From 4749d3c713c7e3ff796a30613b263777f84e12b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Silvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net>
Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 21:45:15 -0300
Subject: Adds @cesarino2022, @allende2022 and @geoghegan2023

---
 anthropology.bib |  9 +++++++++
 information.bib  | 12 ++++++++++++
 politics.bib     | 11 +++++++++++
 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+)

diff --git a/anthropology.bib b/anthropology.bib
index a01c06a..bab196d 100644
--- a/anthropology.bib
+++ b/anthropology.bib
@@ -316,3 +316,12 @@
   volume    = "",
   url       = "",
 }
+
+@book{cesarino2022,
+  title     = "O mundo do avesso - verdade e política na era digital",
+  author    = "Letícia Cesarino",
+  year      = "2022",
+  publisher = "Ubu Editora",
+  series    = "Coleção Exit",
+  isbn      = "978-85-7126-088-7",
+}
diff --git a/information.bib b/information.bib
index 6a23dbb..863ab0d 100644
--- a/information.bib
+++ b/information.bib
@@ -326,3 +326,15 @@
   volume    = "",
   url       = "",
 }
+
+@book{geoghegan2023,
+  title     = "Code: From Information Theory to French Theory",
+  author    = "Geoghegan, Bernard Dionysius",
+  year      = "2023",
+  publisher = "Duke University Press",
+  isbn      = "147801900X,9781478019008",
+  series    = "Sign, Storage, Transmission",
+  edition   = "",
+  volume    = "",
+  url       = "",
+}
diff --git a/politics.bib b/politics.bib
index 2b7b999..b85af1a 100644
--- a/politics.bib
+++ b/politics.bib
@@ -2048,3 +2048,14 @@
   url       = {http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013488561}
   abstract  = {This article systematically assesses whether open political competition ends the coup trap. We use an original data set of coup reports, electoral competition, and socioeconomic data spanning the 20th century in 18 Latin American countries. Our models, which are robust to multiple-comparison tests, generate support for a central claim: While recent experience with military coups increases the risk of incumbents being overthrown, the establishment of open political competition ends cycles of political instability. The risk of being overthrown consequently declines with time for presidents in noncompetitive systems, but remains stable—and, on average, substantially lower—in competitive polities. Coups do not vary with levels of development or of inequality, economic growth rates, or the legislative powers of the presidency.},
 }
+
+@article{allende2022,
+  title      = {A revolução desarmada: discursos de Salvador Allende},
+  author     = {Salvador Allende and Gabriel Boric Font and Rodrigo Karmy},
+  translator = {Emerson Silva},
+  organizer  = {Vladimir Safatle},
+  year       = {2022},
+  publisher  = {Ubu Editora}.
+  series     = {Coleção Explosante},
+  isbn       = {978-85-7126-076-4},
+}
-- 
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