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@@ -598,3 +598,1800 @@ is algorithmic"):
     -- 93
 
 Why not expand this affirmation so _any_ move to signal some intention?
+
+## Misc
+
+Page 101:
+
+    Hence these refinements (e.g. proper equilibria), likethe Nash
+    equilibrium project itself, seem to have to appeal to somethingother
+    than the traditional assumptions of game theory regarding
+    rationalaction in a social context.
+
+Page 102:
+
+    regarding the relation betweenconvention following and instrumental
+    rationality. The worry here takes usback to the discussion of section
+    1.2.3 where for instance it was suggested thatconventions might best be
+    understood in the way suggested by Wittgenstein orHegel. In short, the
+    acceptance of convention may actually require a radicalreassessment of
+    the ontological foundations of game theory.
+
+Page 102:
+
+    actually require a radicalreassessment of the ontological foundations
+    of game theory.
+
+Page 103:
+
+    Why not give up on the Nash concept altogether? This ‘giving up’ might
+    takeon one of two forms. Firstly, game theory could appeal to the
+    concept ofrationalisable strategies (recall section 2.4 of Chapter 2)
+    which seemuncontentiously to flow from the assumptions of instrumental
+    rationalityand CKR. The difficulty with such a move is that it concedes
+    that gametheory is unable to say much about many games (e.g. Figures
+    2.6, 2.12, etc.).Naturally, modesty of this sort might be entirely
+    appropriate for gametheory, although it will diminish its claims as a
+    solid foundation for socialscience.
+
+Page 104:
+
+    Unlike the instrumentally rational model, for Hegelians and Marxists
+    actionbased on preferences feeds back to affect preferences, and so on,
+    in an everunfolding chain. (See Box 3.1 for a rather feeble attempt to
+    blend desires andbeliefs.) Likewise some social psychologists might
+    argue that the key to actionlies less with preferences and more with
+    the cognitive processes used bypeople; and consequently we should
+    address ourselves to understanding theseprocesses.
+
+Page 105:
+
+    105
+
+Page 106:
+
+    Quite simply, the significant social processes which write history
+    cannot beunderstood through the lens of instrumental rationality. This
+    destines gametheory to a footnote in some future text on the history of
+    social theory. Welet the reader decide.3
+
+Page 108:
+
+    Thirdly, the sociology of the discipline may provide further clues.
+    Twoconditions would seem to be essential for the modern development of
+    adiscipline within the academy. Firstly the discipline must be
+    intellectuallydistinguishable from other disciplines. Secondly, there
+    must be some barriersto the amateur pursuit of the discipline. (A third
+    condition which goes withoutsaying is that the discipline must be able
+    to claim that what it does ispotentially worth while.) The first
+    condition reduces the competition fromwithin the academy which might
+    come from other disciplines (to do thisworthwhile thing) and the second
+    ensures that there is no effectivecompetition from outside the academy.
+    In this context, the rational choicemodel has served economics very
+    well. It is the distinguishing intellectualfeature of economics as a
+    discipline and it is amenable to such formalisationthat it keeps most
+    amateurs well at bay. Thus it is plausible to argue that thesuccess of
+    economics as a discipline within the social sciences has been
+    closelyrelated to its championing of the rational choice model.
+
+Page 108:
+
+    kind of amnesia or lobotomy which thediscipline seems to have suffered
+    regarding most things philosophical duringthe postwar period.
+
+Page 108:
+
+    It isoften more plausible to think of the academy as a battleground
+    betweendisciplines rather than between ideas and the disciplines which
+    have goodsurvival features (like the barriers to entry identified
+    above)
+
+Page 109:
+
+    explanations willonly prosper in so far as they are both superior and
+    they are not institutionallyundermined by the rise of neoclassical
+    economics and the demise ofsociology. It is not necessary to see these
+    things conspiratorially to see thepoint of this argument. All academics
+    have fought their corner in battles overresources and they always use
+    the special qualities of their discipline asammunition in one way or
+    another. Thus one might explain in functionalist termsthe mystifying
+    attachment of economics and game theory to Nash.
+
+Page 110:
+
+    We have no special reason to prioritise one strand of our
+    proposedexplanation. Yet, there is more than a hint of irony in the
+    last suggestionbecause Jon Elster has often championed game theory and
+    its use of the Nashequilibrium concept as an alternative to functional
+    arguments in social science.Well, if the use of Nash by game theorists
+    is itself to be explainedfunctionally, then…
+
+Page 111:
+
+    Liberal theorists often explain the State with reference to state of
+    nature. Forinstance, within the Hobbesian tradition there is a stark
+    choice between astate of nature in which a war of all against all
+    prevails and a peacefulsociety where the peace is enforced by a State
+    which acts in the interest ofall. The legitimacy of the State derives
+    from the fact that people who wouldotherwise live in Hobbes’s state of
+    nature (in which life is ‘brutish, nasty andshort’) can clearly see the
+    advantages of creating a State. Even if a State had
+
+Page 111:
+
+    not surfaced historically for all sorts of other reasons, it would have
+    to beinvented.Such a hypothesised ‘invention’ would require a
+    cooperative act of comingtogether to create a State whose purpose will
+    be to secure rights over life andproperty. Nevertheless, even if all
+    this were common knowledge, it wouldnot guarantee that the State will
+    be created. There is a tricky further issuewhich must be resolved. The
+    people must agree to the precise property rightswhich the State will
+    defend and this is tricky because there are typically avariety of
+    possible property rights and the manner in which the benefits ofpeace
+    will be distributed depends on the precise property rights which
+    areselected (see Box 4.1).In other words, the common interest in peace
+    cannot be the onlyelement in the liberal explanation of the State, as
+    any well-defined andpoliced property rights will secure the peace. The
+    missing element is anaccount of how a particular set of property rights
+    are selected and thiswould seem to require an analysis of how people
+    resolve conflicts ofinterest. This is where bargaining theory promises
+    to make an importantcontribution to the liberal theory of the State
+    because it is concernedprecisely with interactions of this sort.
+
+Page 112:
+
+    State creation in Hobbes’s world provides one example (which
+    especiallyinterests us because it suggests that bargaining theory may
+    throw light onsome of the claims of liberal political theory with
+    respect to the State), butthere are many others.
+
+Page 113:
+
+    The creation of the institutions for enforcing agreements (like the
+    State)which are presumed by cooperative game theory requires as we have
+    seenthat agents first solve the bargaining problem non-cooperatively.
+
+Page 113:
+
+    Indeed for this reason, and following thepractice of most game
+    theorists, we have so far discussed the non-cooperative play of games
+    ‘as if ’ there was no communication, therebyimplicitly treating any
+    communication which does take place in the absenceof an enforcement
+    agency as so much ‘cheap talk’
+
+Page 113:
+
+    In cooperative games agents cantalk to each other and make agreements
+    which are binding on later play. Innon-cooperative games, no agreements
+    are binding. Players can say whateverthey like, but there is no
+    external agency which will enforce that they dowhat they have said they
+    will do.
+
+Page 114:
+
+    Thus it will have shown not just what sort of State rational agents
+    mightagree to create, but also how rational agents might solve a host
+    of bargainingproblems in social life. Unfortunately we have reasons to
+    doubt therobustness of this analysis and it is not difficult to see our
+    grounds forscepticism. If bargaining games resemble the hawk-dove game
+    and thediscussion in Chapter 2 is right to point to the existence of
+    multipleequilibria in this game under the standard assumptions of game
+    theory, thenhow does bargaining theory suddenly manage to generate a
+    uniqueequilibrium?
+
+Page 114:
+
+    114face value, the striking result of the non-cooperative analysis of
+    thebargaining problem is that it yields the same solution to the
+    bargainingproblem as the axiomatic approach. If this result is robust,
+    then it seems thatgame theory will have done an extraordinary service
+    by showing thatbargaining problems have unique solutions (whichever
+    route is preferred).Thus it will have shown not just what sort of State
+    rational agents mightagree to create, but also how rational agents
+    might solve a host of bargainingproblems in social life. Unfortunately
+    we have reasons to doubt therobustness of this analysis and it is not
+    difficult to see our grounds forscepticism. If bargaining games
+    resemble the hawk-dove game and thediscussion in Chapter 2 is right to
+    point to the existence of multipleequilibria in this game under the
+    standard assumptions of game theory, thenhow does bargaining theory
+    suddenly manage to generate a uniqueequilibrium?
+
+Page 116:
+
+    A threat or promise which, if carried out, costs more tothe agent who
+    issued it than if it is not carried out, iscalled an incredible threat
+    or promise.
+
+Page 138:
+
+    However, this failure topredict should be welcomed by John Rawls and
+    Robert Nozick as it providesan opening to their contrasting views of
+    what counts as justice betweenrational agents.
+
+Page 138:
+
+    If the Nash solution were unique, then game theory would have
+    answeredan important question at the heart of liberal theory over the
+    type of Statewhich rational agents might agree to create. In addition,
+    it would have solveda question in moral philosophy over what justice
+    might demand in this and avariety of social interactions. After all,
+    how to divide the benefits from socialcooperation seems at first sight
+    to involve a tricky question in moralphilosophy concerning what is
+    just, but if rational agents will only ever agreeon the Nash division
+    then there is only one outcome for rational agents.Whether we want to
+    think of this as just seems optional. But if we do or ifwe think that
+    justice is involved, then we will know, and for onceunambiguously, what
+    justice apparently demands between instrumentallyrational
+    agents.Unfortunately, though, it seems we cannot draw these inferences
+    becausethe Nash solution is not the unique outcome. Accepting this
+    conclusion, weare concerned in this section with what bargaining theory
+    then contributes tothe liberal project of examining the State as if it
+    were the result of rational
+
+Page 140:
+
+    behind the veil of ignorance.
