institution that is going + on forever." 74 More than ever. Watson f us e d himself into every facet of IBM's opera- + tions, injecting his style into every decision, and mesmerizing the psyche of + every employee. "IBM Spirit"—this was the term Watson ascribed to the all- + encompassing, almost tribal devotion to company that he demanded. + + [...] + + Children began their indoctrination early, becoming eligible at age three for + the kiddy rolls of the IBM Club, graduating to junior ranks at age eight. 76 + + [...] + + Watson's own son, Tom, who inherited his father's throne at IBM, + admitted, "The more I worked at IBM, the more I resented Dad for the cult- + like atmosphere that surrounded him." 78 + + [...] + + The ever- present equating of his name with the word THINK was more than an + Orwellian exercise, it was a true-life indoctrination. The Watson mystique was + never confined to the four walls of IBM. His aura was only magnified by + + -- 47 + + Fortune referred to Watson as "the Leader," with a capital "L." So completely + con- scious was Watson of his mythic quality that he eyed even the porters on + trains and waiters in restaurants as potential legend busters. He tossed them + big tips, often as much as $10, which was largesse for the day. + + [...] + + By giving liberally to charities and universities, by towering as a patron + of the arts, by arranging scores of organizational memberships, honorary de- + grees and awards, he further cultivated the man-myth for himself and IBM. 81 + Slogans were endlessly drilled into the extended IBM Family. We For- + give Thoughtful Mistakes. There Is No Such Thing As Standing Still. Pack Up + Your Troubles, Mr. Watson Is Here. 82 + And the songs. They began the very first day a man entered the IBM + culture. They never ended during one's entire tenure. More than 100 songs + were sung at various company functions. There were several for Watson, + including the "IBM Anthem" + + [...] + + Revival-style meetings enthralled the men of IBM. Swaying as they + chanted harmonies of adulation for the Leader, their palms brought together + in fervent applause in hero worship, fully accepting that their families and + destinies were intertwined with the family and destiny of the corporation, + legions of company men incessandy re-dedicated themselves to the "Ever + Onward" glory of IBM. All of it swirled around the irresistible magnetism, + t h e i nt oxi cat i n g command, the charismatic cultic control of one man, + Thomas J. Watson, the Leader. 84 + + -- 48-49 + +### IBM and the Third Reich + + The question confronting all businessmen in 1933 was whether trading + with Germany was worth either the economic risk or moral descent. This + question faced Watson at IBM as well. But IBM was in a unique commercial + position. While Watson and IBM were famous on the American business + scene, the company's overseas operations were fundamentally below the + public radar screen. IBM did not import German merchandise, it merely + exported American technology. The IBM name did not even appear on any + of thousands of index cards in the address files of leading New York boycott + organizations. Moreover, the power of punch cards as an automation tool + had not yet been commonly identified. So the risk that highly visible trading + might provoke economic retaliation seemed low, especially since Dehomag + did not even possess a name suggestive of IBM or Watson. 101 + On the other hand, the anticipated reward in Germany was great. + + Watson had learned early on that a government in reorganization, and + indeed a government tighdy monitoring its society, was good news for IBM. + During the Depression years, when the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration + created a massive bureaucracy to assist the public and control business, IBM + doubled its size. The National Recovery Act of 1933, for example, meant + "businesses all of a sudden had to supply the federal government with infor- + mation in huge and unprecedented amounts," recalled an IBM official. Extra + forms, export reports, more registrations, more statistics—IBM thrived on + red tape. 102 + + Nazi Germany offered Watson the opportunity to cater to government + control, supervision, surveillance, and regimentation on a plane never before + known in human history. The fact that Hitler planned to extend his Reich to + other nations only magnified the prospective profits. In business terms, that + was account growth. The technology was almost exclusively IBM's to purvey + because the firm controlled about 90 percent of the world market in punch + cards and sorters. + + -- 52 + +### Dehomag + + To be sure, Dehomag managers were as fervently devoted to the Nazi + movement as any of Hitler's scientific soldiers. IBM NY understood this from + the outset. Heidinger, a rabid Nazi, saw Dehomag's unique ability to imbue + the Reich with population information as a virtual calling from God. His + enraptured passion for Dehomag's sudden new role was typically expressed + while opening a new IBM facility in Berlin. "I feel it almost a sacred action," + declared Heidinger emotionally, "I pray the blessing of heaven may rest + upon this place." 118 + + That day, while standing next to the personal representative of Watson + and IBM, with numerous Nazi Party officials in attendance, Heidinger pub- + licly announced how in tune he and Dehomag were with the Nazi race scien- + tists who saw population statistics as the key to eradicating the unhealthy, + inferior segments of society. + + "The physician examines the human body and determines whether . . . + all organs are working to the benefit of the entire organism," asserted Hei- + dinger to a crowd of Nazi officials. "We [Dehomag] are very much like the + physician, in that we dissect, cell by cell, the German cultural body. We + report every individual characteristic . . . on a little card. These are not dead + cards, quite to the contrary, they prove later on that they come to life when + the cards are sorted at a rate of 25,000 per hour according to certain charac- + teristics. These characteristics are grouped like the organs of our cultural + body, and they will be calculated and determined with the help of our tabu- + lating machine. 119 + + It was right about this time that Watson decided to engrave the five + steps leading up to the door of the IBM School in Endicott, New York, with + five of his favorite words. This school was the place where Watson would + train his valued disciples in the art of sales, engineering, and technical sup- + port. Those five uppermost steps, steps that each man ascended before enter- + ing the front door, were engraved with the following words: + + READ + LISTEN + DISCUSS + OBSERVE + + The fifth and uppermost step was chiseled with the heralded theme of + the company. It said THINK. 122 + The word THINK was everywhere. + + -- 56-57 + +### The Census + +The datacenter: + + IN MID - SEPTEMBER , 1933, 6,000 brown cardboard boxes began unceremo- niously + arriving at the cavernous Alexanderplatz census complex in Berlin. Each box + was stuffed with questionnaires manually filled out by pen and pencil, but soon + to be processed by an unprecedented automated praxis. As supervisors emptied + their precious cargo at the Prussian Statistical Office, each questionnaire—one + per household—was initialed by an intake clerk, stacked, and then transferred + downstairs. "Downstairs" led to Dehomag's massive 22,000-square-foot hall, just + one floor below, specifically rented for the project. 18 + + Messengers shuttling stacks of questionnaires from the Statistical Office to + Dehomag bounded down the right-hand side of an enclosed stairwell. As they + descended the short flight, the sound of clicking became louder and louder. At + the landing, they turned left and pushed through the doors. As the doors swung + open, they encountered an immense high-ceilinged, hangar-like facility + reverberating with the metallic music of Hollerith technology. Some 450 data + punchers deployed in narrow rows of punching stations labored behind tall + upright secretarial displays perfectly matched to the oversized + census questionnaires. 19 + + Turning left again, and then another right brought the messengers to a + long windowed wall lined with narrow tables. The forms were piled there. + From these first tables, the forms were methodically distributed to central- + ized desks scattered throughout the work areas. The census forms were then + loaded onto small trolleys and shutded again, this time to individual work + stations, each equipped with a device that resembled a disjointed typewriter + - actually an input engine. 20 + + A continuous "Speed Punching" operation ran two shifts, and three + when needed. Each shift spanned 7.5 hours with 60 minutes allotted for + "fresh air breaks" and a company-provided meal. Day and night, Dehomag + staffers entered the details on 41 million Prussians at a rate of 150 cards per + hour. Allowing for holidays and a statistical prediction of absenteeism, yet + ever obsessed with its four-month deadline, Dehomag decreed a quota of + 450,000 cards per day for its workforce. Free coffee was provided to keep + people awake. A gymnast was brought in to demonstrate graceful aerobics + and other techniques to relieve fatigue. Company officials bragged that the + 41 million processed cards, if stacked, would tower two and a half times + higher than the Zugspitze, Germany's 10,000-foot mountain peak. Dehomag + intended to reach the summit on time. 21 + + As company officials looked down upon a floor plan of the layout, the + linear rows and intersecting columns of work stations must have surely + resembled a grandiose punch card itself animated into a three-dimensional + bricks and mortar reality. Indeed, a company poster produced for the project + showed throngs of miniscule people scrambling over a punch card sketch. 