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| -rwxr-xr-x | epistemology.bib | 19 | ||||
| -rwxr-xr-x | politics.bib | 14 |
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diff --git a/epistemology.bib b/epistemology.bib index 6122cf1..740b20f 100755 --- a/epistemology.bib +++ b/epistemology.bib @@ -120,3 +120,22 @@ publisher = {Unesp}, edition = {1a}, } + +@misc{cocco2020, + month = {November}, + title = {The ontology of a theory}, + author = {Lorenzo Cocco}, + year = {2020}, + keywords = {Ontology; ontological commitment; regimentation program; constructional systems; extensionalism; postulation;}, + url = {http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18411/}, + abstract = {This paper defends two claims about the criterion of commitment of W.V.O Quine. The first claim is that the criterion can be made extensional. The second is that a proper formulation becomes an analytic truth. We spend a few preliminary sections clarifying our intended notion of ontological commitment. We will not go very far in our investigation of the criterion if we do not distinguish (1) the things a theory postulates, (2) what its adherents, or anybody else, believe in, and (3) which of these entities we have compelling reasons to accept. A look at [Quine 1953] shows that the criterion concerned the postulation of entities by theories, but it is often misread as an attempt to say something about either (2) or (3). The core of the paper is an exposition of two formulations of the criterion. I first state a schema improving on that of [Scheffler and Chomsky 1959]. The second formulation is a single principle and construes commitment as a relation between theories and predicates: ontological commitment to the entities that satisfy a given predicate. Both criteria are extensional and are formulated for constructional systems, in the sense of [Carnap 1928] and [Goodman 1951], rather than for theories construed as interpreted sets of sentences. This solves a problem raised by [Halvorson 2019]. Their analyticity is substantiated by showing that their most controversial consequences are instances of Tarski?s Convention (T).} +} + +@article{wildman2006, + title = {An Introduction to Relational Ontology}, + author = {Wesley J. Wildman}, + publisher = {Boston University}, + year = {2006}, + month = {5}, + url = {http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/images/docs/(72)%202010%20-%20Wildman%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Relational%20Ontology%20(final%20author%20version)%20-%20Polkinghorne%20ed.pdf}, +} diff --git a/politics.bib b/politics.bib index 5795189..9519047 100755 --- a/politics.bib +++ b/politics.bib @@ -471,3 +471,17 @@ edition = {}, volume = {}, } + +@article{rosenthal2019, + author = {Irena Rosenthal}, + title = {Ontology and political theory: A critical encounter between Rawls and Foucault}, + journal = {European Journal of Political Theory}, + volume = {18}, + number = {2}, + pages = {238-258}, + year = {2019}, + doi = {10.1177/1474885116659633}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885116659633}, + eprint = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885116659633}, + abstract = {Contemporary political thought is deeply divided about the role of ontology in political thinking. Famously, political liberal John Rawls has argued that ontological claims are best to be avoided in political thought. In recent years, however, a number of theorists have claimed that ontology is essential to political philosophy. According to the contributors to this ‘ontological turn’, ontological investigations may foster the politicisation of hegemonic political theories and can highlight new possibilities for political life. This essay aims to contribute to the debate about ontology in political philosophy by arguing that a compelling case for ontology can also be made in light of Rawls’ political liberalism itself, in particular, by taking seriously Rawls’ commitment to the politicisation of justice and the task of orientation of political philosophy. To make this case, the paper brings Rawls' perspective in conversation with the critical methodology and the ontology of agonism and reflections on parrhesia or frank truth-telling of Michel Foucault.} +} |