+
+Page 142:
+
+    Torture: Another example in moral philosophy is revealed by the problem
+    oftorture for utilitarians. For instance, a utilitarian calculation
+    focuses onoutcomes by summing the individual utilities found in
+    society. In so doing itdoes not enquire about the fairness or otherwise
+    of the processes responsiblefor generating those utilities with the
+    result that it could sanction torture whenthe utility gain of the
+    torturer exceeds the loss of the person being tortured.Yet most people
+    would feel uncomfortable with a society which sanctionedtorture on
+    these grounds because it unfairly transgresses the ‘rights’ of
+    thetortured.
+
+Page 143:
+
+    Granted that society (andthe State) are not the result of some
+    living-room negotiation, what kind of“axioms” would have generated the
+    social outcomes which we observe in agiven society?’ That is, even if
+    we reject the preceding fictions (i.e. of the Stateas a massive
+    resolution of an n-person bargaining game, or of the veil ofignorance)
+    as theoretically and politically misleading, we may still
+    pinpointcertain axioms which would have generated the observed income
+    distributions(or distributions of opportunities, social roles, property
+    rights, etc.) as a resultof an (utterly) hypothetical bargaining game.
+
+Page 143:
+
+    Roemer (1988) considers a problem faced by an international
+    agencycharged with distributing some resources with the aim of
+    improving health(say lowering infant mortality rates). How should the
+    authority distributethose resources? This is a particularly tricky
+    issue because different countriesin the world doubtless subscribe to
+    some very different principles which theywould regard as relevant to
+    this problem; and so agreement on a particularrule seems unlikely.
+    Nevertheless, he suggests that we approach the problemby considering
+    the following constraints (axioms) which we might want toapply to the
+    decision rule because they might be the object of significantagreement.
+
+Page 144:
+
+    rule which allocates resources in such a way as to raise the country
+    with thelowest infant survival rate to that of the second lowest, and
+    then if the budgethas not been exhausted, it allocates resources to
+    these two countries until theyreach the survival rate of the third
+    lowest country, and so on until the budgetis exhausted.
+
+Page 147:
+
+    It is tempting to think that the problem only arises here because
+    theprisoners cannot communicate with one another. If they could get
+    togetherthey would quickly see that the best for both comes from ‘not
+    confessing’.But as we saw in the previous chapter, communication is not
+    all that isneeded. Each still faces the choice of whether to hold to an
+    agreement that
+
+Page 148:
+
+    The recognition ofthis predicament helps explain why individuals might
+    rationally submit to theauthority of a State, which can enforce an
+    agreement for ‘peace’. Theyvoluntarily relinquish some of their freedom
+    that they enjoy in the(hypothesised) state of nature to the State
+    because it unlocks the prisoners’dilemma. (It should be added perhaps
+    that this is not to be taken as a literalaccount of how all States or
+    enforcement agencies arise. The point of theargument is to demonstrate
+    the conditions under which a State or enforcementagency would enjoy
+    legitimacy among a population even though it restrictedindividual
+    freedoms.)
+
+Page 148:
+
+    their normal business with the result that they prosper and enjoy a
+    more‘commodious’ living (as Hobbes phrased it), choosing strategy
+    ‘peace’ is like‘not confessing’ above; when everyone behaves in this
+    manner it is much betterthan when they all choose ‘war’ (’confess’).
+    However, and in spite of wideranging recognition that peace is better
+    than war, the same prisoners’ dilemmaproblem surfaces and leads to war.
+
+Page 148:
+
+    While Hobbes thought that the authority of the State should be absolute
+    soas to discourage any cheating on ‘peace’, he also thought the scope
+    of itsinterventions in this regard would be quite minimal. In contrast
+    much of themodern fascination with the prisoners’ dilemma stems from
+    the fact that theprisoners’ dilemma seems to be a ubiquitous feature of
+    social life. Forinstance, it plausibly lies at the heart of many
+    problems which groups
+
+Page 148:
+
+    they have struck over ‘not confessing’. Is it in the interest of either
+    party tokeep to such an agreement? No, a quick inspection reveals that
+    the bestaction in terms of pay-offs is still to ‘confess’. As Thomas
+    Hobbes remarkedin Leviathan when studying a similar problem, ‘covenants
+    struck without thesword are but words’. The prisoners may trumpet the
+    virtue of ‘notconfessing’ but if they are only motivated instrumentally
+    by the pay-offs,then it is only so much hot air because each will
+    ‘confess’ when the timecomes for a decision.
+
+Page 148:
+
+    What seems to be required to avoid this outcome is a mechanism
+    whichallows for joint or collective decision making, thus ensuring that
+    both actuallydo ‘not confess’. In other words, there is a need for a
+    mechanism for enforcingan agreement—Hobbes’s ‘sword’, if you like. And
+    it is this recognition whichlies at the heart of a traditional liberal
+    argument dating back to Hobbes for thecreation of the State which is
+    seen as the ultimate enforcement agency.(Notice, however, that such an
+    argument applies equally to some otherinstitutions which have the
+    capacity to enforce agreements, for example theMafia.) In Hobbes’s
+    story, each individual in the state of nature can behavepeacefully or
+    in a war-like fashion. Since peace allows everyone to go about
+
+Page 149:
+
+    it is notuncommon to find the dilemma treated as the essential model of
+    social life
+
+Page 149:
+
+    The following four sectionsand the next chapter, on repeated games,
+    discuss some of the developmentsin the social science literature which
+    have been concerned with how thedilemma might be unlocked without the
+    services of the State. In otherwords, the later sections focus on the
+    question of whether the widespreadnature of this type of interaction
+    necessarily points to the (legitimate inliberal terms) creation of an
+    activist State. Are there other solutions whichcan be implemented
+    without involving the State or any public institution?Since the scope
+    of the State’s activities has become one of the mostcontested issues in
+    contemporary politics, it will come as no surprise todiscover that the
+    discussions around alternative solutions to the dilemmahave assumed a
+    central importance in recent political (and especially inliberal and
+    neoliberal) theory.
+
+Page 149:
+
+    It arises as a problem of trust in every elemental economic
+    exchangebecause it is rare for the delivery of a good to be perfectly
+    synchronised withthe payment for it and this affords the opportunity to
+    cheat on the
+
+Page 150:
+
+    These are two-person examples of the dilemma, but it is probably the
+    ‘n-person’ version of the dilemma (usually called the free rider
+    problem) which hasattracted most attention. It creates a collective
+    action problem among groupsof individuals. Again the examples are
+    legion.
+
+Page 151:
+
+    The instrumentally rational individual will recognise that the best
+    action is‘do not attach’ (i.e. defection) whatever the others do. This
+    means that in apopulation of like-minded individuals, all will decide
+    similarly with the resultthat each individual gains 2 utils. This is
+    plainly an inferior outcome for allbecause everyone could have attached
+    the device and if they all had done soeach would have enjoyed 3
+    utils.In these circumstances the individuals in this economy might
+    agree to theState enforcing attachment of the device. Alternatively, it
+    is easy to see howanother popular intervention by the State would also
+    do the trick. The Statecould tax each individual who did not attach the
+    device a sum equivalent to 2utils and this would turn ‘attach’ (C) into
+    the dominant strategy.
+
+Page 151:
+
+    There is nothinglike the State which can enforce contracts within the
+    household to keep akitchen clean, but interestingly within a family
+    household one oftenobserves the exercise of patriarchal or paternal
+    power instead. Of course,the potential difficulty with such an
+    arrangement is that the patriarch mayrule in a partial manner with the
+    result that the kitchen is clean but with nohelp from the hands of the
+    patriarch! The role of the State has in suchcases been captured, so to
+    speak, by an interested party determined bygender. Then gender becomes
+    the determinant of who bears the burdenand who has the more privileged
+    role. Social power which ‘solves’prisoners’ dilemmas can be thus
+    exercised without the direct involvementof the State (even though the
+    State often enshrines such power in its owninstitutions).
+
+Page 152:
+
+    Hence the prisoners’ dilemma/free rider might plausibly lie atthe
+    distinction which is widely attributed to Marx in the discussion of
+    classconsciousness between a class ‘of itself’ and ‘for itself’ (see
+    Elster, 1986b). Onsuch a view a class transforms itself into a ‘class
+    for itself’, or a society avoidsdeficient demand, by unlocking the
+    dilemma.
+
+Page 153:
+
+    Adam Smith’s account of how the self-interest of sellers combines with
+    thepresence of many sellers to frustrate their designs and to keep
+    prices lowmight also fit this model of interaction. If you are the
+    seller choosing from thetwo row strategies C and D, then imagine that C
+    and D translate into ‘charge ahigh price’ and ‘charge a low price’
+    respectively. Figure 5.2 could reflect yourpreference ordering as high
+    prices for all might be better than low prices forall and charging a
+    low price when all others charge a high might be the bestoption because
+    you scoop market share. Presumably the same applies to yourcompetitors.
+    Thus even though all sellers would be happier with a high level
+    ofprices, their joint interest is subverted because each acting
+    individually quiterationally charges a low price. It is as if an
+    invisible hand was at work onbehalf of the consumers.
+
+Page 155:
+
+    This is perhaps the most radical departure from the
+    conventionalinstrumental understanding of what is entailed by
+    rationality because, whileaccepting the pay-offs, it suggests that
+    agents should act in a different wayupon them. The notion of
+    rationality is no longer understood in the means—end framework as the
+    selection of the means most likely to satisfy given ends.
+
+Page 155:
+
+    thus enabling‘rationality’ to solve the problem when there are
+    sufficient numbers ofKantian agents.