22 + The surreal artwork was more than symbolic. + + -- 63-64 + +And the description follows which show how was explicity the wish to target Jews. + +Note for error-checking procedure and the "statistical prediction of +absenteeism" which imply on the [informate](/books/sociedade/age-of-the-smart-machine) +aspect of the procedure. + +### Discretion and secrecy + + Watson developed an extraordinary ability to write reserved and clev- + erly cautious letters. More commonly, he remained silent and let subordi- + nates and managers do the writing for him. But they too respected an IBM + code—unwritten, of course—to observe as much discretion as possible in + memos and correspondence. This was especially so in the case of corre- + sponding with or about Nazi Germany, the most controversial business part- + ner of the day. + + -- 68 + + Few understood the far-reaching ramifications of punch card technology and even + fewer had a foreground understanding that the com- pany Dehomag was in fact + essentially a wholly-owned subsidiary of Interna- tional Business Machines. + + Boycott and protest movements were ardently trying to crush Hitlerism by + stopping Germany's exports. Although a network of Jewish and non- sectarian + anti-Nazi leagues and bodies struggled to organize comprehensive lists of + companies doing business with Germany, from importers of German toys and shoes + to sellers of German porcelain and pharmaceuticals, yet IBM and Watson were not + identified. Neither the company nor its president even appeared in any of + thousands of hectic phone book entries or handwritten index card files of the + leading national and regional boycott bodies. Anti- Nazi agitators just didn't + understand the dynamics of corporate multi- nationalism. 64 + + Moreover, IBM was not importing German merchandise, it was export- + ing machinery. In fact, even exports dwindled as soon as the new plant in + Berlin was erected, leaving less of a paper trail. So a measure of invisibility + was assured in 1933. + + -- 75 + +### Fascism + + But to a certain extent all the worries about granting Hitler the techno- + logic tools he needed were all subordinated to one irrepressible, ideological + imperative. Hitler's plans for a new Fascist order with a "Greater Germany" + dominating all Europe were not unacceptable to Watson. In fact, Watson + admired the whole concept of Fascism. He hoped he could participate as the + American capitalistic counterpart of the great Fascist wave sweeping the Con- + tinent. Most of all, Fascism was good for business. + + THOMAS WATSOON and IBM had separately and jointly spent decades making + money any way they could. Rules were broken. Conspiracies were hatched. + Bloody wars became mere market opportunities. To a supranational, making + money is equal parts commercial Darwinism, corporate ecclesiastics, dynastic + chauvinism, and solipsistic greed. + + Watson was no Fascist. He was a pure capitalist. But the horseshoe of + political economics finds little distance between extremities. + + [...] + + After all, his followers wore uniforms, sang songs, and were expected to + display unquestioned loy- alty to the company he led. + + Fascism, the dictatorial state-controlled political system, was invented + by Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini. The term symbolically derived from the + Roman fasces, that is, the bundle of rods surrounding a ceremonial axe used + during Roman times. Indeed, Nazi symbols and ritual were in large part + adopted from Mussolini, including the palm-lifting Roman salute. Ironically, + Italian Fascism was non-racial and not anti-Semitic. National Socialism added + those defining elements. + + Mussolini fascinated Watson. Once, at a 1937 sales convention, Watson + spoke out in Il Duce's defense. "I want to pay tribute ... [to the] great leader, + Benito Mussolini," declared Watson. "I have followed the details of his work + very carefully since he assumed leadership [in 1922]. Evidence of his leader- + ship can be seen on all sides. . . . Mussolini is a pioneer . . . Italy is going to + benefit gready." 65 + + Watson explained his personal attraction to the dictator's style and even + observed similarities with his own corporate, capitalistic model. "One thing + which has greatly impressed me in connection with his leadership," con- + ceded Watson, "is the loyalty displayed by the people. To have the loyalty and + cooperation of everyone means progress—and ultimate success for a nation + or an individual business ... we should pay tribute to Mussolini for estab- + lishing this spirit of loyal support and cooperation." 66 + + For years, an autographed picture of Mussolini graced the grand piano + in Watson's living room. 67 + + In defense of Fascism, Watson made clear, "Different countries require + different forms of government and we should be careful not to let people in + other countries feel that we are trying to standardize principles of govern- + ment throughout the world." 68 + + -- 75-76 + +What an irony: Watson defending non-standardization of goverments around the world... + + His access to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and more importantly to + President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was unparalleled. While the Hoover Justice + Department was at the height of its anti-trust investigation of IBM in 1932, + Watson donated large sums to the Roosevelt campaign. Roosevelt's election + over Hoover was a landslide. Watson now had entree to the White House + itself. 71 + + -- 77 + +A statesman. + + So a happy medium was found between Watson's desire to maintain + deniability in IBM's lucrative relations with Germany and his personal desire + to hobnob with Third Reich VIPs. But, the demands of the growing business + in Germany would not be free of Watson's famous micro-management. Too + + -- 79 + +### Technology for the "Final Sollution" + + IBM did not invent Germany's anti-Semitism, but when it volunteered solutions, + the company virtually braided with Nazism. Like any technologic evolution, each + new solution powered a new level of sinister expectation and cruel capability. + + When Germany wanted to identify the Jews by name, IBM showed them how. When + Germany wanted to use that information to launch pro- grams of social expulsion + and expropriation, IBM provided the technologic wherewithal. When the trains + needed to run on time, from city to city or between concentration camps, IBM + offered that solution as well. Ultimately, there was no solution IBM would not + devise for a Reich willing to pay for services rendered. One solution led to + another. No solution was out of the question. + + As the clock ticked, as the punch cards clicked, as Jews in Germany saw + their existence vaporizing, others saw their corporate fortunes rise. Even as + German Jewry hid in their homes and wept in despair, even as the world + quietly trembled in fear, there was singing. Exhilarated, mesmerized, the + faithful would sing, and sing loudly to their Leaders—on both sides of the + Atlantic. + + Some uniforms were brown. Some were blue. + + -- 79-80 + +### Corporate schizophrenia + + To achieve his goals, each man had to cooperate in an international + campaign of corporate schizophrenia designed to achieve maximum deniability + for both Dehomag and IBM. The storyline depended upon the circumstance + and the listener. Dehomag could be portrayed as the American-controlled, al- + most wholly-owned subsidiary of IBM with token German shareholders and + on-site German managers. Or Dehomag could be a loyal German, staunchly + Aryan company baptized in the blood of Nazi ideology wielding the power + of its American investment for the greater glory of Hitler's Reich. + + -- 83 + +### The rhetoric + + "The physician examines the human body and determines whether ... + all organs are working to the benefit of the entire organism," asserted Hei- + dinger to a crowd of company employees and Nazi officials. "We [Dehomag] + are very much like the physician, in that we dissect, cell by cell, the German + cultural body. We report every individual characteristic ... on a little card. + These are not dead cards, quite to the contrary, they prove later on that they + come to life when the cards are sorted at a rate of 25,000 per hour according + to certain characteristics. These characteristics are grouped like the organs of + our cultural body, and they will be calculated and determined with the help + of our tabulating machine. 27 + + "We are proud that we may assist in such a task, a task that provides our + nation's Physician [Adolf Hitler] with the material he needs for his examina- + tions. Our Physician can then determine whether the calculated values are in + harmony with the health of our people. It also means that if such is not the + case, our Physician can take corrective procedures to correct the sick circum- + stances. . . . Our characteristics are deeply rooted in our race. Therefore, we + must cherish them like a holy shrine, which we will—and must—keep pure. + We have the deepest trust in our Physician and will follow his instructions in + blind faith, because we know that he will lead our people to a great future. + + -- 88 + +### Automation and efficiency + + While Hitler's rhetoric was burning the parade grounds and airwaves, + while Storm Troopers were marching Jews through the streets in ritual + humiliations, while Reich legislative decrees and a miasma of regional and + private policies were ousting Jews from their professions and residences, + while noisy, outrageous acts of persecution were appalling the world, a qui- + eter process was also underway. Germany was automating. + Hollerith systems could do more than count. They could schedule, ana- + lyze, and compute. They could manage. + + -- 92 + + [...] + + Hitler's Germany began achieving undreamed of efficiencies. + + -- 94 + +### Now or then? + + People seated in a doctor's office or a welfare line never comprehended the + destiny of routine information about their personal traits and conditions. + Question 11 required a handwritten checkmark if the individual was a for- + eigner. Later, this information was punched into the correlating punch card in + columns 29-30 under nationality. 