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authorSilvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net>2023-02-17 05:04:00 -0300
committerSilvio Rhatto <rhatto@riseup.net>2023-02-17 05:04:00 -0300
commitdd337116c5ae4952ef3b39e05cca49507cebc546 (patch)
tree46dfedf8c93ce96380cd6d0398434197addc2c82
parent7645d455d3658e66e64a60e64dca05ffb72ad73c (diff)
downloadbiblio-dd337116c5ae4952ef3b39e05cca49507cebc546.tar.gz
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Minor fixes
-rw-r--r--politics.bib4
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/politics.bib b/politics.bib
index b85af1a..e472c5b 100644
--- a/politics.bib
+++ b/politics.bib
@@ -2045,7 +2045,7 @@
volume = {47},
issue = {8},
pages = {1105--1129},
- url = {http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013488561}
+ url = {http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013488561},
abstract = {This article systematically assesses whether open political competition ends the coup trap. We use an original data set of coup reports, electoral competition, and socioeconomic data spanning the 20th century in 18 Latin American countries. Our models, which are robust to multiple-comparison tests, generate support for a central claim: While recent experience with military coups increases the risk of incumbents being overthrown, the establishment of open political competition ends cycles of political instability. The risk of being overthrown consequently declines with time for presidents in noncompetitive systems, but remains stable—and, on average, substantially lower—in competitive polities. Coups do not vary with levels of development or of inequality, economic growth rates, or the legislative powers of the presidency.},
}
@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@
translator = {Emerson Silva},
organizer = {Vladimir Safatle},
year = {2022},
- publisher = {Ubu Editora}.
+ publisher = {Ubu Editora},
series = {Coleção Explosante},
isbn = {978-85-7126-076-4},
}