+
+Page 155:
+
+    For instance, we mighthave wrongly assumed earlier that there is no
+    honour among thieves becauseacting honourably could be connected to
+    acting rationally in some fullaccount of rationality in which case the
+    dilemma might be unlocked withoutthe intervention of the State (or some
+    such agency). This general idea oflinking a richer notion of rational
+    agency with the spontaneous solution ofthe dilemma has been variously
+    pursued in the social science literature andthis section and the
+    following three consider four of the more prominentsuggestions.
+
+Page 155:
+
+    The first connects rationality with morality and Kant provides a
+    readyreference. His practical reason demands that we should undertake
+    thoseactions which when generalised yield the best outcomes. It does
+    not matterwhether others perform the same calculation and actually
+    undertake thesame action as you. The morality is deontological and it
+    is rational for theagent to be guided by a categorical imperative (see
+    Chapter 1). Consequently,in the free rider problem, the application of
+    the categorical imperative willinstruct Kantian agents to follow the
+    cooperative action
+
+Page 156:
+
+    Similarly partisans in occupied Europe during the Second World War
+    riskedtheir lives even when it was not clear that it was instrumentally
+    rational toconfront the Nazis. In such cases, it seems people act on a
+    sense of what isright.
+
+Page 156:
+
+    Likewise, Hardin (1982) suggests thatthe existence of environmental and
+    other voluntary organisations usuallyentails overcoming a free rider
+    problem and in the USA this may beexplained in part by an American
+    commitment to a form ofcontractarianism whereby ‘people play fair if
+    enough others do’
+
+Page 156:
+
+    Instead, rationality is conceived more as an expression of what is
+    possible: ithas become an end in its own right. This is not only
+    radical, it is alsocontroversial. Deontological moral philosophy is
+    controversial for the obviousreason that it is not concerned with the
+    actual consequences of an action, aswell as for the move to connect it
+    with rationality. (Nevertheless, O’Neill(1989) presents a recent
+    argument and provides an extended discussion of thismoral psychology
+    and how it might be applied.)Kant’s morality may seem rather demanding
+    for these reasons, but thereare weaker or vaguer types of moral
+    motivation which also seem capableof unlocking the prisoners’ dilemma.
+    For example, a general altruisticconcern for the welfare of others may
+    provide a sufficient reason forpeople not to defect on the cooperative
+    arrangement.
+
+Page 157:
+
+    Another departure from the strict instrumental model of rational action
+    comeswhen individuals make decisions in a context of norms and these
+    norms arecapable of overriding considerations of what is instrumentally
+    rational.
+
+Page 157:
+
+    On the other hand, given the well-known difficultiesassociated with any
+    coherent system of ethics (like utilitarianism), it seemsquite likely
+    that a person’s ethical concerns will not be captured by a well-behaved
+    set of preferences (see for instance Sen (1970) on the problems ofbeing
+    a Paretian Liberal). Indeed rational agents may well base their actions
+    onreasons which are external to their preferences.
+
+Page 157:
+
+    Of course, there is a tricky issue concerning whether these rather
+    weaker orvaguer moral motivations (like altruism, acting on what is
+    fair or what is right)mark a deep breach with the instrumental model of
+    action. It might be arguedthat such ethical concerns can be represented
+    in this model by introducing theconcept of ethical preferences. Thus
+    the influence of ethical preferencestransforms the pay-offs in the
+    game.
+
+Page 158:
+
+    Disputeswithin Aboriginal society are neither perceived as simply
+    between twoindividuals nor subject to some established community
+    tribunal. It is for thisreason that the resolution of a major conflict
+    will involve a significant amountof negotiation between the parties.
+    Yet the informal laws which govern thecontents of the negotiations are
+    well entrenched in the tribal culture. Forexample, it is not uncommon
+    for family members of the perpetrator to beasked to accept ‘punishment’
+    if the individual offender is in prison andtherefore unavailable.
+
+Page 159:
+
+    First World War. This was a war of unprecedentedcarnage both at the
+    beginning and the end. Yet during a middle period, non-aggression
+    between the two opposing trenches emerged spontaneously in theform of a
+    ‘live and let live’ norm. Christmas fraternisation is one
+    well-knownexample, but the ‘live and let live’ norm was applied much
+    more widely.Snipers would not shoot during meal times and so both sides
+    could go abouttheir business ‘talking and laughing’ at these hours.
+    Artillery was predictablyused both at certain times and at certain
+    locations. So both sides couldappear to demonstrate aggression by
+    venturing out at certain times and tocertain locations, knowing that
+    the shells would fall predictably close to, butnot on, their chosen
+    route. Likewise, it was not considered ‘etiquette’ to fireon working
+    parties who had been sent out to repair a position or collect thedead
+    and so on.
+
+Page 159:
+
+    For instance, it is sometimes argued that thenorms of Confucian
+    societies enable those economies to solve the prisoners’dilemma/free
+    rider problems within companies without costly contracting
+    andmonitoring activity and that this explains, in part, the economic
+    success ofthose economies (see Hargreaves Heap, 1991, Casson, 1991,
+    North, 1991).Akerlof ’s (1983) discussion of loyalty filters, where he
+    explains the relativesuccess of Quaker groups in North America by their
+    respect for the norm ofhonesty, is another example—
+
+Page 160:
+
+    Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations1 is an obvious source for
+    this viewbecause he would deny that the meaning of something like a
+    person’sinterests or desires can be divorced from a social setting; and
+    this is a usefulopportunity to take that argument further. The
+    attribution of meaningrequires language rules and it is impossible to
+    have a private language. Thereis a long argument around the possibility
+    or otherwise of private languagesand it may be worth pursuing the point
+    in a slightly different way by askinghow agents have knowledge of what
+    action will satisfy the condition ofbeing instrumentally rational. Any
+    claim to knowledge involves a firstunquestioned premise: I know this
+    because I accept x. Otherwise an infiniteregress is inevitable: I
+    accept x because I accept y and I accept ybecause…and so on.
+    Accordingly, if each person’s knowledge of what isrational is to be
+    accessible to one another, then they must share the samefirst premises.
+    It was Wittgenstein’s point that people must share somepractices if
+    they are to attach meaning to words and so avoid the problem ofinfinite
+    redescription which comes with any attempt to specify the rules
+    forapplying the rules of a language.
+
+Page 161:
+
+    There is another similarity and difference which might also be
+    usefullymarked. To make it very crudely one might draw an analogy
+    between thedifficulty which Wittgenstein encounters over knowledge
+    claims and a similardifficulty which Simon (1982) addresses. (Herbert
+    Simon is well known ineconomics for his claim that agents are
+    procedurally rational, or boundedlyrational, because they do not have
+    the computing capacity to work out whatis the best to do in complex
+    settings.) To be sure, Wittgenstein finds theproblem in an infinite
+    regress of first principles while Simon finds thedifficulty in the
+    finite computing capacity of the brain. Nevertheless, both
+
+Page 161:
+
+    discussion of the Harsanyi doctrine because a similar claim seems to
+    underpinthat doctrine. Namely that all rational individuals must come
+    to the sameconclusion when faced by the same evidence. Wittgenstein
+    would agree to theextent that some such shared basis of interpretation
+    must be present ifcommunication is to be possible. But he would deny
+    that all societies andpeoples will share the same basis for
+    interpretations. The source of the sharingfor Wittgenstein is not some
+    universal ‘rationality’, as it is for Harsanyi; ratherit is the
+    practices of the community in which the people live, and these willvary
+    considerably across time and space.
+
+Page 162:
+
+    let us make the view inspired by Wittgensteinvery concrete. The
+    suggestion is that what is instrumentally rational is notwell defined
+    unless one appeals to the prevailing norms of behaviour. Thismay seem a
+    little strange in the context of a prisoners’ dilemma where thedemands
+    of instrumental rationality seem plain for all to see: defect! But,in
+    reply, those radically inspired by Wittgenstein would complain that
+    thenorms have already been at work in the definition of the matrix and
+    itspay-offs because it is rare for any social setting to throw up
+    unvarnishedpay-offs. A social setting requires interpretation before
+    the pay-offs can beassigned and norms are implicated in those
+    interpretations. (See forexample Polanyi (1945) who argues, in his
+    celebrated discussion of the riseof industrial society, that the
+    incentives of the market system are onlyeffective when the norms of
+    society place value on private materialadvance.)
+
+Page 162:
+
+    The last reflection on rationality comes from David Gauthier. He
+    remainsfirmly in the instrumental camp and ambitiously argues that its
+    dictates havebeen wrongly understood in the prisoners’ dilemma game.
+    Instrumental rationalitydemands cooperation and not defection! To make
+    his argument he distinguishesbetween two sorts of maximisers: a
+    straightforward maximiser (SM) and aconstrained maximiser (CM). A
+    straightforward maximiser defects (D)following the same logic that we
+    have used so far. The constrained maximiseruses a conditional strategy
+    of cooperating (C) with fellow constrainedmaximisers and defecting with
+    straightforward maximisers. He then asks:which disposition
+    (straightforward or constrained) should an instrumentallyrational
+    person choose to have? (The decision can be usefully compared with
+    asimilar one confronting Ulysses in connection with listening to the
+    Sirens,
+
+Page 164:
+
+    The point is that if instrumental rationality is what motivates the CM
+    inthe prisoners’ dilemma, then a CM must want to defect
+
+Page 164:
+
+    In other words, being a CM may be better than beingan SM, but the best
+    strategy of all is to label yourself a CM and then cheaton the deal.
+    And, of course, when people do this, we are back in a worldwhere
+    everyone defects.