83 + + -- 101 + +### Information as money, on paper + +The discourse on purity was also present on technology itself, in the form +of punch cards produced according rigid specificiations using a paper devoid +of "impurities": + + WHEN HERMAN HOLLERITH designed his first punch card, he made it the + size of a dollar bill. 94 For IBM, information was money. The more Germany + calculated, tabulated, sorted, and analyzed, the greater the demand for + machines. Equally important, once a machine was leased, it required vast + quantities of punch cards. In many cases, a single tabulation required + thousands of cards. Each card was designed to be used only once, and in a + single operation. When Dehomag devised more in-depth data processing, the + improvements only bolstered card demand. How many punch cards were needed? + Millions - per week. 95 + + Punch cards sped through the huffing machines of the Third Reich like tiny + high-speed mechanized breaths rapidly inhaled and exhaled one time and one time + only. But Hollerith systems were delicate, precision-engineering instruments + that depended on a precision-engineered punch card manufac- tured to exacting + specifications under ideal conditions. Because electrical current in the + machines sensed the rectangular holes, even a microscopic imperfection would + make the card inoperable and could foul up the en- + + So IBM production specifications were rigorous. Coniferous chemical + pulp was milled, treated, and cured to create paper stock containing no + more than 5 percent ash, and devoid of ground wood, calk fibers, process- + ing chemicals, slime carbon, or other impurities that might conduct electric- + ity and "therefore cause incorrect machine sensing." Residues, even in trace + amounts, would accumulate on gears and other mechanisms, eventually + causing jams and system shutdowns. Electrical testing to isolate defective + sheets was mandatory. Paper, when cut, had to lie flat without curl or wrin- + kle, and feature a hard, smooth finish on either side that yielded a "good + snap or rattle." 96 + + -- 103 + +There seems to be an equivalent discourse on purity and eugenics during the +development of the transistor. Something to check out. + + Only IBM could make and sell the unique punch cards for its machines. + Indeed, punch cards were the precious currency of data processing. Depend- + ing upon the market, IBM derived as much as a third of its profit from card + sales. Overseas sales were even more of a profit center. Punch card profits + were enough to justify years of federal anti-trust litigation designed to break + the company's virtual monopoly on their sale and manufacture." + When Herman Hollerith invented his technology at the close of the + previous century, he understood the enduring commercial tactic of prolifer- + ating a single universal system of hardware and ensuring that he alone pro- + duced the sole compatible soft goods. Hollerith was right to size his card like + the dollar. IBM's punch card monopoly was nothing less than a license to + print money. + + -- 104 + + Never before had so many people been identified so precisely, so silently, so + quickly, and with such far-reaching consequences. The dawn of the Information + Age began at the sunset of human decency. + + -- 110 + +## 1933 census was just a rehearsal + + Top racial experts of the Interior Ministry flew in for the assignment. Working + with drafts shuttled between Hitler's abode and police headquarters, twin + decrees of disenfranchisement were finally patched together. The Law for the + Protec- tion of German Blood and a companion decree entitled the Reich + Citizenship Law deprived Jews of their German citizenship and now used the term + explicitly—Jew, not non-Aryan. Moreover, Jews were proscribed from marry- ing + or having sexual relations with any Aryan. + + [...] + + Laborious and protracted paper searches of individual genealogical + records were possible. But each case could take months of intensive research. + That wasn't fast enough for the Nazis. Hitler wanted the Jews identified en + masse. + + [...] + + Once drafted, the Nuremberg regulations would be completely + dependent upon Hollerith technology for the fast, wholesale tracing of Jew- + ish family trees that the Reich demanded. Hollerith systems offered the + Reich the speed and scope that only an automated system could to identify + not only half and quarter Jews, but even eighth and sixteenth Jews. 14 + + [...] + + Earlier in 1935, the Party's Race Political Office had estimated the total + number of "race Jews." Thanks to Dehomag's people-counting methods, the + Nazis believed that the 1933 census, which recorded a half million observant + Jews, was now obsolete. Moreover, Nazis were convinced that the often- + quoted total of some 600,000 Jews, which was closer to Germany's 1925 + census, was a mere irrelevance. In mid-June 1935, Dr. Leonardo Conti, a key + Interior Ministry raceologist, declared 600,000 represented just the "practic- + ing Jews." The true number of racial Jews in the Reich, he insisted, exceeded + 1.5 million. Conti, who would soon become the Ministry's State Secretary for + Health overseeing most race questions, was a key assistant to the officials + rishing to compose the Nuremberg Jewish laws for Hitler. 16 + + -- 114-115 + +"Final sollution": + + Gesturing fanatically, he [Hitler] concluded with this warning: The new law "is + an attempt at the legal regulation of a problem, which, if it fails, must be + turned over to the Nazi Party for final solution." 22 + + -- 116 + +### Mechanics + + Ironically, while all understood the evil anti-Jewish process underway, + virtually none comprehended the technology that was making it possible, + The mechanics were less than a mystery, they were transparent. + In 1935, while the world shook at a rearmed Germany speeding toward + + [...] + + NAZI GERMANY was IBM's second most important customer after the U.S. + + [...] + + Business was good. Hitler needed Holleriths. Rigid dictatorial control + over all aspects of commerce and social life mandated endless reporting and + oversight. + + [...] + + IBM was guided by one precept: know your customer, anticipate their needs. + + -- 117 + + [...] + + Dehomag could do the sorting in-house for a fee. The company bragged that + it possessed the ability to cross-reference account numbers on bank deposits + + -- 119 + + None of Germany's statistical programs came easy. All of them required + on-going technical innovation. Every project required specific customized + applications with Dehomag engineers carefully devising a column and corre- + sponding hole to carry the intended information. Dummy cards were first + carefully mocked-up in pen and pencil to make sure all categories and their + placement were acceptable to both Dehomag and the reporting agency. [...] + Dehomag was Germany's data maestro. + + -- 121 + + New devices never stopped appearing. [...] Many of these devices were of course + dual-purpose. They as routinely helped build Germany's general commercial, + social, and military infrastructure as they helped a heightening tower of Nazi + statistical offensives. In Germany, some of the devices, such as the IBM + Fingerprint Selecting Sorter, were only usable by Nazi security forces. 46 + + -- 123 + +### What the alliance meant + + Rottke openly conceded the contract between IBM and Heidinger had + "been made under an unlucky star, [and] appears to be the source of all + evil." But he nonetheless warned Watson again that if Heidinger's shares + were transferred to a foreign source Dehomag would probably not be per- + mitted "the use of the word Deutsche (German) as an enterprise recognized + in Germany as German." 126 That disaster had to be avoided at all costs. To + IBM's doctrinaire German managers, including Heidinger, Dehomag repre- + sented far more than just a profit-making enterprise. To them, Dehomag had + the technologic ability to keep Germany's war machine automated, facilitate + her highly efficient seizure of neighboring countries, and achieve the Reich's + swiftly moving racial agenda. If IBM's subsidiary were deemed non-Aryan, + the company would be barred from all the sensitive projects awaiting it. + Hitler's Germany—in spite of itself—would be deprived of the Holleriths it + so desperately required. + + From Watson's point of view, Germany was on the brink of unleash- + ing its total conquest of Europe. IBM subsidiaries could be coordinated by + + Dehomag into one efficient continental enterprise, moving parts, cards, and + machines as the Reich needed them. The new order that Hitler promised was + made to order for IBM. + + In July 1939, Watson arrived in Berlin to personally mediate with Hei- + dinger. A compromise would be necessary. The stakes were too high for the + Nazis. The stakes were too high for capitalism. But it was the Germans who + gave in, deferring on Heidinger's demands for a few months under term + Watson dictated. "Watson now controlled something the Third Reich needed + to launch the next decisive step in the solution of the Jewish question, not + just in Germany—but all of Europe. Until now, the fastest punchers, tabula- + tors, and sorters could organize only by numbers. The results could then be + sorted by sequentially numbered profession, geographic locale, or popula- + tion category. But now Watson had something new and powerful. 