+
+Page 164:
+
+    Surely, this line of argument goes,it pays not to ‘zap’ a fellow CM
+    because your reputation as a CM is therebypreserved and this enables
+    you to interact more fruitfully with fellow CMs inthe future. Should
+    you zap a fellow CM now, then everyone will know that youare a rogue
+    and so in your future interactions, you will be treated as an SM.
+    Inshort, in a repeated setting, it pays to forgo the short run gain
+    from defectingbecause this ensures the benefits of cooperation over the
+    long run. Thusinstrumental calculation can make true CM behaviour the
+    best course ofaction.
+
+Page 165:
+
+    Moreover, it achieved aremarkable degree of cooperation.
+
+Page 165:
+
+    each program.Tit-for-Tat, submitted by Anatol Rapoport, won the
+    tournament. Theprogram starts with a cooperative move and then does
+    whatever theopponent did on the previous move. It was, as Axelrod
+    points out, not onlythe simplest program, it was also the best!
+
+Page 165:
+
+    dilemma can be defeated without the intervention of a collective agency
+    likethe State—that is, provided the interaction is repeated
+    sufficiently often tomake the long term benefits outweigh the short
+    gains.
+
+Page 166:
+
+    ‘Is the Prisoners’ dilemma all of sociology?’Of course, it is not, he
+    answers. Nevertheless, it has fascinated social scientistsand proved
+    extremely difficult to unlock in one-shot plays of the game—atleast,
+    without the creation of a coercive agency like the State which is
+    capableof enforcing a collective action or without the introduction of
+    norms or somesuitable form of moral motivation on the part of the
+    individuals playing thegame. Of course, many interactions are repeated
+    and so this stark conclusionmay be modified by the discussion of the
+    next chapter.
+
+Page 167:
+
+    Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, mutualdefection remains the only Nash
+    equilibrium. The following two sectionsdiscuss, respectively,
+    indefinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma and therelated free rider
+    games. We show (section 6.4) that mutual cooperation isa possible Nash
+    equilibrium outcome in these games provided there is a‘sufficient’
+    degree of uncertainty over when the repetition will cease.There are
+    some significant implications here both for liberal politicaltheory and
+    for the explanatory power of game theory. We notice that thisresult
+    means that mutual cooperation might be achieved without theintervention
+    of a collective agency like the State and/or withoutappealing to some
+    expanded notion of rational agency
+
+Page 168:
+
+    the absence of a theory of equilibriumselection.
+
+Page 170:
+
+    Firstly, it provides a theoretical warrant for the belief that
+    cooperation in theprisoners’ dilemma can be rationally sustained
+    without the intervention ofsome collective agency like the State,
+    provided there is sufficient (to be definedlater) doubt over when the
+    repeated game will end. Thus the presence of aprisoners’ dilemma
+    interaction does not necessarily entail either a poor socialoutcome or
+    the institutions of formal collective decision making. The
+    thirdalternative is for players to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy
+    rationally.1 If they adoptthis third alternative the socially inferior
+    outcome of mutual defection will beavoided without the interfering
+    presence of the State or some other formal(coercive) institution.
+
+Page 171:
+
+    Equally, it is probable that both prisonersin the original example may
+    think twice about ‘confessing’ because each knowsthat they are likely
+    to encounter one another again (if not in prison, at leastoutside) and
+    so there are likely to be opportunities for exacting ‘punishment’ ata
+    later date.
+
+Page 171:
+
+    Folk theorem
+
+Page 172:
+
+    This is an extremely important result for the social sciences because
+    itmeans that there are always multiple Nash equilibria in such
+    indefinitelyrepeated games. Hence, even if Nash is accepted as the
+    appropriateequilibrium concept for games with individuals who are
+    instrumentally rationaland who have common knowledge of that
+    rationality, it will not explain howindividuals select their strategies
+    because there are many strategy pairs whichform Nash equilibria in
+    these repeated games. Of course, we have encounteredthis problem in
+    some one-shot games before, but the importance of this resultis that it
+    means the problem is always there in indefinitely repeated games.Even
+    worse, it is amplified by repetition. In other words, game theory needs
+    tobe supplemented by a theory of equilibrium selection if it is to
+    explain actionin these indefinitely repeated games, especially if it is
+    to explain howcooperation actually arises spontaneously in indefinitely
+    repeated prisoners’dilemma games.
+
+Page 175:
+
+    Now consider a tit-for-tat strategy in this group which works in
+    thefollowing way. The strategy partitions the group into those who are
+    in ‘goodstanding’ and those who are in ‘no standing’ based on whether
+    the individualcontributed to the collective fund in the last time
+    period. Those in ‘goodstanding’ are eligible for the receipt of help
+    from the group if they fall ‘ill’ thistime period, whereas those who
+    are in ‘no standing’ are not eligible for help.Thus tit-for-tat
+    specifies cooperation and puts you in ‘good standing’ for thereceipt of
+    a benefit if you fall ‘ill’ (alternatively, to connect with the
+    earlierdiscussion, one might think of cooperating as securing a
+    ‘reputation’ whichputs one in ‘good standing’
+
+Page 175:
+
+    Notice your decision now will determine whether you are in ‘good
+    standing’from now until the next opportunity that you get to make this
+    decision (whichwill be the next period if you do not fall ‘ill’ or the
+    period after that if you fall‘ill’). So we focus on the returns from
+    your choice now until you next get theopportunity to choose.
+
+Page 176:
+
+    Who needs the State?
+
+Page 176:
+
+    Here we pick up threads of the Hobbesianargument for the State and see
+    what the result holds for this argument. At firstglance, the argument
+    for the State seems to be weakened because it appearsthat a group can
+    overcome the free rider problem without recourse to theState for
+    contract enforcement. So long as the group can punish free riders
+    byexcluding them from the benefits of cooperation (as for instance the
+    Pygmiespunished Cephu—see Chapter 5), then there is the possibility of
+    ‘spontaneous’public good provision through the generalisation of the
+    tit-for-tat strategy.Having noted this, nevertheless, the point seems
+    almost immediately to beblunted since the difference between a
+    Hobbesian State which enforcescollective agreements and the generalised
+    tit-for-tat arrangement is notaltogether clear and so in proving one we
+    are hardly undermining the other.After all, the State merely codifies
+    and implements the policies of‘punishment’ on behalf of others in a
+    very public way (with the rituals ofpolice stations, courts and the
+    like). But, is this any different from the golfclub which excludes a
+    member from the greens when the dues have not beenpaid or the Pygmies’
+    behaviour towards Cephu? Or the gang which excludespeople who have not
+    contributed ‘booty’ to the common fund?
+
+Page 176:
+
+    Box 6.2
+
+Page 178:
+
+    contract—that the creation of the State by the individual also helps
+    shape asuperior individual.) Hayek, however, prefers the ‘English
+    tradition’ because hedoubts (a) that the formation of the State is part
+    of a process which liberates(and moulds) the social agent and (b) that
+    there is the knowledge to informsome central design so that it can
+    perform the task of resolving free ridingbetter than spontaneously
+    generated solutions (like tit-for-tat). In other words,reason should
+    know its limits and this is what informs Hayek’s support forEnglish
+    pragmatism and its suspicion of the State.Of course there is a big ‘if
+    in Hayek’s argument. Although Beirut stillmanaged to function without a
+    grand design, most of its citizens prayed forone. In short, the
+    spontaneous solution is not always the best. Indeed, as wehave seen,
+    the cooperative solution is just one among many Nash equilibria
+    inrepeated games, so in the absence of some machinery of collective
+    decisionmaking, there seems no guarantee it will be selected. Against
+    this, however, itis sometimes argued that evolution will favour
+    practices which generate thecooperative outcome since societies that
+    achieve cooperation in these gameswill prosper as compared with those
+    which are locked in mutual defection.This is the cue for a discussion
+    of evolutionary game theory and we shall leavefurther discussion of the
+    State until we turn to evolutionary game theory
+
+Page 178:
+
+    Instead the result seems important because it demythologises the
+    State.Firstly the State qua State (that is, the State with its police
+    force, its courts andthe like) is not required to intrude into every
+    social interaction which suffersfrom a free rider problem. There are
+    many practices and institutions which aresurrogates for the State in
+    this regard. Indeed, the Mafia has plausiblydisplaced the State in
+    certain areas precisely because it provides the services ofa State.
+    Likewise, during the long civil war years inhabitants of Beirutsomehow
+    still managed to maintain services which required the overcoming offree
+    rider problems.Secondly since something like the State as contract
+    enforcer might well arise‘spontaneously’ through the playing of free
+    rider games repeatedly, it need notrequire any grand design. There need
+    be no constitutional conventions. In thisway the result counts strongly
+    for what Hayek (1962) refers to as the Englishas opposed to the
+    European continental Enlightenment tradition. The latterstresses the
+    power of reason to construct institutions that overcome problemslike
+    those of the free rider. (It also often presupposes—recall Rousseau’s
+    social
+
+Page 178:
+
+    different if you pay the State in the form of taxes or the Mafia in the
+    form oftribute?
+
+Page 185:
+
+    example comes from strategicdecisions by the legislature when the
+    Executive is trying to push throughParliament a series of bills that
+    the latter is unsympathetic towards.
+
+Page 185:
+
+    President proposes legislation. The Congress is notin sympathy with the
+    proposal and must decide whether to make amendments.If it decides to
+    make an amendment, then the President must decide whetherto fight the
+    amendment or acquiesce. Looking at the President’s pay-offs it
+    isobvious that, even though he or she prefers that the Congress does
+    not amendthe legislation, if it does, he or she would not want to fight
+
+Page 186:
+
+    the Folk theorem ensures that aninfinity of war/acquiescence patterns
+    are compatible with instrumentalrationality. Nevertheless, the duration
+    of such games is usually finite andsometimes their length is
+    definite—e.g. US Presidents have a fixed term andincumbents have only a
+    fixed number of local markets that they wish todefend. What happens
+    then? Would it make sense for the President or theincumbent to put on a
+    show of strength early on (e.g. by fighting the Congressor unleashing a
+    price war) in order to create a reputation for belligerence thatwould
+    make the Congress and the entrant think that, in future rounds,
+    theywill end up with pay-off -1/2 if they dare them?