127 + He had the alphabetizes. + + -- 172-173 + + In Copenhagen, at the ICC [International Chamber of Commerce] Congress, + Watson's pro-Axis proposal exceeded anything the State Department could have + expected. He champi- oned a resolution whereby private businessmen from the + three Axis and three Allied nations would actually supercede their governments + and negoti- ate a radical new international trade policy designed to satisfy + Axis demands for raw materials coveted from other nations. The businessmen + would then lobby their respective governments' official economic advisors to + adopt their appeasement proposals for the sake of averting war. Ironically, the + raw mate- rials were needed by Axis powers solely for the sake of waging war. + + On June 28, under Watson's leadership, the ICC passed a resolution again + calling for "a fair distribution of raw materials, food stuffs and other + products . . . [to] render unnecessary the movements of armies across fron- + tiers." To this end, the ICC asked "the governments of France, Germany, Italy, + Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States . . . each collaborate with + their own leading businessmen . , . with respect to national needs . . . [and + therefore] give all countries of the world a fair opportunity to share in the + resources of the world." 27 + + Even as Watson angled for Germany to be ceded more raw materials, + Germany was openly raping invaded territories. + + [...] + + No wonder the German delegate to the ICC enthusiastically lauded + Watson's proposal, which only sought to legitimize by private consultation + what the Third Reich was undertaking by force. In his final speech of the + Congress, Watson himself summed up the misery and devastation in the + world as a mere "difference of opinion." His solution of businessmen confer- + ring to divvy up other nations' resources to avoid further aggression was + offered with these words: "We regret that there are unsatisfactory economic + and political conditions in the world today, with a great difference of opinion + existing among many countries. But differences of opinion, freely discussed + and fairly disposed of, result in mutual benefit and increased happiness to all + concerned." 31 + + [...] + + One State Department assistant secretary could not help but comment on the + similarity of Watson's suggestion to the Axis' own warlike demands. "This is, + of course, a political question of major world importance," wrote the assistant + secretary, and one upon which we have been hearing much from Germany, Italy and + Japan. It occurs to me that it is most unfortunate that Mr. Thomas J. Watson, + as an American serving as the president of the International Chamber of + Commerce, should have sponsored a resolution of this character. It may well be + that his resolution will return to plague us at some future date." That comment + was written on October 5, 1939. 37 By then it was unnecessary to reply + + -- 181-184 + +### Biblical Census + + The Bible itself taught that unless specifically ordered by God, the census is + evil because through it the enemy will know your strength: + + I Chronicles 21: Satan rose up against Israel and incited David to take a cen- + sus of Israel. . . . This command was also evil in the sight of God. . . Then + David said to God, "I have sinned greatly by doing this. Now I beg you to take + away the guilt of your servant. I have done a very foolish thing." 78 On + October 28, 1939, for the Jewish people of Warsaw, everything + + -- 195 + +### The Ghetto, The Train and the Print Shop + + Now the Reich knew exactly how many Jews were under their jurisdic- + tion, how much nutrition to allocate—as low as 184 calories per person per + day. They could consolidate Jews from the mixed districts of Warsaw, and + bring in Jews from other nearby villages. The transports began arriving. + White armbands with Jewish stars were distributed. Everyone, young or old, + was required to wear one on the arm. Not the forearm, but the arm—visible, + above the elbow. The Warsaw-Malkinia railway line ran right through the pro- + posed ghetto. It was all according to Heydrich's September 21 Express Let- + ter. Soon the demarcated ghetto would be surrounded by barbed wire. + Eventually, a wall went up, sealing the residents of the ghetto from the outside + world. Soon thereafter, the railway station would become the most feared lo- + cation in the ghetto. 83 + + The Nazi quantification and regimentation of Jewish demographics in + Warsaw and indeed all of Poland was nothing less than spectacular—an al- + most unbelievable feat. Savage conditions, secrecy, and lack of knowledge by + the victims would forever obscure the details of exactly how the Nazis man- + aged to tabulate the cross-referenced information on 360,000 souls within + forty-eight hours. + + But this much is known: The Third Reich possessed only one method + of tabulating censuses: Dehomag's Hollerith system. Moreover, IBM was in + Poland, headquartered in Warsaw. In fact, the punch card print shop was just + yards from the Warsaw Ghetto at Rymarska Street 6. That's where they pro- + duced more than 20 million cards. + + -- 196 + + The strategic alliance with Hitler continued to pay off in the cities and + in the ghettos. But now IBM machines would demonstrate their special value + along the railways and in the concentration camps of Europe. Soon the Jews + would become Hollerith numbers. + + -- 203 + +### 'Blitzkrieg' efficiency + + HITLER'S ARMIES SWARMED OVER EUROPE THROUGHOUT the first months of 1940. The + forces of the Reich slaughtered all opposition with a military machine + unparalleled in human history. Blitzkrieg—lightning war—was more than a new + word. Its very utterance signified coordinated death under the murderous + onslaught of Hitler's massive air, sea, and 100,000-troop ground assaults. + + -- 204 + + IBM had almost single-handedly brought modern warfare into the + information age. Through its persistent, aggressive, unfaltering efforts, IBM + virtually put the "blitz" in the krieg for Nazi Germany. Simply put, IBM orga- + nized the organizers of Hitler's war. + + Keeping corporate distance in the face of the company's mounting + involvement was now more imperative than ever. Although deniability was + constructed with enough care to last for decades, the undeniable fact was + that either IBM NY or its European headquarters in Geneva or its individual + subsidiaries, depending upon the year and locale, maintained intimate + knowledge of each and every application wielded by Nazis. This knowledge + was inherendy revealed by an omnipresent paper trail: the cards themselves. + IBM—and only IBM—printed all the cards. Billions of them. + + -- 213 + +### Even more discretion + + Only with great caution could Watson now publicly defend the Hitler + agenda, even through euphemisms and code words. Most Americans would + not tolerate anyone who even appeared to be a Nazi sympathizer or collabo- + rator. So, as he had done since Kristallnacht in late 1938, Watson continued + to insert corporate distance between himself and all involvement in the + affairs of his subsidiaries in Nazi Europe—even as he micro-managed their + day-to-day operations. More than ever, he now channeled his communica- + tions to Nazi Europe through trusted intermediaries in Geneva and else- + where on the Continent. He controlled subsidiary operations through + attorneys and employees acting as nominee owners, following the pattern set + in Czechoslovakia and Poland. 7 + + [...] + + Peace was Watson's message. + + [...] + + Ironically, at that very moment, Watson and IBM were in fact Europe's most + successful organizers not of peace, but of the ravages of war. + + -- 206-207 + +### Customized, proprietaty tech from a monopoly + +How they knew how the card was user for, which would lead to ethical concerns +-- but the part of IBM -- and strategic ones -- by the part of the German government: + + IBM printed billions of its electrically sensitive cards each year for its + European customers. But every order was different. Each set was meticu- + lously designed not only for the singular client, but for the client's specific + assignments. The design work was not a rote procedure, but an intense col- + laboration. It began with a protracted investigation of the precise data needs + of the project, as well as the people, items, or services being tabulated. This + required IBM subsidiary "field engineers" to undertake invasive studies of + the subject being measured, often on-site. Was it people? Was it cattle? Was it + airplane engines? Was it pension payments? Was it slave labor? Different data + gathering and card layouts were required for each type of application. 44 + + [...] + + Once printed, each set of custom-designed punch cards bore its own + distinctive look for its highly specialized purpose. Each set was printed with + its own job-specific layout, with columns arrayed in custom-tailored configu- + rations and then preprinted with unique column labels. Only IBM presses + manufactured these cards, column by column, with the preprinted field topic: + race, nationality, concentration camp, metal drums, combat wounds to leg, + train departure vs. train arrival, type of horse, bank account, wages owed, + property owed, physical racial features possessed—ad infinitum. 46 + + Cards printed for one task could never be used for another. Factory pay- + roll accounting cards, for example, could not be utilized by the SS in its on- + going program of checking family backgrounds for racial features. + + [...] + + An IBM punch card could only be used once. After a period of months, the + gargantuan stacks of processed cards were routinely destroyed. Billions more + were needed each year by the Greater Reich and its Axis allies, requiring a + sophisticated logisti- cal network of IBM authorized pulp mills, paper + suppliers, and stock trans- port. Sales revenue for the lucrative supply of + cards was continuously funneled to IBM via various modalities, including its + Geneva nexus. 50 Slave labor cards were particularly complex on-going projects. + The Reich was constandy changing map borders and Germanizing city and regional + names. Its labor needs became more and more demanding. This type of punch card + operation required numerous handwritten mock-ups and regular revisions. For + example, MB Projects 3090 and 3091 tracking slave labor involved several + mock-up cards, each clearly imprinted with Deho- mag's name along the edge. + Written in hand on a typical sample was the pro- ject assignment: "work + deployment of POWs and prisoners according to business branches." Toward the + left, a column was hand-labeled "number of employed during the month" next to + another column hand-marked "number of employed at month's end." The center and + right-hand column headings were each scribbled in: French, Belgium, British, + Yugoslavian, Polish. 51 Another card in the series was entitled "registration + of male and female + + [...] + + The delicate machines, easily nudged out of whack by their con- + stant syncopation, were serviced on-site, generally monthly, whether that site + was in the registration center at Mauthausen concentration camp, the SS + offices at Dachau, or the census bureau in any country. 54 + + -- 214-217 + +### Business plan and practice + + Few in the financial community were sur- prised. IBM profits had been in a + steep climb since the day Hitler came to power. 57 Clearly, the war was good to + IBM coffers. Indeed, in many ways the war seemed an ideal financial + opportunity to Watson. Like many, he fully expected Germany to trample over all + of Europe, creating a new economic order, one in which IBM would rule the data + domain. Like many, Watson expected that America would stay out of the war, and + when it was over, businessmen like him would pick up the post-war economic + pieces. In fact, Watson began planning for the post-war boom and a complete + + "Our program," asserted Watson, "is for national committees in the individual + countries to study their own problems from the standpoint of what they need + from other countries and what they have to furnish other countries." It was the + same Hitleresque message Wat- son had been preaching for years. Some countries, + both men believed, were simply entided to the natural resources of another. War + could be avoided by ceding these materials in advance. 58 No time was wasted in + making plans. + + -- 217-218 + +But domestic pressue got too high in the US: + + The long delayed moment had come. That day, June 6, Watson wrote a + reluctant letter to Adolf Hitler. This one would not be misaddressed or + undelivered. This one would be sent by registered mail and released to the + newspapers. Watson returned the medal Hitler had personally granted—and + he chose to return it publicly via the media. The letter declared: "the present + policies of your government are contrary to the causes for which I have been + + -- 222 + + Dehomag was to become completely Nazified. The hierarchy had plans + for Hollerith machines that stretched to virtually all the Reich's most urgent + needs, from the conflict in Europe to Hitler's war against European Jewry. + + -- 227 + +But Germany was too dependent on IBM automation technologies. In fact dependency +on information technology was so high that equipment production could not supply +the demand. The automation process might have been exponential, beyond the +capacity of the system itself. Information was faster than physical, industrial +production: + + But the strategic alliance with IBM was too entrenched to simply switch off. + Since the birth of the Third Reich, Germany had automated virtually its entire + economy, as well as most government operations and Nazi Party activities, using + a single technology: Hollerith. Elaborate data operations were in full swing + every- where in Germany and its conquered lands. The country suddenly discov- + ered its own vulnerable over-dependence on IBM machinery. + + [...] + + At the same time, Germany's war industry suffered from a chronic paper and pulp + shortage due to a lack of supply and the diversion of basic pulping ingredients + to war propellants. Only four specialized paper plants in Germany could even + produce Hollerith + + [...] + + Holleriths could not function without IBM's unique paper. Watson controlled the + paper. 17 Printing cards was a stop-start process that under optimal conditions + + [...] + + Holleriths could not function without cards. Watson controlled the cards. 18 + Precision maintenance was needed monthly on the sensitive gears, tum- + + [...] + + Even working at peak capacity in tandem with recently opened IBM factories in + Germany, Austria, Italy, and France, Nazi requests for sorters, tabulators, and + collators were back-ordered twenty-four months. Hollerith systems could not + function without machines or spare parts. Watson controlled the machines and + the spare parts. 19 + + Watson's monopoly could be replaced—but it would take years. Even + if the Reich confiscated every IBM printing plant in Nazi-dominated Europe, + and seized every machine, within months the cards and spare parts would + run out. The whole data system would quickly grind to a halt. As it stood in + summer 1941, the IBM enterprise in Nazi Germany was hardly a stand- + alone operation; it depended upon the global financial, technical, and ma- + terial support of IBM NY and i t s seventy worldwide subsidiaries. Watson + controlled all of it. + + Without punch card technology, Nazi Germany would be completely + incapable of even a fraction of the automation it had taken for granted, + Returning to manual methods was unthinkable. The Race and Settlement + + -- 228-230 + + If Watson allowed the Reich—in a fit of rage over the return of the medal—to + oust IBM technologic supremacy in Nazi Germany, and if he allowed Berlin to + embark upon its own ersatz punch card industry, Hitler's data automation + program might speed toward self-destruction. No one could predict how + drastically every Reich undertaking would be affected. But clearly, the blitz + IBM attached to the German krieg would eventually be sub- tracted if not + severely lessened. All Watson had to do was give up Dehomag as the Nazis + demanded. If IBM did not have a technologic stranglehold over Germany, the + Nazis would not be negotiating, they would simply seize what- ever they wanted. + For Watson, it was a choice. + + [...] + + But Watson would not detach Dehomag from the global IBM empire. + + -- 235 + + Albert empha- sized that in the very near future, "a minority of shares might + be even materi- ally of higher value than the present majority." He added that + the notion of stockholder "control" was actually becoming a passe notion in + Germany since the Reich now direcdy or indirectly controlled virtually all + business. "A majority of shares," he wrote Watson, "does not mean as much as + it used to . . . [since] a corporation, company, enterprise or plant + manufacturing in Germany is so firmly, thoroughly and definitely subjected to + the governmen- tal rules and regulations." 46 + + -- 237 + + For IBM, war would ironically be more advantageous than existing + peace. + + Under the current state of affairs, IBM's assets were blocked in Ger- + many until the conflict was over. Under an enemy custodian, those same + marks would still be blocked—again until any war was over. As it stood, Hei- + dinger was threatening daily to destroy Dehomag unless IBM sold or re- + duced its ownership; and he was demanding to cash out his stock. But if war + with the U.S. broke out, Heidinger and the other managers would be sum- + marily relieved of their management authority since technically they repre- + sented IBM NY. A government custodian chosen on the basis of keen + business skills—and Albert might have the connections to select a reliable + one—would be appointed to replace Heidinger and manage Dehomag. In + fact, the Nazi receiver would diligendy manage all of IBM's European sub- + sidiaries. The money would be waiting when the war was over. 56 + + Plausible deniability would be real. Questions—would not be asked by IBM NY. + Answers-would not be given by IBMers in Europe or Reich officials. 58 + + -- 240-241 + + [...] + + The company that lionized the word THINK now thought better of its + guiding mandate. + + -- 241-242 + + IBM should rely on its decided technologic edge, suggested Chauncey, + because of the profound difficulty in starting a punch card industry from + scratch, especially if New York could block French Bull competition. In spite + of the quality of its devices, French Bull was a very small company with very + few machines. Bull's one small factory could never supply the Reich's conti- + nental needs. Ramping up for volume production—even if based within a + Bull factory—would take months. Hitler didn't have months in his hour-to- + hour struggle to dominate Europe. In a section entided "Length of Time for + Competition to Come in Actuality," Chauncey argued, "Unless the authori- + ties, or the new company, operate in the meantime from the French Bull fac- + tory, it would appear that much time may elapse before such new company + [could] ... furnish machines in Germany." 