+
+Page 186:
+
+    In the finitely repeated version of the game Nash backward
+    inductionargues against this conclusion. Just as in the case of the
+    prisoners’ dilemmain the previous subsection, it suggests that, since
+    there will be no fighting atthe last play of the game, the reputation
+    of the President/incumbent willunravel to the first stage and no
+    fighting will occur (rationally). Theconclusion changes again once we
+    drop CKR (or allow for different types ofplayers).
+
+Page 190:
+
+    Of course, there may be actions that can be takenoutside the game and
+    which have a similar effect on the beliefs of others. Such‘signalling’
+    behaviour is considered briefly in this section to round out
+    thediscussion of reputations. It is of potential relevance not only to
+    repeated, butalso to one-shot games.
+
+Page 192:
+
+    when the game isrepeated and there is a unique Nash equilibrium things
+    change. The Nashequilibrium is attractive because as time goes by and
+    agents adjust theirexpectations of what others will do in the light of
+    experience, then they willseem naturally drawn to the Nash equilibrium
+    because it is the only restingplace for beliefs. Any other set of
+    beliefs will upset itself.
+
+Page 192:
+
+    Nevertheless, there is still no guarantee that a Nash equilibrium
+    willsurface even if it exists and it is unique.
+
+Page 193:
+
+    The strength of the Nash equilibrium is that forward looking agents
+    mayrealise that (R2, C2) is the only outcome that does not engender
+    such thoughts.We just saw that adaptive (or backward looking)
+    expectations will not do thetrick. If, however, after having been
+    around the pay-off matrix a few timesplayers ask themselves the
+    question ‘How can we reach a stable outcome?’,they may very well
+    conclude that the only such outcome is the Nashequilibrium (R2, C2).But
+    why would they want to ask such a question? What is so wrong
+    withinstability (and disequilibrium) after all? Indeed in the case of
+    Figure 2.6 ourplayers have an incentive to avoid a stable outcome
+    (observe that on averagethe cycle which takes them from one extremity
+    of the pay-off matrix toanother yields a much higher pay-off than the
+    Nash equilibrium result). If, onthe other hand, pay-offs were as in
+    Figure 6.4 below, they would be stronglymotivated to reach the Nash
+    equilibrium.
+
+Page 193:
+
+    It is easy to see that this type of adaptivelearning will never lead
+    the players to the Nash equilibrium outcome (R2, C2).Instead, they will
+    be oscillating between outcomes (R1, C1), (R1, C3), (R3, C1)and (R3,
+    C3).Can they break away from this never ending cycle and hit the
+    Nashequilibrium? They can provided they converge onto a common
+    forwardlooking train of thought. For
+
+Page 194:
+
+    Thus we conclude that whether repetition makes the Nashequilibrium more
+    or less likely when it is unique must depend on thecontingencies of how
+    people learn and the precise pay-offs from non-Nashbehaviour.
+
+Page 194:
+
+    Broadly put, this is one and the same problem. It is a problem
+    withspecifying how agents come to hold beliefs which are extraneous to
+    the game(in the sense that they cannot be generated endogenously
+    through theapplication of the assumptions of instrumental rationality
+    and commonknowledge of instrumental rationality)
+
+Page 195:
+
+    the insights of evolutionary game theory arecrucial material for many
+    political and philosophical debates, especially thosearound the State.
+
+Page 195:
+
+    The argument for suchan agency turns on the general problem of
+    equilibrium selection and on theparticular difficulty of overcoming the
+    prisoners’ dilemma. When there aremultiple equilibria, the State can,
+    through suitable action on its own part, guidethe outcomes towards one
+    equilibrium rather than another. Thus the problemof equilibrium
+    selection is solved by bringing it within the ambit of
+    consciouspolitical decision making. Likewise, with the prisoners’
+    dilemma/ free riderproblem, the State can provide the services of
+    enforcement. Alternativelywhen the game is repeated sufficiently and
+    the issue again becomes one ofequilibrium selection, then the State can
+    guide the outcomes towards thecooperative Nash equilibrium.
+
+Page 195:
+
+    intransigent Right’
+
+Page 196:
+
+    —that is, the idea that you can turn social outcomes intomatters of
+    social choice through the intervention of a collective action
+    agencylike the State. The positive argument against ‘political
+    rationalism’, as the quoteabove suggests, turns on the idea that these
+    interventions are not evennecessary. The failure to intervene does not
+    spell chaos, chronic indecision,fluctuations and outcomes in which
+    everyone is worse off than they couldhave been. Instead, a ‘spontaneous
+    order’ will be thrown up as a result ofevolutionary processes.
+
+Page 196:
+
+    Likewise, there are problems of ‘political failure’ that subvert the
+    ideal ofdemocratic decision making and which can match the market
+    failures that theState is attempting to rectify. For example, Buchanan
+    and Wagner (1977) andTullock (1965) argue that special interests are
+    bound to skew ‘democraticdecisions’ towards excessively large
+    bureaucracies and high governmentexpenditures. Furthermore there are
+    difficulties, especially after the Arrowimpossibility theorem, with
+    making sense of the very idea of something likethe ‘will of the people’
+    in whose name the State might be acting (see Arrow,1951, Riker, 1982,
+    Hayek, 1962, and Buchanan, 1954).1These, so to speak, are a shorthand
+    list of the negative arguments comingfrom the political right against
+    ‘political rationalism’ or ‘socialconstructivism’
+
+Page 196:
+
+    Forinstance, there are problems of inadequate knowledge which can mean
+    thateven the best intentioned and executed political decision generates
+    unintendedand undesirable consequences. Indeed this has always been an
+    importanttheme in Austrian economics, featuring strongly in the 1920s
+    debate over thepossibility of socialist planning as well as
+    contemporary doubts over thewisdom of more minor forms of State
+    intervention.
+
+Page 196:
+
+    Hayek (1962) himself tracesthe battlelines in the dispute back to the
+    beginning of Enlightenmentthinking:Hayek distinguished two intellectual
+    lines of thought about freedom, ofradically opposite upshot. The first
+    was an empiricist, essentially Britishtradition descending from Hume,
+    Smith and Ferguson, and seconded byBurke and Tucker, which understood
+    political development as aninvoluntary process of gradual institutional
+    improvement, comparable tothe workings of a market economy or the
+    evolution of common law. Thesecond was a rationalist, typically French
+    lineage descending fromDescartes through Condorcet to Comte, with a
+    horde of modernsuccessors, which saw social institutions as fit for
+    premeditatedconstruction, in the spirit of polytechnic engineering. The
+    former lineled to real liberty; the latter inevitably destroyed it.
+
+Page 197:
+
+    evolutionary stable strategies
+
+Page 197:
+
+    In particular, wesuggest that the evolutionary approach can help
+    elucidate the idea that poweris mobilised through institutions and
+    conventions. We conclude the chapterwith a summing-up of where the
+    issue of equilibrium selection and the debateover the State stands
+    after the contribution of the evolutionary approach.
+
+Page 197:
+
+    The basic idea behind this equilibrium concept is that an ESS is a
+    strategywhich when used among some population cannot be ‘invaded’ by
+    anotherstrategy because it cannot be bested. So when a population uses
+    a strategy I,‘mutants’ using any other strategy J cannot get a toehold
+    and expand amongthat population.
+
+Page 197:
+
+    This is why evolutionary game theory assumes significance in the
+    debateover an active State. It should help assess the claims of
+    ‘spontaneous order’made by those in the British corner and so advance
+    one of the central debatesin Enlightenment political thinking.
+
+Page 198:
+
+    This is, if youlike, a version of Hobbes’s nightmare where there are no
+    property rightsand everyone you come across will potentially claim your
+    goods.
+
+Page 202:
+
+    Secondly, and more specifically, there is the result that although the
+    symmetricalplay of this game yields a unique equilibrium, it becomes
+    unstable the momentrole playing begins and some players start to
+    recognise asymmetry. Sincecreative agents seem likely to experiment
+    with different ways of playing thegame, it would be surprising if there
+    was never some deviation based on anasymmetry. Indeed it would be more
+    than surprising because there is muchevidence to support the idea that
+    people look for ‘extraneous’ reasons whichmight explain what are in
+    fact purely random types of behaviour (see theadjacent box on winning
+    streaks).Formally, this leaves us with the old problem of how the
+    solution to thegame comes about. However, evolutionary game theory does
+    at least point usin the direction of an answer. The phase diagram in
+    Figure 7.2 reveals that theselection of an equilibrium depends
+    critically on the initial set of beliefs
+
+Page 202:
+
+    once animperfect form of rationality is posited. In other words, it is
+    not beingdeduced as an implication of the common knowledge of
+    rationalityassumption which has been the traditional approach of
+    mainstream gametheory.
+
+Page 203:
+
+    Thirdly, it can be noted that the selection of one ESS rather than
+    anotherembodies a convention
+
+Page 203:
+
+    To put these observationsrather less blandly, since rationality on this
+    account is only responsible for thegeneral impulse towards mimicking
+    profitable behaviour, the history of thegame depends in part on what
+    are the idiosyncratic and unpredictable (non-rational, one might say,
+    as opposed to irrational) features of individual beliefsand learning.