103 + + -- 257 + + It seemed that in spite of its autarkic impulses and collective rage + against Watson, the cold fact remained: Nazi Germany needed punch cards. + It needed them not next month or even next week. It needed them every + hour of every day in every place. Only IBM could provide them. + "My inclination is to fight," Chauncey declared straight out. But the + battle would be difficult. He knew that IBM was fighting a two-front psycho- + economic war: Heidinger's demand to cash in his stock, and Nazi Party + demands to take over the subsidiary. Clearly, the two were organically linked, + + [...] + + As for IBM's fight with the Nazi Party, Chauncey reiterated his willing- + ness to "make any representations to the authorities that our managers need + not reveal any information of the activities of Dehomag's customers... . but I + cannot get the actual persons out in the open." 107 That chance would now + come. After weeks of remaining in the background, Dr. Edmund Veesen- + mayer would finally come forward. + + -- 258 + + IBM as a company would know the innermost details of Hitler's Holle- + rith operations, designing the programs, printing the cards, and servicing the + machines. But Watson and his New York directors could erect a wall of credi- + ble deniability at the doors of the executive suite. In theory, only those down + the hall in the New York headquarters who communicated direcdy with IBM + Geneva, such as IBM European General Manager Schotte, could provide a + link to the reality in Europe. But in fact, any such wall contained so many + cracks, gaps, and hatches as to render it imaginary. The free flow of informa- + tion, instructions, requests, and approvals by Watson remained detailed and + continuous for years to come—until well into 1944. + + [...] + + Using codes and oblique references, they nonetheless all spoke the + same language, even when the language was vague. + + [...] + + Millions of punch cards were routinely shipped from IBM in America + directly to Nazi-controlled sources in Poland, France, Bulgaria, and Belgium, + or routed circuitously through Sweden or colonies in Africa. When IBM's + American presses did not fill orders, subsidiaries themselves would ship + cards across frontiers from one IBM location to another. 125 + + -- 264-265 + +Such knowledge would in fact interest the allies. But curiously the State +Deparment acted as a "postman" during "DURING IBM'S day-to-day struggle to +stay in the Axis during wartime" (page 277): + + The Department's desire to secretly advance the commercial causes of + IBM persevered in spite of the nation's officially stated opposition to the + Hitler menace. For this reason, it was vital to Watson that nothing be done to + embarrass or even annoy the Department publicly. This caution was only + heightened by an on-going FBI investigation into IBM's operation as a + potential hotbed of Nazi sympathizers. Avoiding embarrassing moments was + difficult given the far-flung global empire of IBMers so deeply involved with + Fascist and Axis countries, and accustomed to speaking supportively of their + clients' military endeavors. + + -- 277 + +That was before the US entering the war. + +### The new board + + During all the genocide years, 1942-1945, the Dehomag that Watson + fought to protect did remain intact. Ultimately, it was governed by a special + Reich advisory committee representing the highest echelons of the Nazi hier- + archy. The Dehomag advisory committee replaced the traditional corporate + board of directors. As with any board, the committee's duty was to advise + + [...] + + Four men sat on the advisory board. One was a trustee. Second was + Passow, chief of the Maschinelles Berichtwesen. Third was Heidinger. Fourth + was Adolf Hitler's personal representative. 160 + + Hitler's representative on Dehomag's advisory committee was Dr. Edmund + Veesenmayer. 161 + + -- 271 + +### General Ruling 11 + + As America advanced toward the moment it would enter the war, the + Roosevelt Administration had recendy espoused General Ruling 11, an + emergency regulation forbidding any financial transactions with Nazi Ger- + many without a special Treasury Department license involving written justifi- + cations. Even certain corporate instructions of a financial nature were subject + to the rule. This was something completely new to contend with in IBM's + Nazi alliance. IBM would now be required to seek a complicated, bureau- + cratic approval for each financial instruction it ordered for its overseas sub- + sidiaries under Nazi control. General Ruling 11 would not affect subsidiaries + in neutral countries, such as Sweden or Switzerland. Even still, it would + severely hamper all communications with Dehomag itself, and open a gov- + ernment window into many of IBM's complex transactions. 51 + How much time did IBM have? + + -- 288 + + Now it appeared that General Ruling 11 had been violated. + + -- 291 + + IBM would not place a stop on any of its Dehomag business, or any + subsidiary's interaction with it. IBM filed another request with the Treasury + Department, this time to send an instruction to all of its European sub- + sidiaries and agencies, as well, as its divisions in Japan. The instruction: "In + view of world conditions we cannot participate in the affairs of our compa- + nies in various countries as we did in normal times. Therefore you are + advised that you will have to make your own decisions and not call on us for + any advice or assistance until further notice." It was sent to the State Depart- + ment on October 10, 1941, with a request for comment. 77 + + -- 293 + + December, just days before Pearl Harbor, to circumvent Treasury license + requirements and issue financial instructions to Dehomag. Ultimately, after + the U.S. joined the war against Germany, Westerholt was appointed the cus- + todian of CEC. 39 The Nazis were able to do with CEC as they pleased so + long as IBM was paid. The looming competition with Bull never came + to fruition. It was more of a bargaining chip than a genuine threat. Unable to + replace IBM, the Third Reich pressured the company into relinquishing Wat- + son's troublesome micro-managing in favor of the faster and more coordi- + nated action the Reich required. + + -- 306 + +### Holland and France + + Germany wanted the Jews identified by bloodline not religion, pauper- + ized, and then deported to camps, just as they were elsewhere in conquered + Europe. The Jews of France stood vulnerable under the shadow of destruc- + tion. Hitler was ready. + + In France, the Holleriths were not. + + -- 307 + + In 1936, as Inspector of Population Registries, Lentz standardized local + population registers and their data collection methodology throughout the + Netherlands—an administrative feat that earned him a royal decoration. That + same year, he outlined his personal vision in Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, + the journal of the German Statistical Society: "Theoretically," predicted + Lentz, "the collection of data for each person can be so abundant and com- + plete, that we can finally speak of a paper human representing the natural + human." 46 + + [...] + + His motto was "to record is to serve." 47 + + -- 308-309 + + Ten days after the census ordered by decree V06/41 was fully com- + piled, punched, and sorted, Nazi authorities demanded all Jews wear the + Jewish star. Again a number of Dutch people reacted with outrage and + protest. British diplomats reported that in one town, when the burgomaster + ordered Jews to affix the star, many non-Jews wore one as well. 87 + But it was not the outward visage of six gold points worn on the chest + for all to see on the street, it was the 80 columns punched and sorted in a + Hollerith facility that marked the Jews of Holland for deportation to concen- + tration camps. The Germans understood this all too well. + + -- 316 + + Arthur Seyss-Inquart, German Kommissar for Holland: 'Thanks to decree + 6/41, all Dutch Jews are now in the bag." 88 + + FRANCE EXCELLED at many things. Punch card automation was not one of + them. Although IBM had been able to install several hundred Hollerith + devices, mainly for high-volume military, railway, and banking users, Reich + forces had in large part confiscated those machines + + -- 317 + + Oppressive Nazi rule could have dictated its iron will to all reluctant + French authorities, and conquered the demographic uncertainties of a + French Jewry in two zones if only the Holleriths could be deployed. That is + precisely what Holleriths brought to any problem—organization where there + was disorder and tabular certainty where there was confusion. The Nazis + could have punch-carded the Jews of France into the same genocidal sce- + nario in force elsewhere, including Holland. But in the aftermath of the MB's + technologic ravages, France's punch card infrastructure was simply incapable + of supporting the massive series of programs Berlin required. Even if the + machines could have been gathered, transferred, or built—CEC just didn't + have the punch cards. + + -- 319 + + Rene Carmille, comp- troller general of the French Army, had for years been an + ardent advocate of punch cards. More than that, he had machines in good working + order at his government's Demographic Service. Carmille came forward and + offered to end the census chaos. He promised that his tabulators could deliver + the Jews of France. 119 + + -- 324 + + Carmille had been working for months on a national Personal Identifi- + cation Number, a number that would not only be sequential, but descriptive. + The thirteen-digit PIN number would be a manual "bar code" of sorts + describing an individual's complete personal profile as well as professional + skills in great detail. For example, one number would be assigned for metal + workers, with a second modifying number for brass, and then a third modi- + fying number for curtain rods. Tabulators could then be set to whisk + through millions of cards until it located French metal workers, specializing + in brass with experience in curtain rods. Those metal workers could also be + pinpointed in any district. The system mimicked a concurrent Reich codifica- + tion system that assigned a descriptive bar code-like number to every prod- + uct and component in Germany. Carmille's number would ultimately evolve + into France's social security number. 123 + + -- 325 + + "We are no longer dealing with general censuses, but we are really following + individuals." Carmille made clear, "the new organization must now be envisioned + in such a way that the information be obtained continuously, which means that + the updating of information must be carefully regulated." 127 Carmille was now + France's great Hollerith hope. + + -- 328-329 + + Clearly, Carmille was running an active tabulator operation. Why wasn't + he producing the Jewish lists? + + [...] + + Just days after the French mobilized in Algeria the Nazis discovered + that Carmille was a secret agent for the French resistance. He had no inten- + tion of delivering the Jews. It was all a cover for French mobilization. + + [...] + + Carmille had deceived the Nazis. In fact, he had been working with + French counter-intelligence since 1911. During the worst days of Vichy, + Carmille was always considered one of the highest-placed operatives of the + French resistance, a member of the so-called "Marco Polo Network" of sabo- + teurs and spies. Carmille's operation had generated some 20,000 fake iden- + tity passes. And he had been laboring for months on a database of 800,000 + former soldiers in France who could be instandy mobilized into well- + planned units to fight for liberation. Under his plan, 300,000 men would be + ready to go. He had their names, addresses, their military specialties, and all + their occupational skills. He knew which ones were metal workers specializ- + ing in curtain rods, and which were combat-ready troops. 154 + As for column 11 asking for Jewish identity, the holes were never + punched—the answers were never tabulated. 155 More than 100,000 cards + of Jews sitting in his office—never handed over. 156 He foiled the entire + enterprise. + + -- 332-333 + + In early 1944, SS security officers ordered Carmille arrested. He was + apprehended in Lyon at noon on February 3, 1944. He was taken to the + Hotel Terminus where his interrogator was the infamous Butcher of Lyon, + Klaus Barbie. Barbie was despised as a master of torture who had sadistically + questioned many members of the resistance. Carmille went for two days + straight under Barbie's hand. He never cracked. 159 + + -- 334 + + It never stopped in Holland. The Population Registry continued to + spew out tabulations of names. The trains continued to roll. + Meanwhile, in France, the Germans also deported Jews to death camps + as often as possible. But in France, Nazi forces were compelled to continue + their random and haphazard round-ups. 168 + + Carmille was sent to Dachau, prisoner 76608, where he died of exhaus- + tion on January 25, 1945. He was posthumously honored as a patriot + although his role in dramatically reducing the number of Jewish deaths in + France was never really known and in some cases doubted. How many lives + he saved will never be tabulated. After the war, Lentz explained he was just a + public servant. He was tried, but only on unrelated charges, for which he was + sentenced to three years inprison. 169 + + Holland had Lentz. France had Carmille. Holland had a well-entrenched + Hollerith infrastructure. France's punch card infrastructure was in complete + disarray. + + -- 336 + +### American Property + + So even though corporate parents, such as IBM, were not + permitted to communicate with their own subsidiaries because they were in + Axis territory, these companies were deemed American property to be pro- + tected. In fact, since IBM only leased the machines, every Dehomag machine, + whether deployed at the Waffen-SS office in Dachau or an insurance office in + Rome, was considered American property to be protected. 10 + + -- 342 + +### War, Computing, Cryptography and Meteoroloy + + IBM and its technology were in fact involved in the Allies' most top- + secret operations. The Enigma code crackers at Bletchley Park in England + used Hollerith machines supplied by IBM's British licensee, the British Tabu- + lating Machine Company. Hut 7 at Bletchley Park was known as the Tabulating + Machine Section. As early as January 1941, the British Tabulating Machine + Company was supplying machines and punch cards not only to Bletchley + Park, but to British intelligence units in Singapore and Cairo as well. 40 + + Park, but to British intelligence units in Singapore and Cairo as well. 40 + By May 1942, IBM employees had joined America's own cryptographic + service. A key man was Steve Dunwell, who left Endicott's Commercial Re- + search Department to join other code breakers in Washington, D.C. The + group used a gamut of punch card machines made by IBM as well as Rem- + ington Rand to decipher intercepted Axis messages. Captured enemy code + books were keyed into punch cards using overlapping strings of fifty digits. + The punched cards were sorted. Each deciphered word was used to attack + another word until a message's context and meaning could laboriously be + established. At one point, Dunwell needed a special machine with electro- + mechanical relays that could calculate at high speed the collective probability + of words that might appear in a theoretical message bit. Dunwell sought per- + mission from Watson to ask that the device be assembled at IBM. Watson + granted it. + + It was an irony of the war that IBM equipment was used to encode and + decode for both sides of the conflict. 42 + + IBM was there even when the Allies landed at Normandy on June 6, + 1944. Hollerith machines were continuously used by the Weather Division of + the Army Air Forces to monitor and predict t h e tempestuous storms afflicting + the English Channel. When Al lied troops finally landed at Normandy, MRUs + went in soon after the beachhead was secured. 43 + War had always been good to IBM. In America, war income was with- + + -- 348 + + IBM machines were not just used to wage war. They were also used to + track people. Holleriths organized millions for the draft. Allied soldiers miss- + ing in action, as well as captured Axis prisoners, were cataloged by IBM sys- + tems. + + -- 349 + +### Untouchable and beyond reach of any nation + + IBM and Watson were untouchable. Carter learned the immutable truth in the very + words he had written months earlier: + + This [World War] is a conflict of warlike nationalistic states, each having cer- + tain interests. Yet we frequently find these interests clashing diametrically + with the opposing interests of international corporate structures, more huge + and powerful than nations. + + [...] + + IBM was in some ways bigger than the war. Both sides could not afford + to proceed without the company's all-important technology. Hitler needed + IBM. So did the Allies. + + -- 352 + +### One could never escape his code (p. 367), Hollerith erfasst: the Logistics of Genocide (p. 375) + + For the Allies, IBM assistance came at a crucial point. But for the Jews + of Europe it was too late. Hitler's Holleriths had been deployed against them + for almost a decade and were continuing without abatement. Millions of + Jews would now suffer the consequences of being identified and processed + by IBM technologies. + + After nearly a decade of incremental solutions the Third Reich was + ready to launch the last stage. In January 1942, a conference was held in + Wannsee outside Berlin. This conference, supported by Reich statisticians + and Hollerith experts, would outline the Final Solution of the Jewish prob- + lem in Europe. Once more, Holleriths would be used, but this time the Jews + would not be sent away from their offices or congregated into ghettos. Ger- + many was now ready for mass shooting pits, gas chambers, crematoria, and + an ambitious Hollerith-driven program known as "extermination by labor" + where Jews were systematically worked to death like spent matches. + For the Jews of Europe, it was their final encounter with German + automation. + + -- 354 + + The multitude of columns and codes punched into Hollerith and sorted + for instant results was an expensive, never-ending enterprise designed to + implement Hitler's evolving solutions to what was called the Jewish problem. + From Germany's first identifying census in 1933, to its sweeping occupa- + tional and social expulsions, to a net of ancestral tracings, to the Nuremberg + definitions of 1935, to the confiscations, and finally to the ghettoizations, it + was the codes that branded the individual and sealed his destiny. Each code + was a brick in an inescapable wall of data. Trapped by their code, Jews could + only helplessly wait to be sorted for Germany's next persecution. The system + Germany created in its own midst, it also exported by conquest or subver- + sion. As the war enveloped all Europe, Jews across the Continent found + themselves numbered and sorted to one degree or another. + + By early 1942, a change had occurred. Nazi Germany no longer killed + just Jewish people. It killed Jewish populations. This was the data-driven + denouement of Hitler's war against the Jews. + + Hollerith codes, compilations, and rapid sorts had enabled the Nazi + Reich to make an unprecedented leap from individual destruction to some- + thing on a much larger scale. + + -- 369 + + Der Fuhrer was now deter- mined to unleash a long contemplated campaign of + systematic, automated genocide, thus once and for all ridding the world of + Jews. 68 + + -- 370 + + By early 1944, Korherr was able to report to Eichmann a total of 5 million Jews + eliminated by "natural decrease, con- centration camp inmates, ghetto inmates, + and those who were [simply] put to death." 