+
+Page 204:
+
+    Fourthly, the selection of one equilibrium rather than another
+    potentiallymatters rather deeply. In effect in the hawk—dove game over
+    contestedproperty, what happens in the course of moving to one of the
+    ESSs is theestablishment of a form of property rights. Either those
+    playing role R get theproperty and role C players concede this right,
+    or those playing role C get theproperty and role R players concede this
+    right. This is interesting not onlybecause it contains the kernel of a
+    possible explanation of property rights (onwhich we shall say more
+    later) but also because the probability of playing roleR or role C is
+    unlikely to be distributed uniformly over the population. Indeed,this
+    distribution will depend on whatever is the source of the distinction
+    usedto assign people to roles.
+
+Page 204:
+
+    The question, then, of how a source of differentiation gets
+    establishedbecomes rather important.
+
+Page 204:
+
+    Thus the behaviour at one of theseESSs is conventionally determined
+    and, to repeat the earlier point, we can plotthe emergence of a
+    particular convention with the use of this phase diagram.It will depend
+    both on the presumption that agents learn from experience(the rational
+    component of the explanation) and on the particularidiosyncratic (and
+    non-rational) features of initial beliefs and precise learningrules.
+
+Page 206:
+
+    After all, perhaps the presence of these conventions can only
+    beaccounted for by a move towards a Wittgensteinian ontology, in which
+    casemainstream game theory’s foundations look decidedly wobbly. To
+    prevent thisdrift a more robust response is required.The alternative
+    response is to deny that the appeal to shared prominenceor salience
+    involves either an infinite regress or an acknowledgement
+    thatindividuals are necessarily ontologically social
+
+Page 206:
+
+    There is a further and deeper problem with the concept of salience
+    basedon analogy because the attribution of terms like ‘possession’
+    plainly begs thequestion by presupposing the existence of some sort of
+    property rights in thepast. In other words, people already share a
+    convention in the past and this isbeing used to explain a closely
+    related convention in the present. Thus we havenot got to the bottom of
+    the question concerning how people come to holdconventions in the first
+    place.3
+
+Page 206:
+
+    So, of course, we cannot hope to explainhow they actually achieve a new
+    coordination without appealing to thosebackground conventions. In this
+    sense, it would be foolish for socialscientists (and game theorists, in
+    particular) to ignore the social context inwhich individuals play new
+    games.
+
+Page 208:
+
+    This conclusion reinforces the earlier result that the course of
+    historydepends in part on what seem from the instrumental account of
+    rationalbehaviour to be non-rational (and perhaps idiosyncratic) and
+    thereforefeatures of human beliefs and action which are difficult to
+    predict
+
+Page 209:
+
+    mechanically. One can interpret this in the spirit of
+    methodologicalindividualism at the expense of conceding that
+    individuals are, in this regard,importantly unpredictable. On the one
+    hand, this does not look good for theexplanatory claims of the theory.
+    On the other hand, to render theindividuals predictable, it seems that
+    they must be given a shared history andthis will only raise the
+    methodological concern again of whether we canaccount for this sharing
+    satisfactorily without a changed ontology. Insummary, if individuals
+    are afforded a shared history, then social context is‘behind’ no one
+    and ‘in’ everyone and then the question is whether it is agood idea to
+    analyse behaviour by assuming (as methodological individualistsdo) the
+    separability of context and action.4
+
+Page 213:
+
+    The underlying point here is that discrimination may be
+    evolutionarystable if the dominated cannot find ways of challenging the
+    social conventionthat supports their subjugation. This conclusion is
+    not necessarily rightbecause there are other potential sources of
+    change. The insight that we preferto draw is that individual attempts
+    to buck an established convention areunlikely to succeed, whereas the
+    same is not true when individuals takecollective action.
+
+Page 213:
+
+    Stasis, status quo: Thus the introduction of a convention will benefit
+    the average person, butif you happen to be so placed with respect to
+    the convention that you onlyplay the dominant role with a probability
+    of less than 1/3, then you would bebetter off without the convention.
+    This result may seem puzzling at first: whydo the people who play a
+    dominant role less than 1/3 of the time not revert tothe symmetric play
+    of the game and so undermine the convention? The answeris that even
+    though the individual would be better off if everyone quit
+    theconvention, it does not make sense to do so individually. After all,
+    aconvention will tell your opponent to play either H or D, and then
+    instruct youto play D or H respectively; and you can do no better than
+    follow thisconvention since the best reply to H remains D and likewise
+    the best reply toD is H. It is just tough luck if you happen to get the
+    D instruction all thetime!We take the force of this individual
+    calculation to be a powerful contributorto the status quo and it might
+    seem to reveal that evolutionary processes yieldto stasis.
+
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+
+    Conventions, inequality and revolt
+
+Page 214:
+
+    To summarise, we should expect a convention to emerge even though itmay
+    not suit everyone, or indeed even if it short-changes the majority. It
+    maybe discriminatory, inequitable, non-rational, indeed thoroughly
+    disagreeable, yetsome such convention is likely to arise whenever a
+    social interaction like hawk-dove is repeated. Which convention emerges
+    will depend on the sharedsalience of extraneous features of the
+    interaction, initial beliefs and the waythat people learn.
+
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+
+    Standstill: A potential weakness of evolutionary game theory has just
+    becomeapparent. Once the bandwagon has come to a standstill, and one
+    conventionhas been selected, the theory cannot account for a potential
+    subversion of theestablished convention. Such an account would require,
+    as we argued in theprevious paragraph, an understanding of political
+    (that is, collective) actionbased on a more active form of human agency
+    than the one provided byinstrumental rationality. Can evolutionary game
+    theory go as far?
+
+Page 219:
+
+    Recall the idea of a trembling hand in section 2.7.1 and suppose
+    thatplayers make mistakes sometimes. In particular, when they intend
+    tocooperate they occasionally execute the decision wrongly and they
+    defect. Inthese circumstances, playing t punishes you for the mistake
+    endlessly becauseit means that your opponent defects next round in
+    response to your mistakendefection. If in the next period you
+    cooperate, you are bound to get zapped.If you follow your t-strategy
+    next time, then you will be defecting while youropponent will be
+    cooperating and a frustrating sequence of alternatingdefections and
+    cooperations will ensue. One way out of this bind is toamend t to t’
+    whereby, if you defect by mistake, then you cooperate twiceafterwards:
+    the first time as a gesture of acknowledging your mistake and thesecond
+    in order to coordinate your cooperative behaviour with that of
+    youropponent. In other words, the amended tit-for-tat instructs you to
+    cooperatein response to a defection which has been provoked by an
+    earlier mistakendefection on your part.
+
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+
+    Eventhough strategy C would do equally well as a reply to t’, if your
+    opponentmade the mistake (last period) then you know that your opponent
+    willcooperate in the next two rounds no matter what you do this period.
+    Thusyour best response in this round is to defect
+
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+
+    Conventions as covert social power
+
+Page 221:
+
+    even more covert power that comes from being able to mould the
+    preferencesand the beliefs of others so that a conflict of interest is
+    not even latentlypresent.
+
+Page 221:
+
+    with the interests of another.It is common in discussions of power to
+    distinguish between the overt andthe covert exercise of power. Thus,
+    for instance, Lukes (1974) distinguishesthree dimensions of power.
+    There is the power that is exercised in the politicalor the economic
+    arena where individuals, or firms, institutions, etc., are able
+    tosecure decisions which favour their interests over others quite
+    overtly. This isthe overt exercise of power along the first dimension.
+    In addition, there is themore covert power that comes from keeping
+    certain items off the politicalagenda. Some things simply do not get
+    discussed in the political arena and inthis way the status quo
+    persists. Yet the status quo advantages some rather thanothers and so
+    this privileging of the status quo by keeping certain issues offthe
+    political agenda is the second dimension of power. Finally, there is
+    the
+
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+
+    The figure of Spartacus captured imaginations over theages, not so much
+    because of his military antics, but because he personifiedthe
+    possibility of liberating the slaves from the beliefs which sustained
+    theirsubjugation.
+
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+
+    this is the power which works through the mind and which dependsfor its
+    influence on the involvement or agreement of large numbers of
+    thepopulation (again connecting with the earlier observation about the
+    force ofcollective action).
+
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+
+    State were consciously to select a convention in these circumstances
+    thenwe might observe the kind of political haggling associated with the
+    overtexercise of power. Naturally when a convention emerges
+    spontaneously, we donot observe this because there is no arena for the
+    haggling to occur, yet theemergence of a convention is no less decisive
+    than a conscious politicalresolution in resolving the conflict of
+    interest.6Evolutionary game theory also helps reveal the part played by
+    beliefs,especially the beliefs of the subordinate group, in securing
+    the power of thedominant group (a point, for example, which is central
+    to Gramsci’s notion ofhegemony and Hart’s contention that the power of
+    the law requires voluntarycooperation).
+
+Page 224:
+
+    Theannexing of virtue can happen as a result of well-recognised
+    patterns ofcognition.
+
+Page 224:
+
+    Of course, like all theories of cognitive dissonance removal,this story
+    begs the question of whether the adjustment of beliefs can do thetrick
+    once one knows that the beliefs have been adjusted for the
+    purpose.Nevertheless, there seem to be plenty of examples of dissonance
+    removal
+
+Page 225:
+
+    Our final illustration of how evolutionary game theory might help
+    sharpenour understanding of debates around power in the social sciences
+    relates tothe question of how gender and race power distributions are
+    constitutedand persist. The persistence of these power imbalances is a
+    puzzle to some.