88 + + [...] + + More than a statistical bureau, by its very nature, the Hollerith complex at + Friedrichstrasse helped Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich, and Eichmann prioritize, + schedule, and manage the seemingly impossible logistics of genocide across + dozens of cities in more than twenty countries and territories. It was not just + people who were counted and marshaled for deportation. Boxcars, locomotives, + and intricate train timetables were sched- uled across battle-scarred + borders—all while a war was being fought on two fronts. The technology had + enabled Nazi Germany to orchestrate the death of millions without skipping a + note. + + Amidst the whirlwind of the Final Solution, the Third Reich's transition + from the blind persecution of a general population to the destruction of indi- + viduals had come full circle. In genocide, the Jews lost their identity. They + had been reduced to mere nameless data bits. Now each murdered Jew no + longer even represented an individual death. Now every corpse comprised a + mere component in a far larger statistical set adding up to total annihilation. + + -- 375 + +### Business Philosophy of "The Sollutions Company" (page 429) + + Perhaps IBM's business philosophy was best expressed by an executive + of Beige Watson in an August 1939 letter to senior officers of IBM NY. The + letter detailed the company's growing involvement in Japan's aircraft indus- + try. The IBM Brussels executive declared: "It is none of our business to + judge the reasons why an American corporation should or would help a for- + eign Government, and consequently Mr. Decker and myself have left these + considerations entirely out of our line of thought. ... we are, as IBM men, + interested in the technical side of the application of our machines." 102 + But as European territory was liberated in late 1944 and early 1945, + + -- 399 + + Fellinger even put IBM's interest before that of the Third Reich, con- + stantly badgering Berlin to pay more rent, and clear up its delinquencies. + He even demanded that the Wehrmacht pay for CEC machines the German + military seized from occupied France. It took months of burdensome legal + wrangling, but Fellinger successfully argued that the German military had no + right to remove CEC's machines without properly compensating IBM. His + argument hammered away at the theme that because the plundered machines + were leased items, they never belonged to the French government, but to IBM. + As such, the transferred devices were not subject to traditional rules of "war + booty." Only after reams of Fellinger's dense briefs, supported by attestations + by CEC Managing Director Roger Virgile, did the MB finally consent to nearly + a million Reichsmarks in back rent for machines transported out of France. 19 + + -- 407 + + Eventually, after ceaseless efforts, IBM NY regained control of its Ger- + man subsidiary. The name had been changed, the money regained, the + machines recovered, the record clear. For IBM the war was over. + + But for the descendants of 6 million Jews and millions of other Euro- + peans, the war would never be over. It would haunt them and people of con- + science forever. After decades of documentation by the best minds, the most + studied among them would confess that they never really understood the + Holocaust process. Why did it happen? How could it happen? How were they + selected? How did the Nazis get the names? They always had the names. + + What seemingly magical scheduling process could have allowed mil- + lions of Nazi victims to step onto train platforms in Germany or nineteen + other Nazi-occupied countries, travel for two and three days by rail, and then + step onto a ramp at Auschwitz or Treblinka—and within an hour be marched + into gas chambers. Hour a f t e r hour. Day a f t er day. Timetable after timetable. + + Like clockwork, and always with blitzkrieg efficiency. + The survivors would never know. The liberators who fought would + never know. The politicians who made speeches would never know. The + prosecutors who prosecuted would never know. The debaters who debated + would never know. + + The question was barely even raised. + + -- 429-430 + + "IBM does not have much information about this period" + + -- 433 + + IBM stuck to its story that the "Information Company" had no information about + the documents in its own archives, and had transferred some documents to + esteemed institutions for study. + + -- 452 + +## Index + +* Contract irregularities and American taxpayers subsidizing Hollerith, 34. +* Statistics, "race statistics", intellectual shock troops, 53-55. +* Tax avoidance, 65-66. +* Plan for a tower centralizing all the information, 97-98. +* Organized sterilization, 99. +* Slogan: "Hollerith illuminates your company, provides surveillance and helps organize", 110. +* Powers Machine Company, specialized, old and still functioning, like a niche technology, 108. +* Punch card and equipment production in numbers, 123-124. +* Accounting manipulation, 126-130. +* Meeting with Mussolini, 137. +* Meeting with Hitler, '"Heil!" 108 Watson lifted his right arm halfway up before he caught himself', 138. +* Watson wearing a medal with swastikas, 140. +* Office of Automated Reporting (Maschinelles Berichtwesen) and an "universal punch code system", 158-159. +* Animal censuses, 211. +* Monopoly and anti-trust ligitations, proprietary technology, 36, 213-214; monopoly and Soviet government, 243. +* FBI investigation on germans at the IBM, 219-220. +* Examples use for punch cards in nazi-Germany, 215-216, 373; at page 230 it's mentioned the "Race and Setdement Office", "a marriage-assistance bureau for SS officers" "who fulfilled the `[racial]` requirements for marriage", a pre-tinder automated dating agency that could not run correctly due to difficult access to Hollerith machines. +* Bizarre "alien" corporation management by a trustee in war-declared situations (Alien Property Custodian) with plausible deniability, destruction of evidence and layers of indirection, 238-241. +* IBM and State Department, 242. +* Watson was a micromanager, micromanagement (many places in the book). +* Money/revenue flow, 252. +* Patent war, 258 and other pages. +* Nazi-Germany and other US companies, 259. +* Irish Republican Army, 260. +* Ustashi croatian militia, 260. +* International Telephone Company reorganization in Spain; company re-organization under fascist-regimes, 262. +* Competitors: Bull in France, Powers in the US, Kamatec in Holland, 263. +* Veesenmayer: "technical scheduler of actual genocide", 268. +* Network of Hollerith systems installed at railroad junctions; relation between punch cards and trains, 270. +* Tulard file, a form system from 1941, 322. +* Notice from the Jewish Underground, 331. +* Holland and France in numbers: death-ratios (Jews counted / murdered) of 73% versus 25%, 336. +* Control in Business Machines, corporation as an "international monster" (which sounds like a "transleviathan"), 339. +* Argument that Hollerith patents should belong to the US Government "in the first place", 340. +* Watson motive to be "in the international peace movement", 340. +* IBM guns, grenades and masks, 346. +* Final Solution, 370. +* Daily death-rate at Auschwitz getting higher and outpassing Hollerith capacity, giving place to improvised number schemes; decrease of order, 357-358. +* Mengele and his own distinct numbers tatooed on inmates, 357. +* Protocol for mass Jewish extermination, 370. +* Switzerland: "switchboard for Nazi-era commercial intrigue"; banks as annomization proxies, 395. +* Document fabrication "to demonstrate compliance when the opposite was true" and client "blacklisting", 397. +* Watson's letter to all subsidiaries on enemy territory stating that now they were on their own, which in practice was only partially true 293, 398. +* The role of a neutral country to put a subsidiary as a proxy - or a "nexus" (page 399) - between a corporation and it's branches on enemy territories; in the case of IBM it was on Geneva, Switzerland, "a clearing office between the local organizations (...) and the New York Headquarters", 395-399. +* Validity of "punch card signature", 407. +* IBM Soldiers, 409. +* Reparation avoidance after the war, 422. +* Simultaneus translation technology during the Nuremberg Trials, by IBM and free-of-charge, 425. +* Hollerith usage by Allies, 426. +* IBM exemption, 426. +* Another Census, 428. +* Book "The History of Computing in Europe", 429. +* Manual punch card sorting by concentration camp inmates, 432. +* The Hollerith Bunker, 432. +* Caloric intake rationing, 196, 443. +* Defensive Documentation, 446. +* IBM Klub and House of Data, 449. +* Investigation that required "Holocaust knowledge with an emphasis on Hitler-era finance, added to information-technology expertise, sifted through the dogged techniques of an investigative reporter", 454. +* Local and central processing facilities -- like Berlin and Oranienburg, 455. + +[[!tag tecnology history sociology]] diff --git a/books/history/ibm-holocaust/auschwitz.jpg b/books/history/ibm-holocaust/auschwitz.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..e4c21f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/history/ibm-holocaust/auschwitz.jpg diff --git a/books/history/ibm-holocaust/dehomag.png b/books/history/ibm-holocaust/dehomag.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e2ee32 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/history/ibm-holocaust/dehomag.png |