+
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+
+    Once a convention isestablished in this game, a set of property
+    relations are also established.Hence the convention could encode a set
+    of class relations for this gamebecause it will, in effect, indicate
+    who owns what and some may end upowning rather a lot when others own
+    scarcely anything. However, as wehave seen a convention of this sort
+    will only emerge once the game isplayed asymmetrically and this
+    requires an appeal to some piece ofextraneous information like sex or
+    age or race, etc. In short, the creationof private property relations
+    from the repeated play of these gamesdepends on the use of some other
+    asymmetry and so it is actuallyimpossible to imagine a situation of
+    pure class relations, as they couldnever emerge from an evolutionary
+    historical process. Or to put thisslightly differently: asymmetries
+    always go in twos!This understanding of the relation has further
+    interesting implications.For instance, an attack on gender
+    stratification is in part an attack on classstratification and vice
+    versa.
+
+Page 227:
+
+    Likewise, however, it would be wrong toimagine that the attack on
+    either if successful would spell the end of theother.
+
+Page 227:
+
+    On this account of powerthrough the working of convention, the
+    ideological battle aimed atpersuading people not to think of themselves
+    as subordinate is half thebattle because these beliefs are part of the
+    way that power is mobilised.
+
+Page 228:
+
+    . The feedback mechanism, however, ispresent in this analysis and it
+    arises because there is ‘learning’. It is theassumption that people
+    shift towards practices which secure better outcomes(without knowing
+    quite why the practice works for the best) which is thefeedback
+    mechanism responsible for selecting the practices. Thus in the
+    debateover functional explanation, the analysis of evolutionary games
+    lends supportto van Parijs’s (1982) argument that ‘learning’ might
+    supply the generalfeedback mechanism for the social sciences which will
+    license functionalexplanations in exactly the same way as natural
+    selection does in the biologicalsciences.
+
+Page 228:
+
+    effect, the explanation of gender and racial inequalities using
+    thisevolutionary model is an example of functional argument.
+
+Page 228:
+
+    The differencebetween men and women or between whites and blacks has no
+    merit inthe sense that it does not explain why the differentiation
+    persists. Thedifferentiation has the unintended consequence of helping
+    the populationto coordinate its decision making in settings where there
+    are benefitsfrom coordination. It is this function of helping the
+    population to selectan equilibrium in a situation which would otherwise
+    suffer from theconfusion of multiple equilibria which explains the
+    persistence of thedifferentiation.
+
+Page 229:
+
+    So far, however, the difference between the two camps (H&EVGT andMarx)
+    is purely based on value judgements: one argues that illusory moralsare
+    good for all, the other that they are not. In this sense, both
+    canprofitably make use of the analysis in evolutionary game theory.
+    Indeed, aswe have already implied in section 7.3.4, a radical political
+    project grounded
+
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+
+    On the side of H&EVGT, Hume thinks that suchillusions play a positive
+    role (in providing the ‘cement’ which keeps societytogether) in
+    relation to the common good. So do neo-Humeans (like Sugden)who are, of
+    course, less confident that invocation of the ‘common good’ is agood
+    idea (as we mentioned in section 7.6.2) but who are still happy to
+    seeconventions (because of the order they bring) become entrenched in
+    sociallife even if this is achieved with the help of a few moral
+    ‘illusions’. On theother side, however, Marx insists that moral
+    illusions are never a good idea(indeed he dislikes all illusions).
+    Especially since, as he sees it, their socialfunction is to help some
+    dreadful conventions survive (recall how in section7.3.4 we showed that
+    disagreeable conventions may become stable even ifthey are detrimental
+    to the majority). Marx believed that we can
+
+Page 229:
+
+    which sound quite like observations that Marxists might make:
+    theimportance of taking collective action if one wants to change a
+    convention;how power can be covertly exercised; how beliefs
+    (particularly moral beliefs)may become endogenous to the conventions we
+    follow; how propertyrelations might develop functionally; and so on.
+
+Page 229:
+
+    Indeedmost of the ideas developed on the basis of H&EVGT in the
+    precedingpages would find Marx in agreement.
+
+Page 229:
+
+    People may think that their beliefson such matters go beyond material
+    values (i.e. self-interest, which in ourcontext means pay-offs); that
+    they respond to certain universal ideals aboutwhat is ‘good’ and
+    ‘right’, when all along their moral beliefs are a direct(even if
+    unpredictable) repercussion of material conditions and interests.
+
+Page 230:
+
+    An analysis of hawk—dove games, along the lines of H&EVGT, helpsexplain
+    the evolution of property rights in primitive societies. Once
+    theserights are in place and social production is under way, each group
+    in society(e.g. the owners of productive means, or those who do not own
+    tools, land,machines, etc.) develops its own interest. And since (as
+    H&EVGT concurs)conventions evolve in response to such interests, it is
+    not surprising thatdifferent conventions are generated within different
+    social groups in responseto the different interests. The result is
+    conflicting sets of conventions which
+
+Page 230:
+
+    Finally, the established (stable) conventions acquire moral weight and
+    even leadpeople to believe in something called the common good—which is
+    most likelyanother illusion
+
+Page 230:
+
+    In summary, H&EVGTbegins with a behavioural theory based on the
+    individual interest and eventuallylands on its agreeable by-product:
+    the species interest. There is nothing inbetween the two types of
+    interest. By contrast, Marx posits another type ofinterest in between:
+    class interest.Marx’s argument is that humans are very different from
+    other speciesbecause we produce commodities in an organised way before
+    distributingthem. Whereas other species share the fruits of nature
+    (hawk—dove games aretherefore ‘naturally’ pertinent in their state of
+    nature), humans have developedcomplex social mechanisms for producing
+    goods. Naturally, the norms ofdistribution come to depend on the
+    structure of these productive mechanisms.They involve a division of
+    labour and lead to social divisions (classes). Whichclass a person
+    belongs to depends on his or her location (relative to others)within
+    the process of production. The moment collective production (as in
+    thecase of Cephu and his tribe in Chapter 5) gave its place to a
+    separationbetween those who owned the tools of production and those who
+    workedthose tools, then groups with significantly different (and often
+    contradictory)interests developed.
+
+Page 230:
+
+    in collective action is as compatible with evolutionary game theory as
+    is theneo-Humeanism of Sugden (1986, 1989). But is there something more
+    inMarx than a left wing interpretation of evolutionary game theory? We
+    thinkthere is.
+
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+
+    lead to conflicting morals. Each set of morals becomes an ideology.9
+    Which setof morals (or ideology) prevails at any given time? Marx
+    thinks that, inevitably,the social class which is dominant in the
+    sphere of production and distributionwill also be the one whose set of
+    conventions and morals (i.e. whose ideology)will come to dominate over
+    society as a whole.To sum up Marx’s argument so far, prevailing moral
+    beliefs are illusoryproducts of a social selection process where the
+    driving force is not somesubjective individual interest but objective
+    class interest rooted in thetechnology and relations of production.
+    Although there are many conflictingnorms and morals, at any particular
+    time the morality of the ruling class isuniquely evolutionary stable.
+    The mélange of legislation, moral codes, norms,etc., reflects this
+    dominant ideology.But is there a fundamental difference between the
+    method of H&EVGTand Marx? Or is it just a matter of introducing classes
+    in the analysiswithout changing the method?
+
+Page 231:
+
+    So, how would Marx respond to evolutionary game theory if he werearound
+    today? He would, we think, be very interested in some of the
+    radicalconclusions in this chapter. However, he would also speak
+    derisively of thematerialism of H&EVGT Marx habitually poured scorn on
+    those (e.g.Spinoza and Feuerbach) who transplanted models from the
+    natural sciencesto the social sciences with little or no modification
+    to allow for the fact thathuman beings are very different to atoms,
+    planets and molecules.12 Wemention this because at the heart of H&EVGT
+    lies a simple Darwinianmechanism (witness that there is no analytical
+    difference between the modelsin the biology of John Maynard Smith and
+    the models in this chapter). Marxwould probably claim that the theory
+    is not sufficiently evolutionary because(a) its mechanism comes to a
+    standstill once a stable convention has evolved,and (b) of its reliance
+    on instrumental rationality which reduces humanactions to passive
+    reflex responses to some (meta-physical) self-interest.
+
+Page 232:
+
+    Especially in hisphilosophical (as opposed to economic) works, Marx
+    argued strongly for anevolutionary (or more precisely historical)
+    theory of society with a modelof human agency which retains human
+    activity as a positive (creative) forceat its core. In addition, Marx
+    often spoke out against mechanism; againstmodels borrowed directly from
+    the natural sciences (astronomy andbiology are two examples that he
+    warned against). It is helpful to preservesuch an aversion since humans
+    are ontologically different to atoms andgenes. Of course Marx himself
+    has been accused of mechanism and,indeed, in the modern (primarily
+    Anglo-Saxon) social theory literature he istaken to be an exemplar of
+    19th century mechanism. Nevertheless hewould deny this, pointing to the
+    dialectical method he borrowed fromHegel and which (he would claim)
+    allowed him to have a scientific, yetnon-mechanistic, outlook. Do we
+    believe him? As authors we disagree here.SHH does not, while YV does.
+
+Page 232:
+
+    Of course there is always the answer that self-interest feeds into
+    moral beliefsand then moral beliefs feed back into self-interest and
+    alter people’s desires.And so on. But that would be too circular for
+    Marx. It would not explainwhere the process started and where it is
+    going. By contrast, his version ofmaterialism (which he labelled
+    historical materialism) starts from thetechnology of production and the
+    corresponding social organisation. Thelatter entails social classes
+    which in turn imbue people with interests; peopleact on those interests
+    and, mostly without knowing it, they shape theconventions of social
+    life which then give rise to morals. The process,however, is grounded
+    on the technology of production at the beginning of thechain. And as
+    this changes (through technological innovations) it provides theimpetus
+    for the destabilisation of the (temporarily) evolutionary
+    stableconventions at the other end of the chain.
+
+Page 232:
+
+    Ifmorals are socially manufactured, then so is self-interest.
+
+Page 233:
+
+    Perhaps our disagreement needs to be understood in terms of thelack of
+    a shared history in relation to these debates—one of us embarkingfrom
+    an Anglo-Saxon, the other from a (south) European, tradition. It
+    was,after all, one of our important points in earlier chapters that
+    game theoristsshould not expect a convergence of beliefs unless agents
+    have a sharedhistory!
+
+Page 234:
+
+    most of the population. This would seem to provide ammunition for the
+    socialconstructivists, but of course it depends on them believing that
+    collectiveaction agencies like the State will have sufficient
+    information to distinguish thesuperior outcomes. Perhaps all that can
+    be said on this matter is that, if youreally believe that evolutionary
+    forces will do the best that is possible, then it isbeyond dispute that
+    these forces have thrown up people who are predisposedto take
+    collective action. Thus it might be argued that our
+    evolutionarysuperiority as a species derives in part precisely from the
+    fact that we are pro-active through collective action agencies rather
+    than reactive as we would beunder a simple evolutionary scheme.
+
+Page 234:
+
+    Turning to another dispute, that between social constructivism and
+    spontaneousorder within liberal political theory, two clarifications
+    have occurred. The first isthat there can be no presumption that a
+    spontaneous order will deliveroutcomes which make everyone better off,
+    or even outcomes which favour
+
+Page 234:
+
+    Thesetheoretical moves will threaten to dissolve the distinction
+    between action andstructure which lies at the heart of the game
+    theoretical depiction of social lifebecause it will mean that the
+    structure begins to supply reasons for action andnot just constraints
+    upon action. On the optimistic side, this might be seen asjust another
+    example of how discussions around game theory help to dissolvesome of
+    the binary oppositions which have plagued some debates in
+    socialscience—just as it helped dissolve the opposition between gender
+    and classearlier in this chapter. However, our concern here is not to
+    point to requiredchanges in ontology of a particular sort. The point is
+    that some change isnecessary, and that it is likely to threaten the
+    basic approach of game theory tosocial life.
+
+Page 234:
+
+    Secondly, on the difficult cases where equilibrium selection
+    involveschoices over whose interests are to be favoured (i.e. it is not
+    a matter ofselecting the equilibrium which is better for everyone),
+    then it is notobvious that a collective action agency like the State is
+    any better placed tomake this decision than a process of spontaneous
+    order. This may come asa surprise, since we have spent most of our time
+    here focusing on theindeterminacy of evolutionary games when agents are
+    only weaklyinstrumentally rational.
+
+Page 235:
+
+    In other words the very debate within liberal political theory over
+    socialconstructivism versus spontaneous order is itself unable to come
+    to aresolution precisely because its shared ontological foundations are
+    inadequatefor the task of social explanation. In short, we conclude
+    that not only willgame theory have to embrace some expanded form of
+    individual agency, if itis to be capable of explaining many social
+    interactions, but also that this isnecessary if it is to be useful to
+    the liberal debate over the scope of theState.
+
+Page 237:
+
+    sabotage
+
+Page 238:
+
+    What it does mean is thatour interpretation of results must be cautious
+    and that, ultimately,laboratory experiments may only be telling us how
+    people behave inlaboratories.
+
+Page 241:
+
+    becausethere are some players who are unconditionally cooperative or
+    ‘altruistic’ in theway that they play this game and, secondly, because
+    whether someone iscooperative or not seems to be determined by one’s
+    background, rather thanby how clever (or rational) he or she is (see
+    adjacent box on the curse ofeconomics). In this sense, the evidence
+    seems to point to a falsification of theassumption of instrumentally
+    rational action based on the pay-offs
+
+Page 242:
+
+    divisions of an army are stationed on two hill-tops overlooking a
+    valley inwhich an enemy division can be clearly seen. It is known that
+    if both divisionsattack simultaneously they will capture the enemy with
+    none, or very little, lossof life. However, there were no prior plans
+    to launch such an attack, as it wasnot anticipated that the enemy would
+    be spotted in that location. How will thetwo divisions coordinate their
+    attack (we assume that they must maintain visualand radio silence)?
+    Neither commanding officer will launch an attack unless heis sure that
+    the other will attack at the same time. Thus a classic
+    coordinationproblem emerges.Imagine now that a messenger can be sent
+    but that it will take him about anhour to convey the message. However,
+    it is also possible that he will be caughtby the enemy in the meantime.
+    If everything goes smoothly and the messengergets safely from one
+    hill-top to another, is this enough for a coordinated attackto be
+    launched? Suppose the message sent by the first commanding officer
+    tothe second read: ‘Let’s attack at dawn!’ Will the second officer
+    attack at dawn?No, unless he is confident that the first commanding
+    officer (who sent the
+
+Page 242:
+
+    message) knows that the message has been received. So, the
+    secondcommanding officer sends the messenger back to the first with the
+    message:‘Message received. Dawn it is!’ Will the second officer attack
+    now? Not untilhe knows that the messenger has delivered his message.
+    Paradoxically, noamount of messages will do the trick since
+    confirmation of receipt of the lastmessage will be necessary regardless
+    of how many messages have been alreadyreceived.
+
+Page 242:
+
+    We see that in a coordination game like the above, even a very
+    highdegree of common knowledge of the plan to attack at dawn is not
+    enough toguarantee coordination (see Box 8.3 for an example of how
+    different degreesof common knowledge can be engendered in the
+    laboratory). What is needed(at least in theory) is a consistent
+    alignment of beliefs (CAB) about the plan.1And yet this does not
+    exclude the possibility that the two commandingofficers will both
+    attack at dawn with very high probability. How successfullythey
+    coordinate will, however, depend on more than a high degree ofcommon
+    knowledge. Indeed the latter may even be un-necessary providedthe time
+    of the attack is carefully chosen. The classic early experiments
+    byThomas Schelling on behaviour in coordination games have confirmed
+    this—
+
+Page 246:
+
+    Thus in experiments, Pareto superiority does not seem to be a
+    generalcriterion which players use to select between Nash equilibria
+    (see also Chapter7). In conclusion, so far it seems that the way people
+    actually play these gamesis neither directly controlled by the
+    strategic aspects of the game (i.e. thelocation of the best response
+    marks (+) and (-) in the matrix) nor by the size ofthe return from
+    coordinating on non-Nash outcomes such as (R3, C3): it is
+    aso-far-unexplained mixture of the two factors that decides.
+
+Page 251:
+
+    To phrase this conclusion slightly differently, but in a way which
+    connectswith the results in the next section, bargaining is a ‘complex
+    socialphenomenon’ where people take cues from aspects of their social
+    life whichgame theory typically overlooks. Thus players seem to base
+    their behaviouron aspects of the social interaction which game theory
+    typically treats asextraneous; and when players share these extraneous
+    reference points such
+
+Page 258:
+
+    What we have here is an evolution ofsocial roles. Players with the R
+    label develop a different attitude towardsreflective cooperation to
+    those players with the C role in spite of the fact that theRs and the
+    Cs are the same people. In other words, the signal which causes
+    theobserved pattern of cooperation seems to be emitted by the label R
+    or C. Thisreminds us of the discussion in Chapter 7 about the capacity
+    of sex, race andother extraneous features to pin down a convention on
+    which the structure ofdiscrimination is grounded.
+
+Page 258:
+
+    Experimentation with game theory is good, clean fun. Can it be more
+    thanthat? Can it offer a way out of the obtuse debates on CKR, CAB,
+    NEMS,Nash backward induction, out-of-equilibrium behaviour, etc.? The
+    answerdepends on how we interpret the results. And as interpretation
+    leaves plentyof room for controversy, we should not expect the data
+    from the laboratoryunequivocally to settle any disputes. Our suspicion
+    is that experiments are togame theory what the latter is to liberal
+    individualism: a brilliant means ofcodifying its problems and of
+    creating a taxonomy of time-honoureddebates.There are, however,
+    important benefits from experimenting. Watchingpeople play games
+    reminds us of their inherent unpredictability, their sense offairness,
+    their complex motivation—of all those things that we tend to forgetwhen
+    we model humans as bundles of preferences moving around some pay-
+
+Page 258:
+
+    radical breakwith the exclusive reliance of instrumental rationality is
+    also necessary.
+
+Page 260:
+
+    At root we suspect that the major problem is the one that the
+    experimentsin the last chapter isolate: namely, that people appear to
+    be more complexlymotivated than game theory’s instrumental model allows
+    and that a part ofthat greater complexity comes from their social
+    location.We do not regard this as a negative conclusion. Quite the
+    contrary, it standsas a challenge to the type of methodological
+    individualism which has had afree rein in the development of game
+    theory.
+
+Page 260:
+
+    Along the way to this conclusion, we hope also that you have had
+    fun.Prisoners’ dilemmas and centipedes are great party tricks. They are
+    easy todemonstrate and they are amenable to solutions which are
+    paradoxical enoughto stimulate controversy and, with one leap of the
+    liberal imagination, theaudience can be astounded by the thought that
+    the fabric of society (even theexistence of the State) reduces to these
+    seemingly trivial games—Fun andGames, as the title of Binmore’s (1992)
+    text on game theory neatly puts it. Butthere is a serious side to all
+    this. Game theory is, indeed, well placed toexamine the arguments in
+    liberal political theory over the origin and the scopeof agencies for
+    social choice like the State. In this context, the problems whichwe
+    have identified with game theory resurface as timely warnings of
+    thedifficulties any society is liable to face if it thinks of itself
+    only in terms ofliberal individualism.
+
+Page 260:
+
+    The ambitious claim that game theory will provide a unified foundation
+    for allsocial science seems misplaced to